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


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A HISTORY OF JAPAN.

A HISTORY OF JAPAN

VOL. I.

FROM THE ORIGINS

TO THE

ARRIVAL OF THE PORTUGUESE IN 1542 A.D.

BY

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WITH MAPS BY ISOH YAMAGATA.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER	1
I.—PROTOHISTORIC JAPAN (CHINESE AND KOREAN SOURCES)	31
II.—LEGENDARY JAPAN (JAPANESE SOURCES) .	53
III.—OLD YAMATO (400 A.D. TO 550 A.D.) . .	77
IV.—OLD YAMATO. FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF BUDDHISM TO THE GREAT COUP D'ÉTAT (550 TO 645 A.D.)	105
V.—THE GREAT REFORM OF 645	142
VI.—FROM TENCHI TO KWAMMU (662 TO 782 A.D.)	181
VII.—THE EMPEROR KWAMMU (782 TO 805 A.D.)	206
VIII.—THE LEARNED EMPERORS (806 TO 850 A.D.)	226
IX.—THE GREAT HOUSE OF FUJIWARA	235
X.—THE CLOISTERED EMPERORS	274
XI.—THE GREATNESS OF THE TAIRA	292
XII.—THE FALL OF THE TAIRA (YOSHINAKA AND YOSHITSUNE)	336
XIII.—YORITOMO AND HIS WORK	374


CHAPTER	PAGE
XIV.—THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU (1200 TO 1225 A.D.)	413
XV.—THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU (1225 TO 1260 A.D.)	455
XVI.—THE MONGOL INVASIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES	491
XVII.—THE FALL OF THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU .	533
XVIII.—THE ATTEMPT TO RESTORE THE OLD CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT	546
XIX.—THE GREAT SUCCESSION WARS (1337 TO 1392)	562
XX.—ASHIKAGA FEUDALISM	589

LIST OF MAPS.

	PAGE
MAP OF ANCIENT KOREA	33
MAP ILLUSTRATING SUBJUGATION OF NORTH JAPAN	269
KYOTO AND ENVIRONS	328
MAP ILLUSTRATING THE MONGOL INVASION . . .	508
MAP SHOWING THE RIVALRY BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH COURTS	564
FEUDAL MAP OF JAPAN (1467-87)	616
FEUDAL MAP OF JAPAN (16TH CENTURY) . . .	630

HISTORY OF JAPAN

FROM THE ORIGINS DOWN TO THE APPEARANCE
OF THE PORTUGUESE IN 1542 A.D.



INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

THE last half-century has witnessed three great constructive efforts in the field of practical politics. Two of these—the Unification of Italy and the Reconstruction of Germany—have been accomplished among peoples constituting an integral part of the Aryan stock and of the Comity of Modern Christendom. Hence, pregnant with momentous consequences as they have been, and will continue to be, it is not especially difficult for an American or an Englishman to seize their import,—to understand the ideas in the minds of Cavour and Bismarck and their coadjutors, to appreciate the motives by which they were actuated, the ideals by which they were inspired, and the means they adopted to enable them to march triumphantly forward to the realisation of their projects.

The third of the three great movements alluded to, stands on an entirely different plane. It accomplished itself among a non-Aryan people, a people who made its first acquaintance with Christianity only three hundred and fifty years ago, and, after a brief experience of the political effects of the foreign cult, sternly proscribed it within the national bounds. To this people, most of what is considered to be most distinctive in the common heritage of Western Culture was utterly alien. In some cases it was positively repellent, for the base of the social structure in Japan was by no means identical with that of the West. With us, thanks greatly to the Roman Law, the social unit is the individual; in Japan from time immemorial it has been the family. Hence for our intense individualism the islanders of the Far East could have, and had, but little sympathy. Their art canons were not those of peoples that drew their

inspiration from ancient Hellas; the concepts of their philosophy and of ours seemed to lie in entirely different fields; their ideas of poetry were such that the highest fetches of the European muse were meaningless to them, while not a few of the leading ideas in their literature, if they did not actually elude, at all events failed to excite, any emotion, except perhaps sheer amazement, in the mind of the European reader. When their thoughts were even as ours, the expression of them was cast in an entirely different mould. Everywhere the qualifying word, or phrase, or clause before what it modified, no relative pronoun, little or no personification, and as often as not predicates without subjects. And when it came to setting forth their thoughts on paper instead of using an alphabet and writing from left to right, they had recourse to logographs, eked out by a syllabary, and made the brush trace its characters in perpendicular lines, beginning at the right-hand top corner of the page and ending at the bottom of the left.

The sudden, the almost meteor-like rise of an Empire with such a strange and peculiar culture to the proud position of by no means the least among the Great Powers of the modern world is indeed a startling phenomenon. Startling at all events to those who have no intimate acquaintance with the past of the Japanese people. The present open-mouthed surprise of the West at the unexpected development in the North-East Pacific is mainly due to misconceptions of the import of the word civilisation. Many very worthy people seem to fancy that anything that is not strictly synonymous with European, or so-called Christian culture, cannot be regarded as civilisation. This arises from the circumstance that for several centuries the European people have not been in close contact with any great non-Aryan, non-Christian Power. But the domains of Haroun-al-Raschid were fully as civilised as those of Charlemagne eleven hundred years ago, while for generations the highly developed culture of the Mohammedan Power in the Iberian Peninsula continued to present a bright contrast to the barbarism, the coarseness, the superstition, and the mental stagnation of contemporary Western Christendom. These Semitic and non-Christian Empires could hardly be characterised as barbarian. With no more reason could Old Japan be described as such. At the end of the sixteenth century, under the great Taikō, Hideyoshi, it is abun-

dantly clear from the Letters of the Jesuits that the Island Empire was fully abreast, if not positively in advance, of contemporary Europe in all the essentials of cultured and civilised life. It is true that this Japanese culture was different in many important respects, and that the base it stood upon was different, to that of Europe. But it was, on that account, none the less a real culture,—as stable and as efficient. Then, before the middle of the seventeenth century, the islanders, for what they deemed to be good and sufficient reasons, thought fit to expel the Portuguese from their shores, and to seclude themselves behind barriers which only a few Dutchmen were allowed to approach; and for 216 years,—for full seven generations of mortal men,—all attempts by aliens to intrude upon this seclusion were sternly repulsed by the national authorities.

At the date of the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1637 Central Europe was being harried and devastated and depopled by the Thirty Years War—a struggle conducted with a ferocity and marked by horrors unparalleled in even the fiercest of Japanese wars. This welter of murder and rapine had still eleven years of its course to run; and then, before Europe had scarcely time to breathe, much less to recover herself, she had to face the disastrous series of contests provoked by the ambition of Louis XIV. Later came the war of the Austrian Succession, and then the terrible Seven Years War, costing the lives of some 850,000 men, and still a little later the various international armed debates involved in the American fight for independence. Lastly there were the cataclysmic wars of the French Republic and of Napoleon (1792-1815). During all this time Japan continued to enjoy the unspeakable blessings of profound and all but unruffled peace. Her government was at once despotic and repressive; but it is tolerably safe to maintain that the average individual of the unprivileged classes, constituting at least ninety per cent. of the population, enjoyed a greater measure of happiness than fell to the lot of the average unit in the proletariat of Europe down to 1789 at least.

The foregoing propositions are so obvious that the impatient reader may be tempted to dismiss them as so many mere commonplaces. But it not unfrequently happens that important truths get disregarded merely because they are commonplaces. On the other hand, it must be frankly admitted that the preceding statement of the situation is

only the obverse—possibly, indeed, only the reverse—of the coin.

During these two centuries (1637-1853) the energies of Europe were far from being absorbed by merely militant enterprises. At all times there had been a frank exchange of ideas between the philosophers and the scientific men of the various nationalities constituting the European Comity of Culture, and the advance in the knowledge of Nature and her great uniformities during these two centuries had been marvellous. Furthermore, in certain quarters of Europe, in Great Britain especially, there had been a steady accumulation of the resources—call it capital if you will,—that made the application of the discoveries to industrial processes not merely possible but highly profitable. It is only necessary to refer to the invention of the steam-engine and to the inventions that enabled England to prosecute her textile industries on the factory system. Before the Japanese had sundered all connection with Catholic Europe in 1637, the greatest European novelty with which they had become acquainted was perhaps the telescope. In 1853, Perry was able to present them with a miniature railway and rolling-stock and a telegraph-line; while behind his steam frigates with their powerful armaments, were dockyards, and foundries, and machine-shops and spinning-mills innumerable, together with all the countless appliances with which the patient workers in the physical and chemical laboratories were enriching the material civilisation of the *Namban* (Southern Barbarian) men. And meanwhile, during all this time, when these Southern Barbarians had been taking thought and adding cubits to their intellectual stature, Japan, to all seeming, had been somnolently stagnating in a circle of antiquated ideas.

To the more commonplace and vulgar-minded among the complements of Perry's squadron, the Japanese appeared but a barbarian people—quaint and picturesque and exceedingly polite barbarians perhaps, but barbarians notwithstanding. Doubtless Perry and the finer spirits among his officers and men did not fall into any such glaring misconception. Yet even to those, the defects of the civilisation of Old Japan must have been far more obvious than its qualities. For the defects were upon the surface,—plain and open, and apparent to the view. The real strength of the nation lay so deep that its existence was scarcely suspected. Then, before a small squad-

ron of five unarmoured American vessels, Japan lay powerless and helpless; exactly one short half-century later the Japanese navy was to win the greatest sea-fight of modern times,—the greatest sea-fight since Trafalgar. A single one of the units,—indeed a third-class unit—of the fleet commanded by Tōgō in the Battle of the Sea of Japan (1905) could have dealt very effectually with the entire American Expedition which forced Japan to open her doors in 1854. Forty years after Perry's summons, these quaint and picturesque barbarians were rudely to awaken that sleeping giant, the Chinese Empire, and to demonstrate to a hitherto incredulous, or rather credulous, Europe that, apart from its territorial extent, its teeming millions, and its gross inability to read the signs of the times, and to adapt itself to a rapidly changing environment, there was at that time nothing gigantic about it whatsoever. Then ten years later still these same quaint and picturesque barbarians were to more than hold their own on foreign soil against one of the strongest, if not the very strongest, among the military Powers of the world in one of the greatest wars of modern times.

Now, a nation with no real solid, albeit unapparent, because latent, strength in 1854, could never have achieved the brilliant and gigantic feats of 1894-5 and 1904-5. What then were the actual assets of Japan in 1854 ?

In the first place we must set down her population of some 30,000,000 souls,—a population considerably greater than that of either the United Kingdom or of the Great Republic at that time, and a population considerably more homogeneous than that of the British Isles, and very much more homogeneous than that of the United States of North America. Then, whatever may have been the inherent political weakness of the nation, the social organisation was emphatically sound and stable. Next there was a keen sense of honour and of conduct; not so keen indeed in certain matters on which the people of Christendom lay great stress; but keener in others, and on the broad general average, certainly as keen. Furthermore, although the Japanese had to all seeming been somnolently stagnating in a circle of antiquated ideas, the national intellect had been neither somnolent nor stagnant; on the contrary, it had been vigorously active, as it has been at all times, for mental stolidity is the last thing of which an intelligent Japanese could be or can be accused. In 1551 Xavier wrote: "These Japanese

are supremely curious,—eager to be instructed to the highest degree. . . . Their spirit of curiosity is such that they become importunate ; they ask questions and argue without knowing how to make an end of it ; eager to have an answer, and to communicate what they have learned to others. . . . I wrote to Father Rodriguez and, in his absence, to the Rector of the College of Coimbra to send to the (Japanese) Universities none but men tried and approved by your holy charity (*i.e.* Ignatius Loyola). They will be much more persecuted than they believe ; at all hours of the day and a part of the night they will be importuned by visits and questions ; they will be summoned to the more considerable houses, and no excuse taken for their not going there ; they will have no time either to pray or for meditation, or to recollect themselves ; at the beginning especially, no time to say a daily mass ; replying to questions will occupy them so much, that they will scarcely find time to recite the office, to eat, to sleep.” Thus Xavier, a very keen observer, represents Old Japan as being a sort of replica of the Athens of the days of St. Paul, when “all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing.”

So much as regards the alertness and receptivity of the Japanese intellect three hundred and fifty years ago. Profound perhaps it was not ; but then even at the best of times in the West, profundity of intellect has been exceedingly rare. Marlboroughs with their “excellent plain understanding and sound judgement” have been by no means so very common ; yet men of that type have been far more numerous than Aristotles or Aquinases or Galileos or Newtons or Darwins or Spencers have been. And of men of “excellent plain understanding and sound judgement” Japan has generally had enough and to spare.

In addition to Xavier’s, we have abundance of trustworthy testimony regarding the qualities of the Japanese intellect three hundred years ago. In the latter half of the sixteenth and the early years of the seventeenth century, Japan was one of the chief mission fields of the great Company of Jesus. With their proverbial adroitness in adapting means to ends and in selecting the proper agents for the immediate or ulterior purpose in view, the Jesuits from first to last assigned none but picked men for service in Japan. Time and again it is asserted

that the intelligence of the Japanese people made this precaution absolutely imperative. Then the Jesuits were more than mere missionaries ; they were not only professional teachers, but among the finest, if not actually the very finest, schoolmasters in Europe. Their educational work in Japan was on a very extensive scale. Besides their seminaries for candidates for the priesthood, they had thoroughly well-equipped and efficient establishments for the instruction of high-born Japanese youths. In these schools the curriculum was in the main the same as in their educational institutions in Europe. About the condition of things in these Japanese academies the reports we have are numerous. Although they differ in details, they are unanimous on one point. They rate the capacities of Japanese youth much higher than those of European pupils generally ; in some cases we are told that Japanese students acquire a greater knowledge of Latin in a few months than many Europeans do in as many years. And we must remember that these reports were not concocted for the purpose of pandering to Japanese vanity ; they were mostly meant for the eye of the General of the Company or of his chief coadjutors in Rome alone.

A national intellect of such a calibre may reasonably be expected to go far and to accomplish much. That is, if it be exercised in a field where solid practical results are possible. But just about the time that Christianity and everything connected with it got proscribed, the Japanese began to make acquaintance with the Philosophy of the Sung dynasty. This philosophy, professedly an exposition of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, but in reality a new system of ontology, ethics, natural philosophy, and principles of government, was elaborated in China in the eleventh and twelfth centuries,—the age of Anselm, of Roscellinus, of William of Champeau, and of Abelard, in Europe. In fact, it might not inaptly be termed the Scholasticism of the Far East. Only with this difference. Whereas the main interests in Scholasticism were logical and theological, to the comparative neglect of philosophy proper, it was to philosophical problems that the great Sung thinkers devoted most of their attention. Theology with them was practically naught ; while they never had any body of logical doctrines, or principles or apparatus. Yet, notwithstanding, they could reason acutely enough. Like their contemporaries in the West it was not the processes by which

they reached their conclusion that had to be found fault with; it was the assumptions with which they started that were unsatisfactory.

As has just been said, it was at the beginning of the seventeenth century that the Japanese made a first, and somewhat belated, acquaintance with this body of doctrine. For a time it had to contend with the pretensions of Buddhism, whose priests then claimed a monopoly of teaching in Japan; and down to about 1700 the exponents of the new Chinese learning were actually compelled to receive the tonsure. Nevertheless, the Sung philosophy made at once sure and rapid headway, and before a century had gone it had carried everything before it, and triumphantly imposed itself upon the culture of the nation. By that time almost every nook and cranny in the system had been explored by eager disciples; it had been discussed and expounded and commented upon in thousands of volumes under the superincumbent weight of which the shelves of Japanese libraries groan even unto this day. By the middle of the eighteenth century the commentators could find but little new to say about it. Still it lived on as the official system,—the only system sanctioned in the University of Yedo and in the great provincial schools in the various fiefs. And yet withal, the Japanese contrived to add but little to what they had received from China. Their attitude towards the Chinese books was closely similar to that of the European Schoolmen towards the Bible, the Patristic writers, and Aristotle. These latter never dreamt of questioning the dicta of Holy Writ, while they ever appeared to contemplate the universe of Nature and Man, not at first hand with their own eyes, but in the glass of Aristotelian formulæ. Their chief works are in the shape of commentaries upon the various Aristotelian treatises. Their problems and solutions alike spring from the master's dicta and from the need of reconciling these with one another and with the conclusions of Christian theology. In short they are interpreters, not original and independent investigators. They hold fast to the Stagirite's results, and turn their backs upon his methods, which were so fruitful in his own hands, and are, and can be so, wherever they are courageously and conscientiously applied. In a similar way the Japanese Kangakusha (Chinese scholars) seldom or never travelled beyond the scope and results of the original Chinese texts. Such being the case,

the sum of positive knowledge was not very appreciably added to during the Tokugawa régime.

Yet the Sung philosophy rendered great services to Japan,—services similar in kind, and equal in degree, perhaps, to those which European Scholasticism rendered in its day. We can now afford to admit that between the twelfth and the fourteenth century there were intellectual giants in Europe. The pity of it was that they were condemned to walk in intellectual leg-irons and to work in mental manacles,—under conditions which made any substantial advance in positive, and especially in physical, science, all but hopeless. And as it is only advance in physical science that enables man to extend his command over the forces of Nature, and to harness them and subordinate them to his purposes, the progress in the merely material aspects of civilisation was far from considerable. All this is true,—trite, indeed. But it is not the whole case. Education and mere information, or the mere imparting of information, are by no means synonymous terms. If the aim of education is to build up character and to train and discipline the intellectual powers, and especially the reason, the *trivium* and the *quadrivium* and the ancillary courses of study in the great mediæval schools cannot be sweepingly and unreservedly condemned. No more can the Sung philosophy in Japan, for it, equally with Scholasticism, proved an excellent apparatus for sharpening the mind and developing intellectual alertness and acuteness. As soon as it began to appear that there were truths unrecorded either in the letter of Holy Writ or in the dicta of Aristotle, and men began to venture to look upon Nature and her mysteries face to face, the human intellect, emancipating itself from the trammels of Scholasticism, had yet to thank it for what was wholesome in the discipline it had provided for generations. Logic and Theology had been the passion in the thirteenth century, and the really practical results had then been scant; but by assiduous exercise in these seemingly barren fields the European intellect had been drilled and disciplined and its powers developed; and the advantages of the discipline it had thus received could be appreciated when it began to apply itself to humanism, to art, to the inchoate science and the practical discoveries of the fifteenth century, the prelude to that great intellectual efflorescence known as the Renaissance. Then emancipated from the hide-bound authority of the theologians;

and of the dicta—not the methods—of Aristotle, a steadily increasing number of the more commanding intellects in every country in Europe found their passion in “ascertaining the causes of things.” Among a host of minor gifts we have to thank the seventeenth century for the *Novum Organum*, and the discoveries of Kepler, of Galileo, of Leibnitz, and of Newton. The history of the eighteenth is illuminated by a long roll of renowned mathematicians, astronomers, chemists, inventors, and great engineers, while the first half of the nineteenth saw the birth not merely of illustrious scientists, but of many new sciences.

In the middle of this nineteenth century, in the year 1854, Japan intellectually speaking stood, *mutatis mutandis*, pretty much where Europe did in the days of William of Occam. Chinese philosophy had done and was then doing for Japan what Scholasticism had done for Europe four or five long centuries before. William of Occam died in 1347, and with him all that was vital in the lore of the Schoolmen departed. Yet Scholasticism continued to stalk abroad as a sort of venerable gibbering ghost until the death of Suarez in 1617. It was just about this date that the Sung philosophy was beginning to make real substantial headway in Japan. Fujiwara Seigwa (1500-1610) was its Gerbert (d. 1003). For two centuries and a half it was all-powerful in the Island Empire; even in 1854 it was lustily, nay militantly, vigorous. Now in this year 1909 even its wraith is chary of making its appearance. After 1854 it soon became moribund; it made a brief rally somewhere about 1880, and then quickly expired and got quietly and unobtrusively and not indecently consigned to the tomb.

Thus at the very date at which we had finally succeeded in emancipating ourselves from the trammels of Scholasticism, Japan was submitting herself as a bond captive to the allurements and the not unmitigated blessings of an analogous intellectual system. During her two and a half centuries of subsequent scholastic tutelage, she was almost entirely engrossed in the work of sharpening her mental faculties by their assiduous exercise on problems whose solution could advance her merely material interests but scantily at the best. Meanwhile Europe had been grappling with Nature and her mysteries even as Jacob had grappled with the angel at Peniel; and had been wringing from her secret after secret pregnant

with possibilities of material social—and, also, unsocial—progress. The process had been slow and the yearly advance had occasionally been almost imperceptible. Yet when suddenly brought face to face with the cumulative result of three centuries of the Western effort to “ascertain the causes of things,” Japanese national pride and self-complacency received a very rude shock indeed. Japan differed from less favoured outside barbarian realms in that her origin alone was divine, and that she alone was the country of the gods. But whatever Amaterasu-no-Mikoto might have effected against the great Mongol Armada of Kublai Khan in 1281, it would have been a very serious task for the Sun-Goddess, reinforced by all the eight million deities of the Pantheon, to attempt to argue with Perry’s Paixhans. So much the Shogun’s Ministers, at least, very quickly grasped. So they fell back upon their Sung philosophy and dispatched Hayashi Daigaku-no-Kami, the President of the University of Yedo, to make the best terms with the intrusive barbarian chief which he could.

Meanwhile, however, this body of Sung philosophy, as an instrument of intellectual and moral discipline, had not been entirely without rivals in Japan. To some of the finer spirits in the Empire the illegitimate symbolic concepts on which the most considerable portion of the edifice was reared appeared to be no more than so many senseless pedantic aridities. Some of these turned towards the idealistic intuitionism of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1528),—*Ōyōmei* as the Japanese call him. Although the public teaching of his doctrines was frowned upon by the Yedo authorities, yet it was from *Ōyōmei* that some of the finest and greatest men in Tokugawa Japan drew their inspiration. Then about the middle of the eighteenth century there was a sudden revival of interest in old Japanese literature, old Japanese history, or rather in Japanese mythology (for to the scholars of those days there was little distinction between history and mythology),—a diversion of interest to the national origins in fact. As was the case with the revival of English antiquarian studies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this resuscitation of pure *Shintō* in Japan was destined to exercise an important and wholly unexpected influence upon subsequent political developments. It was then that the dogma of the divine origin, not merely of the Imperial line, but of the entire Japanese people, and even of the seas and soil of Japan was, if not first formulated, at all

events first militantly and uncompromisingly insisted upon. All outside peoples were evil-hearted, unclean barbarians; and the very presence of such in the sacred land of the gods was contamination. Half a century after the death of the coryphæus of this misguided movement (Motoori, d. 1801), such barbarians were knocking at the close-bolted doors of the Empire, rudely insisting that they should be unbarred. Thereupon the "patriots" raised their two-fold cry of *Son-ō Jō-i*,—"Honour the Emperor; sweep away the barbarians." It is Motoori who must be held primarily responsible for not a few of those outrages on foreigners in Japan that were perpetrated two generations after his decease. On the other hand the impulse he gave to the movement for the rehabilitation of the Imperial House in its prerogatives and for the re-establishment of a strong centralised government in Japan must plainly be imputed unto him for righteousness.

A third, albeit an insignificant, rival of the dominant scientific philosophy of Sung was what was called Dutch learning. Active interest in this began in the days of the eighth Tokugawa Shogun (Yoshimune, 1717-1745). Shortly afterwards the Dutch were instructed to supply an annual copy of the Nautical Almanac; and by the end of the century certain Japanese had mastered such works as Lalande's, and were calculating eclipses correctly. Two or three decades later on we can see from Siebold that in certain circles in Japan the acquaintance with the developments of contemporary European science was far from contemptible, while of the general course of events in the West the Shogun's officers continued to be kept pretty fully apprised by the Dutch. Of Perry's projected expedition, for example, the Yedo Cabinet had very precise information. Forty years before, Golownin, a captive in Yezo, was told by his jailors of the occupation of Moscow by the French. From the beginning of the nineteenth century the Bakufu had official translators of Dutch books, and in the fourth decade of that century there were two considerable rival coteries of Dutch scholars in the capital. These unofficial associations were not looked upon with any favour by the Government, however. The Dutch were kept in Deshima to play for Japan the part which Bacon's "Merchants of Light" did for his Utopian New Atlantis. Now, just as the Bakufu monopolised the Dutch trade, so it was minded to have Dutch learning confined to its own

officials, or to those strictly under its own control. Rin Shihei of Sendai was by no means the only scholar who met with punishment at its hands for publishing abroad inconvenient truths of "barbarian" provenance. Thus, such "light" as these Dutch merchants purveyed was far from proving of the general national benefit it might well have done. The interests of the Shogunate were bound up in the maintenance of the *status quo* as far as such was possible; and, exceedingly jealous of the great subject feudatories, it was utterly adverse to the diffusion of new practical knowledge in, or the introduction of pestilent inventions into, the great outside fiefs where they might very well presently lead to menacing developments. Hence a partial explanation of the rigid restrictions upon all free intercourse with the "Merchants of Light" in Deshima. The Yedo bureaucrats were anxious indeed to have the "light," but they were no less solicitous about retaining full and perfect command over the meter, so that in its distribution and diffusion there might be the strictest economy and not the slightest risk of disastrous explosions.

From this succinct and all too imperfect sketch of the Japanese intellect and of the arena in which it exercised and disciplined itself under the Tokugawa régime it may be possible to gather why the subsequent seemingly marvellous development has been possible. Yet, withal, that a nation should in less than two generations leap from a condition of culture analogous to that of the fourteenth century in the West to one fully in line with that of the Europe of the twentieth century can hardly cease to be the subject of amaze. A very simple analogy, however, may serve to throw some gleams of light upon the situation. The average Senior Wrangler of to-day, although of excellent mental capacity, if placed in the seventeenth century with the immature intellect of a youth of twenty-one or twenty-two, would have been signally incapable of the grand fetches of discovery achieved by the fully matured mind of Newton. And yet these discoveries of Newton form only a mere fraction in the mathematical and physical acquirements now needful to place a man high in his Tripos. As the average Senior Wrangler of to-day is to Newton, so has Japan been to Europe. All the secret lore Europe has been laboriously wresting from Nature for the last three centuries she

has brilliantly mastered in less than fifty years. It is a commonly accepted article of faith that the Japanese are incapable of original discovery or invention. At present indications are not wanting that this article of faith must be greatly modified, if not actually abandoned. In Medicine, in Chemistry, in Physics, in Seismology, in Bacteriology, Japan is beginning to make contributions of her own to the general store of international knowledge. And surely the successful effort to make up the intellectual leeway of three hundred years should be admitted to be ample occupation for one or two generations of a people whose thoughts are cast in a different mould to ours, and whose normal mode of expression is at utter variance with that of the foreign text-books they have perforce been condemned to use.

In the enumeration of the national assets of Japan in 1854, the national intellect may well seem to have been dwelt upon at disproportionate and inordinate length. The excuse, nay, the justification for this, is at once easy and plain. It is simply that of all the assets of Japan, the national intellect is by far the most considerable.

Furthermore, to the national credit must be set down a high and a seemingly inherent capacity for organisation. In the history of Meiji the display of this capacity has been conspicuous; without it the brilliant military and naval successes of 1894-5 and 1904-5 would have been impossible. In the latter gigantic struggle, apart from the fleet, a force of 600,000 or 700,000 men was provided for easily and handled with signal success. But then to provide for and to handle large masses of men is a task for which not a few Japanese commanders have proved themselves competent. About the time of the third Crusade Yoritomo was launching an army of 284,000 men to deal with Fujiwara Yasuhira in the extreme north of the main island. In 1221 the Hōjō Regent concentrated 100,000 upon Kyōto to deal with the malcontents there. In the war of Ōnin (1469) one of the contending chiefs began the strife with 160,000 men, while his opponent had 90,000. In the latter half of the sixteenth century several of the great feudatories took the field with very considerable forces. When Ōtomo of Bungo was routed by the Satsuma men at the Mimikawa in 1578 he was in command of 70,000 troops. The largest force mobilised by Nobunaga amounted to about 185,000 men. On several occasions Hideyoshi was at the head of still larger

hosts. In 1592-3 there were 205,000 Japanese soldiers on Korean soil, while it was only the dislocation of the Japanese strategy by the exploits of the great Korean Admiral that prevented the dispatch of some 100,000 more troops held in reserve at the headquarters of Nagoya, in Hizen. At the great battle of Sekigahara (October 21, 1600) not more than 130,000 on both sides actually went into action; but on each side there was a column some 40,000 strong within striking distance. Then besides these 210,000 troops there was a strong confederate garrison in Ōsaka, while the war also raged in Kyūshū and in the north of the main island, the forces operating in the latter region being nearly as numerous as those that decided the real issue on the field of Sekigahara. In the first Ōsaka campaign the figures on each side were 180,000 and 90,000 respectively; in the second (1615) the Tokugawa levies amounted to 250,000 and probably more. Again, when the rebel stronghold of Shimabara fell in 1638, the beleaguering force of Kyūshū troops footed up to 100,000 men. It is impossible to verify the figures for the earliest of these campaigns; about the five or six later ones there can be no reasonable doubt, for the muster rolls are easily accessible. Ōyama is indeed the first Japanese commander who has had to handle as many as 600,000 men in an over-sea campaign. But when Ukida commanded a host of 205,000 combatants on Korean soil in 1592-3 we must remember that Europe had never seen more than 60,000 men in the field together under one flag in that century. Thus with the traditional national aptitude for warlike enterprises and the inherent capacity for organisation there is nothing so very surprising in Japan's rapid ascent to the rank of a first-class military Power.

As regards her sudden rise to the proud position of Mistress of the Far Eastern Seas the case is somewhat otherwise. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there were, indeed, daring, nay great, seamen in Japan. But of anything even remotely resembling a national navy there was nothing. Such men-of-war as were then built in Japan and manned by Japanese, mostly flew the Bahan flag. In plain language, they were pirates. They harried the Chinese sea-board so badly that the Chinese Government was ultimately constrained to order its subjects to abandon their towns and villages on the coast and to remove several miles inland. The depredations of these sea-rovers extended to the Straits of Malacca, and further.

On account of their daring all access to Portuguese India was denied to Japanese in Japanese craft. It was in a Japanese piratical raid on the Chinese coast that Anjirō, the first Japanese convert to Christianity, and Xavier's pilot in his Japanese expedition, ended his picturesque and chequered career. Yet the only time when there was anything like a Japanese navy was in the days of Hideyoshi, when the squadrons fitted out for service in the Korean War carried some 10,000 marines. In that struggle the Japanese were hopelessly outclassed by the Korean sailors and their great Admiral on the blue water. Under Iyeyasu, under the instruction of Will Adams, mariner of Gillingham, in Kent, they got as far as building a European-rigged vessel of 170 tons, which made the voyage to Acapulco and back with serious losses among the ship's company. Then the building of foreign-rigged vessels, of men-of-war, and even of large junks was strictly forbidden just at the time that the mercantile marine was beginning to give indications of a rapid and wonderful development. The attempt to introduce ship carpenters and naval architects from Batavia in Titsingh's time, some century and a third ago, proved abortive. It was only after Perry's appearance that the Japanese addressed themselves to the problems of navigation, of naval architecture, and of seamanship in earnest. And yet in May 1905 they fought and won the great battle of the Sea of Japan. This special development is indeed something to excite wonder and surprise.

It is to be admitted, however, that it is in her armaments that Japan is seen at her best. For the fabric of modern Japan has been reared pretty much in the fashion in which the average Japanese builds his house. After laying a fairly stable support for the uprights and placing these in position, it is the roof that next claims his attention. When this is made thoroughly strong and serviceable, capable of resisting typhoons and the other ravages of the sky, the builder proceeds to finish the rest of the structure at his leisure, and it may be months, perhaps years, before the walls and their lining and the general interior appurtenances receive the attention that must be bestowed upon them before, with us, the tenant enters upon occupation. In her army and navy Japan has provided herself with a national roof more than strong enough to safeguard her against all possible external dangers. But it has been reared somewhat at the expense of the general efficiency of the

national fabric which supports it, and which it exists to protect. In other words the creation of her armaments has put a severe strain upon Japan's economic resources.

This brings us to a consideration of the most considerable items in the debit pages of Japan's national ledger in 1854.

In the first place the land was stricken with the curse of poverty. Old Japan was almost entirely an agricultural country. Now what this means may not be readily grasped at first. However, the import of this seemingly colourless assertion may become clearer when it is pointed out that chiefly on account of the mountainous character of the surface, and partly of the vagaries of the innumerable streams in their wide and shallow courses, not more than one-eighth of her superficies of 112,000 square miles was available for cultivation. And these 14,000 or 15,000 square miles had to support a population of close on 30,000,000 souls; that is, nearly 2,000 to the square mile. This population pressed at all times heavily upon the limits of subsistence. In spite of the unbroken peace and tranquillity the nation enjoyed for more than two centuries, the population showed no substantial increase. Between 1721 and 1846, during just a century and a quarter, the augmentation was no more than 900,000; a rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per *century*, whereas the present is one of $1\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. per *annum*! Of pastoral industry there was practically none, for the Japanese were not meat-eaters or milk-drinkers. Thus, apart from the produce of the fisheries, which gave employment to some one million and a half of the population, the nation had to subsist on its perishable crops. Rice alone could be stored, and even rice could be stored for but a small number of years. As there was, of course, no export trade, even the finest of rice harvests added nothing to the capital of the country. At best the superfluity could only be employed to alleviate the miseries and the horrors of the not infrequent years of famine. Thus any permanent accumulation of wealth from agriculture—apart from sericulture, perhaps,—was impossible.

The manufactures, such as they were, were conducted on the household system, and were insignificant. Then there were mines. In mediæval times from first to last the amount of gold and silver obtained from the placers had been considerable. But it had never been utilised for specie until Hideyoshi's days (1585); and the Macaoese Portuguese succeeded in carrying most of it away. From Iyeyasu's time the reefs in Idzu, in

Sado, in Iwami, in Tajima began to be exploited; but again the Dutch and the Chinese prevented any great accumulation of bullion or specie in Japan; while the value of copper carried away by the Hollanders was considerable. Even so early as 1708 Arai Hakuseki was writing: "I compute the annual exportation of gold at about 15,000 *kobans* (30s.); so that in ten years this Empire is drained of 1,500,000 *kobans* (£2,250,000). With the exception of medicines we can dispense with everything that is brought to us from abroad. *The stuffs and other foreign commodities are of no real benefit to us.* All the gold, silver, and copper extracted from the mines during the sway of Iyeyasu and since his time are gone, and *what is still more to be regretted, for things we could very well do without.*" The calculation is wild; but the argument is perfectly sound.* The gold and silver and copper of Japan was mainly exchanged for luxuries and trifles and trinkets and geegaws that could stimulate native industry in no earthly way whatsoever. If the produce of her placers and reefs had been retained in Japan until the era of Meiji, and then utilised to purchase spinning machinery, to start foundries, to establish dockyards and to facilitate her internal communications, her industrial position would have been very different from what it is at present. If this cardinal mistake had not been committed, the efficiency of her armaments, in contrast to the inefficiency of her sons in the arts of peace, would certainly have not been so conspicuous as it is.

Several important factors have to be disentangled in any attempt to account for the sudden expansion of English industry in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Something more than the mere genius of inventors like Watt and Arkwright must be recognised as contributing to the possibility of the revolution in industrial methods that was then effected. There had been no lack of ability and ingenuity among the engineers and mechanics of the seventeenth century; but at that time there were no accumulations of wealth in England available for the realisation of the most ingenious of their projects; and consequently their most promising enterprises came to nothing. By the eighteenth century the state of things was different; the mines of America and the East Indian trade

* See Cunningham's "Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspect," Vol. I., p. 69 and p. 122.

had meanwhile furnished England with an ample store of superfluous capital; while at the same time there was a world-wide demand for British manufactured goods. Watt and Arkwright were thus in a position to seize and make the most of opportunities such as inventors had never had before.

The bearing of this seemingly inconsequent digression should now be readily apparent. Suddenly brought face to face with the accumulated triumphs of two centuries of Western scientific and inventive genius, the Japanese of the Meiji era have had neither occasion nor time to invent. All that they have had to do has been to learn and appropriate and to apply. The rapidity and thoroughness with which they have mastered the new knowledge can only excite feelings of wonder and admiration. But in applying their newly acquired knowledge they have been very seriously hampered by the national poverty. To pass from household economy to the factory system at a bound is only possible when there is an intervention of capital. And in Japan there was very little accumulated capital. Hence, although the Japanese army and navy have been organised in the most economical way, if not indeed at a minimum of cost, yet the effort of providing a national roof of the strongest has told seriously upon the economic development of the Empire generally. And since the industrial international warfare of modern times is, if not a fiercer, at all events a more insidiously serious thing than the red-handed war of armaments, this causes Japanese patriots of keener and more extended vision no small measure of disquietude.

The second great disadvantage in 1854 was the political organisation. The mosaic patchwork of Iyeyasu, put together as a safeguard for a succession of possible mediocrities in the seat of that great statesman, had done rare work in its day, and for eight generations it had given Japan almost unbroken peace. Between 1603, when Iyeyasu was formally invested with the Shogunate, and 1854, the internal tranquillity of the Empire had been disturbed on two occasions only. The years 1614 and 1615 had witnessed the great Ōsaka struggle; that of 1637-8 the *émeute* of Shimabara. During the preceding four centuries and a half, from 1156 to 1603, Japan had enjoyed scarcely a hundred years of domestic repose. Between 1221 and 1322, under the strong and beneficent administration of the Hōjō regents for full three generations, the Japanese had had to abstain from slaughtering each other. Even so, in 1274,

and again in 1281, they had been called upon to repel great Mongol invasions. And then during all the rest of these four centuries and a half the country had been racked and harried and devastated by internecine civil war. Thus in spite of its tyrannical high-handedness, its jealous, narrow-minded repressive spirit even in its best days, and the pitiable ineptitudes and inanities of its later years, the Yedo Bureaucracy is not without some claim upon the gratitude of the Japanese people and the sympathies of the historian who essays the task of recounting the story of their fortunes.

But by 1854, the Tokugawa administrative machine had outlived its usefulness. For decades its gear had been creaking ominously. In a few more generations its breakdown from sheer internal rot and decay would have been certain. And then, just at this point, the foreigner appeared in the land. The ablest thinkers and the truest patriots in Japan were swift to perceive that the Yedo Bureaucracy and the Hōken Seiji (Feudal System) were alike anachronisms; both equally impossible if Japan was to continue to exist as an independent State. All honour to such men as Sakuma of Shinano and Sakamoto of Tosa!

The outcome of all this was the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shōgunate in 1868, the abolition of Feudalism in 1871, the rehabilitation of the Imperial line in its just prerogatives, the establishment of a strong and strongly centralised Government, the emergence of Japan from her seclusion of centuries, and her meteor-like ascent to the rank of one of the great Powers of the world, with the unique distinction of being the only non-Christian Power in the modern comity of civilisation, the only non-Christian Power that commands for itself the unfeigned respect of the most advanced, and even of the most militantly powerful, nations of Christendom.

Now, in the interpretation of the import of this sudden and startling development most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain their own unit of social organisation, which is not the individual as with us, but the *family*. Furthermore, the resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central and local, to certain European systems is not the result of imitation, or borrowing, or

adaptation. Such resemblance is merely an odd and fortuitous coincidence. When the statesmen who overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the Feudal system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 A.D. and more fully supplemented and organised in the succeeding fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards adapted from China and established in the seventh century. Again, the present system of local administration in Japan with its *Fu* or *Ken* (Prefecture), its *Gun* (County), its *Son* (Village or Township) may well seem to be on the model of the French *Département*, *Arrondissement*, and *Commune*. But it is really nothing of the kind. It is also a revival of the local administrative divisions introduced with modifications from China into Japan some twelve and a half centuries ago.

The present administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies.

This single consideration alone might well serve to cast suspicion upon the adequacy of the easy "imitation" formula as an explanation of Japan's modern institutional and social development. The origins of modern Japan have to be sought for much farther afield than in the economy of the Tokugawa feudal régime. It is true that an adequate knowledge of the Tokugawa period is imperative if we mean to write, or to read, the subsequent history of Meiji with real understanding. But such knowledge is only one of a complex of factors, every one of which has claims upon our attention. It is only when we have seized upon the totality of these, assigned each its relative importance, and co-ordinated and integrated them, that the history of modern Japan ceases to be the perplexing riddle it seemingly is. Certain Japanese publicists will have it that the political organisation of Meiji is simply a reversion to the original institutions of Japan. But this is not only not cor-

rect,—it is glaringly incorrect. It is, as just stated, a reversion to the institutions of 646 and the following years. But these institutions were more than mere innovations; they amounted to nothing less than a Revolution,—a Revolution as fundamental, as radical as, and no less startling than, the Revolution of 1868. That Reform of Taikwa (645), as it is called, has profoundly affected the whole subsequent course of the history of the Empire,—so much so, indeed, that without at least a working acquaintance with its causes, its leading incidents, its more important consequences, many of which were entirely unforeseen and unexpected by the authors of the movement, any just appreciation of the worth of the solutions found by the statesmen of Meiji for some of the weightiest problems that confronted them thirty or forty years ago is virtually impossible. And so far is the Restoration of Meiji from being a return to the “original” state of affairs in Japan that the closest analogy to that “original” state of affairs is to be found in that very Tokugawa régime which the Meiji statesmen shattered and swept away. Only it is to be noted that the Tokugawa system was a fully developed Feudal system, marked by practically all the characteristic features that enter into our definition of Feudalism, while the state of society in ante-Taikwa (645) Japan presented many analogies, not, indeed, to the Highland clans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but to the Celtic communities in contemporary Ireland and North Britain when Palladius was preaching to the Scots and Columba converting the Picts.

In presenting the story of centuries historians find it convenient to have recourse to the expedient of epochs or periods. Inasmuch as the successive stages in national development shade into each other in most of their leading features and interests almost imperceptibly, these subjective divisions are now and then wont to prove somewhat unsatisfactory and misleading because of their more or less arbitrary character. In this respect the writer who essays to recount the story of the Japanese people is perhaps more happily circumstanced than his fellows who have to deal with Western annals. While Japan is one of the few countries under heaven that can make the proud boast that she has never had to bend her neck to the insolence of a foreign invader, the course of her development has been profoundly influenced by contact with alien cultures on three separate occasions. The

first of these was in the seventh century, when admiration and reverence for the splendours of the civilisation of the Middle Kingdom led her statesmen to recast the national policy in most of its details. Dread of foreign aggression and of internal commotion constrained her to expel Spaniards and Portuguese alike in the seventeenth century and, abandoning her immemorial traditions of liberality and hospitality, to bolt her doors in the face of the alien from over sea. Then after a hermit-like seclusion and an *apparent* intellectual torpor of full two hundred years, the Japanese once more found themselves forced to face a foreign culture seemingly the hopeless superior of their own, with the alternative of assimilating and utilising its most important intellectual and material products, or of losing their existence as a nation. Which alternative was then adopted is now plain to all ; the Japanese have *not* lost their existence as a nation.

Thus the Japanese historian—or rather the historian of Japan—will readily find conspicuous land-falls to aid him in the distribution of his theme of centuries into orderly and convenient and well-marked subjective divisions. Inasmuch, however, as the first and second of these land-falls are separated by a stretch of some nine or ten centuries, it will be found advisable, nay almost imperative, to find some intermediate halting-places between the middle of the seventh and the beginning of the seventeenth century. Of such, three may be conveniently interposed. And then the whole course of Japanese history will, for purposes of presentation and easy comprehension, be distributed into seven periods, each with some well-marked distinctive peculiarities of its own.

In the first place the historian will treat of Ancient Japan, —of Japan before the Great Reform of 645 A.D. His work on this period can be only tentative at best, for the story can only be reconstructed in the fashion in which the tale of contemporary Celtic Britain can be reconstructed. Such written documents as deal with it were composed in the subsequent period. Indeed, the earliest Japanese records were compiled almost exactly at the time when the Venerable Bede was beginning work on the *Ecclesiastical History of our Island and Nation*. And just as, apart from the inferences that may be gathered from archæological remains, our most trustworthy information about Celtic Britain is to be found in Cæsar and other foreign authors, so the historian of Ancient Japan finds

stray notices in contemporary Chinese records of inestimable value when he essays the task of penetrating the darkness that enshrouds the origins of the Japanese people. Inasmuch as the art of writing seems to have been introduced into Japan only a little before the date when Honorius withdrew the Roman legions from Britain (410 A.D.), these Chinese notices of Japan become almost as precious to the historian as the leaves of the Cumæan Sibyl were to the Roman king of old. The second period commences with that sudden and dramatic Reform, or rather Revolution, of 645, and runs a continuous but chequered course of some five centuries, or fifteen generations. It begins with the organisation of a strong central government, modelled on that of the Middle Kingdom, and, not indeed with the introduction, but with the diffusion of that old Chinese culture whose impress has so profoundly affected the whole subsequent social, political, and ethical development of Japan. The early century of this epoch witnessed the production of the earliest historical works in Japan. The compilation of such was a Government enterprise, projected and carried out in the interests of the new centralised administration. A little later Shintō and Shintō ritual, as we now know them, were also elaborated in the interests of the new ruling powers. Buddhism, introduced from Korea in 552, was likewise regulated and utilised as an instrument of government. But after no great lapse of time it bade fair to display the potentialities of an Aaron's rod. It quickly absorbed and assimilated Shintō. It not only became the religion of the Court, but in course of time we actually read of an Emperor of Japan making solemn public profession of being the humble servant of the three sacred things,—Buddha, the Law, and the Priests, to wit. In 900 the abdicated Sovereign received the tonsure, and this practice soon became customary; and a century or two later it was not the titular reigning Emperor, but the Hō-ō—or cloistered Emperor—who really ruled. In 769 a daring intrigue all but placed a Buddhist priest upon the Imperial throne. But behind all this, the most striking feature of these five centuries was the predominance of the great Fujiwara family. The legitimate Empress of Japan and the Regent during the minority of the Sovereign had to be chosen from among the members of this all-powerful House. Most of the great officers in the Central Government, and, in the early days, nearly all the provincial governors, were Fuji-

waras. In fact, the period might well be labelled the Fujiwara Age.

The land system introduced by Kamatari in 645 had some serious defects; the chief being its numerous exemptions from taxation. It was this that ultimately proved fatal to the Fujiwara predominance. It permitted the rise of the great House of Taira in Western and of Minamoto in Northern Japan. By the middle of the twelfth century these two provincial families had appropriated much of the provincial resources that ought to have gone into the coffers of the central, or, in other words, of the Fujiwara administration; and the Fujiwaras, deprived of financial, and hence of military means, began to find themselves shorn of their power, if not of their prestige. In 1156, when a disputed decision was decided not by Fujiwara finesse as it had been for generations, but by the rude clash of Taira and Minamoto arms in the streets of Kyōto, Japan ceased to be governed by the ink-brush, and for seven long centuries, down to a period well within the recollection of living men, her destinies were to be decided by the strong arbitrament of the sword. When the thirty years strife between Taira and Minamoto reached its term in the extermination of the former, the old centralised government, organised by Kamatari, survived as little better than a shade. Nearly all the real power then passed to Kamakura and to the newly arisen military class. After a somewhat tempestuous period of thirty years, 1192-1221, the remodelled Shōgunate, ably manipulated by the modest Hōjō Regents, gave Japan a century of profound, yet healthy, repose. Then in 1322 began that series of internal commotions which led to the overthrow of the Kamakura administration and the interesting but futile attempt to revert to that system of centralised civilian government established by the great Kamatari in 645. Meanwhile, in the latter years of this period there had been a great popular Buddhist revival analogous to, and contemporary with, that effected by the mendicant friars in Christendom.

The Ashikaga Shōgunate (1338-1573) constitutes the fourth of the seven periods into which it is purposed to distribute the long course of Japanese history. This period is usually regarded as the most barren and the most unprofitable in the annals of the nation. Foreign writers are wont to dismiss it in a few pages of abusive epithets and inflated declamation on the wickedness and barbarity of the times. This course has

the very obvious merits of economising effort on the laborious task of original investigation and the advantages of an effectual screen for ignorance. Whatever may have been the unrest and turbulence so conspicuous in the farrago that enters into the composition of the meagre historical epitomes of the Ashikaga age, and in spite of all its barbarities and ferocities recurring with a frequency that becomes monotonous, this age is by no means unworthy of the close attention of the conscientious historian. It was between 1338 and 1550 that the system of predial serfdom was finally shattered. It was then that a great development in pictorial art was witnessed, a development analogous to, and contemporary with, that of Europe. It was then that the first serious attempt to develop an over-sea commerce was made. And the period witnessed a still more singular phenomenon. What part the Free Cities and the Chartered Municipalities played in the mediæval history of Europe and what services they rendered to the cause of progress and civilisation every schoolboy knows,—or should know. With one single exception, such communities have been unknown in Japan, to her present not inconsiderable detriment. Only in the City of Sakai do we find anything similar to an Italian City Republic of the Middle Ages. And it was in the latter days of the Ashikaga sway that Sakai attained a greatness that enabled her citizens to challenge the arrogant pretensions of the rude and overbearing *Buke* (military class) around her.

Furthermore, the decrepitude of the central Ashikaga administration during its last half-century was not without compensating circumstances. The provinces were thrown on their own resources, and in several quarters strong, stable, and compact principalities were built up. Here men of real practical ability found a rare field for the display of their talents. The years 1533, 1536, 1542 witnessed the birth of Nobunaga, of Hideyoshi, and of Iyeyasu respectively; the great trio whose happy co-operation was destined to reconsolidate the Empire under a single rule. These great men were simply the products of the times. And they were by no manner of means so unique as is generally represented. Several of the rivals they had either to crush or to conciliate were not seriously their inferiors in ability. Takeda of Kai was perhaps not the peer of Hideyoshi, but he was the equal of Iyeyasu, and certainly a better man than Nobunaga. Then the Uyesugi and Hōjō

chiefs were the reverse of contemptible, while Mōri Motonari in Western Japan, Chōsokabe in Shikoku, Ōtomo, Ryūzōji, and Shimadzu in Kyūshū were all great Captains and able administrators. Under a strong central government there would have been no opportunity for these men to prove their sterling mettle. It was the very stress and struggle of the later Ashikaga times that tested and tempered and schooled the youth of such men, and furnished the early training and discipline that lay at the base of their subsequent greatness. But for this very stress and struggle, the annals of Japan during the first half of the century of early foreign intercourse would have been less remarkable for the long roll of illustrious names that lends such an unusual and dazzling lustre to them, and would have lacked many of their most stirring and picturesque pages.

In short, no matter what may have been the anarchy and desolation that reigned in the streets of the capital and its environs, from the arrival of the foreigner in the land in 1542 down to the deposition of the last Ashikaga Shōgun in 1573, Japan was then pulsing with a healthy, vigorous, lusty life. This is one consideration which makes it advisable to detach these thirty years from the Ashikaga epoch and to combine them with the forty odd years that preceded the Ōsaka wars and the final triumph of the Tokugawas in 1616, into a single period of 75 years. The importance of the stirring events and momentous developments that marked this short period justifies the historian in treating it at seemingly disproportionate and inordinate length. If any further justification for this course be needed, it is readily forthcoming. This is almost the only epoch in the national history where native records can be effectually tested and checked and supplemented by trustworthy contemporary foreign documents. It was mainly for this reason that when I addressed myself to the attempt to write a History of the Japanese People a beginning was made with this epoch.* To have to choose the best among several not unsuitable titles for this stretch of seventy-five years is a somewhat perplexing task. "The Re-unification of Japan, —The Age of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu" might serve for a label as well as anything that suggests itself.

* See "A History of Japan during the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse," by JAMES MURDOCH, M.A., in collaboration with ISOH YAMAGATA.

The sixth of the periods into which a History of Japan might be distributed,—that of the Tokugawa régime,—offers a marvellous contrast to those that preceded it. In those, our ears are stunned with the clash of swords, the braying of trumpets, the tramp of armies, and the shock of battle. From 1616 down to 1854, apart from the Shimabara affair of 1638, the prosecution of some vendetta, or some agrarian disturbance of men with mat-flags and bamboo spears, we seek and sigh in vain for the alarms and excursions that might relieve the seemingly humdrum monotony of the narrative. Indeed the student might very well fancy the Tokugawa interdict upon the writing of contemporary history to have been a thoroughly needless and superfluous precaution. For apparently absolutely nothing was happening. Such national life, or national development, as there was, ran its course with no more noise than the growth of one of those gigantic camphor trees that are supposed to go back to the age of Jimmu. And yet, withal, this Tokugawa régime is a most fascinating study for the historian, and still more so, perhaps, for the sociologist, for it is replete, if not with stirring incidents, at all events with many and varied phenomena distinctively its own and of surpassing interest to the student of institutions and of national and social economy.

In spite of the fact that the publication, if not the composition of contemporary annals was strictly forbidden, and that such records as there are were tampered with, and perhaps deliberately falsified, the modern historian of the Tokugawa age finds himself with an abundance of native materials at his command. The unfortunate thing is that there is a great dearth of contemporary foreign documents such as there are for the period immediately preceding. How much this is to be regretted will become evident from a single instance. For the two Tanumas, all-powerful in Yedo before 1784, Japanese writers can scarcely find language too harsh. The younger was assassinated in that year (1784). From Titsingh, his contemporary, it appears that it was really his progressive tendencies that cost him his life, as he stood at the head of a body of advanced liberals who were anxious that Japan should emerge from her seclusion. Of this there is no hint in Japanese documents. If Japan had opened her doors in 1784 instead of in 1854, the whole course of her subsequent history would doubtless have been profoundly affected. The fact that

the question of re-opening the country to foreign intercourse was well within the domain of practical politics so early as 1784 is surely worthy of notice in the briefest summary of Tokugawa history. Yet but for the lucky accident of the presence in Japan of an intelligent and trustworthy foreign writer with excellent means of acquiring information, we should never have suspected the existence of any such body of opinion at that date.

Yet although there must be many similar *lacunae*, not to say actual mistakes, in any narrative of particular incidents, it is possible to limn the state of Tokugawa Japan in its ethical, intellectual, institutional, social, and economic aspects with tolerable accuracy in the broad outlines of the picture at least. Until the arrival of the foreigner in the land in 1853, the changes in the political and social fabric of the Empire since the times of Iyeyasu and Iyemitsu had been neither very important nor very striking; and of the state of the Japanese people during the last decade of the Tokugawa Feudal Age we have numerous accounts by intelligent European and American writers. Furthermore, although to the younger generation,—to men, say, under thirty years of age,—the Feudal System is now as much ancient history as the Wars of the Roses are to Englishmen, we have still hundreds of thousands with us who can recall all the pomp and arrogance of two-sworded privilege on the one hand, and the miseries of abject subjection and oppression on the other; and by a cautious co-ordination of the respective testimonies of samurai and peasant it is not difficult to correct the mistakes and fill up the *lacunae* in the accounts of the last years of Tokugawa Feudalism penned by contemporary witnesses from Occidental lands. The passing of that Feudalism was relatively as swift and sudden as the disappearance of the accumulated snowdrifts of winter from a Scottish moor before the April sun; and the History of Modern Japan, now entered upon that astonishing career which has gained for her not merely admission into, but such a unique and distinguished position in the Comity of Nations, begins to assume towards the record of the Tokugawa Age a relation analogous to that of the fecund efflorescence of the spring landscape to the seemingly rigid and monotonous torpidity of frost-bound winter.

It is undoubtedly this comparatively short space of forty years in the national annals that is of the greatest and most

absorbing interest to Western readers. But, as already contended, it is next-door to impossible to hope to write a satisfactory record of it without an accurate and fairly exhaustive account of the thirteen or fourteen centuries that preceded it, and of which it is at bottom, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, mainly a natural and continuous development. It is true that during this period the Empire has been tremendously influenced by the factor of foreign intercourse in many ways,—political, social, and intellectual. But so it was in the seventh century. And yet, then, as now, Japan remained Japan,—a nation with a distinct and definite individuality and idiosyncrasy of its own. The aim of the present volume is limited in scope. It deals with the story of the Japanese people merely from the origins down to the first appearance of the Portuguese in the realm in the year 1542.

CHAPTER I.

PROTOHISTORIC JAPAN.

(CHINESE AND KOREAN SOURCES.)

WHOEVER hopes to enter upon the history of Old Japan with profit will find it advisable to furnish himself with some outline of the general state of affairs in the Far East during the three or four centuries which precede and follow the beginning of the Christian era.


At that time China—which by the way was then only a fraction of the modern Chinese Empire—bore a relation to the surrounding lands similar in most respects to that borne by the Roman Empire to the wilds of Germany and Britain and the peoples of the North generally. She alone had an old and stable civilisation, she alone had a written history, she alone indeed was acquainted with and practised the art of writing. Hence it is in Chinese authors and not in any native records that we find the earliest authentic information about the Japanese and about the inhabitants of the peninsula which is now known as Korea.

The third, or Chow dynasty of Chinese sovereigns lasted for almost nine centuries—from 1122 to 255 B.C. Its dominions extended from the 33rd to the 38th parallel of latitude, and from longitude 106° to 118°,—in other words it comprised the southern portion of the Province of Chih-li, Shan-si, and Shen-si, the northern portions of Honan and Kiang-su, and the western half of Shantung,—a tract of some 300,000 square miles,—approximately one-fifth of the present superficies of what is now known as China Proper. Under the early Chow monarchs a sort of feudalism had grown up. By 770 B.C. the feudatories had got seriously out of hand, and the subsequent five hundred years are mainly occupied with the record of domestic disorder and internecine strife. That was the Ashikaga or the Carlovingian age of China. The “Spring and Autumn” of Confucius, which covers the two centuries and a half between 722 and 481 B.C., gives us the record of more than 160 principalities, each eager to devour the other, although

all equally under the nominal suzerainty of Chow. But by that time Chow had in truth become as impotent as the Holy Roman Empire at its feeblest. By 425 B.C. these one hundred and sixty contestants had been reduced to seven; besides which there was a curtailed domain of Chow, of which these seven were now practically independent. Presently one of the seven not only ate up all its six rivals, but even made an end of the venerable Chow, and again re-united China under a strong central government. The new dominant power was the semi-barbarous Ts'in (not Tsin), which after an independent existence in the north-west had rejoined the semi-federative system under Chow, to make a summary end of it three or four generations afterwards. This short-lived Ts'in Dynasty (255-202 B.C.) is remarkable in as far as it provides a welcome landmark for bewildered Western students of Chinese history in the person of Chi Hwangti, who has not unreasonably been called the Chinese Napoleon. Inasmuch as he was the contemporary of one of Napoleon's chief rivals to military fame, and as one of his undertakings—the Great Wall, which still survives as one of the wonders of the world—was begun in the very year of Cannae (214 B.C.), it becomes tolerably easy for the European student to "place" him and to bear this date in mind. Succeeding to the throne a mere boy of 13 years in 246, he soon asserted the force of his genius. His military achievements were the drastic settlement of accounts with the Hiung-Nu Tartars, who had been a terror to China for centuries, the crushing of the formidable Honan rebellion set on foot by the feudatories who had been dispossessed when the Empire was recentralised, and the carrying of his victorious arms and the limits of the Empire to the Yang-tse-kiang and the Poyang and Tungting Lakes. The thirty-six provinces into which China was now divided nominally included the Liaotung, South China, and the valley of the upper Yang-tse as far as navigable. But nothing definite was as yet known of Canton, Foo-chow, Yun-nan, Thibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, or Japan. Japan indeed had been heard of by the people of the vassal kingdom around the modern Peking a century before, and in the course of Chi Hwang-ti's eastern tour in the direction of Shan-hai-kwan and Chefoo vague rumours of certain islands beyond the sea had reached his ears.

However, it was not till the reign of Wuti, the sixth of the succeeding Han Dynasty (202 B.C. to 221 A.D.) that the

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Chinese acquired any trustworthy information concerning either Korea or Japan. About 108 B.C. they overran the north of the Korean Peninsula, and although their direct hold upon it was brief, it was not only the beginning of detailed knowledge of that country and of Japan, but of a more or less intermittent communication between those lands and the Middle Kingdom. From our earliest authentic sources it abundantly appears that the term "Korean" at this time was meaningless, for the Peninsula was then occupied by a congeries of heterogeneous tribes of different stock, language, and institutions. Most of these had undoubtedly entered the country from the north, by land. As regards the peoples in the extreme south-west the case may very well have been different; presently the reasons for assigning them a southern over-sea origin will be adverted to at some length, inasmuch as this consideration will be found to be of consequence when we come to deal with primæval Japan.

As the oldest Japanese historical documents are greatly occupied with Korean relations, the student will find it highly advantageous to acquaint himself with the main outlines of the political developments in the Peninsula during the first six or seven centuries of our era.

Shortly after the withdrawal of the Chinese in the first century B.C. three kingdoms were founded, and gradually developed into great Powers.

In the north, Koguryu was established in B.C. 37, and lasted down to 668 A.D. This is the State which appears as Koma in the Japanese annals. As it lay so far to the north the relations of the islanders with it were not very intimate until shortly before its fall, while they never had any territorial foothold in it at all.

The south of the Peninsula was occupied by two considerable States which first became conterminous immediately to the south of the Koguryu frontier. The earliest of these two was Silla, which arose on the Japan Sea coast in B.C. 57 and after absorbing its rivals ran its course until 935. It appears in the *Nihongi* as Shiragi. It was this State that Jingō Kōgō is alleged to have conquered in 200 A.D. The relations between the islanders and Silla (or Shiragi) were generally hostile.

The third kingdom, called Pakche by the Koreans and Kudara by the Japanese, and lasting from 17 B.C. to 660 A.D., stretched along the Yellow Sea coast from the neighbourhood

of Seōul, the present Korean capital, to the south-western extremity of the Peninsula. Its relations with Japan were friendly on the whole; and it was from it that the islanders got the first tincture of continental civilisation.

At this point a word of caution becomes necessary. It would be a serious mistake to regard the extent of these three kingdoms as synonymous with the present Korea. Koguryu stretched far to the north into Manchuria at different times, and on the other hand there were many small independent communities on the confines of the two southern States. A rough modern analogy may be found in the position of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark with respect to France and Germany. Along the southern sea-board opposite a line drawn from Tsushima to Quelpart and for a hundred miles or more inland was a loose confederacy of communities that acknowledged the suzerainty neither of Pakche nor of Silla. It was in this quarter that Japanese influence was strongest, its centre being the Miyake of Imna or Mimana. In fact at the dawn of history this stretch of country would appear to have been much more Japanese and much more under the influence of Yamato than was either the northern half of the main island of the Japanese archipelago, or the south of Kyūshū and the adjacent islets.

Thus this section of Korea is of no small interest to the Japanese historian. Nor is it without still higher claims upon our attention. It was in this tract of country, together with the southern part of that western sea-board fringe which became the kingdom of Pakche. that the so-called Han tribes, the Ma-han, the Chin-han, and the Pyon-han, were settled. Of these a recent historian has remarked that in them we shall find the solution of the most interesting and important problem that Korea has to offer either to the historian or the ethnologist. Mr. Hulbert then proceeds to adduce a body of cumulative evidence going to suggest that these communities were not of northern but of southern origin, and that they reached Korea not by land but from over-sea. The items he enumerates in support of this contention do not indeed amount to proof; but taken together with other still stronger considerations that might well be added to them they indicate that the line of investigation here suggested is likely to be a profitable one, rich perhaps in surprises.

These Han tribes were different in almost everything from the tribes beyond the mountains in the other parts of the Peninsula. Furthermore, there are good grounds for believing that it was the language of these tribes that became the basic element in Korean. Now, two of these tribes at least had the Was or Japanese for neighbours. They had frequent intercourse with these neighbours and were a good deal influenced by contact with them. Modern Korean, no doubt with a vocabulary seriously affected by, if not mainly made up of, words of non-Han provenance, is undoubtedly closely akin to Japanese in structure, while there is no lack of analogies even in the terms of the two tongues. The only other member of this family is Luchuan, which differs from Japanese pretty much as, say, Portuguese does from Italian, a connecting link between Japanese and Luchuan being found in the dialect of Satsuma.

Now all this has an important bearing upon the question of the possibility of an answer to that sphinx-like riddle—the origin or origins of the Japanese people. After trying some half-dozen hypotheses by the tests of (1) power to account for all the known facts in the case, linguistic, anthropological, ethnological, archæological, and legendary,—if there can be such a thing as a “legendary” fact; (2) to meet new facts as they appear; and (3) of applicability as an instrument of research, it has been found that there is only one that is even partially equal to sustaining the triple strain. The inhabitants of the Lūchūs, of Satsuma, and the rest of Southern Kyūshū and the peoples of the old Hans in Korea are, or were, of the same stock or origin,—either Malay or Indonesian. And just as the people of the three Hans supplied the basic element in the Korean language, so those of Lūchū and Kyūshū have furnished that element in the tongue of modern Japan. Furthermore they have furnished Japan with her Imperial House and with the greater part of her aristocracy and ruling caste. So far from southern Kyūshū and Lūchū having been peopled from Korea, it is not at all either impossible or even unlikely that it was South-Western Korea that was peopled from Lūchū and Kyūshū. That Southern Kyūshū and South-Western Korea should have been settled by immigrants from the Southern Seas need excite less surprise than the fact that Madagascar has been mainly peopled not from

the neighbouring continent of Africa but from a remote Malayo-Polynesian centre.*

The hold of the Chinese upon Northern and Central Korea lasted for no more than two generations—from 106 to 36 B.C. Although they appear to have had no immediate political foothold in the extreme south of the Peninsula at this time, they were able to enter into relations not only with the native rulers in this district but even with Japanese chieftains in their mountainous island in the midst of the ocean, and to glean rough details about this mysterious land. Towards the end of the later Han dynasty (25-220 A.D.) we meet with a sort of summary of what the Chinese had then ascertained about their island neighbours. From this it appears that some chieftain in Southern Japan sent an envoy with tribute to the Chinese Court, which thought fit to bestow a seal and a ribbon upon him. Half-a-century later (107 A.D.) a certain king of Wa (*i.e.* Japan) presented 160 living persons and made a request for an interview. The next important item we meet with refers to the latter half of the second century A.D. "During the reigns of Hwan-ti and Ling-ti (A.D. 147-190) Wa (*i.e.* Japan) was in a state of great confusion, and there was a civil war for many years, during which time there was no chief. Then (*i.e.*, about or after 190 A.D.) there arose a woman, old and unmarried, who had devoted herself to magic arts, by which she was clever in deluding the people. The nation agreed together to set her up as Queen. She has 1,000 female attendants; but few people see her face, except one man, who serves her meals and is the medium of communication with her. She dwells in a palace with lofty pavilions, surrounded by a stockade, and is protected by a guard of soldiers. The laws and customs are strict."

All this is substantially corroborated by certain passages in the Wei records written some half century later.**

* The chief objection to the above hypothesis is ethnographical. Dr. Baelz writes: "Die Liū-kiū-Leute haben nicht die Spur von malayischen Typus an sich." [See *Mittheilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, 28stes Heft S.340.] Other writers have found points of physical resemblance to the Ainus among them. Is it possible that at one time the Ainus extended far down into Kyūshū, that while an invading southern tribe pressed the main body towards the north, a remnant was driven to take refuge southwards? In that case the adoption of the language of the invaders by the (hypothetical) Lūchū Ainus would call for explanation.

** To the average Western reader such terms as Han and Wei records are no doubt next door to meaningless. To make things clear, it may be well to say that on the fall of the Han dynasty (after a sway of some four hundred and twenty years) in A.D. 220, China fell apart into

“They (*i.e.* the Japanese) had formerly kings, but for seventy or eighty years there was great confusion and civil war prevailed. After a time they agreed to set up a woman named Himeko as their sovereign. She had no husband, but her younger brother assisted her in governing the country. After she became Queen, few persons saw her.”

That this Japanese “She” was something more substantial than a mere myth may be inferred that in the Wei Chi we meet with full details of missions sent by her to the Northern Chinese Court at Lohyang in 238 and 243 A.D.; while several communications passed between her and the Chinese Prefect of Tai-fang (not far from the modern Seöul) in Korea.

In 247 “a messenger came to the Prefect of Tai-fang from Wa (Japan) to explain the causes of the enmity which had always prevailed between Queen Himeko and Himekuko, King of Konu. A letter was sent admonishing them. At this time Queen Himeko died. A great mound was raised over her, more than a hundred paces in diameter, and over 1,000 of her male and female attendants followed her in death. Then a king was raised to the throne, but the people would not obey him, and civil war again broke out. A girl of thirteen, a relative of Himeko, named Iyo (or Yih-yii) was then made Queen and order was restored.” At this time another Chinese envoy appeared in Japan, and was safely escorted back, a number of slaves, pearls and other things being then sent as presents.

Doubtless it was from such missions as the preceding that the Chinese obtained their knowledge of Japan. It is to be observed that the exchange of communications between the Chinese authorities and the islanders was not confined to a

three rival States. One under Liu Pi had its capital in Sz'chuen and embraced the upper Yang-tse valley and the south-west of the old Empire. The second under Siun Kien with its capital at Nanking stretched south along the sea-board from Shantung and the Yellow River to the mountains of Fukien. The third, under Tsao Tsao, with its capital at Lohyang, comprised the northern provinces. These States were known as the Shuh, the Wu, and the Wei respectively; and the period of their existence (220-265 A.D.) is one of the most stirring and picturesque in the whole course of Chinese history. About a thousand years afterwards Lo Kuang-Chung took their struggles as the theme of his *San Kuo Chih Yen*—undoubtedly the greatest historical romance produced in the Far East. In Japan its effect has been perhaps even greater than it has been in China. In course of time it became the favourite reading of the Japanese Samurai,—the so-called *bushi*,—and any attempt to account for the growth of what is now known as Bushido can be attended with but partial success, unless the influence of this novel be taken into account. In its pages the Japanese *bushi* found not a few of his ideals.

central Japanese government. The country was divided into more than 100 "provinces"—more probably tribes or clans—and of these thirty-two provinces communicated with the Han authorities by a postal service. This communication is said to have begun shortly after the Chinese conquest of Northern and Central Korea in 106 B.C. Naturally the missions must have been under the conduct of Chinese officials or Chinese adventurers, who at that early date had penetrated into most of the surrounding semi-barbaric States, and found their own personal account in opening up and promoting intercourse between the chieftains of the regions in which they had settled and the nearest Chinese authorities, and, if possible, the Chinese Court. It was such adventurers who composed dispatches for Mongols and Manchus and Huns and Koreans and Japanese at a time when these peoples were all innocent of any acquaintance either with the Chinese language or the art of writing. We have something like an analogy to all this in the famous Japanese embassies to the Pope in 1582, and to the city of Seville, the King of Spain, and the Pope in 1614. And just as it is to the European missionaries who really organised and conducted these embassies that we are indebted for what is most valuable in the data accessible to us about the Japan of the later sixteenth and earlier seventeenth century, so it is these early Chinese adventurers that we have to thank for the only authentic accounts we have of primæval Japan.

At the time these Han and Wei records were compiled in the third century A.D. there seem to have been two, and possibly more, independent Japanese States in Japan, for we are expressly told that the kings of Konu, who held sway somewhere in the neighbourhood of the present Tōkyō, were of the same race as the Japanese of Yamato but not subject to them. The chief power, Great Wa, had its seat in Yamato,—in other words in the district around Lake Biwa, and between Lake Biwa and the Pacific. It evidently extended along both shores of the Inland Sea, on to Nagato and Chikuzen, on which it contrived to keep a very firm hand. In these quarters there were local hereditary kings or princelets, but they all stood in wholesome awe of the Imperial Local Commissioner who had his seat at Ito in the latter province, and who had subordinates stationed at various points in the interior. It is tolerably clear that the Yamato authorities regarded this north-western corner of Kyūshū with special solicitude inasmuch as it was

their base for enterprises in Southern Korea, where their influence was much stronger than it was in the centre and south of Kyūshū itself. At one time there had evidently been an independent community in Idzumo on the coast of the Sea of Japan; but possibly long before this date it had been incorporated in the dominions of the Great Was.

From these records we furthermore gather that the Japanese had distinctions of rank, that some were vassals to others, that taxes were collected, that there were markets in the various provinces for the exchange of superfluous commodities, under the supervision of the central authorities. It is somewhat surprising to find how often the assertion that all the islanders practised tattooing is reiterated in these records. "The men, both small and great, tattoo their faces and work designs on their bodies." "The men all tattoo their faces and adorn their bodies with designs. Differences of rank are indicated by the position and size of the patterns." "The women use pink and scarlet to smear their bodies with, as rice-powder is used in China." Japanese women have always been well spoken of by sojourners in the land, it would seem. "The women are faithful and not jealous," we are explicitly told by these early Chinese travellers. We are furthermore informed that they were more numerous than the men, and strangely enough the very first remark made by the Japanese gentleman whom I entrusted with the task of analysing the earliest Japanese census records (about 700 A.D.) was about the astonishing preponderance of females even in those later days! In those early times there seems to have been no lack of occupation for them—"All men of high rank have four or five wives, others two or three"! "There is no theft, and litigation is infrequent." Froez was almost to repeat these words thirteen centuries later! "The wives and children of those who break the laws are confiscated (one source of slaves) and for grave crimes the offender's family is extirpated."

"Mourning lasts for some ten days only, during which time the members of the family weep and lament, whilst their friends come singing, dancing and making music. They practise divination by burning bones and by that means ascertain good and bad luck, and whether or not to undertake journeys and voyages. They appoint a man whom they style the 'mourning-keeper.' He is not allowed to comb his hair, to wash, to eat meat, or to approach women. When they are fortunate they,

make him valuable presents; but if they fall ill, or meet with disaster, they set it down to the mourning-keeper's failure to observe his vows and together they put him to death."

The correctness of all this is substantiated by later native sources. In this early Japanese "medicine-man" we have no difficulty in recognising the IMIBE of the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* and the Shintō rituals.

One particular assertion we meet with in these records raises the question of how the Japanese reckoned time. "The Was are not acquainted with the New Year or the four Seasons, but reckon the year by the spring cultivation of the fields, and by the autumn ingathering of the crops." . . . "They are a long-lived race, and *persons who have reached 100 years are very common.*"

Now at the date of the compilation of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi* at the beginning of the eighth century Japanese literati were well acquainted with Chinese histories. In fact the *Nihongi* bristles with passages transferred *verbatim et literatim* from these histories, and applied to embellish the record of mythical and legendary Japan. That the compilers of the earliest official annals were acquainted with the above passage is more than likely. And it is at least possible that it may have furnished them with one of the inducements which led them to bestow the gift of longevity upon their early Emperors in such lordly measure. Of the one hundred and four sovereigns of Japan who occupied the throne between 400 A.D. and 1867 A.D. only seventeen attained the span of three score years and ten, and of these not one lived to ninety, while no more than four exceeded the age of eighty years. And with respect to the earliest two of these four our chronology is doubtful. Now to the period of 1,060 years antecedent to 400 A.D. the official annalists assigned no more than sixteen rulers, the average reign thus running to 66 years. One of these, Chūai Tennō, who died in 200 A.D. after a short reign of eight years, was only 52 at that date; but then the *Nihongi* by implication asserts that he was born 37 years after the death of his father, Prince Yamato-dake no Mikoto. The second, third, and fourth in the line of these legendary Emperors lived to 84, 57, and 77 respectively. But of all the others not one fell short of a century; the assigned ages ranging indeed from 108 to 143, the average for the twelve being 122 years. Thus possibly the official annalists regarded

the preceding statement in the Han records as a hint too valuable to be neglected.

After 265 A.D. communication between China and Japan apparently ceased ; at all events it is only early in the fifth century that we again begin to glean information about contemporary Japan from the records of the Middle Kingdom. For the intervening century and a half the sole foreign source available for stray notices of Japan and the Japanese is the standard histories of Ancient Korea. The most extensive is the *Tong-guk Tong-Kam*—commonly referred to as the *Tong-Kam*—which was published somewhere about 1470 A.D. This had been preceded by the *Sam-guk-sa* or History of the Three Countries compiled in 1145 from the original annals and records of the kingdoms of Koguryu (37 B.C.—668 A.D.), Pakche (17 B.C.—660 A.D.) and Silla (57 B.C.—935 A.D.). About the authenticity and trustworthiness of the very earliest of these records, authorities differ; it is to a great extent a question of the date of the introduction of the art of writing into, and its diffusion in, the Peninsula. Mr. Courant thinks it likely that while the northern kingdom of Koguryu from its proximity to China may have had a tincture of Chinese letters from early times, it was only between 347 and 375 that passing events began to get committed to writing in Pakche, and that Silla lagged behind Japan even, in this respect. Consequently, if this be so the details of Pakche history previous to the middle of the fourth century and of that of Silla till a still later period repose upon oral tradition “ *et ne méritent qu’une demi-créance.*”*

* Mr. Hulbert's faith in the authenticity and credibility of early Korean history is of a very robust and sturdy type. “The Chinese written character was introduced into Korea as a permanent factor about the time of Christ, and with it came the possibility of permanent historical records. That such records were kept is quite apparent from the fact that the dates of all solar eclipses have been carefully preserved from the year 57 B.C. . . . On the whole we may conclude that from the year 57 B.C. Korean histories are fairly accurate.”—Preface to his *History of Korea*. Now unfortunately it is in the annals not of Koguryu but of Silla that these solar eclipses are recorded,—Silla being the latest of the three peninsular kingdoms to feel the influence of Chinese culture. Buddhism, introduced into Koguryu in 372, did not reach Silla until the middle of the succeeding century; in fact, it was only from 528 that it became an effective force there. With the spread of the new religion the diffusion of Chinese culture kept pace, and so when in 545 orders were issued for the compilation of a national history, there were several who could turn to Chinese records with profit. The Buddhist monks had naturally introduced their religious books in the first place; but they were not long in bringing in the Chinese

In the first four centuries of our era the Silla annals make mention of some thirteen or fourteen Japanese descents on the coasts ; in the fifth century alone an almost equal (eleven) number of hostile attempts on the part of the islanders is recorded. Apart from this we meet with a few other references to intercourse with Japan. In B.C. 48 we are told the Japanese pirates stopped their incursions into the Peninsula for the time being. Thirty years later we meet with a Japanese high in the service of the Silla King. In 158 A.D. we come across the strange legend of Yung-o and Seo-o, Silla subjects who were spirited across the sea to become sovereigns in Japan, leaving their own native land in darkness, to the great consternation of the authorities. The story of how light was ultimately restored to Silla reminds one of the Amaterasu and Susanoo legend. About a century later we are told that the first envoy ever received from Japan arrived in Silla (249 A.D.). A Korean general told him that it would be well for his King and Queen to come and be slaves in the kitchen of the King of Silla. The envoy at once turned about and returned to Japan, and soon a punitive expedition from the islands appeared. The offending Korean told the King of what he had done, and then walked straight into the Japanese camp and offered himself as a sacrifice. The Japanese burned him alive and then withdrew. Next year the same envoy came once more and was well received by the Silla King. But the general's wife obtained leave to work in the kitchen of the envoy's establishment and contrived to poison his food, and that put an effectual stop to the exchange of diplomatic civilities between the two countries for some considerable time. At last, in 300 A.D., another friendly mission from Japan appeared, and a return embassy was sent. Twelve years later (312) the Japanese asked for a matrimonial alliance with Silla, and the daughter of a Silla noble was sent as a consort for the Japanese sovereign. In

classics; various *historical* works, books on *astronomy*, *astrology* and *medicine*, and some Taoist volumes.

Now, is it not more than likely that the Silla historiographers found their data for the early eclipses in these Chinese histories and works on astronomy? Furthermore, Mr. Aston has collated the dates of certain events recorded in Chinese and Korean histories of the first five centuries of our era, and finds among the sixteen instances investigated ten cases of agreement in date, against two disagreements, while Korean history is silent regarding the other four. But, if the Silla historians were drawing upon these various Chinese historical works, introduced by the Buddhist priests, as sources, agreement in date is just what might be expected.

344 another similar request was refused, and in the following year the Japanese Court *wrote* to break off all intercourse with Silla.

If we are to believe the *Nihongi*, Silla had been conquered by Jingō. Kōgō in 200 A.D., and the Kings of Pakche and Koguryu had then sent envoys to acknowledge the suzerainty of Japan. After that all three kingdoms had meanwhile more or less carefully complied with the obligations they had then incurred to send tribute. Now, down to 400 A.D. no confidence whatsoever can be reposed either in the chronology of the *Nihongi* or in the individual incidents it professes to record. Valuable institutional and social items may possibly enough be gleaned from its pages; but when perfervid patriotic enthusiasts begin to dilate upon its claims to our respect as a history, we can do nothing but smile and pass on. The question of the credibility of the early Silla annals may be left to the judgement of the reader; the essential considerations have been adduced already.

As regards Japanese intercourse with the kingdom of Pakche, we find ourselves on somewhat more solid ground. The event in this connection recorded in the *Nihongi*,—the submission of the Pakche sovereign to Jingō Kōgō in 200 A.D.,—is doubtless mythical. But a few pages later on in the *Nihongi* we meet with the first of a series of incidents which are seemingly more or less authentic, as not a few of them can be traced in the Korean records. But the remarkable thing is that the compilers of the *Nihongi* have *ante-dated them by two cycles or 120 years*. Mr. Aston had no difficulty in establishing this interesting fact independently; but he had been anticipated by the great Japanese scholar Motoori, who had arrived at a similar result a century before the acute Irish critic. This means that certain events assigned to 225, 260, 265, 272, 277, and so on, by the *Nihongi* really occurred in 357, 380, 385, 392, and 397 respectively. Of these the one given under 284 is perhaps the most important of the series. "In 284 the King of Pakche sent Atogi with tribute of two good horses. Atogi was placed in charge of the Imperial stables. He could read the classics well, and the Heir Apparent became his pupil. The Emperor asked him whether there were any better scholars in Pakche than himself. He said, 'Yes, one Wani,' whereupon a Japanese official was sent to bring him." Wani arrived in the following year, and became the

instructor of the Prince in the Chinese classics. Now, for 284 A.D. we must substitute 404 A.D. The *Sam guk-sa* tells us that it was only between 346 and 375 A.D. that passing events began to get committed to writing in Pakche, while the *Tongkam* is even still more explicit. "In 375 A.D. Pakche appointed a certain Kohung as professor. It was not till now that Pakche had any records. *The country had no writing previous to this time.*"

Of course the bearing of all this upon the authenticity of what passes as early Japanese history is self-apparent, not only to such as insist that history is a science, but even to those who merely hold that, while history in as far as it is an art of presentation must be regarded as literature, historians must be rigorously scientific in their methods of investigation. In the *Nihongi* we read that "on the 8th day of the 8th month, 403 A.D., local recorders were appointed for the first time in the various provinces, who noted down statements and communicated the writings of the four quarters." That such officers were appointed is indeed credible enough, but that they were appointed a year or two before the introduction of the art of writing into Japan is not credible. What is likely is that in the course of that or the subsequent generations Korean scribes may have been assigned to some such duty. It is an interesting fact that the earliest date of the accepted Japanese chronology which is substantiated by external evidence is 461 A.D.

In addition to foreign contemporary records there is still one more "source" for Japanese history previous to 461 A.D. But in dealing with this special source the exercise of the greatest caution is necessary, for archæology has been responsible for some strange vagaries. However, the student is strongly recommended to study Mr. Gowland's monograph on "The Dolmens of Japan and their Builders" in the Transactions of the Japan Society, London, 1897-8.* The learned author places the beginning of the dolmen age in the second century before Christ and its close somewhere between 600 and 700 A.D. The correctness of the latter assumption is confirmed by contemporary records. The great statesman Kamatari died in 669 A.D. and was buried in a dolmen tumulus. His

* Also see Aston's note to p. 135, Vol. I., of his translation of the *Nihongi*, and the references to Misasagi in the index.

son Jōe was then in China studying for the Buddhist priesthood, and on his return he had his father's corpse removed and buried under a miniature pagoda of stone. This marked the decline of the old system of interment. In 695 A.D. the common people were forbidden to erect mausolea of any kind, and seven years later this prohibition was extended to all under the third rank.

As regards the date of the beginning of the dolmen age there must necessarily be much uncertainty. We know from the language of subsequent legislation that the custom of depositing articles of the highest value in tombs was a comparatively late development,—about the beginning of the fifth century A.D. In the time of Yūryaku (459-479) no expense in the construction of sepulchres was spared; and the people, imitating the example of the Court, expended so much of their substance upon tombs and on valuables to be deposited in them that they became seriously impoverished. Again, in 641, in consequence of the magnificence that attended the obsequies of the Emperor Jomei, elaborate mausolea and expensive funerals caused wide-spread destitution among nobles and people alike. In the drastic decree of 646 dealing with the subject of interments it is roundly asserted that of late the poverty of our people is absolutely owing to the construction of tombs.

However, when we calmly consider how rapidly any fashionable craze or practice has been wont to spread in Japan at all times, it is not necessary to postulate a span of centuries for the evolution of the dolmen. At the beginning of the 17th century what made the Japanese people feel the pinch of poverty was not the erection of mausolea so much as castle-building. Now, what was the length of the period necessary to cover Japan with some 200 or 300 huge fortresses, some of which would have been capable of holding almost the whole of the mausolea of early Japan within their enceintes? The earliest of these fortresses—that of Azuchi—was begun in 1575 or 1576,—forty years later, in 1616, the Tokugawas forbade the erection of any more new castles!

Moreover, even before Yūryaku (459-479) we hear of frequent exchanges of "tribute" between the Japanese and the neighbouring kingdoms in Korea. These foreign articles were most valuable, because most rare in Japan, and precisely on account of their value they would most likely be deposited

in the tombs. Such is the case with the so-called *maga-tama* or "curved jewels" so frequently found in the old sepulchral chambers at all events, for the jade or jade-like stone of which many of them are made is a mineral which has never yet been met with in Japan. May not a good deal of the dolmen pottery be also of Korean provenance?

But perhaps the most suggestive among the archæological spoils of the dolmens is the abundant horse furniture and trappings which have been recovered. Writes Mr. Gowland: "Even in the earliest part of the period the horse was the companion and servant of man." Now, in those Chinese Han records we are distinctly told that at that date (about 220 A.D.) there were no oxen or horses in Japan! Modern zoologists seem to have arrived at conclusions consonant with this statement; one modern authority will have it that the horse was introduced into Japan in the third century A.D. The Japanese word for horse, *uma*, is notoriously of Chinese and not of native origin.

These considerations are of no very great profundity, but they may serve to indicate that caution is necessary when we begin to speculate about the exact date of the beginning of the dolmen-building age in Japan.

The geographical distribution of the dolmens is exceedingly interesting, for it gives us a clue to the chief centres of Japanese power in the early centuries of our era. Yamato and the provinces around the modern Kyōto are richest in these remains. Then come Iwami, Idzumo, Hōki, and Inaba on the Japan Sea, with a connecting group in Tamba. Westward they are found in the Sanyōdō, in Shikoku, and in the east and north of Kyūshū, while their eastward limit is a comparatively small cluster in the Province of Iwaki, a much larger group being found at the junction of the three provinces of Kōdzuke, Shimotzuke, and Musashi. Among the dolmens there is one class deserving of especial attention,—that known as "Imperial burial mounds," termed by Mr. Gowland from their shape "double" mounds, although they never contain more than one dolmen. These large double mounds were undoubtedly the tombs of men of the highest rank or of pre-eminent power. Soga's erection of such a tomb during his lifetime by means of forced labour and State serfs was taken as one strong indication of his intention to usurp the Imperial throne (642 A.D.). "Nearly all the emperors whose names are

recorded in the *Kojiki*, and many whose names and existence have been forgotten, were probably buried in these double mounds. But," continues Mr. Gowland, "I have also found these mounds of Imperial form in the important dolmen districts of Idzumo and Hōki, Bizen, Kōdzuke, and Hyūga. which are remote from the central provinces, the seats of the recognised emperors. This would seem to indicate that these regions were once independent centres, or were governed by chiefs who were regarded as equals with the central ruling family." "Now as regards Kōdzuke, the centre of the kingdom of Konu at the head of Tōkyō Bay, we know from the Han and Wei records that this outpost of the Yamato people in Ainu-land was independent of the Queen of Great Wa in the first half of the third century A.D. There is a great deal in the mythical and legendary part of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi* which points to the early existence of an independent sovereign State in Idzumo on the shore of the Sea of Japan. We hear of the Imperial Court being established in Hyūga for seven years, and at another time for eight years in North-Western Kyūshū, and of Hyūga princesses and Kibi (*i.e.* Bizen) princesses being sent for and wedded by Yamato sovereigns.

Now, let us glance at those sections of Japan where dolmens are not to be found. In the north, south of a line drawn from Kaga, perhaps from Tsuruga to Mount Tsukuba, the Ainu power was still unbroken. In the interior of the mountainous Kii peninsula there were still unsubdued autochthons. And in the south of Kyūshū there were the dreaded and untamable Kumaso.

This brings us to a brief consideration of that vexed topic the origin or origins of the Japanese people,—a subject that has given rise to endless speculation and interminable debate. It seems to be agreed that the earliest inhabitants of these islands were the Ainu—or the Yemishi, as they are called in the oldest Japanese annals—that these entered Yezo from Amur-land, and spread southward, gradually occupying nearly the whole of the main island and even pushing well down into Kyūshū. The evidence adduced consists of place-names and of the "kitchen middens" or shell mounds, with their contents of bones of animals (mingled with a few of men), shells, and stone implements, together with vessels of pottery, but no objects of metal. Their possession of the land appears to have

been first challenged by immigrants from Korea, who gradually established a civilised or semi-civilised State with Idzumo for its centre. To call these immigrants "Koreans" serves no useful purpose, for the population of Korea was exceedingly heterogeneous. Among peoples of various race the Peninsula harboured numbers of Chinese adventurers or refugees escaping from the horrors of dynastic cataclysms, oppressive government or civil strife. Legend has it that a band of such adventurers possessed themselves of a part of South-Western Korea and established among the tribes they found there a kingdom which lasted from 193 to 9 B.C.

Now, Dr. Baelz has pointed out that what is regarded (mistakenly) as the type of the aristocratic Japanese countenance—the fine long oval face with well-chiselled features, oblique eyes with long drooping eyelids and elevated and arched eyebrows, high and narrow forehead, rounded and slightly aquiline nose, bud-like mouth, and pointed chin—is really the aristocratic type among the Chinese, and that this type is not infrequently met with in the Korean Peninsula at the present day. Is it unreasonable to presume that these exceptionally handsome Japanese and Koreans are of Chinese ancestry? Chinese writers mention a belief that the Japanese are descended from the Chinese prince, T'ai Peh of Wu, and that a colony from China under Sii-she settled in Japan in 219 B.C.—the age of the Chinese Napoleon. In a Japanese "Burke" or "Debrett" of the early 9th century of some 1,200 noble families nearly one-third are assigned either a Chinese or a Korean origin. And most of those families appear to have been settled in Idzumo originally.

Altogether it seems not unlikely that the Idzumo State was founded, not by Akkadians, but by Chinese refugees or adventurers direct from China, or by the descendants of Chinese who had settled in Korea,—perhaps by the combined efforts of both at various epochs. The chief objection to this hypothesis may be easily disposed of. That objection is linguistic. The Chinese language is monosyllabic, while Japanese is notoriously polysyllabic, and besides all this the vocabulary and the grammatical structure of the two tongues are about as different as can well be conceived. Now how much Latin is spoken in the British Islands? The Roman invaders present us with an analogy to the position and subsequent fortunes of these (presumably) Chinese adventurers in Idzumo,

only of course with this great difference—that while Latin and Celtic were sister tongues there is apparently no connection between Ainu and Chinese whatever. What was to be the dominant language in Britain was introduced by the Teutonic tribes from the Continent. In course of time Latin and Celtic got swamped—Latin entirely so. And so was it with Ainu and Early Chinese in Japan when brought face to face with the language of that tribe or rather those tribes from the south that evidently played in Japan the part of the Angles, the Saxons, and the Jutes in England. Nor is it necessary to assume that the language of the presumed Chinese settlers in Idzumo was Chinese. It is notorious that at the present day there are thousands of the grandchildren and other descendants of Chinese immigrants into the Dutch East Indies and Siam to whom Chinese is an alien and unknown tongue. The ancestors of the Idzumo adventurers may have been settled in South-Western Korea for several generations, and during this time they may well have lost acquaintance with their own original language and adopted that of the Mahan and other tribes among which they had their settlements; this old South-Western Korean tongue being, according to Mr. Hulbert and others, the basic element in the modern speech of the Peninsula.

According to Sir Ernest Satow's hypothesis, "tradition points to a conquest of Japan from the side of Korea by a people settling in Idzumo and speaking a language allied to Korean. These were followed by a race of warriors coming from the south and landing in Hyūga*—it might be Malay or perhaps a branch of that warlike and intelligent race of which a branch survives in New Zealand, speaking originally a language rich in vowel terminations, who conquered the less warlike but more civilised inhabitants they found in possession, and adopted their language with modifications peculiar to themselves."

About the origin of these southern invaders and about the route by which they arrived in Japan there has been great divergence of opinion. Dr. Baelz, while admitting that they are not of the same stock as the settlers in Idzumo, will have

* Hyūga in primæval times included ōsumi and Satsuma. The early settlement of Jimmu and his ancestors was on the ōsumi, not the Hyūga, side of Mount Kirishima, and it is in the country to the north and west of Kagoshima Gulf and on to Cape Kasasa (or Noma) that the incidents of the legend are localised.

it that they must have entered Japan by the same route as the former,—that is through Korea. Of course this is not impossible ; however, the balance of probability seems to be in favour of Satow's hypothesis. Perhaps even Southern Korea may have been settled from the South Seas *via* Kyūshū. Of course, most of this is hypothetical, and with the limited data at our disposal,—notices in early contemporary Chinese histories, notices from subsequent Korean histories, archaeological discoveries, ethnological and linguistic considerations, and Japanese legend as “selected” for the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*—it is questionable whether in this matter we can ever rise to anything beyond a mere conflict of rival hypotheses. Here as everywhere else it is a case of the survival of the fittest ; and the test of fitness here, as in other hypotheses, is the relative power of explaining all the known facts and such new facts as may emerge, of meeting all objections, and of serviceability as an instrument of research.

Now, keeping this all-important consideration ever in mind, and after perusing the numerous learned, and also unlearned, treatises on this subject, and after much pondering on all that has been advanced, I have been forced to the conclusion that the following hypothetical *résumé* of results may be found of most service to future inquirers. The southern invaders, known at first as Kumaso and later on as Hayato, probably arrived in Southern Kyūshū long before the establishment of the Idzumo State. Of these invaders, evidently of sea-faring proclivities, a branch passed into South-Western Korea, which, according to Mr. Hulbert's hypothesis, was peopled from the south and not from the north. Those settled in Kyūshū came into conflict with the Ainu, a few of whom they may have driven to take refuge in the Lūchū Islands, while the others were exterminated or thrown back into the main island. Meanwhile the Idzumo State got founded by immigrants of Chinese extraction whose ancestors had settled among the Korean Kumaso, had dominated them by their superior culture, but from the paucity of their numbers had been driven to acquire the “Korean-Kumaso” language. Ultimately a branch of the Kyūshū Kumaso came into contact with this Idzumo State, or rather with its outlying dependencies, and had either conquered them, or come to terms and gradually amalgamated with this continental people, their

superiors in culture, but their inferiors in war and in the prosaic work-a-day task of administration, and in real practical ability generally.

The combination of this branch of the Kumaso and the Idzumo men proved irresistible; they pushed their conquests eastward along both shores of the Inland Sea, and ultimately established a strong central State in Yamato, at the expense of the aboriginal Ainu, who may already have found themselves hard pressed by the impact of the Idzumo people from the north-west. Then gradually, partly by arms, partly by astute diplomacy and a constant process of amalgamation, this Yamato power at last succeeded in establishing a suzerainty over Idzumo and so subjecting to its control the whole of the main island west of a line drawn from Tsuruga to Owari, and the northern sea-boards of Shikoku and Kyūshū, the rest of which meanwhile remained in possession of other Kumaso tribes which continued to lead an independent but uncultured existence of their own. In course of time a body of the Yamato Was, now a mixed race of Kumaso and Idzumo men, pushed on into Ainuland, and established the independent kingdom of Konu in the Great Plain of Musashi in the basins of the Tone and Sumida Rivers.

The Kumaso who fared forth to find their fortunes in the Idzumo domains bore pretty much the same relation to the Kumaso who remained in their earlier southern seats in Kyūshū that the Franks, who established themselves in Gaul about the time of Clovis, did to those Teutonic tribes who remained behind in the forests of Germany and who were subjected to the sway of their more civilised brethren by Charlemagne some three centuries afterwards.

One interesting matter in connection with this has been alluded to by Dr. Baelz, who points out that the members of the Imperial House generally have the southern or Satsuma type of features. Now, during the last millenium or more the Emperors have taken their consorts from one great house mainly,—from the Fujiwara to wit. And the first ancestor of this house is represented as descending from Heaven with the grandchild of the Sun Goddess, when he appeared in Ōsumi to take possession of Japan. A less remote ancestor was Jimmu Tennō's staunch and trusty henchman. It is true that after his conquest of Central Japan Jimmu is represented as wedding a Yamato princess, and we are told that it was

from the issue of this marriage that the successor to the throne and the subsequent Imperial line came, Jimmu's eldest son, born in Kyūshū the offspring of a Kyūshū mother, having been set aside to his not unnatural discontent. The Yamato marriage may have been resorted to as a political device to forward the amalgamation of the southerners and the Idzumo people. However, the fact remains that the dominant strain in the Imperial House is Fujiwara, that its members have mostly the Satsuma type of countenance and physique, and that legend assigns the Imperial line and the Fujiwaras alike a southern or Satsuma origin.

CHAPTER II.

LEGENDARY JAPAN.

(JAPANESE SOURCES.)

WE may now proceed to avail ourselves of such light as the native Japanese mythical legendary narratives throw upon the situation previous to 400 A.D. Such light is at best crepuscular. The earliest Japanese document we possess is the *Kojiki*, or Record of Ancient Matters, which was compiled in 712 A.D.,—that is, some ten generations after the close of the period we propose to deal with in this chapter. It was in the first of these ten generations (about 404 A.D.) that the art of writing was introduced into Japan; and even so it seems the keeping of records and of treasury accounts was entrusted to and remained in the hands of a corporation of scribes of Korean origin for two centuries. Doubtless their occupation was mainly with ordinary work-a-day contemporary exigencies. However, we know that when an Emperor or a great chieftain was entombed in his last resting-place,—the mausoleum that took months or sometimes, indeed, years to construct,—it was customary for the great Ministers or the most prominent clansman to pronounce the eulogies of the august deceased. In these funeral orations, doubtless, abundant stress was laid upon ancient, perhaps divine lineage, and the merits and exploits of ancestors immediate and remote. We hear of such eulogies being *read*. Likely enough, then, these Korean scribes may have been called upon to commit them to writing,—perhaps even to compose them. These documents, if kept, as they would naturally be, would be of great value as material to future historians or annalists.

It was not till Buddhism had obtained a secure foothold among the upper classes—shortly before 600 A.D. and after intercourse with China was, after an interruption of a century, resumed—that the native Japanese began to show any great enthusiasm for scholarly pursuits. It was only in 621 A.D., two centuries after the introduction of the art of writing, that the first History of Japan was produced. Part of this work,

the History of the Emperors, was lost in the Great Revolution of 645; but one portion, the History of the Country, was saved, and ultimately got incorporated in one or other of two subsequent works, the *Kojiki* (712 A.D.) and the *Nihongi* (720 A.D.).

It is to these works exclusively that we must go for any information from written native sources about Ancient Japan. It is needless to say that inasmuch as everything set forth antecedent to 400 A.D. reposes on mere tradition these records down to that date must be utilised with the greatest caution. But there is a still more important consideration. These annals do not give us the traditions of ancient Japan but merely a *selection* from these traditions. Yasumaro, who edited and committed the *Kojiki* to writing (and who was also joint-author of the later *Nihongi*), tells us this expressly in his preface:—

“Hereupon the Heavenly Sovereign (*i.e.* Temmu Tennō in 681) commanded saying: ‘I hear that the chronicles of the Emperors and likewise the original works in the possession of the various families deviate from exact truth, and are mostly amplified by empty falsehoods. If at the present time these imperfections be not amended, ere many years the purport of this, the great basis of the country, the great foundation of the monarchy, will be destroyed. So now I desire to have the chronicles of the Emperors *selected* and recorded; and the old words examined and ascertained, falsehoods being erased and the truth determined, in order to transmit the (latter) to after ages.’ At that time there was a retainer whose surname was Hiyeda and his personal name Are. He was 28 years old (in 681), and of so intelligent a disposition that he could repeat with his mouth whatever met his eyes, and record in his heart whatever struck his ears. Forthwith Are was commanded to learn by heart the genealogies of the Emperors, and likewise the words of former ages. Nevertheless, time elapsed and the age changed, and the thing was not yet carried out. . . . Then, on November 3rd, 711, the ruling Empress Gemmyō commanded me, Yasumaro, to *select* and record the old words learnt by Hiyeda-no-Are according to the Imperial Decree, and dutifully to lift them up to Her. In reverent obedience to the contents of the Decree I have *made a careful choice.*”

A reference to the *Nihongi* (Aston's Translation, Vol. II., 380) shows that two of the twelve commissioners entrusted

with the task of compiling annals in 681 “took the pen in hand themselves and made notes.” So it is not necessary to assume that Are’s memory continued for thirty years to be the sole depository of the data that ultimately became the *Kojiki* in 711. Nor does a careful examination of the language of Yasumaro’s Preface commit us to the necessity of maintaining that he simply wrote out what fell from Are’s lips.

The need of a *selection* and a *careful* choice will become apparent when we consider the political objects the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* were alike composed to subserve. In 647, shortly after the great and startling *coup-d’état* of 645, we meet with the following in an Imperial Decree:—“The Empire was entrusted (by the Sun-Goddess to her descendants, with the words) ‘My children in their capacity of Deities shall rule it.’ For this reason, this country, since Heaven and Earth began, has been a monarchy. From the time that Our Imperial Ancestor first ruled the land, there has been great concord in the Empire, and there has never been any factiousness.*

“In recent times, however, the names, first of the Gods and then of the Emperors, have in some cases been separated (from their proper application) and converted into the Uji (*i.e.*, family names) of Ōmi or Muraji, or they have been separated and made the qualifications of Miyakko, etc. In consequence of this, the minds of the people of the whole country take a strong partisan bias, and conceiving a deep sense of the me and thee, hold firmly each to their names. Moreover the feeble and incompetent Ōmi, Muraji, Tomo no Miyakko and Kuni no Miyakko [all kinds of local chieftains,—heads of groups, corporations, clans, or chiefs of districts] make of such names their family names; and so the names of Gods and the names of Sovereigns are applied to persons and places in an unauthorised manner, in accordance with the bent of their own feelings. Now, by using the names of Gods and the names of Sovereigns as bribes, they draw to themselves the slaves of others, and so bring dishonour upon unspotted names. The consequence is that the minds of the people have become unsettled and the government of the country cannot be carried on. The

* This assertion is notoriously at variance with the records, which are full of accounts of factiousness, rebellions, and internal broils and brawls and battles. The language of these decrees frequently sets forth as fact merely what the authorities wish to be believed.

duty has therefore now devolved on us in Our Capacity as Celestial Divinity to regulate and settle these things.”

Some Japanese scholars have perhaps not altogether unreasonably complained that the purport of this is obscure. However, an earlier passage in the *Nihongi* may help to elucidate the matter somewhat.

415 A.D.—“The Emperor (Ingyō) made a decree, saying :— ‘In the most ancient times good government consisted in the subjects having each one his proper place, and in names being correct. It is now four years since We entered on the auspicious office. Superiors and inferiors dispute with one another: the hundred surnames are not at peace. Some by mischance lose their proper surnames; others purposely lay claim to high family. This is perhaps the reason why good government is not attended to.’

“After consulting the Ministers the following edict was then issued :—‘The Ministers, functionaries and the Miyakko of the various provinces each and all describe themselves, some as descendants of Emperors, others attributing to their race a miraculous origin, *and saying that their ancestors came down from heaven.* However, since the three Powers of Nature assumed distinct forms, many tens of thousands of years have elapsed, so that single houses have multiplied, and have formed anew ten thousand surnames of doubtful authenticity. Therefore let the people of the various houses and surnames wash themselves and practise abstinence, and let them, each one calling the Gods to witness, plunge their hands in boiling water.’ The cauldrons of the ordeal by boiling water were therefore placed on the ‘Evil Door of Words’ spur of the Amagashi Hill. Everybody was told to go thither, saying :—‘He who tells the truth will be uninjured; he who is false will assuredly suffer harm.’ Hereupon every one put on straps of tree-fibre and coming to the cauldrons, plunged their hands in the boiling water, when those who were true remained naturally uninjured, and all those who were false were harmed. Therefore those who had falsified (their titles) were afraid, and, slipping away beforehand, did not come forward. From this time forward the houses and surnames were spontaneously ordered, and there was no longer anyone who falsified them.”*

* The *Kojiki* deals with all this in a single sentence :—“The Heavenly Sovereign, lamenting the transgressions in the surnames and gentile names of the people of all the surnames and names in the Em-

In Professor Chamberlain's masterly *résumé* of the contents of the *Kojiki* we meet with the following sentences:—"After Suizei Tennō (581-549 B.C.) occurs a blank of (according to the accepted chronology) five hundred years, during which absolutely nothing is related excepting dreary genealogies. . . . From this time (400 A.D.) forward the story in the *Kojiki*, though not well told, gives us some very curious pictures, and reads as if it were trustworthy. It is tolerably full for a few reigns, after which it *again dwindles into mere genealogies*, ending with the death of the Empress Suiko in 628 A.D."

Now, it may be shrewdly suspected that the chief *raison d'être* of the *Kojiki* was to furnish these genealogies, for apart from the previously cited passages from the *Nihongi*, we have a good many more hints leading us to infer that this very convenient and very potent weapon of a claim to divine descent was being wielded by more than one of the chiefs of the great houses contending for supremacy in old Yamato. In the fifth and sixth centuries, the Ōtomo, the Mononobe, the Soga and others, with the Iwai in Kyūshū and the Kibi in Mimana in Korea, were all to be reckoned with by those Nakatomi, or Fujiwara, who ultimately succeeded in breaking the power of the rival clans, in centralising the government and in making themselves the masters of the Empire of Japan. The *coup d'état* of 645 marked the beginning of a political and social transformation not a whit less startling than that of 1868. A full account of that amazing Revolution must be reserved for a subsequent chapter; but here even, for our present purpose, something must be known about it.

It may suffice to say that the Reformers established a strongly centralised government on the Chinese model, the Emperor at the head claiming absolute power; a strong and efficient Ministry, with a well-organised Bureaucracy under it, and local Governors in the outlying provinces making its authority felt at the expense of that of the old semi-indepen-

pire, placed jars (for trial by) hot water at the Wondrous Cape of Eighty Evils in Words at Amakashi, and deigned to establish the surnames and gentile names of eighty heads of companies." This is a not unfair sample of the way in which the *Nihongi* decks out the simple data of the *Kojiki* in Chinese embroidery. It must not be forgotten for a moment that Yasumaro was at once the *rédacteur* of the *Kojiki* and joint-author (with Prince Toneri) of the *Nihongi*, published eight years after the *Kojiki*.

dent territorial aristocracy. The personnel of the new administration was to a great extent furnished by the former magnates; and in the case of those who did not come to Court but stayed on in their former domains there was a tendency to recognise them as heads of districts acting under the Provincial Governor. But many of the old chiefs did not welcome the new state of things with enthusiasm, and it was desirable to break their power and render them innocuous. The provincial Governors were directed to look closely into the titles of those who aspired to authority. "If there be any persons," they were instructed in 645, "who lay claim to a title but who, not being Kuni no Miyakko, Tomo no Miyakko, or Inaki of districts *by descent*, unscrupulously draw up lying memorials, saying, 'From the time of our forefathers we have had charge of this Miyake, or have ruled this district,' in such cases, ye, the Governors, must not readily make application to the Court in acquiescence in such fictions, but must ascertain particularly the true facts before making your report." Here the question of genealogies was evidently of considerable practical consequence.

Meanwhile, Buddhism had been adopted and regulated as the State religion in the interests of the State; Chinese learning had also been encouraged but at the same time made subservient to political ends, and although the old Shintō cult was for the time treated with neglect by Ministers and Sovereign alike, its potentialities as an instrument of government were again recognised in the course of the next century, and its rituals elaborated by the astute Fujiwaras, those past-masters in state-craft. And the centralised monarchy had found it advisable to increase its stability by yet another buttress,—the compilation of an official history.

This enterprise was taken in hand in 681 A.D., but the work on it had been interrupted: and it was, as has been said, not until 711 that the *Kojiki* appeared, to be followed (and to be practically superseded for generations) by the *Nihongi* eight or nine years later (720).

The *Nihongi*, although a much longer work than the one that preceded it, is very much more occupied with the ages more immediately antecedent to the date of its compilation than is the *Kojiki*. Whereas of the 830 pages of Aston's translation 530 are devoted to the period from 400 to 697 A.D., and only 300 to mythical and legendary Japan, three-fourths of the bulk

of the *Kojiki* (133 sections out of 180) are occupied with the tales of the Gods and of the series of long-lived Emperors which came to an end with Nintoku Tennō in 399 A.D.

Inasmuch as the authors of both works,—those of the *Nihongi* notoriously so—tend to project the ideas of their own times or of the ages immediately antecedent to them into the primæval past, any attempt to reconstruct Ancient Japan from their pages is bound to prove unsatisfactory, if not doomed to hopeless failure. Yet perhaps with the aid of the feeble light afforded by the other data at our disposal something may be effected. At all events it is necessary to know, not perhaps what was the case, but what these earliest Japanese logographers asserted to have been the case, for the selected early traditions have had a marked effect upon national thought and political developments at several weighty crises in the subsequent history of the Empire,—notably in the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries.

In the Japanese mythology as officially “selected” in the eighth century, we begin in the Plain of High Heaven, where a succession of deities come into existence without creation and afterwards die. In course of time five pairs (male and female) of gods are born, the last of which, a brother and a sister named Izanagi and Izanami, were ordered to descend in order to make, consolidate and give birth to this drifting land. The legend makes them alight somewhere in the Inland Sea near Awaji, and they at once set to work to give birth to the Islands of Japan (the items in the lists of the various versions differing in number and occasionally in name), and to some thirty or forty deities. In giving birth to the last of them—the Fire God—Izanami loses her life and is buried on the borders of Idzumo and Hoki. Inconsolable for his loss, Izanagi, Orpheus-like, visits her in the underworld to implore her to return to him. She would willingly do so, and bids him wait while she consults with the deities of the place. But he, impatient at her long tarrying, breaks off one of the end-teeth of the comb stuck in the left bunch of his hair, lights it and goes in, only to find her a hideous mass of corruption, in the midst of which sit the Eight Gods of Thunder. Angry at being put to shame, Izanami sends the hosts of hell to pursue Izanagi, who escapes with difficulty, and, blocking up the Even Pass of Hades with a rock, stands opposite to his former spouse on the other side of it, and exchanges a bitter leave-

taking with her. "So what was called the Even-Pass-of-Hades is now called the Ifuya Pass in the Land of Idzumo."

From Idzumo, then, Izanagi proceeds to Hyūga to purify himself, by bathing in a stream there. As he does so, fresh deities are born from each article of clothing he throws down on the river-bank, and from each part of his person. One of these deities is the Sun-Goddess, who was born from his left eye, while the Moon-God sprang from his right eye, and the last born of all, Susa-no-wo ("the Impetuous Male"), was born from his nose. Between these three children their father divides the inheritance of the universe,—the claims of his other fifty odd children and those of the denizens of High Heaven being alike unconsidered.

As Professor Chamberlain points out, there are two early (an Idzumo and a Kyūshū) cycles of Legends and a later one (that of Yamato); and the "selectors" of the myths have been at no small pains to dove-tail these into each other in a sufficiently neat and plausible fashion. In these two incidents above quoted—that of the Even Pass of Hades in Idzumo and of Izanagi's purification and the birth of the Sun-Goddess and Susa-no-wo in Hyūga—we find the earliest attempt to link these two centres.

In the immediate sequel in the legend we may perhaps discern a still further effort in the same direction. The Moon-God is no more heard of; and while the Sun-Goddess ascends to assume rule in the Plain of High Heaven, Susa-no-wo, instead of taking charge of the sea, goes on crying and weeping till his beard reaches the pit of his stomach. When remonstrated with about all this by his father, this Impetuous Male, oblivious of the fact that from his very first breath he had been a motherless child, told his father that he wept because he wished to go to his mother in Hades! Thereupon his father expelled him with a divine expulsion, but the Impetuous Male expressed a wish to go and take leave of his sister the Sun-Goddess before going into exile. His arrival in the Plain of High Heaven was not exactly welcome; the Sun-Goddess arrayed herself in all the panoply of war when she went to meet him. She sternly inquired into the cause of his appearance, and, doubting his assertions, she proposed to him a test of his sincerity. They took their stand on opposite sides of the tranquil River of Heaven, and she begged him to hand her his mighty sabre. She broke it into three pieces and then

crunched these in her mouth and blew the fragments away. Her breath and the fragments blown away turned into three female deities. Then Susa-no-wo (the Impetuous Male) took the jewels which his sister the Sun-Goddess wore, and crunched them in his mouth and blew them out, and they were turned into five male deities.

The question at once arose as to which parent these three female and these five male divinities respectively belonged? The Sun-Goddess claimed the males as her own, and assigned the three females to Susa-no-wo. Now it was the son of the eldest of these five male divinities who descended upon Mount Takachiho in Hyūga to take possession of Japan, and to establish the line of the Mikados. And the Impetuous Male was not only the ancestor of the Idzumo monarchs, but he is actually represented as ruling in Idzumo itself!

The partition of progeny by the Sun-Goddess did not please the Impetuous Male, and in his resentment he committed a series of outrages against his sister the Sun-Goddess, which threatened to be fraught with disastrous consequences. She retired into a murky cavern, and the whole Universe, which was then synonymous with the Plain of High Heaven and certain portions of the islands of the Japanese archipelago, was shrouded in night, much to the inconvenience of the lieges—divine as well as human. By a cunning stratagem the Goddess was at last lured from her retreat, and Gods and men could again go about their lawful business for a fair moiety of their time, while “the eight hundred myriad deities took counsel together, and imposed on His-Swift-Impetuous-Male-Augustness a fine of a thousand tables and likewise cut his beard, and even caused the nails of his fingers and toes to be pulled out, and expelled him with a divine expulsion.”

Yet in spite of all this it is Susa-no-wo who is henceforth the central figure in the mythical narrative for some considerable space. According to one version in the *Nihongi*, accompanied by a son he descended to the Land of Silla in Korea, where he built a boat of clay in which he passed over to Idzumo. There he rescues a maiden from an eight-forked dragon in one of whose tails he finds a wonderful sword, which afterwards becomes one of the items in the regalia of Japan. This sword plays an important part in the myth as a link between Kyūshū and Idzumo. Various versions are given of the way in which

the blade was sent up to the Plain of High Heaven,—some of them make the Impetuous Male himself deliver it up, while one in the *Nihongi* says it was a descendant of his in the fifth generation who did so. At all events, when the Sun-Goddess's grand-child was sent down to Kyūshū to occupy Japan we find the Goddess bestowing this very sword upon him as one of the three sacred insignia.

The Idzumo legend then runs on in comparative isolation for six generations, during which, however, relations with Yamato begin. Ōnamuji, sixth in descent from the Impetuous Male, is ruling in Idzumo as a man of might when a great conclave of Gods is convoked in the High Plain of Heaven to discuss the affairs of Japan, and arrange for their settlement. Of this episode we have several ancillary versions in the *Nihongi* whose main narrative here differs in important details from that of the *Kojiki*. In the *Nihongi* it is not the Sun-Goddess but the Goddess's ancestor eleven generations removed who mainly originates and directs the enterprise. This ancestor, Takamusubi, has a daughter whom he bestows in marriage on the Sun-Goddess's eldest son, and it is in the interests of the son born of this union that this unusually "immortal god" bestirs himself. (According to the *Kojiki* he had come into existence and passed away some æons before.) In the others it is the Sun-Goddess who is the protagonist here, and the grandson who ultimately was sent on the mission was unborn at the date of the great conclave held to discuss the project. A succession of envoys are sent down to Idzumo to summon Ōnamuji to give up his kingdom, but the first three messengers allow themselves to be seduced and beguiled by the beauties of the land. A fourth embassy is at last successful in obtaining the submission of the monarch or deity of Idzumo, who surrenders his throne and undertakes to serve the new dynasty if a palace or temple be built for him and he be appropriately worshipped. One of Ōnamuji's sons proved recalcitrant, however, and fled to Suwa in Shinano, where the temple of Take-minakata, as he was called, is thronged with devotees even at the present time. His brother Koto-shiro-nushi strongly urged compliance with the demands of the Sun-Goddess's envoys, and in consequence of this he was subsequently held in great honour at the Imperial Court, of which he was considered one of the principal protectors. He appears as one of the deities who advised Jingō Kōgō's famous Korean expedition. The Jingikwan included him among the

eight Gods specially worshipped by the Imperial House to the neglect of many more important deities, including even his father, Ōnamuji. One thing that perhaps helps to explain this is that Koto-shiro-nushi figures in the sequel as the grandfather of the second Emperor of Japan, for it was his daughter that Jimmu wedded and made his Empress after the conquest of Yamato. Koto-shiro-nushi is thus an important link, not merely between Idzumo and Kyūshū, but between Idzumo, Kyūshū and Yamato.

Ōnamuji's cult as the Great God of Miwa was also subsequently established in Yamato. Behind the legend we have indications that the more cultured Idzumo State continued to be a source of apprehension to the Yamato rulers, who had no small trouble from time to time in conciliating or crushing the priestly dynasty on the shores of the Sea of Japan that had ostensibly demitted its secular functions.

On receiving the abdication of the Idzumo sovereign, the Sun-Goddess might naturally have been expected to make Idzumo the immediate objective of her grandchild when he fared forth on his mission. However, it is on Mount Takachiho in the land of So (*i.e.* Kumaso) that Ninigi no Mikoto alights with his train ; and the country around the Gulf of Kagoshima now becomes the scene of the legendary incidents.

The Heavenly Grandchild has a *liaison* with a native Satsuma lady, who gives birth to triplets, between the two elder of whom there is discord when they arrive at manhood. In his distress the younger of these fares over sea to the Hall of the Dragon King, whose daughter he weds, and by whose help he is enabled to overcome his elder brother when he returns home. This elder brother, who promises that his descendants will serve those of the victor, is called the ancestor of the Hayato, who, as we shall see, are possibly identical with the Kumaso. The offspring of the younger brother and the daughter of the Dragon King is a prince who, marrying his mother's younger sister, becomes the father of the future first Emperor, Jimmu Tennō, and his three elder brothers.

The legends thus attribute a Satsuma or Kumaso strain of blood to the first earthly generation of the Imperial line, while they also will have it that the Hayato are of the stock of the elder brother of Jimmu Tennō's grandfather

It is Jimmu who brings Kyūshū and Yamato into touch with

each other. Of his three brothers, one "treading on the crest of the waves, crossed over to the Eternal Land,"* while yet another "went into the Sea-Plain, it being his deceased mother's land." But Jimmu and his elder brother, Itsu-se, dwelling in the Palace of Takachiho, took counsel saying: "By dwelling in what place shall we most quietly carry on the government of the Empire? It were probably best to go east." Forthwith they left Himuka (Hyūga or Ōsumi), on their progress to Tsukushi (Chikuzen). "So when they arrived at Usa in the land of Toyo (Buzen) two of the natives, the Prince of Usa and the Princess of Usa, built a palace raised on one foot, and offered them a great august banquet. Removing thence, they dwelt for *one year* at the Palace of Okada in Tsukushi (Chikuzen). Again making a progress up from that land, they dwelt *seven years* at the Palace of Takeri in Aki (modern Hiroshima). Again removing, and making a progress up from that land, they dwelt *eight years* at the Palace of Takashima in Kibi (Kibi=Bingo, Bitchū, Bizen)."

This is the *Kojiki* account of the early Kumaso migration, and it has been given *verbatim*, inasmuch as the narrative has evidently been very considerably modified and "improved" in what they no doubt believed to be the interests of scholarship if not of plausibility by the compilers of the *Nihongi*. According to it, Jimmu set out with his *three* brothers and a great naval force in the winter of 667 (!), and after visiting Usa, Chikuzen, and Aki, and making a stay of three years in Kibi, arrived off Naniwa (or Ōsaka) in the spring of 663 B.C. The *Kojiki's* narrative of the Conquest of Yamato is incoherent in several respects; the *Nihongi* addresses itself to removing some of the difficulties, and it does indeed get over some of those geographical stumbling-blocks to which Motoori has called attention.

The *Nihongi* compilers have found it advisable to devote more attention to the problem of dovetailing the Kyūshū and

* See Chamberlain's note (12) on p. 87 of his Translation of the *Kojiki*. If the Eternal Land be Korea, and the Sea-Plain, the Dragon King's daughter's land, be Luchu, an etymologist might be able to elaborate some very interesting theories. With pure unadulterated etymology, unchecked by prosaic mundane considerations, anything may be established. Both Macedon and Monmouth have their initial M. But, apart from etymology, other things tend to make the hypothesis of a settlement of South-Western Korea from the south *via* Kyūshū worthy of consideration.—See Aston's notes on Kumaso, Kuma, and Koma in his Translation of the *Nihongi*.

the Main Island legends into each other than the *Kojiki* has done. In the conquest of Yamato, the Nigi-haya-hi no Mikoto story is only referred to in the *Kojiki*; in the *Nihongi* it is utilised to good purpose to legitimatise the rule of the Kyūshū conquerers in Central Japan.* In the *Nihongi* there are four other attempts to bring Kyūshū and Yamato into connection,—Keikō Tennō's invasion of Kyūshū and his seven years' sojourn there (82 to 89 A.D.), of which the *Kojiki* says nothing; the story of Yamato-dake's conquest of the Kumaso in the same reign; Chūai Tennō's struggle with the Kumaso a century later (192-200 A.D.), and Jingō's chastisement of them just previous to her Korean expedition.

Now, in all these accounts, except that of Yamato Take, the *lues etymologica* runs riot. In the *Kojiki*'s account of the conquest of Yamato, there are three or four etymologies. In that of the *Nihongi* there are four times as many, while incidents are either adduced or invented to account for popular sayings, incantations, and practices. And in the passages dealing with Keikō and Chūai and Jingō in Kyūshū we find place-name after place-name accounted for by certain events and episodes in their respective enterprises. Again, the tale of Jingō's conquest of Yamato after the Korean expedition is not without echoes of events in the history of Jimmu. It should be furthermore mentioned that in the *Kojiki* Chūai Tennō (Jingō's husband) is introduced on the stage with his court in North-Eastern Kyūshū and not in Central Japan, where all the previous emperors are represented to have had theirs. The *Nihongi*, on the other hand, here again supplies a link, and makes Chūai simply come to Kyūshū from Yamato on a punitive expedition. But for this latter version of the story, we might be tempted to fancy that we have here a hint of yet another irruption of Kumaso or Kyūshū men into Yamato. If the *Nihongi* gets over the seeming geographical dislocation in the story it introduces sad confusion into its own chronology at this point. Chūai Tennō's son, Ōjin Tennō, the future God of War, was fourteen months in the womb of his mother, Jingō Kōgō. But as Chūai was born in 148 A.D. and his father, Yamato-dake, died in 111 A.D., Chūai's lady mother must have been a very remarkable woman indeed.

* See Aston's Translation of the *Nihongi*, vol. I., pp. 127-128.

As has just been said, the Yamato-dake legend is also utilised to bring Yamato and Kyūshū into touch. At the age of sixteen this prince made a very summary end of his own elder brother, who had offended their father, the Emperor, and the latter, thinking his presence at Court somewhat dangerous, dispatched him on a mission to Kyūshū to deal with the "rebellious" Kumaso there. By an act of daring treachery he succeeds in assassinating two of their prominent chiefs and returns to Yamato in triumph, only to find that there is a similar enterprise ready for him in another direction. He is sent off to subdue the Yemishi or Ainu in Eastern Japan,—around Tōkyō Bay,—and, in command of a force composed mainly of his own butler, he completes the work,—“an achievement fully equal in courage, skill, daring, patience, and romantic interest to that of Napoleon,” an American historian would have us believe. The story of Yamato-dake was evidently a very fine old folk-lore tale which Temmu's commissioners admired so highly that they fancied a place should be found for it in their authentic record of "Ancient Matters."

But here again the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi* differ in their narratives. Both alike make the hero smite the West and the East; but whereas the *Kojiki* makes him proceed to Idzumo, and slay the bravo there—also by a piece of trickery—the *Nihongi* says nothing about that particular incident in his career, and employs the details given in the *Kojiki* to embroider an earlier Idzumo story. According to the *Nihongi* the 11th legendary Emperor Sui-nin wished to see the Divine Treasures of the Temple of Idzumo, and sent envoys to bring them to him. The High Priest was then absent in Tsukushi (Kyūshū), and a younger brother of his complied with the Imperial order. On his return the High Priest was exceedingly wroth, and later on he killed his younger brother in a treacherous manner,—in exactly the way the *Kojiki* makes Yamato-dake kill the Idzumo bravo. Imperial officers were thereupon sent to kill him; and therefore "the Ōmi of Idzumo desisted for a while from the worship of the Great God."

Standing by itself this incident may seem pointless, but taken with certain preceding passages it acquires a good deal of significance. It is one incident in a struggle that was going on between the Gods of Idzumo and those of Yamato,—or perhaps more correctly it points to a persistent attempt on the part of the rulers of Yamato to break the power of the priest-

rulers of Idzumo. In B.C. 93, we find the previous Emperor Sujin worshipping the Sun-Goddess and the Great God of Yamato together "within the Emperor's Great Hall. He dreaded, however, the power of these Gods, and did not feel secure in their dwelling together." So they were entrusted to two Imperial Priestesses and enshrined in separate localities. Thereupon a great pestilence broke out, and calamities of all kinds followed. At last Oho-mono-nushi (*i.e.* Ōnamuji) appeared to the Emperor in a dream and told him that if a certain mysterious son or descendant of his was appointed to worship him, troubles would cease. Thus the Idzumo God's worship was established in Yamato, where he was known as the Great God of Miwa, and ultimately came to be regarded as the Great God of Yamato. Thus the Idzumo High Priests of the line of Ōnamuji found themselves confronted with a rival line in Yamato, and in the light of the subsequent Yamato attempts—for more than one are hinted at—to become possessed of the Divine Treasures of the Great Idzumo Temple, this incident acquires political no less than sacerdotal significance.

Meanwhile the Sun-Goddess, after having been in charge of the same priestess for eighty-seven years, was transferred to the care of Yamato-dake's aunt, Yamato-hime no Mikoto. In B.C. 5, the Goddess instructed the new priestess, saying: "The province of Ise, of the divine wind, is the land whither repair the waves from the eternal world, the successive waves. It is a secluded and pleasant land. In this land I wish to dwell." So a shrine was erected to her in the province of Ise. "It was there that Ama-terasu no Ohokami first descended from Heaven."

It may be well to take note of those elements in the composite cult of ancient Japan which came from the south. The Sun-Goddess herself heads the list, and then we have the Nakatomi priesthood, whose descendants were destined to become all-powerful politically in the Empire under the name of Fujiwara. Furthermore, there were the Imibe, or "abstainers," who, however, ultimately receded into insignificance, and the Sarume or female "mediums." This would appear to have been about the sum total of the Southern invaders' contribution to the religious life of the community. It is true that Jimmu, Chūai, Jingō, Ōjin, Yamato-dake, and Takeuchi no Sukune were afterwards deified and worshipped as Gods, but

none of these are treated as deities in the older Shintō books. But, meagre as the Kyūshū element in the old religion may appear to be, it was enough. The Southern men have at all times been remarkable for organising and administrative ability, and their organising and administrative faculties enabled the Nakatomi to utilise the Idzumo cult and the Idzumo pantheon very effectively in the service of themselves and of Yamato.

We are not without indications that, however inferior to the Yamato men in political and military power the Idzumo people may have been, they were evidently possessed of a higher culture than they: One such hint is afforded by the legend of Nomi no Sukune, who is now worshipped as the Patron God of Wrestlers, although it was certainly not from his wrestling that the Idzumo claims to a milder and more advanced civilisation become apparent. In B.C. 23 “the courtiers represented to the Emperor as follows:—‘In the village of Taima there is a valiant man called Kuyehaya of Taima He is of great bodily strength, so that he can break horns and straighten out hooks. He is always saying to the people: “You may search the four quarters, but where is there one to compare with me in strength? O that I could meet with a man of might, with whom to have a trial of strength, regardless of life or death.”’ The Emperor, hearing this, proclaimed to his Ministers, saying: ‘We hear that Kuyehaya of Taima is the champion of the Empire. Might there be anyone to compare with him?’ One of the Ministers came forward and said: ‘Thy servant hears that in the Land of Idzumo there is a valiant man named Nomi no Sukune. It is desirable that thou shouldst send for him, by way of trial, and match him with Kuyehaya.’” The Emperor did so, and “straightway Nomi no Sukune and Kuyehaya were made to wrestle together. The two men stood opposite to one another. Each raised his foot and kicked at the other, when Nomi no Sukune broke with a kick the ribs of Kuyehaya, and also kicked and broke his loins and thus killed him. Therefore the land of Kuyehaya was seized, and was all given to Nomi no Sukune.” Nomi then entered the Emperor’s service, but it was not till more than a score of years later on* that he rendered his great service to the cause of humanity.

* Of course these dates are worthless, for down to the middle of the eighth century the *Nihongi’s* chronology is untrustworthy, its first

In B.C. 2 the Emperor's younger brother, Yamato-hiko, died and "was buried at Tsukizaka in Musa. Thereupon his personal attendants were assembled, and were all buried alive upright in the precincts of the mausoleum. For several days they died not, but wept and wailed day and night. At last they died and rotted. Dogs and crows gathered and ate them. The Emperor, hearing the sound of their weeping and wailing, was grieved in heart, and commanded his high officers, saying—"It is a very painful thing to force those whom one has loved in life to follow him in death. Though it be an ancient custom, why follow it, if it is bad? From this time forward, take counsel so as to put a stop to the following of the dead."

Five years later this became a very pressing question when the Empress died (A.D. 3). "Some time before the burial, the Emperor commanded his Ministers, saying:—"We have already recognised that the practice of following the dead is not good. What should now be done in performing this burial?" Thereupon Nomi no Sukune came forward and said:—"It is not good to bury living men upright at the tumulus of a prince. How can such a practice be handed down to posterity? I beg leave to propose an expedient to your Majesty." So he sent messengers to summon up from the land of Idzumo a hundred men of the clay-workers' company. He himself directed men of the clay-workers' company to take clay and form therewith shapes of men, horse, and various objects, which he presented to the Emperor, saying:—"Henceforward let it be a law for future ages to substitute things of clay for living men, and to set them up at tumuli." . . . Then a Decree was issued saying:—"Henceforth these clay figures must be set up at tumuli; let not men be harmed." The Emperor bountifully rewarded Nomi no Sukune for this service, and also bestowed on him a kneading-place, and appointed him to the official charge of the clay-workers' company. His original title was therefore changed, and he was called Hashi no Omi. This was how it came to pass that the Hashi no Muraji (Chief of the Clay-workers) superintends the burials of the Emperors."

Inasmuch as we hear of this practice of "following the

dozen centuries or so of dates being "faked" in the most unblushing manner.

dead" being in vogue in Japan as late as the middle of the third century A.D., and inasmuch as the early chronology of the *Nihongi* has been not unfairly characterised as "one of the greatest literary frauds ever perpetrated," we may see further reason to doubt the hoary antiquity assigned to certain of the Japanese dolmens. Writes Mr. Gowland:—"An important feature of *some* of the ancient burial mounds and dolmens is the terra-cotta figures which were set up on them at the funeral ceremonies. Like many other races, the early Japanese practised that curious rite of animistic religion, the funeral sacrifices of men, women, and *horses* for the services of the dead in a future life. According to the *Nihongi*, the substitution of terra-cotta figures for living retainers was made about the beginning of our era, but remains of these figures have *been found on mounds which are probably of an earlier date*. . . . Terra-cotta figures of *horses* were also frequently set up on burial mounds along with the human figures."

Now, if the Chinese are correct in saying that there were no horses in Japan until the third century A.D.—indeed it is only after the Korean present of a stallion and a mare in 284 A.D. (or 404 A.D. according to Mr. Aston) that we hear much about horses in the *Nihongi*,—we have here another indication that not a few of the Japanese tumuli are of a much later origin than is commonly supposed.

At this point it may be well to advert to another circumstance which seems to be of some importance when we consider the early relations of Kyūshū and Idzumo men. In the seats of the Kumaso—that is, in Satsuma, Ōsumi, and Southern Hyūga—*there are very few dolmens*. It was in this land of So (*i.e.* Kumaso) that the Heavenly Grandchild is said to have made his appearance in Japan. It was here that he was succeeded in the exercise of his sway (of 528 years) by three successive generations of his descendants, the last of which fared forth to effect the conquest of Yamato. Now, since dolmen-burial was rarely practised by the Kumaso it is not likely that it was the Kyūshū invaders that introduced the dolmen into Yamato. It was evidently of Idzumo origin, and the victorious southern chieftains probably adopted it after establishing themselves in their new seats.

In both the *Nihongi* and the *Kojiki* the history of the early Emperors is continuous with the mythology. This fact was

fully acknowledged by those leading native commentators of the eighteenth century whose opinions are regarded as orthodox by modern Shintoists. From this the conclusion is drawn that everything in these old standard national histories must be accepted as literal truth, the supernatural equally with the natural. This position seems to have the merit of being logical at least, for the tales of Jimmu, of Yamato-dake, of Jingō, and of the rest stand or fall by the same criterion as the legends of the Creator and the Creatress Izanagi and Izanami. Both sets of tales are told in the same books, in the same style, and with an almost equal amount of supernatural detail. The so-called historical part is as devoid as the other of all contemporary evidence, while it is contradicted by such contemporary Chinese notices of Japan as we have. However, as has been already hinted, the main purpose of the compilers of the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi* at this point was not so much to write a history as to supply genealogies which were to be regarded as official and authentic. This makes a cursory glance at some results of their efforts necessary.

In both books the Imperial succession from Jimmu devolves from father to son down to Seimu, the thirteenth Emperor. However, it is neither the eldest son, nor yet the son of the chief consort, who necessarily comes to occupy the throne on the demise of the father. The Imperial family is usually a small one at this time. The first six sovereigns have no more than thirteen children between them; the seventh is credited with eleven, his two immediate successors with five each, Sujin with twelve, and Sui-nin with sixteen, while Seimu, the thirteenth, had one son if we follow the *Kojiki* and "no male offspring" according to the *Nihongi*. In all this there is nothing remarkable. But the twelfth sovereign, whose stature was ten feet five inches, is assigned no fewer than eighty children, and in connection with these we seem to get a glimpse into the political condition of primeval Japan. With the exception of the three eldest, "the other seventy and odd children were all granted fiefs of provinces and districts, and each proceeded to his own province. Therefore, those who at the present time are called *Wake* of the various provinces are the descendants of these separated (*wakare*) Princes." Mr. Aston remarks that this passage from the *Nihongi* points to something like a feudal system. But while no one has done better

service than Mr. Aston in calling attention to the numerous instances where the *Nihongi* gets embellished not merely with the diction but with the incidents of Chinese histories, he seems here to have forgotten that Wu-wang, the founder of the Chow dynasty, is said (1115 B.C.) to have divided his kingdom into *seventy-two* feudal States, in order that he might bestow appanages on his relations and the descendants of former Emperors. However, it must be frankly admitted that this is not the only passage that points to the possible prevalence of something analogous to a feudal system in legendary Japan. In 291 Ōjin Tennō, also the father of a large family (26 sons and daughters), is represented as dividing Kibi, which corresponds to the provinces of Bizen, Bitchū, and Bingo, into six fiefs and apportioning them to as many of his children.

With the death of Keikō Tennō's successor, Seimu (whose chronicle of two brief pages is mainly made up of impossible Chinese speeches and decrees, albeit he reigned from 130 to 190 A.D.), occurs the first break in the transmission of the Imperial dignity from father to son. It then passes to Seimu's nephew—and Keikō's grandson—to Chūai Tennō (192-200 A.D.), another Son of Anak, who fell only the odd inches short of his grandfather's stature of ten feet five. The genealogy here is puzzling in sooth. Yamato-dake was the second son of Keikō, and one of Keikō's consorts (according to the *Kojiki*) was the great grand-daughter of Yamato-dake! In other words Keikō Tennō is made to marry his own great-great-granddaughter! Nor is this all. As already pointed out, Chūai Tennō was born in 148 A.D., while his father Yamato-dake died in 111 A.D.—that is, thirty-seven years before the birth of his son! And in addition to all this, at this point there is a great topographical breach in the legend. Without a word of warning the *Kojiki* here transfers the seat of the Court from Yamato, where it had been for thirteen generations, to Kyūshū. Chūai is occupied in reducing the Kumaso, but his consort the Amazon Jingō is "divinely possessed," and when "the Prime Minister the noble Take-uchi, being in the pure Court, requested the divine orders, the Empress charged him with this instruction and counsel:—'There is a land to the westward, and in that land is abundance of various treasures dazzling to the eye, from gold and silver downwards. I will now bestow this land upon thee!'" Chūai

Tennō was incredulous, called the “possessing” deities lying deities, and was straightway stricken with death. Then the *Kojiki* makes Jingō proceed to the conquest, not of Korea, but of Shiragi or Silla, which is a very different matter. “So the wave of the august vessel pushed up on to the land of Shiragi (Silla), reaching to the middle of the country. Thereupon the chieftain of the country, alarmed and trembling, petitioned (the Empress) saying: ‘From this time forward, obedient to the Heavenly Sovereign’s commands, I will feed Her august horses, and will marshal vessels every year, nor ever let the vessels’ keels dry or their poles and oars dry, and will respectfully serve Her without drawing back while Heaven and Earth shall last.’ So therefore the Land of Shiragi (Silla) was constituted the feeder of the august horses, and the Land of Kudara (Pakche) the crossing store. Then the Empress stuck her august staff on the gate of the chieftain of Shiragi (Silla), and having made the Rough Spirits of the Great Deities of the Inlet of Sumi the guardian Deities of the land, she laid them to rest, and crossed back.”

True to its inveterate wont, the jack-daw *Nihongi* here tricks itself out in its frippery of peacock’s feathers purloined from Chinese books, and devotes eight or nine pages of stilted rhodomontade to this filibustering enterprise. It exceeds itself by winding up thus:—“Hereupon the kings of the two countries of Koryo and Pakche, hearing that Silla had rendered up its maps and registers (!), and made submission, secretly caused the warlike power (of the Empress) to be spied out. Finding then that they could not be victorious, they came of themselves without the camp, and bowing their heads to the ground and sighing, said: ‘Henceforth for ever, these lands shall be styled thy western frontier provinces, and will not cease to offer tribute.’ Accordingly interior Governments were instituted. This is what is termed the three Han.” Now, to talk of Silla “maps and registers” at this time is absurd. In the next place the name Koryo was not used until about 500 A.D.,—*i.e.*, three centuries after this date. And in the third place the three Han were *not* Silla, Pakche, and Koguryu—or Shiragi, Kudara, and Koma in Japanese. In the earliest times there were three Han States in the southwest of the Korean peninsula. Of these Ma-han to the west consisted of 54 communities; Chen-han to the east included 12, and Pien-chen, to the south of the second, was composed

of 12 more. One of these Ma-han communities later on formed the nucleus of the kingdom of Pakche, while others were absorbed in Kara or Kaya, which at one time formed either part or the whole of the Japanese possessions in the south of Korea, known in Japanese history as Mimana or Imna. In Koryo or Koguryu, or Korea to the north of Seoul, the Japanese never had the slightest foothold; to Silla they often made themselves very unpleasant and disagreeable, but they never seem to have conquered that State, while as regards Pakche they are frequently found co-operating with it against Silla. Their foothold was in the district between the confines of Silla and Pakche to the south. Here they seem to have really held a dominant position for some centuries, and it was this district that really constituted the three Han.*

Now is this Jingō legend to be dismissed as an incident in a Japanese Apocrypha? Mr. Aston identifies the alleged expedition of 200 A.D. with those events of 249 A.D. which we have previously culled from the Korean histories. But just a little before this the Japanese "She" of contemporary Chinese records was being "followed in death" by her thousand hapless attendants. These records, as has been stated, will have it that at this date there really was a great and able female sovereign in Japan, who had for long years exercised a strong and beneficent rule over a united and peaceful country which her genius had extricated from a series of deadly internecine wars which had distracted and devastated the land for no fewer than eighty years.

During the two centuries between Jingō's conquest of Shiragi and the death of Nintoku Tennō in 399, the annals reckon no more than three sovereigns: Jingō, who lived to attain her hundredth year, died in 269; her son Ōjin ruled till 310, and after some peculiar difficulties about the succession he was followed by his second son Nintoku, who is assigned a reign of 87 years. This is according to the *Nihongi*. The *Kojiki*, on the other hand, makes Ōjin live to 130; and as he was born just after his mother returned from her Korean expedition in 201, his reign would thus extend down to 331 A.D. Nintoku is credited not with a reign of 87, but with an age of 83 years.

* See Parker's *Race Struggles in Korea*, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. XVIII.; pt. ii., pp. 206-213, and Hulbert's *History of Korea*, vol. I., pp. 28-33.

If the chronology of these sovereigns in these ages presents problems, that of their Prime Minister treats us to impossibilities. Born on the same day as the Emperor Seimu in 92 A.D., Takeuchi no Sukune was the friend and companion of that prince, who appointed him Chief Minister on succeeding to the throne in 130 A.D. The exact year of his death is not given ; but in 362 A.D. we find the Emperor Nintoku consulting him and addressing him as

“Thou beyond all others
A man distant of age—
Thou beyond all others
A man long in the land.”

At that date he was 270 years of age,—if the chronology be trustworthy.* During these three reigns the *Nihongi* has a good many notices of events in connection with Japanese and Korean intercourse. It is here that Mr. Aston has had no difficulty in showing that the *Nihongi* has antedated most of them by 120 years. In other words, the *Nihongi* writers have here interpolated two cycles of 60 years each. Some Japanese authorities will have it that between Jimmu (660 B.C.) and Nintoku (399 A.D.) as many as ten of these cycles of 60 years have thus been interposed, but their arguments in support of the contention are not wholly convincing.

It may well be asked why it was that the *Nihongi* authors fixed upon 660 B.C. as the exact date when Jimmu established the Empire of Japan. The most plausible account seems to be this :—It was not till 554 A.D. that the Japanese made an acquaintance with the Chinese system of chronology, when a man learned in the calendar was sent from Pakche in Korea by request, and it was only in 602, when chronological and astronomical works and a movable disc for calculating calendars were brought to Japan, that a really earnest study of the science of Chinese chronology seems to have been begun. It was in 675 that the first astronomical observatory was erected, and it was in 690 that the first official calendar was promulgated. This latter date was eight years subsequent to the establishment of Temmu's Historical Commission and thirty years before the appearance of the *Nihongi*.

Now, Chinese chronology had the famous system of cycles,

* See Aston's note to his *Nihongi*, vol. i. pp. 294-5.

sixty years forming a smaller cycle, and twenty-one such cycles, or 1,260 years, a larger one. The fifty-eighth year of the smaller cycle was supposed by the Chinese to be the year in which some revolution was liable to take place. It is suggested that the writers of the *Nihongi*, seeing that 600 A.D. was the first year of revolution before the adoption of the calendar in 602, counted backward for the space of a large cycle, thus reaching 660 B.C., and made that the first year of the Japanese Empire. They then fell under the necessity of distributing the somewhat scanty data at their disposal over a very long range of time, and, when it came to assigning events not merely their year, but their month, and their day of the month, the difficulties of producing a chronologically consistent narrative proved insuperable. Motoori and Mr. Aston and others have pointed out the most striking of the vagaries into which they were thus betrayed. But no list of such vagaries is complete, for the earlier (so-called) historical portion of the *Nihongi* bristles with them.

CHAPTER III.

OLD YAMATO.

(400 A.D. TO 550 A.D.)

WITH the beginning of the fifth century A.D. the student of Japanese history ceases to be bewildered by the mirage of centenarian reigns, albeit still condemned to grope his way onward among the quicksands of uncertain and fluctuating legend. From this point the chronology of the *Nihongi* ceases to be the pretentious and audacious mockery of sober reason and common-sense which it has been since it introduced Jimmu upon the scene some eleven centuries before. To say that it now becomes trustworthy is quite another matter, however. All that can be admitted is that it is no longer wildly reckless; that its inherent inconsistencies are less gross, open, and palpable. But still they continue to stand in the record; all the more dangerous perhaps because they are not so glaringly conspicuous.

Temmu Tennō's commissioners for "selecting" materials for a National History were evidently prudent men, well-advised of the advisability of making figures at least approximately plausible as they drew nearer to the age when certain things were getting to be set down in black on white. Indeed, if it were not for the existence of contemporary Korean records, and of antecedent, contemporary, and even subsequent Chinese histories, the guileless reader might very readily accept the last five-eighths of the *Nihongi* as thoroughly authentic. But when, for instance, we find the learned commissioners purloining the death-bed harangue of the Chinese Emperor Kaotsu, *who died in 604 A.D.*, and putting it, with very few and slight variations, into the mouth of the Japanese Emperor Yūryaku, *who died (according to them) in 479*, we may be excused if, having our doubts excited about the good faith and accuracy of the commissioners even in this later portion of their work, we refuse to take any of their assertions on mere trust. When in B.C. 88 a Japanese Emperor is made to say that "the distant savages, however, do *not receive our calendar* because they are

yet unaccustomed to the civilising influences of our rule," the thing is comparatively harmless, for, knowing that this is a Chinese way of speaking, that the Japanese knew nothing of the Chinese calendar till 554 A.D., and that the first official Japanese calendar was issued only in 690, we are easily enabled to dismiss the harangue as a mere "fake," to use a somewhat vulgar, but thoroughly appropriate term. But such a "fake" as that of Yūryaku's death-bed address is another thing. It is vastly more dangerous to the interests of veracity. The commissioners can have found absolutely nothing in their own national archives to serve as a basis for these "dying words."

It is needless to observe that such purple patches in the *Nihongi* are something entirely different from the speeches that add vivacity and dramatic effect to the narrative set forth in Thucydides' immortal pages. These speeches, albeit never spoken, were at least the composition of one of the greatest minds in Greece; of a great Greek writer and thinker penning a keenly critical record of contemporary Hellas. Thoroughly acquainted with all phases of the political thought and passions of his own time as Thucydides was, and, except perhaps in the sole case of Cleon, coldly impartial, his speeches are a fair and lucid exposition of what was really in the minds of the various factions and their leaders. The ideas they express are neither anachronistic nor alien. On the other hand, down to the beginning of the seventh century, the hold of Chinese ideas upon the Japanese was slight. It was only towards the middle of that century that such ideas began to carry all before them. In the course of a generation or two they were triumphantly dominant. Now it was by the men of the second generation after the Great Reform of 645 that the *Nihongi* was compiled. These men were dazzled by the splendours of Chinese civilisation; by the magnificence of the Chinese Court, by the highly elaborated political and ethical systems of the Middle Kingdom, and by what they considered the polished elegance of Chinese literature. The effect of this situation was disastrous to the interests of sober veracity when Temmu's commissioners addressed themselves to the task of "selecting" the old records and compiling a History of Japan from the origins down to their own times. In the first place, the transformation since 645 had been so rapid and so complete that the new generation had as much difficulty in conceiving the state of things prevalent antecedent to that date as the young men.

of Meiji have in realising the conditions under which their Tokugawa grandfathers lived. In the next place they seem to have been somewhat ashamed of the rude and primitive simplicity of their ancestors. In the third place their History was an official History in the interests of the new order of things. And it was to rank not merely as a record, but as literature. This meant that it was to be based on Chinese models. If the commissioners had rested content with taking their literary models from China and their facts from Japan, there would not be any very great reason for modern students to complain. But they boldly pilfered stilted passages from standard Chinese Histories and put them into the mouths of their simple and unsophisticated ancestors, thus reminding us of Shakespeare's Hector quoting Aristotle at the siege of Troy. Down to about 600 A.D. the language and ideas of the speeches and decrees in the *Nihongi* are at once alien and anachronistic. When not transferred body-bulk from the page of some Chinese author they are composed of a cento of turgid high-sounding Chinese sentences and phrases. And worse than this is the fact that the *Nihongi* historiographers purloin not a few of the incidents with which they embellish their pages from Chinese books. There is reason to believe that the *Kojiki* is not altogether free from all taint of this particular form of literary dishonesty.

However, with all its manifold shortcomings the *Nihongi* must continue to be our mainstay in any attempt to reconstruct ante-Taikwa (645) Japan. The *Kojiki* professedly brings the record down to 628, but from 488 onwards it is occupied with nothing but those genealogies so dreary to us, but so serviceable in the interests of the newly constituted aristocracy of office. Even from the death of Nintoku (399) its details become fragmentary and meagre. They are mainly valuable in serving to excite our suspicions about the correctness of some very plausible statements in the very much fuller and very circumstantial accounts in the *Nihongi*. Yet another source for a portion of the period is again supplied by contemporary Chinese notices of Japan. These extend from about 400 to 502 A.D., and, after another silence of a century, from about 600 onwards.

It has been pointed out that while the accuracy of the Chinese chronology at this time has never been disputed, it is possible that errors may have crept in in the case of notices

relating to a distant and little-known country. "On the other hand, it should be remembered that the matters noticed are chiefly embassies, of which an official record would naturally be kept. Internal evidence in favour of the accuracy of the Chinese account is not altogether wanting. In a memorial presented to one of the Wei Emperors by King Wu (Emperor of Japan), in 478, he styled himself Supreme Director of Military Matters in the Seven Countries of Wa, Pakche, Silla, Mimana, Kara, Chinhan, and Bohan, General-in-Chief for the Pacification of the East, and King of Wa, in which titles he was confirmed by China. His four predecessors had requested Imperial sanction for somewhat similar titles. The truth of this statement is attested by the fact already noticed that Japan during the fifth century exercised a powerful influence in the Korean peninsula, and it derives further confirmation from the use of the word Mimana, which, as far as we know, was an exclusively Japanese name for one of the minor Korean kingdoms."

Here, then, in these brief Chinese notices we have seemingly fairly firm ground to stand upon, chronologically speaking. These references may not be enough to enable us to reconcile some of the divergent and discrepant details of the *Nihongi* and the *Kojiki*, but they at least impel us to look into the chronology and the accounts of the Japanese historiographers more searchingly than we might otherwise have done.

Now, even so late as 531 the *Nihongi* chronology continues to present inherent inconsistencies. In that year the Emperor Keitai dies at the age of 82. On the very day of his death he nominates his eldest son his successor. Yet the *Nihongi* makes 534 the first year of Ankan Tennō (Keitai's successor). On the other hand the *Kojiki* makes him die the father of a family of nineteen children at the early age of 43. Both cannot be right, and both are possibly wrong. The point is, that inasmuch as Japanese chronology even as late as 530 is not accurate, it is probable that it is still more untrustworthy for the preceding century. During this century Chinese chronology, on the other hand, is fortified with very strong credentials. Now, for this century we arrive at the following list of Japanese monarchs from Chinese sources:—

From about 400 to after 425.... Tsan (1)

From after 425 to before 443.... Chên (2)


From before 443 to before 462.... Tsi (3)

From before 462 to before 478.... Hing (4)

From before 478 to after 502.... Wu (5)

Of this quintette of rulers the first three were brothers, the fourth and fifth were also brothers, elder and younger sons of the third.

Next let us go through the drudgery of examining the sub-joined genealogical table of the earliest of the non-legendary sovereigns of Japan. (The last long-lived monarch, Nintoku, who reigned from 312-399 A.D., is counted the sixteenth Emperor of Yamato.)



Here we have not five, but nine sovereigns. As in the Chinese records, we here find that the first three of these were brothers, and the next two were also brothers, both being sons of the third. To the last four there is nothing corresponding in the Chinese contemporary record, where during the period occupied by their reigns in the *Nihongi* we find King Wu exercising sway in Japan. King Wu, the younger of the last two brothers on the list, is evidently Yūryaku Tennō, whom the *Kojiki* makes a mere youth at the time of his brother's assassination, and to whom it assigns an age of 124 years at his death. This is of course entirely against probability, but on the other hand it may lead us to doubt whether he died so early as 479, as the *Nihongi* asserts he did. Then Buretsu (or Muretsu) Tennō, who is represented as reigning from 499 to 506, was, according to the accepted chronology, no more than eighteen years old

at the time of his death. There is reason to believe that Yūryaku and Buretsu were one and the same individual. As regards the three intervening sovereigns it may be suspected that they are either figments created out of certain characters and incidents in old Chinese history, or that they were aspirants to the throne who had been powerful enough to displace Yūryaku (or Buretsu) for a time. What lends a certain measure of plausibility, if not of probability, to this latter hypothesis is the fact that from the very beginning of semi-authentic history we find the succession to the throne of Yamato a matter of fierce and deadly contention. The elder brother of Nintoku, the last legendary Emperor, is represented as perishing in an abortive attempt to possess himself of the Empire. Then the life of Nintoku's eldest son and successor, Richū, was attempted by the second of Nintoku's five sons, Prince Nakatsu, who proved a dangerous competitor.*

Richū's own two sons and his daughter Ihitoyo were passed over when his brother Hanshō (another Son of Anak, standing 9 ft. 2½ in.) became Emperor. On the death of the latter, his brother (and Richū's brother) was made Emperor to the exclusion of Hanshō's son and Richū's children alike. On this occasion the succession question was plainly decided by the Ministers, by whom are meant the heads of certain of the great clans, who are presently to become so prominent in the annals of Yamato. The history of this Emperor (Ingyō) is given at considerable length and with considerable detail by the *Nihongi*,—only it is to be noted that for eighteen years of his reign, from 435 to 453, there is a complete lacuna. And as regards the chronology of the incident assigned to 434-5 the *Nihongi* flagrantly contradicts itself. This incident of 434-5 is interesting for several reasons. The Emperor's eldest son, Prince Karu, had been designated by him as his successor. But it was discovered that he had had a *liaison* with his own full-blood sister, the Princess Karu. Marriages between half-brothers and half-sisters on the father's side continued to be common down to 645 A.D., and even later, while the nuptials of uncles and nieces were not unusual even so late as the Tokū-

* He was stabbed to death by a Hayato in his own service, who had been seduced by specious allurements of preferment, only to find "the word of promise kept to his ear and broken to his hope." For long we have not heard of either Kumaso or Hayato. Now the Hayato again emerge, but the Kumaso have vanished from the record for ever.

gawa age. But this *liaison* between brother and sister of full blood seems to have revolted the moral sense of the time. Here let us look at the language of the two old records. The *Kojiki* says: "After the decease of the Heavenly Sovereign (Ingyō) it was settled that Prince Karu of Ki-nashi should rule the Sun's succession. But in the interval before his accession he debauched his younger sister, the Great Lady of Karu. . . . Therefore all the officials and likewise all the people of the Empire turned against the heir apparent, Karu, and towards the august child Anaho . . . so Prince Karu was banished to the hot waters of Iyo (in Shikoku). . . . So being banished to restrain her love the Princess Karu went after him. . . . Having thus sung they (the Prince and Princess Karu) killed themselves." According to the *Nihongi*, "the Emperor Ingyō died in the 42nd year of his reign (453). *At this time*, the heir apparent was guilty of a barbarous outrage in debauching a woman. The nation censured him, and the Ministers would not follow him, but all without exception gave their allegiance to the Imperial Prince Anaho. [This means that they set aside the nomination of his successor by the late Emperor, and decided the succession question themselves.] Hereupon the heir apparent wished to attack the Imperial Prince Anaho, and to that end secretly got ready an army. The Imperial Prince Anaho also raised a force, and prepared to give battle." As the result of all this "the heir-apparent died by his own hand in the house of Ohomahe no Sukune."

Now *at this time* is plainly between the 1st and the 10th month of 453. But three or four pages before we have a full and circumstantial account of the *liaison* under the years 434 and 435! And similar instances of playing fast and loose with the realities of things, while keeping up the semblance of a pedantic accuracy in the matter of months and days, are not rare in the *Nihongi* in this, and even in the following century.

This Prince Anaho succeeded to the throne, and, appearing as Hing in the contemporary Chinese records, is known in Japanese history as Ankō Tennō (454-456). Owing to the covetousness of an intriguing Minister who wished to appropriate a certain jewel headdress, he was led to assassinate his grand-uncle Okusaka, the son of Nintoku Tennō. He thereupon made Okusaka's wife his concubine; and a year afterwards he was assassinated by Okusaka's son, a child of seven years!

"Then," says the *Kojiki*, "Prince Oho-hatsuse (*i.e.* Yūryaku

Tennō), *who at that time (756)* was a lad, was forthwith grieved and furious on hearing of this event and went forth to his elder brother King Kuro-hiko and said:—‘They have slain the Heavenly Sovereign. What shall be done?’ But Kuro-hiko was not startled, and was of unconcerned heart. Thereupon Prince Oho-hatsuse (Yūryaku) reviled his elder brother, saying: ‘For one thing it being the Heavenly Sovereign, for another thing it being thy brother, how is thy heart without concern? What! not startled, but unconcerned on hearing that they have slain thy elder brother!’ and forthwith he clutched him by the collar, dragged him out, drew his sword, and slew him. Again, going to his elder brother King Shiro-hiko, he told him the circumstances as before. The unconcernedness was like King Kuro-hiko’s. So Oho-hatsuse (Yūryaku) forthwith clutched him by the collar, pulled him along, and dug a pit on reaching Woharida, and buried him as he stood, so that by the time he had been buried up to the loins, both his eyes burst out and he died.”

The *Nihongi* recounts all this somewhat differently and in a way much less favourable to the credit of the very masterful and mettlesome Yūryaku. It will be noted that he was the youngest of five brothers, that the eldest had perished in a contest for the succession, that the second had been assassinated, and that the surviving two having been thus summarily disposed of, Yūryaku naturally became sovereign. However, even so his title was not assured, if we are to follow the *Nihongi*. “Yūryaku resented the Emperor Anaho’s having formerly wished to transfer the kingdom to the Imperial Prince Ichinohe no Oshiha, and to commit the succession definitively to his charge.” This Prince Ichinohe was the son of the seventeenth Emperor (Richū Tennō,) and consequently the uncle of both Anaho and Yūryaku. The latter now inveigled him to a solitary hunting-trip, and in the course of it shot him down, and, says the *Kojiki*, forthwith moreover cut his body (to pieces), put (them) into a horse’s manger and buried them level with the earth.* There was still one son of Richū Tennō surviving, and his turn came presently.

Yūryaku so far is more of a Richard III. than of a Nero. But the reign thus begun in blood continued to be a record of

* This form of burial was a great indignity to a Prince, who should have had a magnificent mausoleum.

ferocities. A Pakche lady had been sent over as an Imperial concubine, but she had an intrigue with one of the courtiers. Yūryaku "was greatly enraged, and had the four limbs of the woman stretched on a tree. The tree was placed over a cupboard, which was set on fire and she was burned to death." It is not strange to learn that Pakche refused to supply Yūryaku with any more Imperial concubines after that. In 469 we read that "the carpenter Mane of the Wina Be planed timber with an axe, using a stone as a ruler.* All day long he planed, and never spoiled the edge by mistake. The Emperor visited the place, and, wondering, asked of him, saying: 'Dost thou never make a mistake and strike the stone?' Mane answered and said: 'I never make a mistake!' Then the Emperor called together the Uneme (Court ladies) and made them strip off their clothing and wrestle in open view with only their waistcloths on. Hereupon Mane ceased for a while, and looked up at them, and then went on with his planing. But unawares he made a slip of the hand and spoilt the edge of his tool. The Emperor accordingly rebuked him, saying: 'Where does this fellow come from, that without respect to Us, he gives such heedless answers with unchastened heart?' So he handed him over to the Mononobe to be executed on the Moor." A little before this, a noble on duty in the Palace was ill-advised enough to speak of his wife to his comrades in the strain of King Candaules. His words reached the Emperor's ears, and Tasa, the noble in question, was promptly dispatched to fight in Korea, even as Uriah was sent to Rabbah and Otho to Spain, while Yūryaku appropriated his spouse. Withal, however, Yūryaku was not so much sensual as ferocious. People were punished for the most trivial offences, and the Emperor now and then summarily cut down offenders with his own hand. Says the *Nihongi*: "The Emperor, taking his heart for guide, wrongfully slew many men. The Empire censured him, and called him 'the greatly wicked Emperor.' The only persons who loved him were Awo Musa no Saguri of the Scribes' Company and Hakatoko, employer of the people of Hinokuma."

However, even from the *Nihongi's* own account, it is clear that Yūryaku was neither an entire stranger to pity, nor altogether devoid of generous impulses, and his Imperial Majesty certainly had a sense of humour. Possibly the Mane

* The plane was apparently still unknown.

incident was merely a rather indecent practical joke, for the order for the carpenter's execution was countermanded and he survived to celebrate the episode in verse.

Now, let us cast a glance at what we may well suspect to be not so much Yūryaku's double, as a continuation of Yūryaku himself. Muretsu or Buretsu, son of Yūryaku's cousin Ninken, according to the accepted chronology, dies at the age of eighteen in 506 after a reign of eight years. Thus when he succeeded in 499 he must have been a child of ten. Yet the *Nihongi* begins its account of him thus: "When he grew to manhood he was fond of criminal law, and was well versed in the statutes. He would remain in court till the sun went down, so that hidden wrong was surely penetrated. In deciding cases he attained to the facts. But he worked much evil and accomplished no good thing. He never omitted to witness in person cruel punishments of all kinds, and the people of the whole land were all in terror of him."

With respect to this, it is perhaps superfluous to remark that Buretsu never attained to manhood, that the Japanese had no courts of law at this time, and that to speak of statutes here is absurd. What is more to the point is to draw attention to the fact that from "When" down to "facts" has been purloined verbatim from the history of that Chinese Emperor, Ming-ti, who introduced Buddhism into China in the time of Nero (65 A.D.).

Some of the earliest subsequent notices are these:—"500 A.D., 9th month.—The Emperor (*ætat* 11) ripped up the belly of a pregnant woman and inspected the pregnant womb. 501, 10th month.—He plucked out men's nails and made them dig yams. 503, 6th month.—The Emperor made men lie down on their faces in the sluice of a dam and caused them to be washed away; with a three-bladed lance he stabbed them. In this he took delight. 505, 2nd month.—He made men climb up trees and then shot them down with a bow, upon which he laughed."

The atrocities of the next year, 506, constrain the Western modern translator to take refuge in Latin. "And these things he took a pleasure in. At this time he dug a pond and made a park which he filled with birds and beasts. He was fond of hunting,* and of racing dogs and trying horses. He went out

* Yūryaku is represented as a veritable Nimrod, it may be remarked.

and in at all times, taking no care to avoid storms and torrents of rain. Being warmly clad himself, he forgot that the people were starving from cold; eating dainty food, he forgot that the Empire was famishing. He gave great encouragement to dwarfs and performers, making them execute riotous music. He prepared strange diversions, and gave licence to lewd voices. Night and day he constantly indulged in wine in the company of the women of the Palace. His cushions were of brocade, and many of his garments were of damask and fine white silk."

At this point it may be well to advert to a matter which a careful collation of the *Nihongi* with the *Kojiki* discloses. In the Age of the Gods the *Nihongi* deals with fewer incidents than the *Kojiki*. But on the other hand it frequently gives us "other versions" of the same incident—sometimes as many as six, seven, or eight. At the beginning of the so-called historical portion of the *Nihongi* this practice does not indeed cease altogether, but it becomes much less common. Instead of giving "other versions" of the same incident, it now begins to convert these different versions into distinct and different incidents and to assign them widely separated positions in the record. Its compilers seem to have been forced to this by the exigencies of filling up the gaps in that spurious chronology they had adopted, which, as has been said, has not unfairly been branded as "one of the greatest literary frauds ever perpetrated." And they go still farther. They separate the various details of one episode, construct two separate incidents out of these, and assign these also to widely separated positions in the record. And in addition to all this they boldly pilfer incidents from Chinese histories, and record them as events in the history of Japan.

The bearing of this consideration upon the case immediately before us is obvious. The incidents of Muretsu's reign recall certain of those of Yūryaku's,—both sovereigns have certain points of character in common. And in the *Nihongi* record of both we have passages audaciously pilfered from Chinese histories. Nor is this all,—the incidents not only of Yūryaku's and Muretsu's reigns, but those of the intervening Emperors, Ninken and Kenzō, are reminiscent of incidents in Chinese legendary history (2100 B.C.) and of the equally legendary Chinese Emperors Ki-eh, Chau-sin, and Tan-ki. From the hints we get from contemporary Chinese and Korean annals we

should judge that this Yūryaku or Buretsu or King Wu was really a strong and masterful, albeit fierce and ferocious ruler, who has been as unfairly dealt with by legend and the *Nihongi* writers as Macbeth has been by Wyntoun, Hector Boece, Holinshed, and Shakespeare.*

Now, as regards the three intervening sovereigns between Yūryaku and Muretsu, the *Kojiki* assigns a single son to the former, who became the Emperor Seinei. "This Heavenly Sovereign had no Empress and likewise no august children. So after the Heavenly Sovereign's decease there was no King to rule the Empire. Therefore on inquiry being made (for a King) who should rule the Sun's succession the Princess Ihi-toyo (was found to be) residing in Kadzuraki." On the other hand the *Nihongi* says Yūryaku had *three* sons, and makes the two younger ones perish in a civil war that preceded Seinei's succession. On Seinei's death the Empire was administered by the Princess Ihi-toyo for about ten months, although she is not reckoned among the sovereigns of Japan. When this Princess Ihi-toyo's brother Ichinohe was assassinated by Yūryaku in 457 his two children fled to Harima, where they hid their persons and worked as grooms and cowherds for a rich land-owner there. Just at this juncture they were discovered by a Government official on circuit, who sent a courier off with the intelligence. "Thereupon their aunt, Queen Ihi-toyo, delighted to hear (the news), made them come up to the palace." After "yielding the Empire" to each other for some months—a contest in fraternal affection reminiscent of the episode of Nintoku Tennō and his younger brother 170 years before,—the younger brother at last consents to ascend the throne. When he dies childless in 488 he is succeeded by the elder, who reigns ten years, and dies in 498, leaving five daughters and two sons, the elder of whom becomes Muretsu, that precocious monster of depravity.

Now, in certain early lists of sovereigns compiled after the date of the *Nihongi*, Yūryaku's son Seinei does not appear. He is dropped entirely. Then the whole history of this time smacks of old Chinese history. What is possible is that one of the numerous revolts against Yūryaku which we hear of in the *Nihongi* had been temporarily successful, and that Yūryaku had in turn succeeded in crushing his opponents in his own

* See Hume Brown's History of Scotland, vol. i., p. 55.

forcible way. At all events, on the death of Muretsu, Yūryaku's "double," we find the line of Nintoku Tennō extinct.*


Thus the succession question was a perplexing one for the Ministers who now had to deal with it. The accounts we have of what followed are perhaps significant of "King Wu's" masterful ways, for the possible claimants to the throne appear to have felt that the mere fact of being of Imperial stock made them marked men, and so had gone into hiding in remote country districts. "The Oho-muraji, Ohotomo no Kanamura, counselled, saying: 'At this moment there is no successor to the throne. Where shall the Empire bestow its allegiance? From ancient times even until now this has been a cause of disaster. Now there is in Tamba Prince Yamato-hiko, a descendant of the Emperor Chūai (192-200 A.D.) in the fifth generation. Let us make the experiment of preparing an armed force to surround his carriage as a guard, and sending to meet him, establish him as our sovereign.' The Oho-omi and Oho-muraji all agreed and sent to meet him in the manner proposed. Upon this, Prince Yamato-hiko, viewing from a distance the troops which were sent to meet him, was alarmed and changed countenance. Accordingly he took refuge in a mountain-valley, and no one could learn whither he had gone."

The Ministers then bethought them of Prince Wohodo, fifth in descent from the fifteenth legendary Emperor Ōjin, who was then living in obscurity at Mikuni in Echizen. "Omi and Muraji were sent with emblems of rank and provided with a palanquin of State to fetch him. The troops to form his guard arrived suddenly in awe-inspiring array, clearing the way before him. Upon this, the Prince Wohodo remained calm and self-possessed, seated on a chair, with his retainers in order by him, just as if he already occupied the Imperial

* Another inconsistency between the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* here may be noted. When Heir Prince before 488, Ninken Tennō, according to the *Kojiki*, had a contest with a certain grandee for the possession of the person of a certain fair daughter of Yamato. The duel, which ended in the death of the grandee, was conducted partly in verse. The *Nihongi* makes Buretsu the hero here. Inasmuch as Buretsu (or Muretsu) ceased to be the Heir Prince at ten years of age, it argues an unwonted precocity to find a child like him contending with a bearded man for the love of a mature woman, and not only that but actually capping his rival's verses with rare skill. It is true that the *Nihongi* says he died at fifty-seven. But the accepted chronology assigns him no more than eighteen years. By the "accepted chronology" is meant that of "The Digest of the Imperial Pedigree" issued by the Japanese Government in 1877.

throne. The envoys, therefore, bearing the emblems of rank, with respect and reverence bowed their hearts and committed to him the Imperial authority, asking permission to devote to him their loyal service. In the Emperor's mind, however, doubts still remained, and for a good while he did not consent. Just then he chanced to learn that Arako Kawachi no Mumakahi no Obito had sent a messenger secretly to inform him minutely of the real intentions of the Ministers in sending to escort him. After a delay of two days and three nights, he at length set out. Then he exclaimed, admiringly:—'Well done, Mumakahi no Obito! Had it not been for the information given by thy messenger, I ran a great risk of being made a laughing-stock to the Empire!'

At this point it may be well to examine how the succession question, which was here plainly decided by the Ministers, was dealt with on future occasions. Henceforth it never proved such a perplexing problem as it did at this juncture when the line of Nintoku Tennō had become extinct. The new Emperor (507-531) had nineteen children, and three of these came to occupy the throne in succession. The family of the third of these, Kimmei Tennō (540-571), was still larger, and of his twenty-five children four became sovereigns of Japan. The genealogical table for this period stands thus:—



Ankan (27) was nominated as his successor by Keitai Tennō on the day of his death in 531. The strange thing is that Ankan's reign does not begin until 534. On his death in 535 without children, "the Ministers in a body delivered up the sword and mirror to Ankan's next (full) brother," and made him assume the Imperial dignity" (Senkwa, 536-540). Of the next Emperor, Kimmei (540-571), we are merely told that he was the Emperor Keitai's (507-531) rightful heir. Kimmei in his lifetime designated his second son Bidatsu (572-586)

as his successor. This Emperor Bidatsu had seventeen children, but none of these came to the throne. Bidatsu was the son of a daughter of Senkwa Tennō (536-539), and he was married to his own half-sister, who afterwards came to rule in her own right as the Empress Suiko (593-628). Now, this lady was one of the thirteen children the Emperor Kimmei had by the daughter of his Prime Minister, Soga no Iname. By another Soga lady, variously given as the aunt or half-sister of Suiko's mother, he had five more, one of whom plays a somewhat prominent part in the history of the time as the Prince Anahobe. This Prince's sister, the Princess Anahobe, became the chief consort of Bidatsu's half-brother and successor, the Emperor Yomei (587-588), who was the full-brother of Bidatsu's Empress, later known as the Empress Suiko. On Yomei's death, Sūjun (588-593) succeeded, and he was a full brother of Yomei Tennō's Empress, and thus a scion of the House of Soga. However, on becoming Emperor he did not take a Soga lady as consort, but went to the great rival house of Ohotomo for one. It may not have been this step which cost him his life, but the fact remains that he was presently assassinated by an emissary of the Prime Minister, Soga no Mumako. Thereupon Bidatsu's Empress, whose mother was a Soga, was established as Empress in her own right, while the Prince Shōtoku was nominated Heir Prince. A look into his genealogical tree will serve to show that he had more Soga blood in his veins than anything else. In truth it was the Sogas who now ruled Yamato, for behind the sovereign and all the Imperial Princes and Princesses of Soga extraction stood the great Soga clan, or rather clans, with their all-powerful chieftains.

Although it is only with the appointment of Soga Iname to the office of Oho-omi or Great Minister in 536 that the Soga family comes into prominence, it was yet at once of hoary antiquity and Imperial descent, tracing its lineage back to the eighth legendary Emperor, Kōgen Tennō (214-157 B.C.). A grandson of that sovereign was that Japanese Methusaleh, Takeuchi no Sukune, who served five successive sovereigns as Prime Minister and died in the reign of Nintoku, after 362 A.D., aged at least 270 years. From him were descended several of the great clans of Yamato, the Kose, the Heguri, the Ki, and,—greatest of all,—the Soga. The real founder of the greatness of the family was that Iname who began the stubborn fight to establish Buddhism in Japan. After a thirty-four years'

tenure of office he died in 570, and on the accession of Bidatsu Tennō in 572, Iname's son, Mumako, succeeded to his father's post, and held it for more than half-a-century, down to 626. What Iname had vainly striven for Mumako accomplished. At the time of his death there were forty-six Buddhist temples, with 816 priests and 569 nuns in Yamato, while on the occasion of his illness in 614, a thousand persons, men and women, had "entered religion" for his sake. It was this Mumako who was the Great King-Maker in old Yamato. His son Emishi (626-645) and his grandson Iruka were perhaps even more powerful in their time, but theirs was the pride that goes before a fall. It was against them that the Great Revolution of 645 was primarily directed. The *coup d'état* began with the assassination of Iruka at a solemn court function: then followed the execution of his father, and the power of the seemingly omnipotent Soga was broken for ever. And with the fall of the Soga, the knell of old Yamato was rung, and what may now be called "Old Japan" was born. The real primeval Yamato institutions were now swept away, the administration and nearly everything else got Sinicised, and two generations later we have to deal with Sinicised official (so-called) historians struggling not altogether ineffectually to execute their mandate to impress their contemporaries and succeeding ages with the belief that the political theories of 720 A.D. had been those of the Land of the Gods from the beginning of (un)-recorded time!

This has a not unimportant bearing upon very recent Japanese history. While foreign writers are mistaken in asserting that the Meiji statesmen went to France or to any other country in Europe for their administrative models, Japanese publicists are equally at fault when they assure us that the Reform of Meiji was merely a reversion to the original state of things prevalent in these islands. Hirata, the great Shintoist of the last century, approximates more closely to the truth when he maintains that the Tokugawa régime was in a measure a replica of the organisation that prevailed in old Yamato previous to the Revolution of Taikwa (645 A.D.). What the men of Meiji did really in a measure revert to was the Sinicised Japan of 645 and the subsequent century or two. But the political theories that then prevailed had very little that was autochthonous in them. In short, it is not too much to say that these theories were in many respects at diametrical variance with the old Yamato ideas. The authors of the

Nihongi strive might and main to make out that such theories had really been consonant with primeval practice. But they only succeed in stultifying themselves to anyone who cares to devote time and pains to collating their divergent statements, and to an investigation of their real "sources." For instance, in 534, an Emperor makes his Minister use the following words to a subject who had given offence: "Of the entire surface of the soil there is no part which is not an Imperial grant in fee; under the wide Heaven there is no place which is not Imperial territory. The previous Emperors therefore established an illustrious designation and handed down a vast fame; in magnanimity they were a match for Heaven and Earth; in glory they resembled the Sun and Moon. They rode afar and dispensed their mollifying influence to a distance; in breadth it extended beyond the bounds of the capital and cast a bright reflection throughout the boundaries of the land, pervading everywhere without a limit. Above they were the crown of the nine heavens; they passed abroad through all the eight points of the compass; they declared their efficiency by the framing of ceremonial observances; they instituted music, thereby manifesting order. The resulting happiness was truly complete; theirs was gladness which tallied with that of past years."

Now, all this is not only make-believe, but it is absurd make-believe. The rude and unlettered district chief to whom this language is addressed could no more have understood it than he could contemporary Byzantine Greek, while the Minister himself could not possibly have used it. Forty years later (572) we find Emperor, Prime Minister, and the official clerks all equally unable to read a dispatch (in Chinese) from the King of Koguryu in Northern Korea. As the above speech is not only Chinese, but real Chinaman's Chinese, the absurdity of the thing should be evident. In truth, with the exception of the first sentence, the whole passage is stolen from the records of the Liang Dynasty (502-554), with which the Japanese did not make acquaintance until after their resumption of intercourse with China shortly before the close of the sixth century. Such a theory of eminent domain was indeed put forward by implication in Shōtoku Taishi's famous Laws of 604,* but it was only after 645 A.D. that it actually became an article in the constitutional doctrine of Japan.

* See Dr. Florenz's instructive note on p. 13 of his translation of the *Nihongi* (592-69).

Yet what prevailed in ante-Taikwa Japan can hardly be described as a feudal system. The nearest analogy to the organisation of old Japan is to be found in the west of contemporary Europe,—among the Celtic tribes or clans of Gaul, of Wales, and of Ireland.* The term “clan” is generally applied to the fiefs of the Tokugawa régime. But these fiefs were not clans,—they were as much fiefs as those of our feudal system were,—characterised by tenure of land by military service, sub-infeudation, and an element of contract, while there was no doctrine of a descent of the community from a common ancestor. In dealing with ancient Japan, on the other hand, the term “clan” is by no means inappropriate. The chief clan was the Imperial one—the descendants of the Heavenly Grandchild. Its head had full and direct power over all its members, but as regards the members of the other clans, he could exercise authority over them through their respective heads only. Possessed of broader acres and with a greater number of immediate personal dependents than his fellow-chieftains, the Great Yamato Chief was probably gradually elevated from the position of a mere *primus inter pares* by the exercise of three prerogatives. As the ancestral gods of his house developed into the gods of the nation at large his functions as High Priest of a clan widened into those of the High Priest of the whole people, and this presently enabled him to call upon the heads of the houses for contributions to defray the expenses of the due maintenance of the national cult. Next towards foreign Powers (by which the Korean States are chiefly meant) he became the representative of Yamato, charged with the power of declaring war and making peace and of speaking in its name with authority generally. It lay with him to receive embassies from and to dispatch envoys to the over-sea Courts. Hence his right to call upon the clans for military contingents in cases of complications. In the third place he became the judge in cases of disputed successions to the headships of *Uji* (clans), and in the fifth century we find him creating, dissolving, and degrading *Uji* in the clear light of history. In the sixth century we see the Emperors vigorously engaged in extending their power; and

* The Japanese student of the earliest annals of his own country will find a perusal of the first chapter of Vinogradoff's *Growth of the Manor*, and Bloch's volume on *Les Origines, La Gaule Indépendante et la Gaule Romaine* very instructive.

their chief method of doing so is by bringing *more land under direct Imperial possession and control*. Many instances in the *Nihongi* go to support Dr. Florenz in his contention that the heads of clans had something more than a mere superiority over their lands ; that in fact they were the absolute owners of them. Numerous incidents of real practical life seem effectually to negative the assumption that the doctrine, "Under the wide Heavens there is no place that is not Imperial territory," then had currency in Yamato. On the other hand, we have two emphatic declarations about the non-alienability of certain estates which belonged to the Emperor *ex officio*. The true statement of the case seems to be something like this :—In pre-Taikwa Japan the ownership of the soil of the whole Empire was vested in the sovereign neither practically nor theoretically. On the other hand, the sovereign was one of the greatest, if not by far the greatest, landholder in Japan, and furthermore he was usually actively engaged in an endeavour to extend his real powers by adding to his acres.

Now, a succession of strong and able sovereigns of the calibre of the first three Norman kings, of Henry II. and of Edward I. in England, of James I. and of James II. in Scotland, of Philip IV. and of Louis XI. in France, might very well have succeeded in crushing all the great houses of Yamato by this very simple means. But, chiefly on account of the system of virtual polygamy that then prevailed in Japan, the titular sovereigns tended to become little more than pawns in the great contest for power then raging between several great (nominally) subject houses.

At the beginning of the fifth century we meet with mention of the Ministers,—of the Great Omi and the Great Muraji,—and from Yūryaku (457-479) onwards we hear of the appointment of a Great Omi and of Great Muraji (sometimes one, sometimes two) at the beginning of each succeeding reign. Mr. Aston ventures the supposition that the Great Omi was the chief civil, and the Great Muraji the chief military official. Nothing in the records seems to negative Dr. Florenz's hypothesis—or rather categorical assertion—that the Great Omi was the chief of the Omi, and that the Omi were nobles who were of Imperial descent—who, in other words, could trace their lineage from the Heavenly Grandchild, and consequently from the Sun-goddess. At one time we find a Heguri, at another a Tsubura, and finally, the Soga acting as Great Omi. All

these families were of remote Imperial descent. The Muraji were all noble houses, but they were not of Imperial stock. They fell into two categories, those descended from Heavenly Deities,—by which is meant those who traced their lineage back to the companions of the Heavenly Grandchild who alighted with him on the Peak of Takachiho in the Land of So (Kumaso),—and the progeny of Earthly Deities, that is, of the gods and chieftains whom Jimmu found domiciled in Yamato at the time of his conquest of it. In other words, the Muraji were nobles partly of Kyūshū and partly of Idzumo extraction. To the former belonged the great houses of Nakatomi (later the Fujiwara) and Ohotomo, to the latter those of Miwa and Mononobe. The Kyūshū Muraji were generally represented by the Great Muraji Ohotomo, the Idzumo by the Great Muraji Mononobe. Both of these great clans paid special attention to military matters, and so far Mr. Aston's assertion is perfectly correct.

Omi and Muraji alike were generally supposed to appear at times, if not to live permanently, in the capital—which at this time, by the way, changed at least once, and sometimes oftener, in every reign. Here, however, they did not take instructions directly from the sovereign,—his communications to them were conveyed through the medium of the Great Omi or the Great Muraji. A Great Omi, like Soga, thus occupied a rather peculiar position, for he exercised a sort of control over the general body of the Omi, and at the same time he was *the* Soga, inasmuch as he was at the head not only of his own clan proper, but of the chiefs of the numerous cadet Omi houses into which, in course of time, it had ramified. The heads of these cadet houses were absolute masters of their own lands, and exercised absolute and untrammelled authority over their own tribesmen, clients, and slaves. With these the Great Omi could not interfere directly; but he could call upon the chiefs of the cadet houses to join, for example, in the work of erecting a mausoleum for his own father, the former Great Omi and head of the Soga clan in the widest sense of the term,—for *the* Soga in short. Although generally resident in the capital, these Omi and Muraji were great landholders with vast estates in the country; several of them with many estates, as widely separated as were those of the barons of our first Norman king. Only it is to be noted that on these estates it was not so

much the *feudal* as the old Celtic tribal tie that was the bond of connection between lord or chief and dependent.

However, the estates of the Emperor, of the Omi, and of the Muraji formed only a portion, albeit perhaps the major portion, of the total superficies of what then constituted the so-called Empire of Yamato. A very considerable part of the soil was occupied by the Kunimiyakko, or Kuni Miyatsuko, or Kunitsuko, for all three terms are various forms of the same word, which Professor Chamberlain translates as "Country-Ruler." Of these, shortly before the Great Revolution of 645 there were about 140, great and small; for Country Ruler (Kunitsuko) was used in two senses. In the first place it was a generic term for local independent magnates—Kimi, Wake, Kunitsuko, Agata, Inaki—of various origins and of widely dissimilar resources, and secondly it was sometimes specifically employed to denote the more limited cases among those that actually ruled a "country" in contradistinction to a mere district or perhaps a few villages. Six children of the Emperor Ōjin are said to have been provided with as many appanages in Kibi (Bizen, Bitchū, and Bingo),* and the sons of other sovereigns who did not come to the throne were usually provided with estates in various parts of the country. In connection with the accession of Keitai (507) we meet with two such instances. For the first five or six generations these were known as *Kimi* or *Wake*; after that they usually became merged in the general body of *Kuni no Miyakko* or *Kunitsuko*.

These *Kuni no Miyakko*, Country Rulers, were no mere Governors removable at the Imperial pleasure, or holding office for a term of years. They were real chieftains, heads of clans, who owned the soil on which they were settled. We have instances (under Yūryaku) of some small clans being extirpated, and probably in such cases their lands may very well have been seized by the Emperor. But in other instances where the chieftain was punished with death we know the lands were not confiscated; and in several places in the *Nihongi* we meet with mention of chiefs (Kunitsuko) purging themselves of offences against the sovereign by surrendering *portions* of their domains to him. As has been already remarked, the sovereign also acted as judge in cases of disputed succession to the headships of clans, and then it seems to have been customary for the suc-

* See Aston's *Nihongi*, vol. II., p. 162.

cessful aspirant to surrender some of his estates with the serfs upon them to the sovereign as a sort of thank-offering. These were two of the three chief means of extending the Imperial territories.

A third was by the establishment of *Be* or *Tomo*. About this peculiar institution of ancient Japan, which was only abolished in 646, there is a great deal of obscurity. The words have sometimes been translated "clan" or "guild." But the members of the *Be* or *Tomo* were connected by no tie of blood-relationship, while the son of the member of a mediæval guild was not in all cases compelled to enter the guild. The nearest Western analogy to these is also, strangely enough, to be found in contemporary Europe, in the *hereditary* guilds of the later Roman Empire. Some of the Japanese *Be* of the fifth century were almost the exact counterpart of the *Navicularii*, the *Pistores*, the *Suarii*, the *Pecuarii* with whom the legislation of the Roman Emperors was so much concerned at that time.*

* "An army of public servants incorporated in hereditary guilds were charged with the duty of bringing up supplies, and preparing them for consumption. . . . One of the hardest tasks of the Government was to prevent the members of these guilds from deserting or evading their hereditary obligations. It is well known that the tendency of the later Empire was to stereotype society, by compelling men to follow the occupation of their fathers, and preventing a free circulation among different callings and grades in life. The man who brought the grain of Africa to the public stores at Ostia, the baker who made it into loaves for distribution, the butchers who brought pigs from Samnium, Lucania, or Bruttium, the purveyors of wine and oil, the men who fed the furnaces of the public baths, were bound to their callings from one generation to another. It was the principle of rural serfdom applied to social functions. Every avenue of escape was closed. A man was bound to his calling, not only *by his father's but by his mother's condition*. If the daughter of one of the baker caste married a man not belonging to it, her husband was bound to her father's calling. Not even a dispensation obtained by some means from the Imperial chancery, not even the power of the Church, could avail to break the chain of servitude. The *corporati*, it is true, had certain privileges, exemptions, and allowances, and the heads of some of the guilds might be raised to the rank of 'Count.' But their property, like their persons, was at the mercy of the State."—DELL, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, pp. 232-3.

"Et comme il fallait que ces cadres demeuraissent remplis, le négociant, l'artisan fut rivé de père en fils à son métier et à son collège, comme le colon à la terre, comme le soldat à l'armée, comme le curiale à la curie. . . . Les corporations étaient soumises à un régime plus ou moins tyrannique suivant qu'elles avaient avec l'Etat des rapports plus ou moins étroits. Les plus durement traitées étaient celles qui comprenaient les ouvriers travaillant dans les manufactures impériales, dans les fabriques de monnaies, d'armes, d'étoffes précieuses, dans les mines. Hommes libres ou esclaves, tous, quel que fût leur état civil, étaient marqués au fer rouge, de manière à ne pouvoir s'échapper. Ils ne jouissaient d'ailleurs d'aucune autonomie, et dépendaient entièrement des préposés nommés par l'Empereur. Les corpora-

These *Be* or *Tomo*, or groups or corporations, were very numerous. The *Nihongi* constantly speaks of the 180 *Be*, but this is not to be taken literally; for one hundred and eighty was an ancient Japanese expression for "all," when the totality included a great many individuals whom it might have been tedious or impossible to enumerate. They seem to have existed for many purposes, to have been instituted on various pretexts and to have differed very widely in their memberships. We have details about the formation of the Fleshers' *Be* under Yūryaku (458), which appears to have been originally composed of serfs presented by the Empress Dowager, the Omi, Muraji, Kuni no Miyakko, and the *Tomo* (or *Be*) no Miyakko. This special *Be* was doubtless meant to provide for the necessities of the Court exclusively, and was strictly local. A good many, perhaps most, *Be* stood on a somewhat similar footing. But there were others that were not merely local, but extended over the greater part of the Empire. For instance, in 480, the Emperor Seinei sent officers to establish three sets of *Be* in every province in order that the memory of his three childless consorts should be kept alive for ever. These were called the *Be* of Palace Attendants, of Palace Stewards, and of Palace Archers respectively, but they were really agricultural communities of serfs working estates the revenue of which was nominally to go to the maintenance of certain court functionaries and body-guards. Other agricultural corporations were established for purposes similar to that of our mediæval manors assigned as 'pin-money' to queens and noble dames. On such occasions the Provincial magnates were expected to be complaisant enough to make over the necessary rice-fields or other lands and to donate the serfs needed for working them. It is not difficult to understand that a strong sovereign might have found this a very efficient device for extending the Imperial domains. Again, in Richū's time (404 A.D.), we find the head of the Carters' *Be* proceeding from Yamato to Kyūshū and holding a review of all the Carters' *Be* in that island. Two great corporations were those of the Seamen and the Mountain Wardens. On several occasions we meet with these

tions qui par quelque côté concouraient à la subsistance publique, celles qui produisaient les denrées alimentaires et celles qui les faisaient circuler, étaient aussi surveillées de près et devaient une notable partie de leur travail à l'Etat.—M. Bloch in LAVISSE'S *Histoire de France*, Tome I., p. 435.

Be mobilised as formidable military forces; and that the latter corporation held lands of its own we know from an incident which occurred after the death of Ōjin and before the accession of Nintoku. The heads of these corporations, although hereditary, were originally appointed by the Emperor. In 400 A.D. Richū deposes Adzumi Muraji from the headship of the Seamen's *Be* in Awaji; however, a new head is not appointed, but the *Be* is broken up and the seamen made agricultural serfs on the Imperial estates in Yamato. In 485 Wodate, the official who had discovered the future Emperors Ninken and Kenzō serving as farm hands in Harima, on being asked to name his own reward, requested to be made chief of the Mountain-Warden *Be*. Thereupon the Emperor gave him the title of Yamabe no Muraji; the Omi of Kibi was associated with him, and the Yamamori *Be* (Mountain Warden's *Be*) were made their serfs. Here the new head of the corporation is ennobled—*i.e.* becomes Muraji, it will be remarked—while the other head, the Omi of Kibi, a descendant of the Emperor Ōjin, is also, of course, a noble. Over the Mountain-Wardens these heads exercised the power of life and death,—it was only after the Reform of 645 that the *corporati* were allowed to appeal from their chiefs to the (newly-established) Central Government.* It will thus be seen that the chiefs of the Greater Corporations were very important men from the number of their dependants; and it is not so very strange to find the Rulers of Corporations (*Tomo no Miyakko*) ranking with the Country Rulers (*Kuni no Miyakko*). These Rulers of Corporations sometimes held large estates in various parts of the country *ex officio*, and in addition to this they were sometimes heads of clans, with their own tribesmen, really or theoretically connected with them by the blood-tie, at their beck and call. The Rulers of Corporations were neither serfs nor plebeians; at the lowest they were gentlemen ranking with the Country Rulers. On the other hand several of them were ennobled, bearing the titles of Omi and Muraji, while, as has just been said, others of them were at the same time not only heads of corporations of serfs but chieftains of clans as well. Many Japanese scholars maintain that it was only the sovereign who could create a

* These Yamamori perhaps had functions analogous to the *dendrophores* of the later Roman Empire, while the *Amabe* or Seamen's Corporation corresponds to the *Navicularii*, See LAVISSE'S *Histoire de France*, Tome I., p. 432.

Be. This contention at first sight seems to be invalidated by the fact that we find offending magnates compounding for their delinquency by making over certain *Be* to the Emperor. But bearing the origin of Yūryaku's Fleshers' *Be* in mind we can readily understand that what the offenders surrendered was merely land and people which the sovereign thereupon constituted a *Be*. The superintendents of the Imperial Agricultural *Be* in the outlying provinces appear in some cases to have developed into autonomous Country Rulers, or Group Rulers, if we are to believe the assertions of the legislators of 645-6. Even in the ninth and tenth centuries it sometimes took seven or eight weeks for a Governor to get from Tosa to Kyōto and twice or three times as long from Kyōto to the present Tōkyō. The mere difficulties of communication must have made it no light task for even a strong central government to make its power felt in the more distant provinces. As a matter of fact the central government previous to 645 was exceedingly feeble,—even in Yamato and the surrounding districts it was far from being omnipotent. Accordingly its representatives,—the superintendents of the Imperial estates and of Imperial corporations—in the remoter portions of the Empire could safely conduct themselves very much as the heirs of Charlemagne's local officers did under the laxly exercised authority of his degenerate successors. Thus the attempts to extend the Imperial domain in the outlying sections of the Empire, which might very well have proved effectual under a succession of able sovereigns, merely ended in a mushroom-like growth of new "Country" or "Group" Rulers, the more astute of whom were about 645 fortifying the autonomous position to which they either had attained, or were aspiring to, by recourse to forged and fictitious genealogies.

From all this the discerning reader will readily infer that in old Yamato there were really two partially antagonistic, partially complementary and interwoven social organisations in the field,—the clan system and the group or corporation system, to wit. In several instances chiefs of clans were also heads of corporations. But in most cases the heads of corporations stood opposed as a sort of rival aristocracy, or rather gentry, to the clan-chieftains.

One very peculiar and important, nay perhaps preponderant, factor in the corporation system was the immigrant and foreign element. From the very beginning of semi-authen-

tic history we meet with numerous and unmistakeable indications of a steady and considerable influx of immigrants from the peninsular States which are now collectively known as Korea. The index to Mr. Aston's *Nihongi* is seriously defective, yet in it as it stands we meet with no fewer than twenty references to "Immigration into Japan" before 645 A.D. Mimana, Silla, Pakche, Koguryu and China all alike contributed to the stream. In 289 (really 120 years later) we hear of Achi no Omi and his son bringing with them to Japan a company of their people of seventeen districts, and elsewhere we run across notices of whole villages crossing the sea from the peninsula. In addition to that there were numerous Chinese refugees. Under 540 we read that "the men of T'sin, and of Han, etc., the emigrants from the various frontier nations were assembled together, settled in the provinces and districts, and enrolled in the registers of population. The men of T'sin numbered in all 7,053 houses." Here a word of caution becomes necessary. A modern Japanese house is on the average composed of about five units. For fiscal purposes in 747 the normal Japanese house was supposed to consist of twelve individuals. And this seems to have been seriously under the truth. In 700 in a district in Mino one house had 94 inmates, another more than 50, several over 30, while the general average was 18. Thus seven thousand houses in ancient Japan would represent a very much greater fraction of the total population than it would nowadays. The T'sin people, then, in all probability numbered something like 120,000, or 130,000. And besides them there were "the men of Han (also Chinese or Koreans of Chinese extraction ultimately) and the men of the frontier States." All told, this alien population must have been a very numerous one. In a peerage of the early eighth century some 381 out of 1,177 nobles are assigned either a Korean or a Chinese origin. It is not probable that the Chinese and Korean leaven was as strong among the Japanese plebs as it was among the patricians; yet it seems somewhat beside the mark to assert, as is sometimes done, that these immigrants constituted "but a drop in the ocean" in the composition of the people of Japan.

These immigrants would naturally attach themselves to the Great Imperial Clan and shelter themselves under its patronage and protection. The aristocrats among the new-comers were evidently treated as aristocrats from the very first.

Doubtless a portion of the followings of these consisted of mere unskilled agricultural or common labourers, and these being neither necessary nor indispensable in Japan would sink into the general mass of serfs. But besides these there were bodies of skilled artificers and workmen plying handicrafts with which the Japanese were unacquainted. Their labour made this class of immigrant important; their presence in the land was felt to be necessary. Hence they had no difficulty in establishing themselves in a position of respect and consideration. They were in fact the "aristocrats of labour"; and their *Be* or corporations stood on a higher plane than the native *Tomo*. Among them, for example, were constituted at first two, and ultimately three, perhaps more, corporations of scribes, whose business it was to write and read dispatches for the sovereign, to manage his treasure-houses and keep his accounts, as well as those of the numerous Imperial granaries scattered over the Empire, and to record events. This of course was a position of great influence, and it is not strange to find several of these men treated as nobles.

It seems that these foreigners were mostly concentrated into two great settlements. The men of Han, known as the Eastern Aya, occupied a district in Yamato. In 472 their chief was made head of the whole community of *Be* among them. "The Emperor (Yūryaku) established their *Tomo no Miyakko*, granting him the title of *Atahe*."

The T'sin people, known as the Western Aya, had been established in Kawachi. These are more commonly met with under the name of *Hada*, a group of noble families, by the way, that claimed to be descended from *Chi Hwangti*, the Napoleon of China. Of these, under 471, we read:—"The *Hada* house was dispersed. The *Omi* and *Muraji* each enforced their services at pleasure, and would not allow the *Hada no Miyakko* to control them. Consequently, *Saké*, *Hada no Miyakko*, made a great grievance of this, and took office with the Emperor. The Emperor (Yūryaku) loved and favoured him, and commanded that the *Hada* house should be assembled and given to Lord *Saké* of *Hada*. So this Lord, attended by excellent *Be* workmen of 180 kinds, presented as industrial taxes fine silks which were piled up so as to fill the Court. Therefore he was granted a title—viz., *Udzu Masa*."

It can readily be conceived that this foreign element, by attaching itself to the immediate fortunes of the Great Im-

perial Clan, became a strong support for the sovereign, and added vastly to his power. Indications are not lacking that it was the constant and consistent support of these alien communities that chiefly enabled Yūryaku to deal with opponents in the drastic fashion he did. Yūryaku was devoting much attention to the development of sericulture in Japan; and as the Hada people were experts in this, the Hada house was soon afterwards again dispersed in numerous settlements throughout the Empire as teachers and instructors. It was this house which under the name of T'sin we find to have numbered 7,053 families in the year 540. The men of Han, or the Yamato Aya, on the other hand, continued as a united community in their original settlement down to 645. On many occasions we find the Atahe, or head of these Yamato Aya, playing a very prominent rôle in political developments, and in 645 we find him and his people forming the last defence of the Soga, in the supreme crisis of their fortunes.

CHAPTER IV.

OLD YAMATO.

FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF BUDDHISM TO THE GREAT
COUP D'ÉTAT (550 TO 645 A.D.)

IN the previous chapter we have confined our attention to the strictly domestic concerns of Yamato. However, it must be borne clearly in mind that during all these ages there was also an over-sea Japan; and that Yamato, if she did not have extensive possessions, had, at all events, a firm foothold and vital interests in the peninsula beyond the Straits of Tsushima. The importance of all this will be clear when it is pointed out that it was the protection of these foreign interests of hers that occasioned that intimate intercourse with the kingdom of Pakche which brought Yamato to a knowledge and appreciation of the higher culture of continental Asia, and especially of China. An examination of the relations then subsisting between Pakche and Japan will disclose the interesting fact that "the gift of the image of Shaka Butsu in gold and copper, several flags and umbrellas, and a number of volumes of Sutras," which is regarded as the introduction of Buddhism into Japan (552 A.D.), was merely one of a series of presents with which the Pakche King was eagerly endeavouring to conciliate the good-will of the Japanese Court, in order to enlist its aid in the desperate contest then being waged by Pakche against Ko-gur-yu and Silla.

It has been stated that Korea was then divided into three considerable States. In the north was Ko-gur-yu, fierce, warlike, and aggressive. In truth it was a first class military Power, for on several occasions in its history it was able to bid successful defiance to the whole embattled might of the Chinese empire. The strip along the coast of the Sea of Japan to the south of Ko-gur-yu was occupied by the kingdom of Silla, not by any means a *great* military Power, although yet fairly strong. On the other hand, the Silla statesmen were adepts in diplomacy, for Pakche often found that Silla intrigue was more to be dreaded than Ko-gur-yu ferocity. This king-

dom of Pakche, extending south from Ko-gur-yu along the shores of the Yellow Sea to the south-west of the peninsula, often found itself in a difficult position. At most times it was on bad terms with Silla, for both were trying to extend their influence into the buffer States that lay between their respective eastern and western boundaries to the south, and on the other hand it was frequently menaced by those hard fighters, the men of Ko-gur-yu, to the north. As Pakche felt that it could not stand alone, and as China, of which in common with its two rivals and neighbours it professed itself to be a vassal State (from 417 A.D.), was far away, it spared no effort to make a friend of Yamato.

However, as already pointed out, these three kingdoms of Ko-gur-yu, Silla, and Pakche did not occupy the whole of the peninsula. Driven in between the southern portions of Pakche and Silla like a blunt wedge, were the territories of the kingdom of Ka-rak with its dependencies the five fiefs of Kaya. Says Mr. Hulbert:—"Ka-rak extended eastward as far as Wang-san River, six miles to the west of the present Yang-san; to the north-east as far as Ka-ya San, the present Koryung; to the south and south-west as far as the coast, and on the west to Chi-ri San. From this we see that it was little inferior to Silla in size." Korean historians have not found very much to say about Ka-rak:—"The kingdom of Ka-rak had existed side by side with Silla on terms of mutual friendship for 482 years, but in 527 her King, Kim Ku-hyung, gave up his sovereign power and merged his kingdom into that of Silla. He was, however, retained at the head of the Ka-rak State under appointment by the King of Silla. It does not appear from the scanty records that this was other than a peaceful change. Ka-rak had long seen the growing power of Silla and doubtless recognised that more was to be gained by becoming part of that kingdom than by standing aloof and running the chance of becoming disputed territory between the rival powers of the peninsula."

When it is borne in mind that it was exactly among the Ka-rak and Kaya States that Yamato had its firm foothold and its sphere of influence, the dulness of the preceding quotations may probably be quickened into something with a spark of life. Moreover, in the light of these quotations, certain things given under 527 A.D. in the Japanese annals become pregnant with significance, for the modern historian can then

easily understand what a formidable thing the Silla diplomacy of those days was, not only to Pakche, but to Yamato.

Somewhere near the confines of this Ka-rak State was situated the *Miyake* of Mimana or Imna.* From the accounts of its overthrow by Silla in 562, it becomes apparent that it is more or less to be identified with some or all of those Kaya fiefs that at one time at least were dependencies of the kingdom of Ka-rak. From time to time we meet with mention of a Japanese garrison here; at other times we hear of a Resident-General, and we have frequently notices of Japanese "Governors" in the smaller outlying districts. By these governors are probably meant either semi-independent Japanese chiefs, or Japanese residing at the courts of the petty local princelets as advisers. In a good many instances we can see that the Japanese in Mimana were mainly fighting for their own individual hands. Inter-marriage with the native aristocracy was frequent, and the issue of such unions, of uncertain nationality, and well acquainted with the languages of both parents, too often endeavoured to play the part Alcibiades played between Tissaphernes and the Athenian aristocrats in 411 B.C. Occasionally these men occupied high office in the service of the Korean States. Silla and Pakche were usually on bad terms, while Ka-rak was not altogether without its differences with Silla; and when it suited their own purposes these half-Japanese politicians and adventurers would not hesitate to embroil all three States, and then if need be appeal to Yamato for assistance. A really strong Yamato ruler, like King Wu (the Emperor Yūryaku), was too formidable to be trifled with, perhaps; but on Wu's death, some time after 502, the game of intrigue at once recommenced. With the confused data at our disposal it seems hopeless to attempt to unravel the complications that then ensued; however it is tolerably plain that they were serious. We here find a Japanese governor acting in his own interests by procuring for Pakche the cession of extensive tracts within the Yamato sphere of influence. This would seem to have caused a formidable re-

* At one time in ancient Japan *mita* signified land reserved for the use of the Government, *i.e.* of the Emperor, or his officers; *tabe* were the *coloni* that worked these lands; while *miyake* were the granaries in which the produce of the *mita* was stored. *Miyake* thus came to signify "Government house." In course of time we hear of private *miyake*. These were often very small. In 646 the Reform Prince surrendered 181 *miyake* and 524 men of the tribe, who worked them.

bellion, and the insurgents proved strong enough to repulse a considerable Yamato naval force dispatched to restore order. This was in 516; and then eleven years later the Japanese statesmen found to their cost how much Silla diplomacy was to be dreaded. It was in this year, 527, that the King of Karak incorporated his kingdom with his eastern neighbour, who had very astutely profited by the general discontent excited by the cession of territory and ports to Pakche by Japan. Yamato now braced itself for a great effort, and 60,000 (?) men were mustered for an attack on Silla. Says the *Nihongi*:—"Afumi no Kena no Omi, in command of an army of 60,000 men, was about to proceed to Mimana, in order to re-establish and unite to Mimana South Kara and Tök-sa-than, which had been conquered by Silla, when Iwai, Tsukushi (*i.e.* Chikuzen) no Miyakko, secretly plotted rebellion so that there was a delay of several years. Fearing that the matter would be hard to accomplish, he was constantly watching for a favourable opportunity. Silla, knowing this, secretly practised bribery with Iwai, and encouraged him to oppose the passage of Kena no Omi's army. Hereupon Iwai occupied the two provinces of Hi and Toyo (*i.e.* Hizen, Higo, Buzen, and Bungo), and would not allow the taxes to be paid [that is, he seized the Imperial granaries with the estates attached to them in these provinces]. Abroad he intercepted the route by sea, and led astray the yearly tribute ships from Ko-gur-yu, Pakche, Silla, and Mimana, while at home he blocked the way for Kena no Omi's army, which was being sent to Mimana."

To quell this insurrection took about a year and a half. Here we have what appears very much like a determined attempt to establish an independent State, if not a rival dynasty, in Kyūshū. That Iwai had been aping royalty we know from archaeological sources. In Yamato, burial in a dolmen covered with a *double* mound was a form of sepulture reserved for the Imperial family. Now, in his own life-time Iwai had constructed one of these double-mounded tombs as a mausoleum for himself. This Iwai was not the only Kyūshū chieftain who had questionable dealings with the peninsular States. In the strange story of Illa, "Country Ruler" of a district in Hizen or Higo, and at the same time a high official in Pakche employ (*Nihongi* 583 A.D.), we meet with incidents that lead us to suspect that Kyūshū magnates had more intimate connections with the over-sea Courts than

they had with that of Yamato. For one thing, both Silla and Paekche were nearer and more easily accessible than was Central Japan. The position of several of these Kyūshū heads of clans was not unlike that of those Norman barons in our own history who had their fiefs and followed their fortunes "in Scotland and in England both."

This Kyūshū revolt of 527 ought to have taught the Imperial councillors that it would be impossible to prosecute over-sea enterprises effectually with the Japanese clan system continually threatening the existence of the central authority. The lesson indeed seems to have been taken to heart, for in the next two reigns we hear little of Korea, and a great deal about efforts to extend the Imperial domain at home. Ankan Tennō (534-536) added considerably to his possessions by allowing chieftains between Tōkyō Bay and the Pacific to compound for offences; by deciding a case of disputed succession in Kōdzuke, by extorting presents of riceland in Yamato, and by the institution of various new *Be* in *all* the provinces. Besides all this, we hear of the establishment of as many as 26 *miyake* (granaries), no fewer than ten of which were in Kyūshū, and seven in districts through which the communications between Kyūshū and the capital ran. Then in the following reign (Serikwa, 536-539) we meet with the following:—"Let there be built a Government house at Nanotsu no Kuchi (in Chikuzen). The *miyake* of the three provinces of Tsukushi, Hi and Toyo (*i.e.* all Kyūshū then under Yamato supremacy) are dispersed and remote: transport is therefore impeded by distance. Let the various *miyake* therefore be charged each severally to transfer, and to erect one jointly at Nanotsu no Kuchi."

The very apparent fact seems to have been grasped that unless the Imperial authority was strengthened and extended, and Kyūshū thoroughly secured above all things, it was hopeless for Yamato to attempt to deal with the Korean situation. After Iwai had been crushed in 528 or 529, Kena no Omi had been sent with a small force to Mimana as Resident-General. But his tenure of office had been a glaring failure, and he had to be recalled in disgrace within a year (530). Now, at last, a fresh start was made. While one son of Ohotomo, the Military Minister, stayed in Chikuzen to keep order in Kyūshū, and to make preparations for war in Korea, another went to Mimana and "restored peace there" while "he also lent aid

to Pakche." However, Yamato's worst enemies in Korea were the Japanese domiciled there. The Pakche King (Myung-nong, 524-555) could read the signs of the time readily enough. His fierce northern neighbour Ko-gur-yu was a standing menace to Pakche, while Silla, rapidly increasing in power, was almost as much to be dreaded. It was Pakche's policy to get the Ka-rak territories detached from Silla, and either re-established as an independent State, or partitioned between herself and the Japanese who still maintained control over the Ka-ya cantons. This is what is really meant by the phrase "the Re-establishment of Mimana" (or Imna) of which we hear so much in the *Nihongi*. That is, between 527 and 562, for in that year Silla seized the last of the Japanese possessions in the peninsula, and after that the same phrase (the Re-establishment of Imna) comes to have an essentially different purport.

Now, after 540, we see Pakche effectually thwarted by Silla diplomacy. King Myung-nong of Pakche had got promises of Yamato support; a strong Japanese force was to be sent to co-operate with him. But meanwhile Silla had successfully bribed the Imna agents and the local Japanese authorities, and Ki no Omi and Kawachi no Atahe, with the all-powerful half-breeds Yanasa and Mato, were, while ostensibly acting as Yamato officers, not much more than Sillan tools. It was to little purpose that the poor Pakche King, in mortal dread of Ko-gur-yu, Silla, and these treacherous Japanese agents and half-breeds, sent mission after mission to Yamato to press the dispatch of an expeditionary force. Each mission was fortified with the argument of valuable presents, and Myung-nong, finding the first of these ineffective, was driven to rack his royal brains and to ransack his kingdom for novelties that might prove acceptable. And it was this sad strait to which the Pakche monarch was put that actually led to the introduction of Buddhism into Japan! For, as already remarked, that present of "an image of Shaka Butsu in gold and copper, several flags and umbrellas, and a number of volumes of Sutras in 552," was only one in a long series of gifts with which Myung-nong was strenuously endeavouring to cajole the Yamato Court into dispatching troops to fight for him. And Buddhism, as much as Christianity, is a gospel, if not of peace, at all events of brotherly love! However, as it is given to but few of the sinful sons of men to appreciate Comedy on the grand scale, we refrain from dilating on this incident.

‘As a compensation, we crave the indulgence of the reader for the reproduction of the following passages from the *Nihongi*, 554 A.D.—“Pakche sent A, B, C, D, etc., to communicate with E, F, G, etc., etc. They said:—‘Our previous envoys stated that Uchi no Omi and his colleagues would come in the first month of this year. But although they said so, it is still doubtful whether you are coming or not. Moreover, what of the number of the troops? We pray that you will inform us of their number, so that we may prepare cantonments in advance.’

“In a separate communication they said: ‘We have just heard that thou, by command of the August Emperor, hast arrived in Tsukushi in charge of the troops bestowed on us by him. Nothing could compare with our joy when we heard this. The campaign of this year is a much more dangerous one than the last; and we beg that the force granted to us may not be allowed to be later than the first month.’

“Hereupon Uchi no Omi answered in accordance with the commands of the Emperor (Kimmei):—‘Accordingly there is being sent an auxiliary force to the number 1,000 men, 100 horses, and 40 ships.’

“Second month.—Pakche sent A, B, etc., to ask for auxiliaries. They took the opportunity of offering Makko in exchange for the hostage the Nasol Wön (both sons of a former king), whose turn it had previously been; and Wang Yang-Kwi, a man learned in the five (Chinese) classics, in exchange for the Ko-tok, Ma Työng an, and the Buddhist priest Tam-hyé, and eight others in exchange for To-sim and six others.

“Separately, in obedience to the Imperial commands, they brought the Si-tök, Wang To-nyang, *a man learned in divination*, the Ko-tök, Wang Po-son, *a man learned in the calendar*, a physician, two herbalists, and four musicians, all which persons were exchanged according to request.

“Fifth month, 3rd day.—Uchi no Omi proceeded to Pakche in command of a naval force.”

The drift of the foregoing should be tolerably apparent. Then, as now, the Japanese were before all things first-class fighting men, and it was his real regard for their powers in the field of battle that led the Pakche sovereign to study the tastes and consult the whim of the Yamato Court. And so it came to pass that *Japan actually got her first Buddhist Sutras*

and her first calendars in exchange for the services of a naval force!

When Pakche at last succeeded in getting Yamato auxiliaries, it was not a moment too soon. That very year (554) the storm broke; and both Silla and Ko-gur-yu hurled their forces against the stout little kingdom. Before the year was out King Myung-nong had been taken and killed by the Silla men, who in their turn were very roughly handled by the Yamato contingent. When hostilities ceased temporarily in the following year, 555, Silla was able to form a new province out of her Pakche spoils. The next seven years were filled with diplomatic intrigues, and then under 562 we at last read:—"Silla destroyed the *miyake* of Imna." And with the fall of this Japanese Calais in the peninsula, the islanders lost all prospects of continental expansion. Several attempts were indeed made to recover Mimana, but they came to nothing. That of the same year (562) ended in foul disaster. In 583 an outbreak of pestilence in Japan made a projected expedition impossible. In 600 there seems to have been a Mimana revolt against Silla, and 10,000 Japanese were sent to cooperate with the insurgents. Here again Silla diplomacy proved as effective as of old; the Yamato leaders were presumably bought off, and when they withdrew the rebels' cause was hopeless. The final Japanese attempt of 622 would appear to have been frustrated in a somewhat similar fashion.

Meanwhile, in old Yamato there had been strange and startling developments. That very harmless-looking Pakche present of 552—"an image of Shaka Butsu in gold and copper, several flags and umbrellas, and a number of volumes of Sutras,"—very soon threatened to assume the form of a veritable Pandora's box. Before a year was out it had caused serious dissensions in the Imperial councils. The Pakche King's memorial accompanying the present was as follows:—"This doctrine is among all doctrines the most excellent. But it is hard to explain and hard to comprehend. Even the Duke of Chow and Confucius had not attained to a knowledge of it. This doctrine can create religious merit and retribution without measure and without bounds, and so lead on to a full appreciation of the highest wisdom. Imagine a man in possession of treasures to his heart's content, so that he might satisfy all his wishes in proportion as he used them. Thus it is with the treasure of this wonderful doctrine. Every prayer

is fulfilled and naught is wanting. Moreover from distant India it has extended hither to the three Han,* where there are none who do not receive it with reverence, as it is preached to them."

"This day," continues the *Nihongi*, "the Emperor, having heard to the end, leaped for joy, and gave command to the envoys saying: 'Never from former days until now have we had the opportunity of listening to so wonderful a doctrine. We are, however, unable to decide of ourselves.' Accordingly he inquired of his Ministers one after another, saying: 'The countenance of this Buddha which has been presented by the Western frontier State is of a severe dignity such as we have never at all seen before. Ought it to be worshipped or not?' Soga no Oho-omi addressed the Emperor, saying: 'All the Western frontier lands without exception do it worship. Shall Akitsu-Yamato alone refuse to do so?' Mononobe no Oho-Muraji and Nakatomi no Muraji addressed the Emperor jointly, saying: 'Those who have ruled the Empire in this our State have always made it their care to worship in Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter the 180 Gods of Heaven and Earth, and the Gods of the Land and of Grain. If just at this time we were to worship in their stead foreign deities it may be feared that we should incur the wrath of our National Gods.'

"The Emperor said: 'Let it be given to Soga no Iname, who has shown his willingness to take it, and as an *experiment*, make him worship it.'

"Soga knelt down and received it with joy. He enthroned it in his house at Oharida, where he diligently carried out the rites of retirement from the world, and on that score purified his house at Muku-hara and made it a Temple. After this a pestilence was rife in the Land, from which the people died prematurely. As time went on it became worse and worse, and there was no remedy. Mononobe no Muraji and Nakatomi no Muraji addressed the Emperor jointly, saying: 'It was because thy servants' advice on a former day was not approved that the people are dying thus of disease. If thou dost now retrace thy steps before matters have gone too far, joy will surely be the result! It will be well promptly to fling it away, and diligently to seek happiness in the future.'

* It was introduced into Ko-gur-yu in 372 A.D., into Pakche in 384, by the sovereigns of these countries, and at once became the Court religion. It reached Silla somewhere between 417 and 458, but it did not become the official cult there until much later.

“The Emperor said: ‘Let it be done as you advise.’ Accordingly officials took the image of Buddha and abandoned it to the current of the Canal of Naniha. They also set fire to the Temple, and burnt it so that nothing was left. Hereupon there being in the heavens neither clouds nor wind a sudden conflagration consumed the Great Hall (of the Palace.)”

Soga Iname appears to have acquiesced in all this quietly enough. Though he continued to direct the most important affairs of the Empire down to the date of his death in 570, we find him giving no further offence to the National Deities. Nay, indeed, in 555, we actually meet with him remonstrating with a Pakche Prince, then in Japan, about the worship of the Shintō God, Ōnamuji, having been abandoned in Pakche. “But if,” he wound up, “you now repent your former errors, if you build a shrine to the God and perform sacrifice in honour of his divine spirit, your country will prosper. Thou must not forget this.”*

In 577, the King of Pakche sent back with a Japanese mission to his court “a number of volumes of religious books, with an ascetic, a meditative monk, a nun, a reciter of mantras (magic spells), and a temple architect, six persons in all.” The gift does not appear to have been very highly appreciated; at all events in 584 Soga no Mumako (son of Soga Iname), on sending Shiba Tattō and two other emissaries “in all directions to search out persons who practised Buddhism,” “only found in the province of Harima a man named Hyé-phyōn of Ko-gur-yu, who from a Buddhist priest had become a layman again.” “So the Oho-omi (Soga Mumako) made him teacher, and caused him to receive Shima, the daughter of Shiba Tattō, into religion. She took the name of the Nun Zen-shin (twelve years of age). Moreover he received into religion two pupils of the Nun Zen-shin. . . . Soga, still in accordance with the Law of Buddha, revered the three nuns, and gave them to Hida no Atahe and Tattō, with orders to provide them with food and clothing. He erected a Buddhist Temple on the east of his dwelling, in which he enshrined the stone image of Miroku. He insisted on the three nuns holding a general meeting to partake of maigre fare. At this time Tattō found a Buddhist relic in the food of abstinence, and presented it to Soga no Mumako. Soga, *by way of experiment*, took the relic,

* It is here that we meet the first use of the word Shintō in Japanese literature.

and placing it on the middle of a block of iron, beat it with an iron sledge-hammer, which he flourished aloft. The block and the sledge-hammer were shattered to atoms, but the relic could not be crushed. Then the relic was cast into water, when it floated on the water or sank as one desired. *In consequence of this* Soga no Mumako, Hida no Atabe, and Shiba Tattō held faith in Buddhism and practised it unremittingly. Soga built another Buddhist Temple at his house in Ishikawa. *From this arose the beginning of Buddhism."*

In the spring of the following year (585), Soga "took ill. Having made inquiry of a diviner (*i.e.* a native or *Shintō* augur), the diviner answered: 'It is a curse sent by the will of Buddha worshipped in thy father's (Soga no Iname, A.D. 570) time.' Soga accordingly sent a young man of his family to report to the Emperor (Bidatsu, 572-586) the nature of the divination. The Emperor gave orders saying: 'In accordance with the words of the diviner, let thy father's Gods be worshipped.' Soga, in obedience to the Emperor's commands, worshipped the stone image (of Miroku, the Buddhist Messiah), and *prayed that his life might be prolonged.* At this time there was a pestilence rife in the land, and many of the people died." A week later, "Mononobe no Ohomuraji and Nakatomi no Daibu (Minister) addressed the Emperor, saying: 'Why hast thou not consented to follow thy servants' counsel? Is not the *prevalence of pestilence from the reign of the late Emperor thy father down to thine, so that the nation is in danger of extinction, owing absolutely to the establishment of the Buddhist religion by Soga?*' The Emperor gave command, saying: 'Manifestly so; let Buddhism be discontinued.'"

A month after this we find Mononobe going "to the Temple, and sitting on a chair, cutting down the pagoda, which he then set fire to and burnt. He likewise burnt the image of Buddha, and the temple of Buddha. Having done so he took the remains of the image of Buddha which were left from the burning and flung them into the Naniha Canal. On this day there was wind and rain without any clouds, and Mononobe had on his rain-coat. He upbraided Soga and those who followed him in the exercise of religion and made them feel shame and contrition of heart. Moreover, he sent two emissaries to summon Zen-shin and the other Nuns provided for by Soga. So Soga did not dare to disobey the command, but

with grief and lamentation called forth the Nuns and delivered them to the messengers. The officials accordingly took away from the Nuns their garments, imprisoned them and flogged them at the road-station of the market of Tsubaki." Presently, "again the Land was filled with those who were attacked with sores and died thereof. The persons thus afflicted with sores said: 'Our bodies are as if they were burnt, as if they were beaten, as if they were broken,' and so lamenting they died. Old and young said privately to one another: 'Is this a punishment for the burning of the image of Buddha?'" A little later Soga "addressed the Emperor, saying: 'Thy servant's disease has not yet been healed; nor is it possible for succour to be afforded me unless by the power of the three precious things (*i.e.* Buddha, the Law, and the Priesthood).' Hereupon the Emperor commanded Soga saying: 'Thou mayst practise the Buddhist religion alone, but discontinue it so far as others are concerned.' So the three Nuns were given back to Soga, who received them with rejoicing, lamenting their unexampled misfortunes and bowing down his head in their honour. He built them a Temple anew, into which he welcomed them, and provided them with sustenance."

The following extract, dated two months later, may not at first blush seem to have much to do with the nascent fortunes of Buddhism in Japan. But a very little reflection will serve to dispel that erroneous impression:—

"The Emperor's (Bidatsu's) disease having become more and more inveterate, he died in the Great Hall. At this time a palace of temporary interment was erected at Hirose. Soga delivered a funeral oration with his sword girded on. Mononobe burst out laughing and said: 'He is like a sparrow pierced by a hunting-shaft.' Next Mononobe, with trembling hands and legs, delivered his funeral oration. Soga laughed and said: 'He ought to have bells hung upon him.' From this small beginning the two Ministers conceived a hatred of each other."

The two chief opponents of the new religion were Nakatomi and Mononobe. The former was a Muraji, or noble of non-Imperial descent. He traced his lineage back to a henchman of Jimmu's who had followed him from Kyūshū, even as the first ancestor of the Nakatomi clan, Ama no Koyane, had accompanied the Heavenly-Grandchild when he descended on Mount Takachiho in the Land of So. The Nakatomi chiefs had from time immemorial been charged with the superinten-

dence of certain matters connected with the native cult. If that cult were to be dethroned by an alien religion, the Nakatomi would infallibly lose in prestige, in importance, and in influence.

The Mononobe had strong reasons for acting in union with the Nakatomi at this conjuncture. Their head was also a Muraji. His first ancestor was that Idzumo chieftain, Nigihaya-hi, who is represented as tendering a dutiful submission to Jimmu. These Mononobe constituted one of the two great military clans of Yamato; and at this time it would appear that the rival military clan of Ohotomo had sunk into comparative insignificance. The Mononobe were also concerned with religious matters, being especially devoted to the cult of the Idzumo God, Ōnamuji and charged with the care of the divine treasures of the Temple of Iso-no-kami in Yamato. A new State religion could not fail to touch them very nearly in this respect also. And they seem to have been still further embittered by what they doubtless regarded as an insidious attempt on the part of the Soga to rob them of an immemorial prerogative. From the earliest times we find them, in conjunction with the Ohotomo, furnishing the guardsmen for the Imperial Palace. Now this function had lately been, at least partially, assigned to Hayato,—that is, to warriors brought from Satsuma and Ōsumi, the ancient seats of the Kumaso.

These latter make their first appearance in connection with the fierce succession quarrels that ensued on the death of the Emperor Bidatsu in 585 or 586. It will be remembered that Bidatsu was one of the Emperor Kimmei's (540-571) three sons by his chief consort. Two of Kimmei's other consorts were sisters of Soga no Mumako, and one of these presented him with thirteen and the other with five children. Bidatsu's chief consort, who was the mother of eight of his own seventeen sons and daughters, was one of the senior Soga lady's family of thirteen, and consequently Bidatsu's own half-sister and Soga no Mumako's niece. On the death of Bidatsu a determined attempt to seize the person of his chief consort was made by Prince Anahobe, a half-brother of Bidatsu, and also of his chief consort, for Anahobe was a son of Kimmei by the junior Lady Soga. This attempt was frustrated by the Hayato under the command of a certain Sakae, Miwa no Kimi, a favourite officer of the dead Emperor Bidatsu. Thereupon Anahobe made common cause with Mononobe, and the latter

sent an armed force to make away with the obnoxious official. Soga no Mumako bestirred himself in Sakae's behalf—only to find that he was too late, however. On hearing of the death of Sakae, Soga “broke into bitter lamentations, saying: ‘Civil disorder in the empire is not far off.’ Mononobe, hearing this, answered and said: ‘Thy position is that of a small Minister; thou dost not know.’”

Meanwhile, on the death of Bidatsu, all his own children and his elder brothers had been passed over, and the eldest of the senior Lady Soga's thirteen children had ascended the throne (Yōmei, 586-587). This sovereign, we are told, believed in the Law of Buddha and revered the way of the Gods. In 587, after performing the Shintō ceremony of tasting the new rice on the riverbank of Iware “he took ill, and returned to the palace. All the Ministers were in attendance. The Emperor addressed them, saying: ‘It is Our desire to give Our adherence to the three precious things (*i.e.* Buddha, the Law, and the Priests). Do ye Our Ministers advise upon this.’ All the Ministers entered the Court and consulted together. Mononobe no Moriya and Nakatomi no Katsumi opposed the Imperial proposal and advised, saying: ‘Why should we reverence strange deities, and turn our backs upon the gods of our country? Of course we know naught of any such thing.’ Soga no Mumako said: ‘Let us render assistance in compliance with the Imperial command. Who shall offer advice to the contrary?’” Then at this point Prince Anahobe, that stormy petrel, always keenly alive to his own interests, introduced a Buddhist priest into the palace. “Mononobe no Moriya glared at them in great wrath.” When told that all the Ministers were plotting against him and intended to waylay him, he made a hurried exit and retired to one of his numerous country-houses, where he assembled a strong force. Meanwhile “Nakatomi no Katsumi assembled troops at his house and went with them to the assistance of Mononobe. At length he prepared figures of the Heir-Apparent and the Imperial Prince Takeda (sons of Bidatsu Tennō, 572-586) and loathed them (*i.e.* practised witchcraft upon them). But presently finding that success was impossible he repaired to the palace of the Heir-Apparent at Mimata. Here one of the attendants, Ichii by name, watched till Nakatomi no Katsumi was withdrawing from the presence of the Heir-Apparent, and drawing his sword slew him.” In the

meantime Soga had also put himself under the protection of an armed force of Ohotomo men, "which did not leave him by night or by day."

"The Emperor's sores became worse and worse, and when the end was approaching the son of Shiba Tattō came forward and addressed him saying: 'Thy servant, on behalf of the Emperor, will renounce the world and exercise religion. Moreover, he will make an image of Buddha sixteen feet high, and a temple!' The Emperor was deeply moved."

On the death of Yōmei Tennō (587) there was yet another fierce succession dispute. The Heir-Apparent, Prince Takeda, and the restless Prince Anahobe were equally set aside, and a son of Kimmei by the junior Lady Soga became Emperor of Yamato (Sujun Tennō, 588-592). Mononobe did not rest quiet at this unexpected development, and made a strong effort to establish Prince Anahobe on the throne. As the result of three abortive *émeutes* Anahobe lost his life, and Soga no Munako determined to have a final settlement of accounts with his colleague in the Ministry (Mononobe) who had inflicted so many humiliations upon him. The forces of five Imperial Princes and ten great clan chieftains were mobilised and launched against the great surviving foe of Buddhism, Mononobe, who, "in personal command of the young men of his family and a slave-army, built a rice-fort and gave battle" in Kawachi. "Mononobe climbed up into the fork of an elm at Kisuri, from which he shot down arrows like rain. His troops were full of might. The army of the Imperial Princes and the troops of the Ministers were timid and afraid and fell back three times. At this time the Imperial Prince Mumayado, his hair being tied up on his temples, followed in the rear of the army. He pondered in his own mind, saying to himself: 'Are we not going to be beaten? Without prayer we cannot succeed.' So he cut down a *nuride* tree and swiftly fashioned images of the four Heavenly Kings. Placing them on his top-knot he uttered a vow: 'If we are now made to gain the victory over the enemy, I promise faithfully to honour the four Heavenly Kings, guardians of the world, by erecting to them a temple with a pagoda.' Soga also uttered a vow: 'Oh, all ye Heavenly Kings, and great Spirit King, aid and protect us, and make us to gain the advantage. If this prayer is granted, I will erect a pagoda in honour of the Heavenly Kings, and the great Spirit King, and will propagate everywhere the three

precious things.' When they had made this vow, they urged their troops of all arms sternly forward to the attack. Now there was a man named Ichii (the assassin of Nakatomi no Katsumi), who shot down Mononobe from his branch and killed him. Mononobe's troops accordingly gave way suddenly. Joining their forces they every one put on black clothes,* and going hunting on the plain of Magari in Hirose, so dispersed. In this war some of the children and relatives of Mononobe made their escape, and concealing themselves on the plain of Ashihara changed their personal names and altered their titles (*i.e.* their surnames), while others fled away nobody knew where. The people of that time said of them to one another: 'The wife of Soga is the younger sister of Mononobe, and Soga, injudiciously acting on his wife's advice, slew Mononobe.' "

When the civil troubles had been quieted, a temple of the Four Heavenly Kings was built in the province of Settsu.† Half of Mononobe's slaves, together with his house, were constituted the slaves and farm-house of the Great Temple, and 10,000 *shiro* of rice-land were given to Ichii (who had assassinated Nakatomi no Katsumi, and killed Mononobe in battle). Moreover Soga, in fulfilment of his vow, erected the Temple of Hōkōji (near Nara).

From the very first the fortunes of Buddhism had been bound up with those of the house of Soga; and as the Soga chieftain now bade fair to become all-powerful, the new religion obtained a firm foothold and began to make rapid progress at the Court and among certain sections of the Yamato aristocracy. In 594 we are told that "at this time all the Omi and Muraji vied with one another in erecting Buddhist shrines for the benefit of their lords and parents. These were called temples." Not only priests, but temple architects and artists and artificers of various kinds had been brought from Korea; and the simple Japanese, if unimpressed by the spiritual and moral aspects of the new cult, could not fail to have their interest excited by art and the new arts and crafts the demands of its ritual were introducing into the Empire.

Soga's persecuted nuns had been sent to Pakche for instruc-

* Black was then the colour of underlings' clothes.

† This was the Tennōji, near Ōsaka, destroyed in the great war of 1614, to the huge exultation of the Christian missionaries, then with Hideyori's forces.

tion in discipline; and after a short sojourn there they returned to Japan, to be joined by a daughter of the Ohotomo Chief and his two Korean wives. It would seem from this and various other indications that the heads of the former great military clan of Ohotomo had virtually become clients of the Soga. At all events, from this time onwards, we no longer find an Ohotomo acting as an Oho-muraji; henceforth down to 645, indeed, there is only an Oho-omi, and that always a Soga. Soga influence was especially strong among the Aya of Yamato, people of Korean or Chinese descent; and many of these became *religieux*. However, the new religion was mainly under foreign direction. "In 595 a priest of Ko-gur-yu, named Hyé-cha, emigrated to Japan, and was taken as teacher by the Prince Imperial (Mumayado). In the same year a Pakche priest, named Hyé-chhông, arrived. These two priests preached the Buddhist religion widely, and were together the mainstay of the Three Precious Things."

The Three Precious Things, whose interests were so zealously promoted by Soga no Mumako, do not appear to have done very much for Soga's morals, however. In 592 "a wild boar was presented to the Emperor (Sujun). Pointing to it, he said: 'When shall those to whom we have an aversion be cut off as this wild boar's throat has been cut?' An abundance of weapons was provided beyond what was customary. Soga, having been told of the pronouncement of the Emperor, and alarmed at this detestation of himself, called his people together and conspired with them to assassinate the Emperor." A little later, "he lied to the Ministers, saying: 'To-day I present the taxes of the Eastern Provinces,' and sent Koma, Chief of the Yamato Aya, who killed the Emperor."

Many Imperial Princes had lost their lives in the fierce succession quarrels that had raged from time to time in old Yamato, and yet more were destined to perish as the victims of their ambition in the course of the next few generations. But this was only the second occasion on which a reigning Emperor of Japan had been assassinated by a subject.

The immediate effect of the outrage, however, was not to shake but to consolidate Soga's power. For centuries, with the exception of Princess Ihitoyo's brief rule in 484, there had been no Empress ruling over Japan in her own right. At the present time there were perhaps a score of Imperial Princes, all more or less eligible for the Imperial dignity. Yet

this king-maker, Soga, passed them all over, and raised his own niece, Bidatsu Tennō's Empress, to the throne. Suiko Tennō, as she is called in history, was now thirty-nine years of age, and the mother of seven children. Yet with the nomination of Prince Mumayado as Heir-Apparent, a few months after Suiko's accession, their subsequent claims to the throne were set aside.*

This Prince Mumayado, better known as Shōtoku Taishi (572-621), we have met with playing a prominent part when a youth of fifteen in that battle of Shigisen (587) which ended in the death of the Mononobe chieftain and the annihilation of his clan. Possibly it was Mumayado's fervent zeal on behalf of Buddhism that first recommended him to the favourable consideration of the great kingmaker. At all events, now at the age of twenty-one, we find him nominally, at least, "with general control of the Government, and entrusted with all the details of the administration." That this Constantine of Japanese Buddhism, as he is usually christened by European scholars, was a man of undoubted ability, if not of commanding intellect, can scarcely be questioned. He certainly was, what Constantine was not, not merely one of the greatest, but the very greatest scholar of his time,—not merely an adept in Buddhistic lore, but highly proficient in the classics and philosophy (ethical and political) of the Middle Kingdom. And in him we distinctly recognise the possessor of a highly developed rational moral sense,—a thing which, *pace* that great man Motoori, was by no means common in the Japan of those days. Whether because of all this, or in spite of all this, the fact remains that Shōtoku's administration was a highly popular one, as we can infer from not one but from many stray indications. At his death in 621, "all the Princes and Omi, *as well as the people of the Empire*—the old, as if they had lost a dear child, had no taste for salt and vinegar (*i.e.* well flavoured food) in their mouths; the young, as if they had lost a beloved parent, filled the ways with the sound of their lamenting. The farmer ceased from his plough, and the pounding woman laid down her pestle. They all said: 'The sun and

* It is true that the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi* differ in their genealogies here. The former says Suiko had eight children, but it names only seven,—all sons. The *Nihongi* mentions two sons and five daughters, one of whom was married to Prince Mumayado, the Heir Apparent.

moon have lost their brightness; heaven and earth have crumbled to ruin; henceforth, in whom shall we put our trust?" Obituary eulogies—especially those of emperors and kings and Imperial princes and of other great personages with whose descendants it is profitable to curry favour by the exercise of a cheap and fulsome adulation—are always to be looked upon somewhat askance by the honest historian, who does not choose to forget that even Alexander the son of Jupiter Ammon had perforce to return to the dust of which he was made. Accordingly this very fine obituary notice of his Imperial Highness Shōtoku Taishi, Regent of Japan under the Empress Suiko, was at first greeted with the cynical smile that courtly panegyrics are wont to provoke. But in course of time, a somewhat careful consideration of the incidents of Prince Mumayado's life, and of the social, political, intellectual, and moral circumstances of the Japan of his day, brought more than a suspicion that this special obituary notice of Shōtoku Taishi was not the mere dithyrambic of conventionality such notices usually are; that, on the contrary, it may very well have been the sincere and heart-felt expression of regret for a loss that almost amounted to a national calamity.

With perhaps ninety-nine per cent. of Shōtoku Taishi's fellow-converts to the new religion Buddhism was simply another device for adding to, or ensuring, their material prosperity. It is true that we find him as a stripling of fifteen attempting to bribe the Four Deva Kings at the critical point in the great battle of Shigi-sen, an action that the Buddha himself would infallibly have condemned. But as he grew to manhood his Buddhism with him really became a religion of the rational conscience, while what was best and highest in Chinese ethics also appealed to his sympathies very strongly. His so-called "Laws"—sadly misnamed a Constitution by some modern Japanese historians—may very well strike us as being nothing but a jumble of old and out-worn moral platitudes,—short homilies on prosy copy-book texts. But those "hints to officers in the execution of their duties,"—for that is just what the famous seventeen articles of 604, amount to,—must have come home to his subordinates with all the force of novelty and originality. It was an attempt to rule by moral suasion,—by an appeal to the strength and charm of what has been called sweet reasonableness. And to such an appeal no

people lend more willing and attentive ears than the Japanese; with the most turbulent among them even, it has time and again proved irresistible. Only, the slightest suspicion of lack of sincerity, of good faith, of absolute disinterestedness on the part of the preacher is sure to prove fatal. Prince Mumayado early succeeded in winning the full and complete confidence of his fellow-countrymen, and he retained it unimpaired till the end. Even Soga no Mumako, that pietistic ruffian of a murderer and a liar, had to acknowledge the moral and intellectual ascendancy of the young Regent, in whom no doubt he expected to find a mere docile and pliable tool. During the whole of the Prince's administration (593-621) Soga continued to be *the* Oho-omi, the sole Great Minister; and on the occasion of the reception of Embassies and of other Court functions we meet with him playing the *rôle* of *the* Great Man. But withal, during all these eight and twenty years he appears to have been kept out of all mischief very effectually. Doubtless the Prince induced him to expend his energies on a study of the sutras and the classics. At all events Soga in his later days developed scholarly proclivities. "This year" (620), we read, "the Prince Imperial, in connection with Soga, drew up a history of the Emperors, a history of the country, and the original record of the Omi, the Muraji, the Tomo no Miyakko, the Kuni no Miyakko, the 180 Be, and the free subjects."

The Prince evidently made an endeavour to strengthen the Imperial power at the expense of the clan chieftains and heads of groups. Article XII. of his "Laws" runs as follows:—"Let not the provincial authorities, or the Kuni no Miyakko, levy exactions on the people. In a country there are not two lords; the people have not two masters. The sovereign is the master of the people of the whole country. The officials to whom he gives charge are all his vassals. How can they, as well as the Government, presume to levy taxes on the people?" Why Soga did not get restive at this importation of Chinese political theory into Yamato can perhaps be explained. The Empress was a Soga, and the interests of the great Soga house were getting more and more intertwined with those of the Imperial family, and so the extension of the authority of the Crown did not necessarily involve any diminution of Soga influence. The Prince may have used this or similar arguments, or he may not. At all events Soga remained quiet during the life of the Regent. However, two years after the death of the latter, we

find Soga endeavouring to possess himself of an Imperial estate that could be held by none but the actual occupant of the throne; and twenty years still later this Soga's son and grandson flouted Article XII. of the so-called Constitution in most glaring and audacious fashion.

That Soga and the Prince, while both working for the spread of Buddhism in the land, had very different ideas about what was really important and vital in that cult is perfectly plain. The former did not trouble himself over-much about the quality of the converts; and hypocrites and profligates early made their appearance in the monasteries. In 623, two years after the Prince's death, a Buddhist priest smote his paternal grand-father with an axe. This incident gave rise to a general investigation of affairs among the *réligieux*, and a fair number of wicked priests and nuns were detected. A Sōgō and a Sōdzu were appointed for the superintendence of ecclesiastics, a Korean being assigned to the former, and a Japanese to the latter office, while a Japanese noble was made Hōtō, or Chief of the Department of the Buddhist religion. Furthermore, "There was an inspection of the temples, and of the priests and nuns, and an accurate record made of the circumstances of the building of the temples, and also of the circumstances under which the priests and nuns embraced religion, with the year, month, and day of their taking orders. There were at this time 46 temples, 816 priests, and 569 nuns,—in all 1,385 persons." Of these no fewer than a thousand had entered religion on the occasion of Soga's illness in 614 !

Some of the young ladies who had professedly abandoned the frivolities and vanities of the world were occasionally found to have failed to emancipate themselves entirely from the frailties of the flesh and mundane passions of the vulgar sort. In 628, for example, a certain young nobleman, a nephew of Sago Yemishi, fleeing for his life, "concealed himself in the tiled house of a nunnery. Here he had intrigues with one or two of the nuns. Now, one of the nuns was jealous and informed on him," and as a final result, the young man "committed suicide on the mountain (to which he had escaped) by stabbing himself in the throat."

The death of Shōtoku Taishi was really a most serious loss to Japan, for he was doing rare service in moralising a people that stood sadly in need of being moralised. It is all to no purpose that Motoori paints old Yamato as a sort of sinless

garden of Eden. "In ancient times," says he, "although there was no prosy system of doctrine in Japan, there were no popular disturbances, and the Empire was peacefully ruled." That very *Kojiki* and those very "ancient writings" on which he relies as his authorities for his doctrines emphatically condemn this assertion as an audacious and unblushing falsehood. "The country was spontaneously well governed, in accordance with the 'way' established by the gods." Yūryaku Tennō dealt with his brothers and the Imperial Princes in the most approved Turkish fashion, while Buretsu's government can scarcely be characterised as a good one by the most servile of courtly historians, nor do incidents like the assassination of the Emperor Sujun by Soga's emissary, to say nothing of the numerous internecine succession disputes, say much for the morality of old Japan. "It is because the Japanese were truly moral in their practice that they required no theory of morals. In 562, in connection with the Imna campaign of that year, the *Nihongi* tells us bluntly that "at this time between father and child, husband and wife, there was no mutual commiseration," and the cowardly and disgusting episode it then goes on to recount is strong evidence in support of its allegation. Again, in 646, the new Reformed Government found itself called upon to deal vigorously with certain public abuses. Not a few of these sprang from superstitions not remotely connected with the Way of the Gods. "There have been cases of men employed on forced labour in border lands who, when the work was over and they were returning to their village, have fallen suddenly ill and lain down to die by the roadside. Upon this the (inmates of the) houses by the roadside say: 'Why should people be allowed to die on the road?' And they have accordingly detained the companions of the deceased and compelled them to do purgation. For this reason it often happens that even if an elder brother lies down and dies on the road, his younger brother will refuse to take up his brother (for burial).

"Again, there are cases of peasants being drowned in a river. The bystanders say, 'Why should we be made to have anything to do with the drowned men?' They accordingly detain the drowned men's companions and compel them to do purgation. For this reason it often happens that even when an elder brother is drowned in a river his younger brother will not render assistance.

“Again, there are cases of people who, when employed on forced labour, cook their rice by the roadside. Upon this the (inmates of the) houses by the roadside say: ‘Why should people cook rice at their own pleasure on our road?’ and have compelled them to do purgation.

“Again, there are cases when people have applied to others for the loan of pots in which to boil their rice, and the pots have knocked against something and have been upset. Upon this the owner of the pots compels purgation to be made.

“*All such practices are habitual among the unenlightened vulgar.* Let them now be discontinued without exception and not permitted again.”

Now, inasmuch as “the unenlightened vulgar” constituted at least 95 per cent. of the three million or three million and a half subjects ruled by his Imperial Majesty, Kōtoku Tennō, these reprehensible and inhumane, if not actually inhuman, practices must have prevailed very extensively. “Purgation” may need some explanation. The idea was that those who were compelled to do purgation had been defiled, and that contact with them was contaminating to the lieges. Hence a ceremony or ritual had to be performed to cleanse them, and this involved expenses. Accordingly putting to purgation was merely an extortionate device. “Shintō,” we have been told, “provides no moral code, and relies solely on the promptings of conscience for ethical guidance. If man derives the first principles of his duties from intuition a schedule of rules and regulations for the direction of everyday conduct becomes not only superfluous but illogical.” In 646, the ethical guidance supplied to the unenlightened vulgar by the promptings of conscience, judged by its practical results, argued little for the pretensions of the Apostles of the Way of the Gods. Again, we are assured that “Shintō is essentially a religion of gratitude and love.” But listen to Motoori, its eighteenth-century Mahomet:—“Whenever anything goes wrong in the world it is to be attributed to the action of the evil gods, whose power is so great that the Sun-goddess and the Creator-God are sometimes unable to restrain them: much less are human beings able to resist their influence. The prosperity of the wicked and the misfortunes of the good, which seem opposed to ordinary justice, are their doing. . . . The people prayed to the good gods in order to obtain blessings, and performed rites in honour of the bad gods in order to avert their displeasure. If they committed

crimes, or defiled themselves, they employed the usual methods of purification taught them by their own hearts. As there are bad as well as good gods, it is necessary to propitiate them with offerings of agreeable food, playing the harp, blowing the flute, singing and dancing, and whatever else is likely to put them in a good humour." The gratitude to the good gods is evidently of the kind which has been defined as a very lively sense of favours to come; while the naïveté with which the necessity of what is virtually demon or devil worship is justified suggests that there may be a soupçon of truth in the *primus in orbe Deos fecit timor* account of the origin of religion, after all.

In view of the prevalence of the inhuman practices denounced by the legislators of 646, we begin to understand how a whole page of the *Nihongi* is devoted to the account of an act of Good Samaritanship on the part of Shōtoku Taishi in 613.* The episode ought to have proved a most invaluable object lesson in the circumstances of the time. And then what of old Yamato when smitten with famine and pestilence, as she was from time to time? In 624, the year after the death of Shōtoku Taishi, "there was a great famine in the Empire. The old ate the roots of herbs, and died by the road-side. Infants at the breast died with their mothers. Thieves and robbers sprang up in great numbers and could not be put down." In 567 there "were floods in the districts and provinces with famine. *In some cases men ate each other.*" The extracts cited in connection with the introduction of Buddhism serve to indicate that Japan was then almost in equally evil case with the civilised parts of contemporary Europe, when at one time five and at another ten thousand persons were dying each day at Constantinople, when many of the cities of the East were left vacant, and when in several districts of Italy the harvest and the vintage rotted on the ground. It will be remembered that at this time pestilence continued either to stalk abroad or to lurk in the Eastern Empire for 52 years,—from 542 to 594. Our first notice of pestilence in Japan is in 552, and we hear of it again in 585 and 586. It would be interesting to discover whether the pest in Japan proceeded from the same centre of infection as that which devastated the Byzantine Empire about the same date.

* See Aston's *Nihongi*, vol. ii., pp. 144-145.

During the twenty-eight years' administration of Shōtoku Taishi (593-621) Japan enjoyed the unwonted blessings of good government. Shortly after the death of the Regent, old Soga Mumako began to show signs of renewed turbulence, but he was fortunately removed by death in 626 before he could do much mischief. His power and his office of Great Minister (*Oho-omi*) thereupon passed to his son Soga Yemishi. On the death of the Empress Suiko, in 628, this Soga also aspired to the rôle of king-maker,—“he wished to decide the matter of the succession on his sole authority.” The Empress on her deathbed had spoken to two of the Imperial Princes,—one a grandson of Bidatsu Tennō and the other a son of Shōtoku Taishi,—about the succession in a perplexingly ambiguous manner. The good understanding between old Soga Mumako and Shōtoku Taishi did not continue to exist between their respective sons and successors, and Soga exerted himself actively to set Yamashiro no Ōye (Shōtoku's son) aside. This led to acute dissensions among the eight Ministers who then appear as acting under the Great Minister, and between Soga and the chief of a cadet house of the great Soga clan. The result was that the latter was “executed,” otherwise murdered, and that Bidatsu's grandson was made Emperor (Jomei, 629-641). On his death in 641, the Heir Apparent, then sixteen years of age, was summarily set aside, and a great granddaughter of Bidatsu Tennō raised to the throne as Empress. (Kōgyoku Tennō, 642-645). Of course this was the work of Soga, or rather of the Sogas, for at this date yet another Soga chieftain comes prominently on the scene. “Yemishi, Soga no Omi, was made Great Minister as before. His son, Iruka, took into his own hands the reins of government, and his power was greater than his father's. Therefore thieves and robbers were in dread of him, and things dropped on the highway were not picked up.” Before this year of 642 was out, Soga had given pretty clear indications that he aspired to something even higher than the position of the most powerful, if not the first, subject in the realm of Yamato.

“Yemishi Soga-no-Oho-omi erected his own ancestral temple and performed an eight-row dance. Moreover, he levied all the people of the land as well as the serfs of the 180 *Be* and constructed two tombs in preparation for his death. One was called the Great Misasagi and was intended as the tomb of the Great Minister; one was called the Small Misasagi and was

meant for the tomb of his son, Iruka. It was his desire that after his death other people might not be troubled. Moreover he assembled all the serfs of the Princess, the daughter of Shōtoku Taishi, and made them do forced labour in the precincts of the tombs. Hereupon the Princess was wroth and said: ‘Soga wantonly usurps the government of the land and does many outrageous things. In Heaven there are not two suns; in a State there cannot be two sovereigns. Why should he, at his own pleasure, employ in forced labour all the people of the fief?’ From this time her hate began to gather, and she at length fared in the common downfall (of the family of Shōtoku Taishi).”

The ancestral temple and the eight-row dance amounted to an assumption of Imperial rank, while we have already seen a rebellious subject when aping royalty erecting a double-mounded mausoleum for himself (Iwai in Kyūshū, 527). The wish “not to have other people put to trouble after his death” was merely an excuse—Soga was putting many people to trouble during his lifetime. Shōtoku’s daughter here falls back upon the Chinese political doctrine set forth in Article XII. of her father’s so-called Constitution, over which the Soga were now riding rough-shod.

In the following year “Soga Yemishi, on his own private authority, bestowed a purple cap on his son Iruka, thus advancing him to the rank of Great Minister, while Iruka’s younger brother Mononobe was at the same time promoted by him to the same dignity.” This was a clear usurpation of an Imperial prerogative.

Shōtoku’s son, Yamashiro no Ōye, whose claims to the succession had been set aside in 629 was now in the prime of life, with sons who showed signs of real ability. This family was the chief obstacle to the Soga ambition. Ostensibly acting in the interests of the Soga Imperial Prince, Furubito no Ōye, but really in his own, Soga Iruka now sent emissaries to arrest,—in plain language to murder,—Yamashiro no Ōye. The latter proved himself to be a true son of Shōtoku Taisha’s. In 629 his claims were supported by a numerous body of adherents, who would have gladly fought to the death to make them good. Now, when urged to gather forces in the eastern provinces, he made answer: “If we did as thou sayest, we should certainly succeed. In my heart, however, I desire for ten years not to impose a burden on the people. For the sake

of one person only, why should I distress the ten thousand subjects? Moreover I do not wish it to be said by after generations that for my sake anyone has mourned the loss of a father or mother. *Is it only when one has conquered in battle that he is to be called a hero? Is he not also a hero who has made firm his country at the expense of his own life?*" After various attempts at escape he returned to the temple of Ikaruga, where he was immediately surrounded by Soga Iruka's bloodhounds. To their officers he sent the message: "If I had raised an army, and attacked Iruka, I should certainly have conquered. But for the sake of one person I was unwilling to destroy the people. Therefore I deliver myself up to Iruka." . . . "Finally he and the younger members of his family, with his consorts, strangled themselves at the same time and died together" . . . Soga Yemishi, hearing that Prince Yamashiro no Ōye and all his people had been destroyed by Iruka, chid him angrily, saying:—"Ah! Iruka! Thou art foolish exceedingly, and dost arbitrarily practise outrage. Is not thine own life precarious?"

Ominous words, indeed; and much truer than the speaker of them could believe. For at this time, the Grand Conspirator who was soon to lay the whole Soga edifice of grandeur in ruins had thought out his problems, and was on the outlook for suitable confederates.

Meanwhile the Soga seemed to be marching steadily onward to the destined goal,—the throne of Yamato. In the summer of 644 "the witches and wizards of the whole country, breaking off leafy branches and hanging them with tree fibre, watched the time when the Great Minister was crossing a bridge and vied with one another in addressing to him subtle interpretations of divine words. They were in great numbers, so that they could not be distinctly heard. Old people said that this was a sign of changes."

In the winter of the same year, "Iruka built two houses on the Amagasaki Hill. The Grand Minister's house was called the Palace-Gate; Iruka's house was styled the Valley-Palace-Gate. Their sons and daughters *were styled Princes and Princesses*. Outside the houses palisades were constructed, and an armoury was erected by the gate. At each gate was set a tank for water, and several tens of wooden hooks (to pull down intervening buildings) as a provision in case of fire. *Stout*

fellows were constantly employed to guard the houses with arms in their hands."

"The Grand Minister (Soga Yemishi) built a house on the east side of Mount Unebi, and dug a moat so as to make of it a castle. He erected an armoury, and provided a store of arrows. In his goings-out and comings-in he was always surrounded by an attendant company of fifty soldiers. These sturdy fellows were called the Eastern Company (probably Ainu). The people of the various noble houses came to his gate and waited upon him. He called himself their father and them his boys. The Aya no Atahe (Chief of the Korean and Chinese settlers in Japan) attended wholly upon the two houses."

In their attempt to establish a new dynasty in Yamato—for in plain language that is what the father and son were endeavouring to do—the Sogas were exerting themselves to conciliate the semi-foreign interests in the Empire. They had the Chinese and Korean immigrants at their beck and call; and Soga the elder had been very gracious to those Ainu or Yemishi whose name he bore. It must not be forgotten that these Yemishi then and for long afterwards disputed with the Kumaso or Hayato of Satsuma the claim to be the Pathans and Afridis of Japan,—the fiercest if not the finest fighting men in the archipelago. The Yamato sovereigns seem to have been ready to utilise their services whenever they could be enlisted. In 479, on the death of Yūryaku Tennō, we hear of the revolt of a body of 500 Yemishi (Ainu) in the modern province of Suwō, on their way for service in Korea. They held their ground well, and made good their retreat into the province of Tamba, where, however, they were annihilated. Eighty years before this the Yemishi had inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Yamato troops in the peninsula between Tōkyō Bay and the Pacific. In 540 we have a notice of the Yemishi and of the Hayato (*i.e.* the Kumaso) bringing their people with them and coming to Court and rendering allegiance. Then in 581 we are told of the haughty way in which Bidatsu Tennō addressed the repentant Ayakasu, Chief of the Yemishi on the frontier, who had shown hostility there. What may have done much to aid Soga to form the conclusion that Yemishi support was not to be despised was the incident of 637, when the Japanese commander who was sent to smite the Yemishi of

the East was utterly defeated by the Ainu and cooped up in a fortress by them, and whose poltroonery was only redeemed by the heroism of his wife*. At all events, when the chiefs of several thousand Echigo Ainu, who had submitted in 642, came to Court we are told that "Soga no Oho-omi entertained the Yemishi in his house, and personally made kind inquiries after their welfare." Possibly it was then that he contrived to hire his Ainu body-guard.

Although cowed into cringing and servile subservience the people of the noble houses who fawned upon the Soga must have felt that in them they had to deal with two of those "bad gods" that had to be propitiated of necessity, and the love they bore them must have been the love of the devotee trying to cajole his devils or demons with forced exhibitions of simulated joy. The older Soga was somewhat cautious, and could unbend and be complaisant and condescending enough upon occasion. But the younger man was clearly of a mind to carry things with a high hand—indeed with the mailed fist; and the nobles felt that it was with this swaggerer they would have to deal exclusively when the father was no more. Even among the heads of certain of the cadet houses of the great Soga clan he was far from popular, and by certain of the Imperial Princes and Court nobles, who could keep their own counsel, he was hated with a bitter hatred. It was rapidly coming to be a question of who would "bell the cat."

It will be remembered that the great opponents of Soga Iname's unsuccessful and Soga Mumako's successful attempt to establish Buddhism in Japan had been the heads of the Nakatomi and of the Mononobe clans. The latter perished, and the Mononobe house was crushed in the decisive battle of Shigi-Sen (587), while the Nakatomi chieftain lost his life in the course of the troubles which immediately preceded that decisive contest. The hereditary chiefs of the Nakatomi house, as has been said, were also the hereditary heads of the native Shintō cult; but with the sovereign a devout Buddhist, and the most influential nobles adherents of the new religion, the office of head of Shintoism had lost all its prestige, and its duties had practically fallen into abeyance. In, or before 644 Nakatomi no Kamatari was, or had been, pressed to accept the post hereditary in his

* Aston's *Nihongi*, vol. ii., p. 168.

family, "but he declined the appointment several times, and would not take it up. On the plea of ill-health he went away and lived at Mishima."

This Kamatari was still a young man,—25 according to one account, 31 according to another. Inferior to Shōtoku Taishi in moral elevation and disinterestedness he was fully his equal, if not his superior, in sheer force of intellect. At all events his was perhaps the finest and the ablest brain in the Yamato of his day.

When pieced together the disconnected paragraphs in which the story of his successful plot and the great *coup d'état* is told in the *Nihongi* really form a fine piece of thrilling narrative.

"At this time Prince Karu (afterwards Kōtoku Tennō) had an ailment of the leg which prevented him from coming to Court. Now Kamatari had before this a friendship for the Prince, and therefore went to his palace to spend the night in attendance on him. The Prince, knowing well that Kamatari was a man of exalted sentiments, and of a bearing which made rudeness to him impossible, sent his favourite consort, a lady of the Abe House, to sweep out a separate room and to spread him a new sleeping-mat. There was nothing which was not provided for him, and the respect shown him was extraordinary. Kamatari was very sensible (of all this) and addressed the chamberlain saying: 'I have been treated with a special kindness which exceeds all that I expected. Who would not make him Ruler over the Empire?' The chamberlain accordingly reported to the Prince what he had said, and the Prince was greatly pleased. Kamatari was a man of an upright and local character, and of a reforming disposition. He was indignant with the younger Soga for breaking down the order of Prince and Vassal, of Senior and Junior, and cherishing veiled designs upon the State. One after another he associated with the Princes of the Imperial line, trying them in order to discover a wise ruler who might establish a great reputation. He had accordingly fixed his mind upon Naka no Ōye, but for want of intimate relations with him he had been so far unable to unfold his inner sentiments. Happening to be one of a football party in which Naka no Ōye played, he observed the Prince's leathern shoe fall off with the ball. Placing it on the palm of his hand, he knelt before the Prince, and humbly offered it to him. Naka no Ōye in his turn knelt down and

respectfully received it. From this time they became mutual friends, and told each other all their thoughts. There was no longer any concealment between them. They feared, however, that jealous suspicions might be caused by their frequent meetings, and they both took in their hands yellow rolls (*i.e.* Chinese books), and studied personally the doctrines of Chow and Confucius with the learned teacher of Minabuchi. Thus, they at length, while on their way there and back, walking shoulder to shoulder, secretly prepared their plans. On all points they were agreed.

“Kamatari counselled Naka no Ōye, saying: ‘For him who cherishes great projects, nothing is so essential as support. I pray thee, therefore, take to thee the eldest daughter of Soga no Kurayamada, and make her thy consort. When a friendly marriage relationship has been established, we can then unfold our desire to associate him with us in our plans. There is no shorter way to success than this.’ Now, when Naka no Ōye heard this, he was much pleased and acted in accordance with his advice in every particular. Kamatari accordingly went himself, and as go-between conducted the marriage negotiations to a successful issue. On the night, however, fixed for the wedding, the eldest daughter was stolen away by a relation. In consequence of this her father was grieved and alarmed. He looked up, and he looked down, and he knew not what to do. His younger daughter, wondering at his grief and alarm, went up to him and inquired of him, saying: ‘Why art thou sorrowful and in fear?’ Her father told her the cause. The younger daughter said: ‘I beseech thee do not grieve, but offer me. It is still not too late.’ Her father was greatly rejoiced and at length offered this daughter. She served the Prince with sincerity of heart and without any shyness whatever.

“Kamatari commended Komaro and Amida to the Prince, saying,” etc., etc.

Some months after this the Empress held a Court in the Great Hall of Audience. Among others in attendance was Prince Furubito no Ōye, in whose interests the younger Soga had annihilated the family of Shōtoku Taishi. This Prince Furubito, a son of Jomei Tennō and a Soga consort, was a cousin of Soga Yemishi, it should be remarked.

“Kamatari, knowing that Soga Iruka was of a very suspicious nature and wore a sword day and night, showed the

performers an expedient to make him lay it aside. Soga Iruka laughed, and having ungirded his sword, entered, and took his place in attendance by the throne. Kurayamada (the Soga conspirator, and Prince Naka no Ōye's father-in-law) advanced and read aloud the memorials of the three Kingdoms of Korea. Hereupon Prince Naka no Ōye ordered the Guards of the Gates to fasten all the twelve gates at the same time, and to allow nobody to pass. Then he called together the Guards of the Gates to one place and offered them rewards. Prince Naka no Ōye then took in his own hands a long spear and hid it at one side of the hall. Kamatari and his people, armed with bows and arrows, lent their aid. A man was sent to give two swords in a case to Komaro and Amida, with the message. 'Up! Up! make haste to slay him!' Komaro and the other tried to send down their rice with water, but were so frightened that they brought it up again. Kamatari chid and encouraged them. Kurayamada feared lest the reading of the memorials should come to an end before Komaro and his companion arrived. His body was moist with streaming sweat, his voice trembled, and his hands shook. Soga Iruka wondered at this, and inquired of him, saying: 'Why dost thou tremble?' Kurayamada answered and said: 'It is being near the Empress that makes me afraid, so that unconsciously the perspiration pours from me. Prince Naka no Ōye, seeing that Komaro and his companion, intimidated by Soga Iruka's prestige, were trying to shirk and did not come forward, cried out 'Ya!' and forthwith coming out with Komaro and his companion, fell upon Iruka without warning, and with a sword cut open his head and shoulder. Iruka started up in alarm, when Komaro with a turn of his hand flourished his sword and wounded him on the leg. Iruka rolled over to where the Empress sat and bowing his head to the ground said: 'She who occupies the hereditary Dignity is the Child of Heaven. I, Her Servant, am conscious of no crime, and I beseech Her to make an examination into this.' The Empress was greatly shocked, and addressed Prince Naka no Ōye saying: 'I know not what has been done. What is the meaning of this?' The Prince prostrated himself on the ground, and made representation to her Majesty, saying: 'Soga Iruka wished to destroy the Celestial House utterly, and to subvert the Solar Celestial descendants.' The Empress at once got up, and went into the

interior of the palace. Komaro and Amida then slew Soga Iruka. On this day rain fell, and puddle-water overflowed the Court. They covered Iruka's body with mats and screens. When Prince Furubito no Ōye saw this he ran into his private palace, and said to his people: 'The Koreans have slain Soga Iruka. My heart is sore.' Then he went into his sleeping-chamber, shut the door, and would not come out.

"Prince Naka no Ōye presently entered the Temple of Hōkōji, which he fortified and prepared to defend*. The Imperial Princes, Ministers, Daibu, Omi, Muraji, Tomo no Miyakko, and Kuni no Miyakko one and all followed him. Men were sent to deliver the body of Iruka to his father, Soga Yemishi. Hereupon the Aya no Atahe (*i.e.* chiefs of the Chinese and Korean immigrants) assembled all their clan. Clad in armour, and with weapons in their hands, they came to the assistance of the Great Minister (Soga Yemishi) and formed an army. Prince Naka no Ōye sent Kose no Tokudai no Omi to explain to the rebel band that ever since the creation of Heaven and Earth there were lords and vassals, and to make himself acquainted with the cause of this uprising. Hereupon Kunioshi, Takamuku no Omi, addressed the Aya no Atahe, saying: 'We are bound to receive (capital) punishment on account of Soga Iruka. Moreover it is not doubtful that to-day or to-morrow swift execution awaits the Great Minister. This being so, for whom should we fight to no purpose, rendering ourselves all liable to be put to death?' When he had finished speaking, he ungirded his sword, flung away his bow, and went away, deserting the cause. The rebel troops, moreover, following his example, dispersed and ran away."

On the following day, "Soga Yemishi and his people, when about to be executed, burnt the "History of the Emperors," the "History of the Country," and the objects of value. The Chief of the Shipping Office (an erstwhile Soga *protégé*) straightway hastened to seize the burning "History of the Country," and delivered it to Prince Naka no Ōye (afterwards the Emperor Tenchi). On this day permission was given for

* Here we meet with one of those little ironies of life not infrequent in Japanese history. This temple (near Nara, but now no longer in existence) had been built in fulfilment of the vow of Soga Mumako at the battle of Shigi-Sen (587), when he annihilated his opponents, the Mononobe. Now, less than sixty years afterwards, it serves as a stronghold for the assassins of his grand-son and the executioners of his son!

the interment of the bodies of Soga Yemishi and Soga Iruka in tombs. Lament for them was also allowed."

Desperate diseases call for desperate remedies, and seventh century Japanese patriots and Imperialists may very well have fancied that they had abundant justification for making a summary end of the Soga domination by any means, no matter how questionable. But the fact remains that the recital of the vile and dirty work of this *coup d'état* leaves a very nasty taste in the mouth. For Kamaro and Amida, cowards no less than assassins, there can be nothing but contempt and detestation, while Kose Tokudai no Omi was perhaps even worse than they. He had been Soga Iruka's willing hangman in the extirpation of the noble Yamashiro no Ōye and his family; and now, like the despicable cur he was, he is found turning upon his master and snapping at the hand that had fed him and upon which he had cringingly fawned. Kunioshi stands in a somewhat different category; in 643 he had excused himself when called upon by Soga Iruka and Prince Furubito to do their filthy work.*

It is to be observed that the death of the two all-powerful Sogas in 645 did not carry with it the consequences that attended the fall of the Mononobe about 60 years before. In and after the battle of Shigi-Sen (587) the Mononobe house was virtually extirpated. On the other hand the Soga continued to be the most influential clan in the land for at least a full generation after the events of 645. Soga Kurayamada, Prince Naka no Ōye's father-in-law, was at once advanced to the position of Great Minister in the reformed administration; and when he fell a victim to the intrigues of a younger half-brother of his own in 649, and had to strangle himself, the prestige of the great house of which he had been the head for five years was but little impaired.

During the night following the execution of the elder Soga and his adherents, and the conflagration of the great house on the hill, the conspirators must have been very busy. At all events, on the following day we meet with the first instance of

* In old Yamato, assassins were wont to take few personal risks, and commonly tried to disarm their intended victim. See *Kojiki*, sec. LXXXI; *Nihongi*, Aston's Translation, vol. I., p. 162, vol. ii., p. 308. The Tokugawa and Meiji assassins, on the other hand, have nearly always been prepared to give life for life—in the accomplishment of their purpose their own personal safety has mostly been the last thing thought of by them.

the abdication of a sovereign in the annals of Japan. The Empress sent for her son, Prince Naka no Ōye, and signified her intention of transferring the Imperial dignity to him. Acting on the advice of the shrewd Kamatari, Prince Naka recommended his mother to make her younger brother, Prince Karu, then about fifty years of age, her successor. This Prince Karu in turn advocated the claims of the Soga Prince, Furu-bitō no Ōye, in whose interests Soga Iruka had been professedly acting. Prince Furubito knew better than to accept, however. He ungirt his sword, and flung it on the ground, and ordering all his household to do likewise, he went off to the temple of Hōkōji; and there, between the Hall of Buddha and the pagoda, he shaved off his beard and hair, and put on the *kesa*. However, it was pretty well appreciated that he had retired merely to mark the course of events from a safe and convenient retreat. Three months later he was at the head of a strong party of malcontents,—Sogas and Yamato no Ayas;—and early in 646 he was slain by the emissaries of Prince Naka no Ōye, together with his children, while his consorts had to strangle themselves perforce.

The new sovereign, known as Kōtoku Tennō (645-654), who “honoured the religion of Buddha and despised the Way of the Gods,” was a simple-minded, kindly-hearted, easy-going old man,—a docile and pliant instrument in the hands of the vigorous Naka no Ōye, now nominated Heir Apparent. For form’s sake, two Great Ministers were appointed,—Abe and Soga Kurayamada, both fathers-in-law of the Emperor, and the latter father-in-law of Naka no Ōye as well. But the real power lay not with them. “A great brocade cap of honour was given to Kamatari, and he was made Naijin (*not* Naidaijin, be it remarked), with an increased feudal revenue of a large number of houses, etc., etc. Trusting to his power as ruling Minister, he took place over the various functionaries. In respect, therefore, to advancements and dismissals, taking measures or abandoning them, everything was done in accordance with his counsel,” etc., etc. And yet for the next nine years Kamatari’s name does not make a single appearance in the annals of Japan (until 654), when we are curtly informed that “he was granted a purple cap, and his fief increased by a number of houses.” Under Tenchi Tennō (661-671), his old fellow-conspirator Naka no Ōye, his name appears once or twice, but it is only on the occasion of his death in 669 that he is mentioned with

emphasis. "The Emperor sent his younger brother, the Prince Imperial, to the house of Naidaijin Fujiwara to confer on him the cap of the 'Great Woven Stuff,' and the rank of Oho-omi (Great Minister). He also granted him a surname, and made him the house of Fujiwara. From this time forward he was generally known as Fujiwara no Daijin."

And this is all we hear not merely of the greatest man of his time, but of one of the greatest men that Japan has ever produced! Kamatari, the founder of the Fujiwara family, was the first and perhaps the most illustrious of those Kuromaku who have been the real rulers of the Japanese Empire from time to time. *Maku* signifies a curtain, and *Kuro* means black; and the man behind the "Black Curtain" on the Japanese stage is known to Europeans as the "stage-prompter." Only it is to be remarked that the *Kuromaku* of Japanese politics has not unfrequently been very much more than a mere prompter. Kamatari, for example, was responsible for most of the text of the play, for the distribution of the parts, and for the *mise en scène*.

To the general public of the time it was Prince Naka no Ōye who appeared as the protagonist among the Reformers. On the morning after the execution of Soga Yeimishi we have found him declining to ascend the throne vacated by his mother. Possibly his youth may have been one consideration which moved him to this act of self-abnegation, for according to one account he was no more than eighteen at the time. Although only Heir Apparent, and acting in everything through his uncle, the Emperor, he evidently wielded well-nigh absolute authority. In 653 a little episode serves to cast a flood of light upon the real situation: "This year the Heir Apparent petitioned the Emperor, saying:—'I wish the Imperial residence were removed to the Yamato capital.' The Emperor refused to grant his request. Upon this the Heir Apparent took with him the Empress Dowager, the Empress, and the younger Imperial Princes, and went to live in the temporary palace of Asuka, in Yamato. At this time the Ministers and Daibu with the various functionaries all followed and changed their residence. The Emperor resented this and wished to cast away the national dignity." He had a palace built at Yamazaki and sent a pitiful little ode of remonstrance to his Empress.

On this Emperor's death in the following year (654) the Heir Apparent again refused to ascend the throne, and re-in-

stalled his mother, the abdicated Empress Kōgyoku, there (Empress Saimei, 654-661). In 658, Prince Arima, son of Kōtoku Tennō, made an abortive attempt to possess himself of the Imperial dignity, and as usual in such cases, was "executed." Then in 661, when the Empress Saimei died, we meet with a puzzling state of things. For seven years there appears to have been an interregnum. At all events it was only in 668 that Prince Naka no Ōye at last ascended the throne (Tenchi Tennō, 668-671), which he occupied for only three years. He and the great *Kuromaku* Kamatari were thus removed by death within two years of each other. Their work was not complete; it had to be supplemented and amended in various respects during the next half-century or so. But the foundations had been solidly laid, and all that was of cardinal importance in the new State-structure had been erected. The following chapter will be devoted to a consideration of what the Reformers attempted.

CHAPTER V.

THE GREAT REFORM OF 645.

IT has already been remarked that the intercourse between the Yamato rulers and the Chinese Court, which had been resumed about 400 A.D., again came to a cessation with the year 502. During all this time and for the next eighty years the Middle Kingdom was a distressful and a distracted country. "Numerous States sprang up into existence, some founded by the Heung-nu and others by the Seen-pe tribe, a Tungusic clan inhabiting a territory to the north of China, and who afterwards established the Leaou dynasty in China. The hand of every man was against his neighbour. Nothing was lasting, and in 419 the Eastern Tsin dynasty, which had dragged on a chequered existence for nearly a century, came to an end, and with it disappeared for close on two hundred years all semblance of united authority. The country became divided into two parts, the North and the South. In the North four families reigned successively, two of which were of Seen-pe origin—*viz.*, the Wei and the How Chow; the other two, the Pih Tse and the How Leang, being Chinese. In the South five different houses supplied rulers, who were all of Chinese descent. This period of disorder was only brought to a close by the establishment of the Sui dynasty in 590."

During this sixth century the three kingdoms of Korea were engaged in their triangular duel, and two of them at least were eager to obtain Chinese support. Ko-gur-yu kept sending embassies to one or other of the Northern Chinese Courts, while Pakche was just as assiduous in her endeavours to gain the goodwill of one or other of the rivals of the house courted by Ko-gur-yu. Now, both Ko-gur-yu and Pakche, the latter especially, had a salutary respect for Japan, as indeed Silla had also.* In the sixth century the goodwill of Yamato was of the most vital consequence to Pakche in her struggle with

* An impartial Chinese author of 600 A.D. tells us that Silla and Pakche both consider Wa (*i.e.* Japan) a great country with many precious things, and look up to it accordingly. Embassies are constantly passing from one to the other.

her two more powerful peninsular rivals, and she left no stone unturned in her effort to conciliate it. Statues of Buddha and sutras were far from being her only presents to Japan. Year in, year out, Pakche appears to have kept a distinguished savant as professor of Chinese philosophy and Chinese literature at the Yamato capital, and we frequently hear of one learned doctor being exchanged for another. In 602 an important event in Japan's intercourse with the continent took place. "A Pakche priest named Kwal-leuk arrived, and presented, by way of tribute, books of Calendar-making, of Astronomy, and of Geography and Geomancy, and also books of the art of invisibility and of magic. At this time three or four pupils were selected, and made to study under Kwal-leuk. One studied the art of calendar-making, another studied astronomy and the art of invisibility. Yet another studied magic. They all studied so far as to perfect themselves in these arts." As adumbrating the state in 602 A.D. of the most advanced culture in what has been destined to become the England of the Far East, this notice is of some slight consequence. However, in 602, and for many long years afterwards, Great Britain was a good deal more backward, it must be admitted.

This event took place under the enlightened administration of Shōtoku Taishi. Just as the Japanese of the later Tokugawa age were swift to perceive that the Dutch Merchants of Light in Deshima were purveyors of the discoveries of Britons, Americans, Frenchmen, and Germans, Shōtoku Taishi promptly discerned that the Pakche savants were merely transmitters of the culture of the Middle Kingdom. Accordingly he resolved to repair to the fountain-head; and five years later the famous mission of 607 was dispatched to the Court of Loh-yang, where the warlike debauchee Yang-ti (605-617), the third monarch of the Sui dynasty, held state. The Chinese account of this mission, and Motoori's comments upon the Chinese account, are equally amusing. When Yang-ti "ordered his officers to inquire into the Japanese customs, the envoy said: 'The Wa Prince considers Heaven his elder and the Sun his younger brother. At dawn he goes out to hear matters of government sitting in state cross-legged. On the Sun appearing he ceases the conduct of business, and leaves it to me his younger brother.' Yang-ti said: 'This is most outrageous talk,' and admonitions were at once given for it to be

altered." The Japanese envoy, Imoko, Mono no Omi, was not a very brilliant diplomatist. The Pakche men searched him, and relieved him of his dispatches on his way home through their country, and he was going to be banished for this miscarriage when "the Empress Suiko made an order, saying:—'Although he is guilty of losing the letter, We cannot easily punish him, for in that case the guest of the Great Country would hear of it, and this is undesirable.' So he was pardoned and left unpunished,"—to save face!

Another Chinese history, in its account of this mission, gives a letter from the Empress Suiko in which is the famous sentence: "The Ten-shi (Son of Heaven) of the place where the Sun rises sends a letter to the Ten-shi of the place where the Sun sets." "If the Empress Suiko," says Motoori, "really sent such a letter, she treated the Chinese sovereign with far too much civility, and if she had addressed him with some such language as, 'The Heavenly Emperor notifies the King of Go (Wu),' he ought to have been filled with gratitude, instead of which he is represented by the Chinese historiographer as having been offended at being treated as an equal. But the truth is that Suiko Tenno wanted to get something from him and therefore condescended to flatter his vanity." The Japanese envoy was accompanied on his return by a Chinese embassy and the Empress Suiko showered civilities upon its members, but Motoori does not care to dwell on that.* Shortly after the re-opening of Japan to intercourse with the outside world about half-a-century ago, batch after batch of young Japanese were sent to study in foreign lands, and the stream of such students still continues to flow on. Not a few of these men have subsequently writ their names large in the annals of Meiji, and some of them have affected the destinies of

* About the subsequent intercourse with China, which lasted without a break for two centuries, Motoori's remarks should not be overlooked. "It was unworthy of Japan to enter into relations with a base barbarian State, whatever might be the benefits which she expected to obtain. It resulted in too many cases in the shipwreck of the vessels and the profitless deaths of the envoys by drowning. Had the Chinese ruler paid due reverence to the Mikado as a being infinitely superior to himself, the objection would have been less." After the close of the tenth century the Mikado ceased sending envoys to China for some time, and Motoori observes that "so long as Japan wanted anything from China, she overlooked the insolent pretensions of the Chinese sovereigns, but being now no longer in a position to gain by the interchange of courtesies, she rejected all further overtures of friendship."

the Empire profoundly. It may well be doubted, however, whether any of these have had as large a share in re-shaping the national polity as some of that first band of four lay and four priestly students dispatched to prosecute their studies in China in 608. Most, if not all, of them were either Chinese or Korean immigrants or the descendants of such, settled in Yamato and Kawachi. Some of these came back in 632, while two of them stayed on at the Chinese Court until 640; that is, for more than thirty years. Two of these,—Bin, the priest, and Kuromaro Takamuku,—were made “national doctors” on the second day after the *coup d'état* of 645, this being the first appointment made by the Reformed, or rather the Reforming Government. The Reform consisted mainly in Sinicising old Yamato and its institutions; and it was these men who sat in the chancellery, drafted the decrees, organised the bureaucracy, and prompted the great *Kuromaku*, Kamatari, and the seemingly all-powerful Heir Apparent alike. By themselves they had to discharge the functions of the legion of foreign employés on whom the statesmen of the early years of Meiji relied for advice, if not for inspiration.

The quarter or third of a century during which these men sojourned in China was an all-important time in the history of the Middle Kingdom. When they arrived there in 608, the Sui dynasty, which had just again reunified China after centuries of anarchy, appeared to have consolidated its position and to be reasonably certain of a long lease of life. The founder of the house, Yang Keen, had ruled with vigour, and some of his work has been permanent and endures even to this day. Among other things he made a survey—a sort of Domesday Book—of his empire, and portioned China out into interdependent provinces, prefectures, and districts, with corresponding officers, an arrangement that has ever since existed. His attempt to introduce the caste system of India, however, was not very successful. His son Yang-ti (605-617), who began by making his elder brother, the rightful heir to the throne, strangle himself, and who has been called a Chinese Caligula, was an able man, in spite of all his aberrations and debaucheries. He extended the frontiers of his empire through the Tarim valley, and down to the Southern Ocean, and although his first attempt on Ko-gur-yu at the head of 300,000 men was a failure, he was on the point

of success in a second venture when he was recalled by intelligence of the domestic insurrection which cost him his life and his throne (617 A.D.).

In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign of ten years he handed over the Imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung (627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of civilisation. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the Inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the Hindu Kush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereigns of Nepal and Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia.

The Chinese Caligula of the Sui dynasty (605-617) had had decided literary tastes and he had done something to remodel the Chinese system of examinations; indeed it was by him that the second or Master's Degree is said to have been instituted. On the other hand, he kept the University and the great provincial schools closed during the last ten years of his reign (600-616). The second T'ang sovereign, however, not only remodelled the University and the provincial academies, but he organised that famous system of examinations which has ever since his days been such a prominent feature in the social and political economy of China. The Middle Kingdom had had for ages what Japan had never had,—codes of law; and Tai-tsung undertook a task not entirely dissimilar to that essayed by Justinian a century before. He did not live to see the result of his labours, for the new Code of the Empire was not completed until two or three years after his death in 650. Tai-tsung was unquestionably one of those rare monarchs who not only reign but rule. He was the master, and not the tool, of his officers; but, subject to him and to the law they administered, these officers were supreme in their allotted spheres. Their authority could be questioned by no local

chieftain or feudal potentate. Tai-tsung was not merely the head of the most powerful clan in the land—a sort of *primus inter pares* among a number of chiefs of rival houses,—he was undoubtedly Emperor before whom every one of his 50,000,000 subjects had to bend. It has been well said that he and China exercised a humanising effect on all the surrounding countries, and led their inhabitants to see the benefits and understand the administration of a government where the laws were above the officers.

Now, what must have been the effect of all this on the minds of the two or three able, astute, and alert Japanese then at the Chinese Court, with the express official mandate to prosecute their studies there at the expense of the ruler of Yamato? In the summer of 1863 a band of four Chōshū youths were smuggled on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends who sympathised with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for purposes of study. These friends possibly did not know that some of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilisation with the sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the sacred soil of Japan. Prince Itō and Marquis Inouye—for they were two of this venturesome quartette—have often told of their rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world. The priest Bin—whoever he may be, whether Shōan of Minabuchi or somebody else—and Kuro-maro Takamuku no Ayabito, who proceeded to China in 608 as the earliest Kwampisei [literally, official-expense students] in Japanese history, rendered even more illustrious service to their country perhaps than Itō and Inouye have done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, and the real men of political knowledge at that time were not so much Prince Naka no Ōye and the great *Kuromaku* Kamatari, as the two National Doctors of 645, Bin (or Min),

the Buddhist priest, and the layman Kuromaro Takamuku no Ayabito.*

To put ourselves in the places of these old men, and to realise their feelings on again setting foot on the beloved soil of old Yamato after an exile of more than thirty years, is a task involving no small effort of the constructive imagination. Yet the endeavour must be attempted by any one who wishes to understand this most critical and all-important period in the history of the Japanese Empire.

Then and now,—608 and 640 ! In the former year, when the famous eight set their faces Chinaward with all the high hopes and buoyancy of youth, Yamato, under the benevolent yet strong administration of Shōtoku Taishi, seemed to be marching steadily forward and upward on the path of progress. The worst abuses of the clan system were being grappled with, the Central Government was beginning to assert its powers at the expense of the chieftains and heads of groups, to extend an effective control over the national resources, and to unify and consolidate the Empire as it had to be unified and consolidated before Japan could hope to deal satisfactorily with her over-sea problems in the peninsula. Furthermore, an earnest attempt was being made to assimilate that higher continental culture which was so essential for the regeneration of Yamato. Now, in 640, the evils of the clan system were more rampant than ever. Not only was the sovereign destitute of the resources necessary to make his authority felt, but the occupant of the throne had become a mere tool of the Soga, who seemed to be upon the point of attempting to establish a dynasty of their own. And under such a dynasty Yamato would not likely be any better off. The case of the Sogas was merely an unusually glaring instance of the evils naturally inherent in the old social and political system. So long as every magnate continued to do just what was right in his own eyes, the nation must remain impotent for any collective effort and enterprise. More than the Soga must be made away with; the clan and group system must likewise go; and the Empire be fundamentally reformed socially and politically.

* There is some obscurity about the priest Bin or Min. Mr. Aston identifies him with Shōan, Minabuchi no Ayabito, one of the eight students dispatched to China in 608, and who returned with Takamuku in 640. Bin is not mentioned among the famous eight of 608, and the *Nihongi* makes him return with a fellow-student in 632. Between 632 and 640 the *Nihongi* has several notices of him,

The necessity of all this and more was doubtless strongly represented to Kamatari and Prince Naka no Ōye what time "they both took in their hands yellow rolls and studied personally the doctrines of Chow and Confucius with the learned teacher of Minabuchi." At all events, as has been just said, one of the earliest, indeed the very earliest, appointment made by the new Emperor Kōtoku was that of the priest Bin and Takamuku to the post of "National Doctors."

If the chieftains and heads of groups had had any inkling of the fact that the assassination of Soga Iruka was merely the first step in a series of measures levelled at their own preponderance in the State, it is not likely that they would have lent such ready support to the two great conspirators when they fortified themselves in the temple of Hōkōji. However, the future Reformers kept their own counsel well and proceeded cautiously enough at first.

Their first step, the nomination of three Ministers,—those of the Left, Right, and Interior,—did not excite any misgivings, for although the names were Chinese, the offices seemed to be those of the Oho-omi and Oho-muraji of former reigns. The introduction of the reckoning of time by year-periods, as in China, could give no offence, and a sort of oath of allegiance couched in Chinese phraseology may very well have struck the nobles as a meaningless and harmless innovation. The next steps must have done something to make them restless; and this perhaps gave the Soga Prince, Furubito no Ōye, his opportunity to assert his pretensions to the throne. On the 5th day of the 8th month, 645, "Governors of the Eastern Provinces were appointed. Then the Governors were addressed as follows: 'In accordance with the charge entrusted to Us by the Gods of Heaven, we propose to regulate the myriad provinces.'" These governors were to prepare registers of all the free subjects of the State, and of the people under the control of others, whether great or small. They were to look closely into the titles of the magnates claiming lands or jurisdiction within their districts. They were to build armouries, and to collect all the weapons in the possession of individuals and store them there.

This step was tentative only; no more than eight governors, —all for service in the East,—were appointed at this time. The next measure was more plainly levelled at the heads of

groups. Hitherto they had exercised absolute jurisdiction over their subjects. Now the latter were allowed an appeal to the Central Government and the Emperor. In the next month, when the weapons had been stored in the armouries and possible malcontents thus disarmed, a decree was issued strictly forbidding powerful men to engross land and extend their holdings at the expense of the peasants, their less powerful neighbours, or the State. Then, in the first month of 646, the Reformers ventured upon a series of drastic measures which must have carried consternation into many a great house in Yamato. "As soon as the ceremonies of the New Year's congratulations were over the Emperor promulgated an Edict of Reforms (in four articles):—I. Let the people established by the former Emperors, etc., as representatives of children be abolished; also the *miyake* of various places and the people owned as serfs by the Wake, the Omi, the Tomo no Miyakko, the Kuni no Miyakko, and the chief men of villages. Let the manors of serfs in various places be abolished."

It has been mentioned that one way of extending the Imperial domain had been to institute *Be* or groups to commemorate the names of childless sovereigns, Imperial consorts, or other members of the Imperial Household, and on various other pretexts. In course of time the hereditary heads or managers of these groups had established a virtual independence and had appropriated the lands and serfs as their own. In other cases these estates had been seized by neighbouring magnates. Now, with a single stroke of the inkbrush the Crown recovered all these manors and a very great deal more besides, for the whole system of *Be* or *Tomo* was now swept out of existence. The Central Government was careful, however, not to leave the more influential heads of groups unprovided for. They were now as far as possible employed as functionaries, and assigned "fiefs for their support." This term calls for special remark, for a "sustenance-fief" was a very different thing to a "fief" as we usually understand the term. It means the taxes of a certain district, or of a certain number of families assigned as a salary for the support of a functionary, or Court favourite, who otherwise had no interest in or jurisdiction over the district or its inhabitants.

What always militated against the enduring possibility of a strong Central Government in Japan was not so much distance as difficulty of communication, for the country is a re-

plica of ancient Hellas on an extended scale. In 646 the Empire of Yamato, with a population of 3,000,000 or 3,500,000, covered no more than 65,000 or 70,000 square miles, since at that date the southern half of Kyūshū, and some 35,000 or 40,000 square miles in the north of the main island, remained unsubdued. At that time the Middle Kingdom was at least twenty times as extensive as Yamato, with at least fifteen times the population of Japan. But thanks to the great rivers, the magnificent canal system, the public roads connecting the capital with a network of great walled towns situated mostly in wide and level plains and therefore easily accessible, Taisung's authority could readily make itself respected in every nook of his broad domains, for against any recalcitrant province he could readily throw the resources and the forces of its obedient neighbours. In Japan there were no great rivers, no great canal system, no magnificent public roads. Between Lake Biwa and the Southern Sea there was one considerable plain; but even in Yoshino in Yamato, and in the Kishū peninsula, there were mountains that afforded a ready asylum for refugees from the real or fancied oppression of the sovereign. Then from the site of modern Ōsaka on to the Straits of Shimonoseki, the Inland Sea afforded an easy and what should have been a safe avenue of communication. Safe, however, it was only on the exceptional occasions when the Central Government was something better than a hollow sham. As a rule it was what Cilicia and the southern seaboard of Asia Minor were before Pompey took them in hand in 67 B.C.,—a pirates' lair. In spite of that, however, the Central Government generally contrived to keep the way open between the capital and the vice-royalty in Chikuzen, so important as a base for communication with the Korean States and the Middle Kingdom, while Anato or Nagato and Kibi appear to have generally been well maintained under central control. Beyond Lake Biwa towards the Sea of Japan, the province of Koshi was slowly extending its frontiers at the expense of the Yemishi or Ainu; but time and again we meet with notices of events there which make it tolerably plain that the local magnates were wont to act very much as if there had been no such person as the Emperor of Japan. Among the mountains of Hida, and the mountains and table-lands of Shinano, the Imperial writs, if they ever by any means penetrated so far, were simply so much waste paper. On the Pacific seaboard from the Owari

Gulf westward it was somewhat different. Mino, Owari, Suruga all bent to Yamato rule in varying degrees at various times, while on both sides of Tōkyō Bay and in the spacious and fertile plain at the head of that inlet the Japanese had ousted the Ainu and established themselves pretty securely. But to bring these outlying provinces into due subordination to the central authority was no easy matter. From Tōkyō to Kyōto is now a matter of a dozen hours or so; in the seventh and eighth centuries an ordinary journey between the Kwantō and Nara, or the constantly shifting Japanese capital before the Nara epoch, not unfrequently occupied as many weeks. Nor was an ordinary journey always possible. The effects of freshets and inundations had as often as not to be allowed for, and impracticable fords, broken bridges, and impassable tracks not infrequently delayed communications for the best part of six months. One thing was plain,—the conveyance of heavy taxes in kind from these quarters to the central store-houses was next door to an impossibility. And this was only one of an intricate complex of difficulties that had to be effectively grappled with before the magnates of the Kwantō could be stripped of that virtual autonomy which they enjoyed as the result of their geographical situation.

After the nomination of governors to these impracticable districts the Reformers concentrated their attention upon quarters more amenable to their immediate control. The second article in the Reform Edict stated that “the capital is for the first time to be regulated, and governors appointed for the Home Provinces and districts. Let barriers, outposts, guards, and post-horses, both special and ordinary, be provided, bell tokens made, and mountain (passes) and river (ferries) regulated.” The capital was to be divided into wards, each with an alderman for the superintendence of the population and the investigation of criminal matters, with a sort of mayor over the four wards. But these were only regulations for the city that was to be. In Japan at this time there was not one single town in the Chinese sense of the word. On the death of a sovereign—and often on other occasions—the “palace” was abandoned and the Imperial residence transferred to some other of the Imperial manors in what were to be known as the Home Provinces from 646 onward. On one occasion, at least, we find it at Ōtsu on Lake Biwa, in Ōmi, first outside

the boundary of the Go-Kinai. Even now the palace was roofed with thatch or shingles, and of such frail materials that not so much repairs as rebuilding continued to be necessary at very short intervals. Furthermore there was the idea that death defiled the dwelling where it occurred. So long as the sovereign was merely a patriarchal chief, subsisting on the produce of his own estates, inhabiting the most unpretentious of domiciles, and living in a very simple style, there was no great inconvenience in thus frequently "shifting the capital." But after the Reform, the new magnificence of the Court, the elaborately organised central administration with its numerous functionaries, its huge granaries and store-houses for the reception of taxes in kind, and the other extensive buildings made necessary by the new conditions, caused these removals to be looked upon with dread by the taxpaying and working part of the population. On several occasions they gave rise to great popular discontent, and this was one of the considerations which led to the erection of a real permanent capital at Nara in 710. Then, and not till then, was there any pressing need for "a regulation of the capital."

The "Home Provinces" was a reproduction of a prominent feature in the administration of the Middle Kingdom. Only, in Japan the inhabitants of the Home Provinces were not at first marked out for the privileges and the special treatment accorded the favoured population in the environs of the Chinese capital. The reason of this is not far to seek. The Reformers felt they needed the strong support of material resources. To obtain these resources from the outlying provinces was easy in China; but if not impossible, at all events exceedingly difficult in Japan, that land of the mountain and the flood. Besides, it was in the Home Provinces that the most dangerous possible rivals and opponents of the new Government were to be found. Accordingly it was only statesman-like that the Chinese system should here be not so much adopted as adapted to meet the exigencies of the actual situation. And so it came to pass that it was among the peasantry of the Home Provinces that the saying "Better be a thief than a tax-collector" originated. The "barriers" were also borrowed from China, and although at first they may have seemed an unnecessary institution in Japan, they were not long in proving their utility. In the succession war of 671-672 they

were found to be of considerable strategic importance, while they soon after that were of great service in dealing with run-away peasants taking refuge in flight from the exactions of the tax-gatherer. The establishment of the post-system, soon destined to become notorious for its abuses, was really a vital necessity, if the new central administration was seriously minded to be a permanent reality.

“ (In the Home Provinces) districts of 40 townships are constituted Greater Districts, of from 30 to 4 townships are constituted Middle Districts, and of three or fewer townships are constituted Lesser Districts. For the district authorities of whatever class let there be taken *Kuni no Miyakko* of unblemished character, such as may fitly sustain the duties of the time. . . . Let men of solid capacity and intelligence who are skilled in writing and arithmetic be appointed assistants and clerks.”

In the tract of country henceforward to be known as the Home Provinces, a little later on, we find as many as 53 districts, or *Gun* or *Kōri*. The administrative posts in these would thus provide for a considerable number of the territorial nobility and gentry, who otherwise might have felt inclined to make themselves unpleasant to the reforming Government. It was the policy of the latter to leave the chieftains in the possession of their former titles, for at all times the average Japanese has been extremely fond not merely of honour, but of honours. As the provincial governors were at first strictly prohibited from exercising judicial functions, and were severely reprimanded, if not subjected to more serious punishments, when they presumed to take cognisance of suits, the heads of *kōri* still found ample scope for making themselves both feared and respected by the people of their districts. The only innovation in connection with their judicial position was that an appeal from their decisions to the Central Government was now possible. They could no longer levy taxes; that was one of the chief functions of the provincial governor and his staff. But, on the other hand, the district governors were encouraged to report any malfeasances or any malpractices on the part of the provincial governor to the central authorities. One outcome of this peculiar situation was that provincial governors were, in spite of themselves, constrained to conciliate the goodwill of their subordinates, the district governors. In 646, the earliest district governors were indeed

nominated by the provincial governors. But the provincial governors held their positions for a limited number of years only—sometimes four, and sometimes six,—while the district governor held his office for life, and, as often as not, he transmitted his post to his son or heir. In theory the district governor was responsible to the provincial governor; as a sober matter of fact he was, if an able man, but slightly under central control. The position of the provincial governor no doubt appeared magnificent; but in the narrower confines of his district, the virtually hereditary district governor was a very much more powerful man than was the provincial governor, who nominally swayed it over half-a-score or a dozen of district governors for a brief term of six years at the outside. And long before these six years were out a combination of his subject district governors might very readily relegate him to obscurity and the meagre fare of the ex-official. The pivot on which the success of the Sinicised administration turned was the provincial governor; and the course of events was soon destined to show that from the conditions and limitations imposed upon that functionary, it was only an angel from Heaven, or a man gifted with the preternatural astuteness of Machiavelli's Prince, that could be expected to cope successfully with the exigencies of the office.

Let us now proceed to a consideration of the remaining two Articles of the Reform Edict:—"III. Let there now be provided *for the first time* registers of population, books of account, and a system of the receipt and re-granting of distribution-land.

"Let every fifty houses be reckoned a township, and in every township let there be one alderman who shall be charged with the superintendence (of the registers) of the population, the direction of the sowing of crops and the cultivation of mulberry trees, the prevention and examination of offences, and the enforcement of the payment of taxes and of forced labour.

"For rice-land, thirty paces (5 feet) in length by twelve paces in breadth shall be reckoned a *tan*.* Ten *tan* make one

* The *tan* would thus be 9,000 feet, or 1,000 square yards. Five *tan* would thus be equal to a little more than an acre (4,840 square yards). Just before Hideyoshi's time (1582-1598) the *tan* was equal to 1,440 square yards. He reduced it to its present extent of 1,200 square yards, approximately a quarter of an acre.

chō. For each tan the tax is two sheaves and two bundles (such as can be grasped in the hand) of rice; for each chō (2 acres) the tax is 22 sheaves of rice. On mountains or in valleys where the land is precipitous, or in remote places where the population is scanty, such arrangements are to be made as may be convenient.

“IV. The old taxes and forced labour are abolished, and a system of commuted taxes instituted. These shall consist of fine silks, coarse silks, and floss silk, all in accordance with what is produced in the locality. For each chō (2 acres) of rice-land the rate is ten feet of fine silk, for four chō (8 acres) one piece forty feet in length by two and a half feet in width. For coarse silk the rate is twenty feet per chō. For cloth the rate is forty feet of the same dimensions as the silk for each chō. Let there be levied separately a commuted house-tax. All houses shall pay each twelve feet of cloth. The extra articles of this tax, as well as salt and offerings, will depend on what is produced in the locality. For horses for public service, let every hundred houses contribute one horse of medium quality. Or if the horse is of superior quality, let one be contributed by every two hundred houses. If the horses have to be purchased the price shall be made up by a payment of twelve feet of cloth from each house. As to weapons, each person shall contribute a sword, armour, bow and arrows, a flag and a drum. For coolies, the old system, by which one coolie was provided by every thirty houses, is altered, and one coolie is to be furnished from every fifty houses for allotment to the various functionaries. Fifty houses shall be allotted to provide rations for one coolie, and one house shall contribute 22 feet of cloth and 5 shō (545 cubic inches, or about $\frac{1}{4}$ of a bushel) of rice in lieu of service.”

Later on in the same year, an instruction was issued ordaining that in granting rice-lands the peasants' houses should adjoin the land, and that the commuted taxes should be collected *from males only*. As these latter taxes were paid in products of female labour, this latter provision implied that the heads, or at least the male members, of families were to be held responsible for the liabilities of their female relatives or dependents.

Land tenure and taxation are no doubt very dry and prosaic topics. But in any real history of Japan they are subjects

that may not be shirked. In fact it is perhaps not too much to say that whoever has mastered them and their bearings upon the social and political development of the country, holds in his hands one of the chief keys to the history of the Empire, for the polity of Japan down to a very recent period has been based upon agriculture almost exclusively. In subsequent chapters much must be said about these subjects of land tenure and of taxation from time to time. Here, after a few very simple but perhaps necessary remarks, we must proceed to deal with the other salient innovations of the Reforming Government.

This new system of land-holding and taxation was simply that of contemporary China transferred to Yamato. The land-tax proper was not a heavy one. A *tan* of average rice-land was supposed to yield 50 sheaves, and a *chō* 500 sheaves (equal to 5 *koku*, or about 25 bushels). In the home provinces, which were subsequently exempted from forced labour and the tax in lieu of forced labour (*yō*), the land-tax proper was carefully collected. But in the further distant provinces, where difficulties of communication made the transport of their produce to the capital almost impossible, the other taxes were regarded as of greater consequence by the central authorities. In certain districts, at least, we find that the land-tax proper, the tax on textiles and similar products, and the forced labour tax stood to each other in the ratio of 3:4:2. In other words, the land-tax represented no more than a third part of the farmer's chief liabilities to the Government. Of the remaining 66.6 per cent., 44.4 per cent. were *chō*, or taxes payable in textiles, and the rest was either *corrée* work or contributions in lieu of it. Theoretically at least this system of taxation did not appear to be an oppressive one. Practically, however, on account of the abuses that crept into it, it ultimately brought the Empire into anarchy, the Emperor to indigence, and the Imperial power and the central authority to hopeless impotence.

The Reformers next directed their attention to the organisation of a central administration. Forty years before, Shōtoku Taishi had made a premature effort to introduce the Court institutions of the Sui dynasty into Japan. For dignitaries and officials below the third rank a system of 12 grades with distinctive caps had been introduced in 604; and an attempt had then been made to define more rigorously that Court eti-

quette which a French historian has characterised as “le culte de la religion monarchique.” But it had had little or no effect upon the clan system. In 647 this system of rank was amended, and in 649 it was still further modified,* when nineteen cap-grades were instituted. “In the same month an order was given to the National Doctor, Takamuku no Kuromaro, and the Buddhist priest Bin to establish eight departments of State and one hundred bureaux.”

There is good reason to believe, however, that Bin (who passed away in 653) and Takamuku (who died at the head of an embassy in China in 656) did not live to complete this undertaking. At all events, it is in the Code of Taihō (702) that we meet with the first full account of an organised central administration. Probably, however, the system was completed some time between 662 and 671. We are told that it was then that the Great Council of State (Dajō-Kwan) was established. It was composed of the Dajō-daijin, or Chancellor of the Empire, of the Minister of the Left (Sa-daijin) and of the Minister of the Right (U-daijin); while the First Adviser of State (Dainagon) was to participate in deliberations, and the Minister of the Nakatsukasa-Shō was to inspect and affix his seal to Imperial Rescripts. Under this Council of State were placed eight Boards,—(1) The Nakatsukasa-Shō (Ministry of the Imperial Household); (2) The Shikibu-Shō (Ministry of Court Ceremonies and of Civil Office); (3) The Jibu-Shō; (4) The Mimbu-Shō (Home Department); (5) The Hyōbu-Shō (Ministry of War); (6) The Gyōbu-Shō (Ministry of Justice); (7) The Ōkura-Shō (National Treasury); and (8) The Kunai-Shō (Treasury of Imperial Household). Although this subject is well-nigh as tedious and tiresome as that of land-tenure and taxation, or man millinery, it will be well to reproduce the full details of the functions of these eight Boards as they are given in the Code of 702.

I.—The Nakatsukasa-Shō had to deal with the following matters: (1) Attendance upon the Emperor, tendering Him counsel about His personal affairs; assisting Him in the maintenance of a proper dignity, and in the observance of proper forms of etiquette. (2) The inspection and countersigning of drafts of Imperial Rescripts, and the forms to be observed in

* During Takamuku's absence on a diplomatic mission to Silla in 646-7 there was a pause in the work of reform.

making representations to the Emperor. (3) The issuing of Imperial orders in time of war. (4) The reception of addresses to the Emperor. (5) The compilation of the National History. (6) The gazetteer; and the personal status of the Imperial Princesses, and of the maids of honour and Court ladies. (7) The submission to the Emperor's inspection of the census returns, the taxes to be levied, and the lists of priests and nuns in the Empire. (8) The Grand-Empress Dowager, the Empress Dowager, and the Empress. (9) The Imperial archives. (10) The annual expenditure of the Court. (11) The Calendar. (12) Painting. (13) The Physicians in waiting. (14) The maintenance of order in the palace.

It is not difficult to understand how an able man at the head of this Ministry might contrive to make himself a veritable power in the land. Even in certain quarters in Europe Ceremony has been a much more potent thing than Religion, while even now a breach of etiquette sometimes entails graver social penalties upon the offender than flagrant outrages on what is most vital in morality do in the highly moral and comparatively democratic British Empire under the sway of King Edward VII. Now, in Far Eastern lands a dozen centuries or so ago, and, indeed, even at the present day, ceremonial is of infinitely greater consequence than it is, or ever has been, in the West,—except perhaps in the Byzantine Empire, at the Court of Spain, or at Versailles in the time of Louis XIV. Whoever fails to grasp the import of this very simple proposition must abandon all hope of understanding much that is of essential importance in the history of China, Japan, and Korea. By far the most important of the Five Chinese Classics* in its effects upon society has been the *Li* or Book of Rites. We have seen the “yellow rolls” of this book in the

* The Five Chinese Classics, properly so called, are (1) The *Yih-king*, or Book of Changes (by Wan Wang, 1150 B.C.); (2) The *Shih-king*, or Book of Odes, containing Ballads of various dates from 1800 to 500 B.C.; (3) The *Shūking*, or Book of History (from Chaos till 721 B.C.); (4) The *Chun-Tsū*, or Spring and Autumn Annals, written by Confucius, and giving what purported to be the History of the Empire from 721 to 479 B.C.; and (5) The *Li*, or Book of Rites. Besides these, the “Four Books” go to make up the full complement of the Nine Classics. Three of these four—the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Confucian Analects, were compiled by pupils or followers of Confucius, while the fourth, the Works of Mencius, is by a subsequent disciple of that philosopher. Inasmuch as these works continued to be the oracles of Japanese savants for ages, European students of Japanese history will do well to bear this prosaic scrap of Chinese literary history in mind.

hands of the great reformers, Kamatari and Naka-no-Ōye, when they were sedulously weaving the web of their conspiracy before 645. Said to have been compiled by a Duke of Chow in the 12th century B.C., it has since then served Chinamen as the guide and rule for the regulations of all the actions and relations of their lives. "In ceremonial is summed up the whole soul of the Chinese," says Callery, "and to my mind the *Book of Rites* is the most exact and complete monograph that this nation can give of itself to the rest of the world. Its affections, if it has any, are satisfied by ceremonial; its duties are fulfilled by means of ceremonial; its virtues and vices are recognised by ceremonial; the natural relations of created beings are essentially connected with ceremonial,—in a word, for it ceremonial is man, the man moral, the man politic, the man religious in their numberless relations with the family, society, the State, morality and religion."

To apply this language in all its sweeping compass to Japan would be highly unjust; for among the Japanese people the natural affections not only exist, but are exceedingly strong. But, on the other hand, it must be frankly conceded that Chinese ceremonial has done much to regulate and modify the expression of the natural feelings among the Japanese. Towards the end of the sixteenth century we find Valegnani writing to Acquaviva, the Jesuit General in Rome, to the effect that "the most austere Order in the Church has no novitiate so severe as is the apprenticeship to good-breeding that is necessary in Japan." The severity of this apprenticeship in forms and ceremonies was no doubt salutary in many respects; but withal the training had the defects of its qualities in abundant measure. It is easy to perceive that the functionaries charged with the office of "advising the Emperor on His personal matters, and of assisting Him in the maintenance of a proper dignity and in the observance of proper forms of etiquette," could do much to curb all free action and initiative on the part of a sovereign not possessed of an exceptional share of force of character. Presently we shall find that the throne of Japan was occupied by an oppressive tyrant. But the tyrant was not the Emperor. It was Chinese ceremonial. Strong Emperors were now and then wont to abdicate, if not for the express purpose, at all events for the real purpose of freeing

themselves from the despotism of this ceremonial, and of, not reigning, but really ruling the Empire.

Two of the remaining seven Ministries were also very much occupied with the details of ceremonial. These were:—

II.—The Shikibu-Shō, charged with (1) Keeping the lists of civil officials; (2) Appointments to office and rank, and the rewarding of meritorious services; (3) The maintenance of schools, and examinations; (4) The appointment of stewards in the houses of Imperial Princes, and in those of officials above the 4th rank; (5) Pensions and donations; and (6) Official precedence at Court functions.

This Shikibu-Shō was complemented by—

III.—The Jibu-Shō, which dealt with (1) The names of officials and the marriage and succession of officials *above* the 6th rank; (2) Omens; (3) Deaths, funerals, the granting of posthumous rank, or donations of money to the family of the deceased; (4) Anniversaries of the demise of the former Emperor, and the record of the names of all former Emperors, so that none of those names shall be used by any succeeding Emperor or any subject (*tabu*); (5) Rendering of homage by foreign countries; (6) Adjudication of disputes about precedence among various families; (7) Music; (8) Registration of Buddhist temples and *religieux*; (9) Court reception of foreigners; (10) Imperial tombs, and their attendants.

One more Ministry was occupied with Court Affairs. This was—

VIII.—The Kunai-Shō, superintending (1) The rice-lands for the supply of the Imperial family; (2) Harvesting on the Imperial domains; (3) The presentation of rare delicacies by subjects; (4) The Imperial kitchen, palace repairs, breweries, Court ladies, Court servants, Court smiths, the Imperial wardrobe and the like; and (5) The lists of Imperial Princes or Princesses from the second to the fourth generation inclusive.

It will be observed that none of these four Ministries brought either the sovereign or the officials into contact with the people at large. A full half of the elaborate machinery of the Government was thus almost exclusively occupied with the affairs of a select aristocracy of perhaps less than 10,000 individuals all told in a population of some four millions. To attend to the interests of the nation at large was the work of the four remaining departments. These were—

IV.—The Mimbu-Shō, dealing with (1) The census; (2) Forced labour; (3) Exemption from forced labour, and rewarding the meritorious poor, or relieving the distressed; (4) Bridges, roads, harbours, lakes, farms, mountains, rivers, etc.; (5) Estimation and collection of taxes in products and textiles, to the disbursing of the national funds, and estimates of national expenditure; and (6) Granaries, and land-tax in grain.

V.—The Hyōbu-Shō, in charge of (1) the rosters of military officers, their examinations, their rank and their commissions; (2) The dispatch of troops; (3) Weapons, guards, fortifications, and beacon fires; (4) Pastures, studs, and cattle; (5) Postal stations; (6) Arsenals, and mechanics employed in them; (7) Military music and private means of water transportation; and (8) The training of hawks and dogs.

VI.—The Gyōbu-Shō conducted criminal trials, and took cognisance of suits for debt.

VII.—The Ōkura-Shō had charge of (1) The public accounts; (2) Textile taxes and offerings to the Emperor; (3) Weights and measures; (4) The prices of commodities; (5) The mint; (6) Lacquer-ware manufacture, weaving, and other industries.

One unfortunate thing in connection with these Ministries was that although theoretically equal in rank, all the prestige of office went to the functionaries employed in those of them which had no connection with the real national interests in the broader sense of the term. The chief function of the Mimbu-Shō (Home Office) and of the Ōkura-Shō (National Treasury) was to see to it that means should be provided for the adequate support of the Court and the courtiers, who filled the posts in the favoured departments, I., II., III., and VII., reserved for the *jeunesse dorée* of Sinicised Japan. The administration of justice, which tends more and more to become the most important function of the modern State, was never of any great consequence in Old Japan, where every one appreciated the wisdom of agreeing with his adversary quickly lest worse betide. As for the War Department (Hyōbu-Shō), in 702 A.D. it was the very reverse of what it, together with the Ministry of Marine, is in Japan in 1909. At present, the War Office and the Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. When a party government does by any strange hap make its appearance on the political stage,

the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For the most extreme of party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of the Army and the Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments showered with more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension. In Old Japan it was this Chinese view of the case that prevailed for centuries after the Reform of 645. To guileless Europeans who have heard so much of the *Samurai* and of *Bushido*,—the Way of the Warrior,—this statement may very well come as something of a shock. But it is simple, sober, literal truth. It was the institutions of the T'ang Dynasty that the Japanese statesmen were then endeavouring to introduce and establish in the Empire in spite of the fact that the historical development of the country had been vastly different to that of the Middle Kingdom, and that the natural features of Japan, her social economy, and the racial peculiarities of her population made the adoption of these institutions exceedingly hazardous unless they were adopted with modifications considerable enough to convert their adoption into an adaptation. In the long course of centuries the force of circumstances and the appearance of a few men of genius strong enough to shake themselves free from the trammels of a mechanical conventionality and to place their trust in the first principles of common sense and mother wit have served to rescue Japan from the abyss to which the Reform of 645 once bade fair to consign her. But for that she might very well now be a variant of the Empire of Korea.

“The people in the Empire (of China),” says the *Liu H'ü*, “were divided into their classes, each of which was bound to keep to its own vocation; those who studied letters and arms were Gentlemen (Shi); those who devoted themselves to agriculture were Farmers (Nō); those who designed and made utensils were Artisans (Kō); and those who purchased and

sold goods were Merchants (Shō). The Artisans and Merchants should not attend to the work of the Gentlemen; the salaried men shall not seek the profit of the inferior people." Down to a time well within the memory of the living we find this Chinese organisation of society in Japan, into which it was originally introduced shortly after the Great Reform of 645, only with a difference. The gentleman in China was before all things a scholar, for the soldier and his calling have ever been held in comparatively slight esteem by the peace-loving gentry of the Middle Kingdom. In feudal Japan, on the other hand, it was the *samurai* who were the gentlemen. In other words, the gentleman in this Empire was, before all things, a soldier. He might indeed by some lucky chance be a man of wide scholarship, but, as often as not, he was as guiltless of learning as the father of Gawain Douglas, the Bishop of Dunkeld, was. In any case it was in the sword and not in the pen that he placed his trust. The *samurai*, who came to constitute at least a full ninety-five per cent. of the gentlemen of Japan, were, in short, a highly privileged military caste. But the creation of a privileged *military* class was one of the very last things that the Reformers aimed at. In the great succession war of 672 we find 20,000 Owari troops acting under the orders of the provincial governor; and provincial governors occupied no very high status in the official hierarchy of the Court. In the reign of the Empress Jitō (686-697) the national army was a strictly conscript one, one-fourth of the able-bodied freemen being selected for a service of three years, and a few years later this proportion was increased to one-third. *A privileged military class was an outcome of feudalism*; and the appearance of feudalism in Japan was contemporary with its appearance in Europe and proceeded from similar causes. In the West the local military chiefs found their opportunity in the dissolution of Charlemagne's Empire under his incapable successors; in Japan it was the breakdown of the Reform machinery that made the pen of no effect, and the sword all-powerful.

What the Reformers were really endeavouring to do was to introduce the Chinese social and administrative system into Japan. *Now, the Chinese law had for its very object the suppression of feudalism and the prevention of its reappearance.* The problem of the Japanese statesman was to abolish the clan

system, and to make the social unit not the tribe or sept, but the family. So much they accomplished; but into the national house thus emptied, swept, and garnished entered the evil spirit, with his attendant devils, of feudalism, and the last state of the Empire became worse than the first.

In China, the subjects of the Emperor were divided into two layers. The great bulk of the population consisted of peasants whose sole business was to keep the peace and to till the fields. Their only concern with governmental matters was to pay their taxes. Above them were the officers, for whose support they were to work, and who, on their part, were to guide and protect the moiling black-haired millions. However, *these officers constituted no aristocracy of birth*. Every Chinese school-boy had, and has, on his lips the old query which answers itself in the negative, "How can kings, princes, generals, and councillors have their breed (*i.e.* be limited to certain families)?" There was no post, however high in the service of the Emperor, which the son of the humblest peasant in the land might not aspire to fill, provided he could give satisfactory proof of capacity in the examination halls. It was, and is, a case of *la carrière ouverte aux talens*; the talents being almost exclusively literary, however. Whatever may be the faults of this Chinese examination system, it has perhaps contributed more than any other single factor to the stability of the Middle Kingdom. Among other results it induced the people to cover the Empire with a network of schools and colleges at their own expense.

The Japanese statesmen made a cardinal mistake in omitting to reproduce this institution in its entirety in their country. They did, indeed, go some little way in an endeavour to copy it. A university had been established by the Emperor Tenchi (Prince Naka no Ōye) in 668, and it was re-organised in 702. But it provided for no more than 400 students, against the 8,000 in the capital of T'ang. As the curriculum extended over nine years, and failures in the examinations were frequent, it is questionable whether as many as a score of graduates received official appointments in any one year. And then the students were generally chosen from among the children of families not below the fifth rank, although bright boys from families of sixth, seventh, and eighth ranks might be admitted. At last, in 821, only families of the three highest ranks could

furnish candidates for admission to the Literary Department. Even the Provincial Schools, with their 50, 40, or 20 students, were strictly aristocratic, the pupils being taken from the families of the provincial officials or the district governors. All these institutions were official; there was not the slightest encouragement for the establishment of schools by the people on their own initiative. In Japan it was emphatically held that "kings, princes, generals, and councillors" could, and did, "have their breed."

In short, even after the Reform, the constitution of Japanese society continued to be not a whit less aristocratic than before. We are told that a new nobility of rank and office was created, and so much is indeed true. But the new nobility was merely the old one arrayed in new caps of nineteen different colours. The text of the piece was largely modified, if not entirely rewritten, the cast was considerably changed, but the company continued to be composed of the same actors. In this vital respect 645 is vastly different from 1868, when the officials of the Bakufu were relegated to obscurity, and an entirely fresh set of men took charge of the fortunes of the State.

In old Yamato the nobles were variously known as Omi, Muraji, Kuni no Miyakko, Tomo no Miyakko, and Inaki. When stripped of their powers and resources *quâ* Omi, Muraji, Kuni no Miyakko, Tomo no Miyakko, and Inaki, they were not deprived of these titles; and for a full generation these designations continued in current use. At last, in 684, the Emperor, Temmu, proceeded to deal with them. He re-arranged the old clan and group titles into the eight classes of Mabito, Asomi, Sukune, Imiki, Michi no Shi, Omi, Muraji, and Inaki, thus degrading the two highest of the old titles to a very low position. Mabito was reserved for Imperial Princes; former Omi were mostly promoted to Asomi, and former Muraji to Sukune, while not individuals but whole households were gratified with the lower ranks,—batches of thirty, or forty, or fifty households at the same time. The net effect of this was to vulgarise the old titles; and it very soon became apparent that they were impotent to survive the rude process of wholesale cheapening to which they had been subjected. What must have greatly contributed to their outward euthanasia was the fact that the possessors of the old territorial and group-head titular distinctions were at the same time

the holders of either rank or office, or of both, in the new order of things. The old titular designations were nothing more than empty names of honours; the higher grades of official rank, and official employment, carried with them substantial emoluments, and it is only the most stupidly belated of conservatives that persistently keep on clutching at the shadows of forms from which all material reality has departed for ever and for aye. The nobles now preferred to be addressed by the name of the office they happened to occupy, or by the degree of rank which they happened to hold.

If we interpret honours—not honour,—as Falstaff did in the currency of seventh-century Japan, we shall find that they were somewhat substantial. At that date this Empire had but little metallic currency of its own,—that was to come with the year 708,—everything of any consequence was estimated in *chō* and *tan*, which we will translate into acres and fractions thereof. Certain individuals of the blood imperial received estates varying in extent from 160 acres to half that amount. The number of these was limited, and their position, of course, exceptional. After this, in the Land Provisions of the Code of Taihō came the assignments of land made to holders of the higher ranks. At the Reform, nineteen grades of rank had been established. Under the Emperor Temmu the number of these grades had been increased to as many as forty-eight. By the time of the compilation of the Taihō Code (702) they had been reduced to thirty, distributed into ten classes, the first three and the last two of which comprised two grades each, the intervening five classes being distributed into four grades apiece,—although about this distribution there seems to be a certain amount of uncertainty. Now the relative importance of these grades may be inferred from an inspection of the revenue assigned for the support of their holders. Holders of a—

Senior First Class	received	160	acres.
Junior	„ „ „	148	„
Senior Second Class	received	120	„
Junior	„ „ „	108	„
Senior Third Class	received	80	„
Junior	„ „ „	68	„
Senior Fourth Class	received	48	„
Junior	„ „ „	40	„

Senior Fifth Class received	24	acres.
Junior " " "	16	"

A female of corresponding rank received two-thirds of a male's share.

The first five of the ten classes, whose children, it will be remembered, could claim admittance to the University, thus formed a sort of superior aristocracy. For the support of such as held ranks of the last five classes no land was specifically assigned; they received their emoluments from the public treasury in silk or textiles or in similar products of taxation. All ten classes alike were immune from the attentions of the collectors of revenue. In other words, they formed a highly privileged class or caste, into which it was next-door to impossible for a man of the people to force his way. In this respect at least Japan, much to her ultimate disadvantage, did *not* copy China.

Thus the income of an aristocrat depended mainly upon the grade of rank he held; and this perhaps partly accounts for the intensity of the struggle and the eagerness of the scramble for these grades among the courtiers. In addition to these rank-incomes, there were others, however. *Ex officio*, and independent of the particular grade he held, the Chancellor of the Empire received 80 acres; the two Great Ministers (Left and Right) 60 acres each; and the Dainagon 40 acres.

A highly responsible position was that of the Viceroy of Dazaifu, who had charge of the nine provinces of Kyūshū, together with the islands of Iki and Tsushima. In many respects he was autocratic. In the British Empire a Viceroy of India receives more than twice as much as, and a Governor of Bombay or Madras considerably more than, a British Prime Minister gets as a salary. But in old Japan, the Viceroy of Dazaifu, being remote from the sacrosanct precincts of the Court, was regarded as a very inferior dignitary. *Ex officio* he had to be satisfied with an estate of 20 acres,—one-fourth of that of the Chancellor. Of course, he would naturally hold a very high grade of rank, and the emoluments of this would constitute his main source of income. The case of a provincial governor was a replica of that of the Viceroy of Kyūshū on a reduced scale. He was usually a holder of a higher fifth-class rank, and as such would hold 24 acres. But *ex officio* his emoluments were no more than 5.2 acres in a

first-class post, while in a fourth-class province they were only 3.2 acres.

Now, inasmuch as the 60 odd provincial governors were the most important functionaries in the Empire, if the Reformed Government was really to be a success, the cheese-paring treatment meted out to them was exceedingly short-sighted policy. Every official was desirous of being in the capital if possible; after the foundation of Kyōto at least it came to be a good deal more than what Versailles was in the time of Louis XIV. Service in any provincial post, and especially in a remote provincial post, ultimately came to be regarded as a sort of exile. To readers acquainted with the old Spanish system of colonial administration (from 1520 to 1820 A.D., and even later in the case of Cuba and the Philippines) the situation can be made tolerably clear in a very few words. Those who sought appointments in the Spanish colonies were mostly courtiers of broken fortunes. It was not the wont of a *hidalgo* of the *sangre azul* to betake himself to Mexico, Lima, Santa Fé de Bogota, Buenos Ayres, or, still later, to Manila or Havana, either for the sake of his health or for pleasure. Neither was it for the mere trivial consideration of a paltry salary that a grandee entitled to bask in the sunshine of the Royal presence submitted to the eclipse of a temporary exile. The main inducement was—*opportunities*. Perquisites, whether semi-legal or utterly illegal, were not perhaps so numerous, and were certainly much less magnificent, in the provinces of old Japan than they were in the Castilian vice-royalties beyond the Atlantic. But, notwithstanding, there *were* perquisites,—sufficiently considerable in the eyes of impecunious blue-blooded courtiers bent on a speedy return to the capital furnished with substantial arguments in favour of their own advancement there.

Besides Rank-land (*I-den*) and Office-land (*Shoku-bun-den*) an astute official often contrived to add to his resources by obtaining a *Kō-den*—that is, an estate granted for public merit. Of these estates there were four categories. For the very highest public merit, a man received lands to be held by him and his heirs for ever, free of all taxes. Another description of *Kō-den*—for high public merit—was transmissible to the third generation, another descended only to the second generation, while the lowest of all descended only to a son or a daughter.

In addition to all this, a courtier might be gratified with a *Shi-den*, or an estate created by the special fiat of the sovereign. In these tax-free estates, which continued to be added to and expanded at the expense of neighbouring occupiers, the aristocrats fortunate enough to own them had the material bases necessary for the foundation of great families and powerful houses. Pliny assures us that it was the *latifundia* which ruined Italy. These tax-free estates did not perhaps ruin Japan, but they contributed more than any other one single factor to the decay and downfall of the Imperial authority and of the central government in Sinicised Japan. The categories of exemption above given were the most prominent among the original ones. But they were not the only ones, for in course of time we find a landholder could legally set the tax-collector at defiance on any one of eight and twenty different kinds of title-deeds. From the later Valois Kings and Henry IV. down to 1789 there was a constant endeavour to escape the incidence of the *taille* in France on many pretexts and by an infinity of devices, with the ultimate result that nearly the whole burden of taxation had to be borne by the indigent, poverty-stricken, toiling poor. The economic history of France from 1560 to 1789 and the economic history of Japan from 650 to 1150 A.D. have a strong generic likeness, with striking specific differences, while the remedies for the malady in the two polities were so different as to be antithetic. In France the cure for the disease was the abolition of feudalism; it was in the twelfth century that the feudal system became the only possible system in Japan.

The succeeding chapters will be largely occupied with a consideration of the causes that led to the necessary rise of this feudal system at the expense of the central government, and in the course of this discussion there will be ample opportunity for dealing incidentally with the minuter details of the system introduced by the Reformers of 645 and developed by their successors. Here, to obviate the danger of not being able to see the wood on account of the trees, we shall content ourselves with recapitulating the main features of the new polity in its broadest outlines.

The Yamato sovereign was no longer to be merely the head of the chief clan in Japan, with a feeble control over the other great clan chieftains, and with no direct control over the

dependents of these. Henceforth he was really to be the Emperor of Japan. Every rood of the soil was theoretically supposed to have been surrendered to him,—that is to say, the theory of eminent domain was now effectually established. The land thus surrendered was then distributed to the subjects of the Emperor in approximately equal portions. The holders of these portions were subject to the national burden of taxation (of which there were three main categories). Taxes could be levied by none but the duly constituted Imperial authorities. The members of the old landed tribal aristocracy and the aristocracy of Group or Corporation Heads, while allowed to retain their titles of honour as such, were deprived of all emoluments. But they were formed into a new aristocracy of Court rank, in virtue of which they received tax-free estates or house fiefs, while the *personnel* of the Central Government and of the Viceregal and Provincial Governments came mainly from their ranks. Others of them found employment as district governors or district officials, such offices ultimately becoming hereditary and all of them carrying with them modest emoluments in the shape of land. For a man of the people to force his way into this privileged caste was exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible. In 682 Temmu Tennō issued the following edict: “Let the lineage and character of all candidates for office be always inquired into before a selection is made. None whose lineage is insufficient are eligible for appointments, even although their character, conduct, and capacity may be unexceptionable.”*

Thus, a practically hereditary governing caste was constituted, to which admission was denied to all except the descendants of the old clan chieftains and of the former Group Heads, together with those of the “new men” who had been fortunate enough to distinguish themselves on the winning side in the great succession war of 671-2. It is questionable whether

* This would appear to abrogate a previous decree of 676: “Let all persons from the outer provinces who wish to enter our service be permitted to do so, whether they be sons of Omi, Muraji, Tomo no Miyakko, or even the sons of Kuni no Miyakko. Further, let men of distinguished ability be allowed to do so, even though they are of the common people, of lower rank than the above.” Incidentally it here becomes apparent that a (titular) Country Ruler (Kuni no Miyakko) was of much less social consequence than a (titular) Group Head (Tomo no Miyakko) at this time, even although the Groups or Corporations had been abolished thirty years before.

the caste as thus defined embraced as much as a half per cent. of the total population of the Empire.

The great bulk of the non-privileged classes of the nation consisted of free peasants, occupying approximately equal little holdings, for which they had to pay taxes in cereals, in silk, and in textile products, while they were subject to the burden of forced labour when not drawn in the conscription. In the latter case, they escaped all *corvée* work. But during their three years of service, with the exception of the small number drafted to the capital for service in the Imperial Guard there, the men did not entirely abandon their original occupations. They formed, not so much a standing army as a national militia, receiving a training which was perfunctory at best, as militia training is wont to be. They certainly constituted no privileged military class ; in fact the only privilege they seem to have enjoyed was their exemption from the *corvée* during the limited time they were amenable to service (three years).

Below the free plebeians stood the slaves. So far as can be made out from an inspection of the very defective census and taxation records of the years following 700 A.D., the servile population was not at all a considerable one. It amounted, so far as we can judge, to something between 150,000 and 200,000,—about five per cent. of the 3,000,000 or 3,500,000 subjects of the Emperor. The slaves fell into the two categories of private and public. Apart from such as were relatives of the family of the owner, the former could be bought and sold like so many oxen or horses. On their account the head of the household owning them received an allowance of land (one-third of that allotted to a free-born subject), for the taxes on which he was held responsible. The public slaves were in a much more favoured position. They received as much land as a freeman, although they could not deal with it so freely as the latter, and they were exempt from all forced labour apart from their specific tasks. Possibly this arose from the fact that nearly all the public slaves were to be found in the home provinces, where ultimately no forced labour was exacted.

It now only remains to consider the attitude of the new Government towards the various cults then competing for official recognition. Down to the end of the sixth century the "Way of the Gods" had been one of the chief concerns, if not the chief concern, of the head of the State. The introduction of Buddhism and of the ethical systems of China had greatly

impaired its prestige. How things stood in 642, three years before the great *coup d'état*, becomes tolerably plain from the following quaint passages in the *Nihongi*:—

“5th month, 25th day.—The Ministers conversed with one another, saying:—‘In accordance with the teachings of the village *hafuri* (Shintō priests), there have been in some places horses and cattle killed as a sacrifice to the Gods of the various (Shintō) shrines, in others frequent changes of the market-places, or prayers to the River-Gods. None of these practices have had hitherto any good result.’ Then Soga no Ohomi answered and said:—‘The Mahayana Sutra ought to be read by way of extract in the temples, our sins repented of, as Buddha teaches, and thus with humility should rain be prayed for.’”*

“27th day.—In the South Court of the Great Temple, the images of Buddha and of the Bosatsu, and the images of the Four Heavenly Kings were magnificently adorned. A multitude of priests, by humble request, read the ‘Mahayana Sutra.’ On this occasion Soga no Oho-omi held a censer in his hands, and having burnt incense in it, put up a prayer.

“28th day.—A slight rain fell.

“29th day.—The prayers for rain being unsuccessful, the reading of the Sutra was discontinued.

“8th month, 1st day.—The Empress made a progress to the river-source of Minabuchi. Here She knelt down and prayed, worshipping towards the four quarters, and looking up to Heaven (*i.e.*, in the Chinese fashion). Straightway there was thunder, and a great rain, which eventually fell for five days and plentifully bedewed the Empire.

“Hereupon the peasantry throughout the Empire cried with one voice ‘Banzai,’ and said, ‘A sovereign of exceeding virtue!’”

At this time the fortunes of Shintō had fallen upon evil days. It will be remembered that Kamatari, the Nakatomi chieftain, whose hereditary position entitled him to the headship of the old national cult, positively and persistently refused

* See Aston's notes to Vol. II., pp. 174-175. of his Translation of the *Nihongi*. What popular Shintō as expounded by its village priests in the old time was we simply do not know. Our carefully selected and edited official edition of Shintō is certainly not true aboriginal Shintō as practised in Yamato before the introduction of Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight.

to assume the office. The Emperor Kōtoku (645-654), virtually the nominee of Kamatari, "despised the Way of the Gods." In 661 we hear of the graves round a Shintō shrine being summarily cut down to make room for a new palace. Under Tenchi Tennō, Shintō recovered somewhat; and in Temmu Tennō's time (672-686) it was again held in a fair measure of official consideration. It is then that we meet with the first really historical notice of the Great (National) Purification (*Oho-harahe*),—one of the most important and most solemn ceremonies of the old cult, * while we hear of the celebration of many Shintō functions and festivals in the course of the fourteen years of this reign. But Shintō suffered shrewdly from a lack of substantial endowments; and so was never in a position to make itself either much feared, or to become at all formidable to the ruling authorities. Furthermore it had no code of morality; and it said little or nothing about a future life. A half-yearly Great General Purification served to settle matters effectually for the nation at large for the space of six months; and individuals could easily arrange their own private scores with the Gods on very easy terms. It was just the spiritual counterpart of the general half-yearly house-cleaning in certain provincial municipalities on which the swordgirt police of the present day insist, and which they superintend with all the dignified severity of demeanour such a very grave and serious function demands.

Buddhism stood on a very different footing. Sufficient has already been said to indicate that the edition of Buddhism which came to Japan and obtained the devoted, if not the very devout, support of the Soga would have infallibly been repudiated by the founder of the religion, for Buddha no less than Jesus of Nazareth has had only too abundant reasons to pray to be saved from many of his professed disciples. As has been said, to Shōtoku Taishi Buddhism was evidently a religion of the rational moral sense,—a religion not only of obligation or of fear, but of gratitude for the receipt of blessings, if not unsought for, at all events undeserved. But to most of his contemporaries Buddhism was simply a splendidly easy device for obtaining temporal and perhaps everlasting prosperity, for dodging the Devil or Devils, and escaping the pains and

* See Dr. Florenz's learned essay in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. xxvii., part I.

penalties of the various Hells. "Do right for the sake of doing right; don't do right for the expectation of a reward,"—this was no accepted maxim of conduct among the generality of the professed Buddhists of old Japan, any more than it is among the generality of professing modern Christians. The continental religion at first, at least, was valuable not for supplying a rule or rules of conduct, so much as a new devil-dodging device, and a means of securing material prosperity or evading disaster both in this life and in that which is to come. Buddhism made its appeal to the ignorant vulgar by its magicians and exorcists, by its living saints in the flesh who were supposed to possess strong Court interest with the dignitaries of the ghostly world, by the gorgeousness of its temples and the solemn pomp of its ritual observances. Yet in spite of all this it held within its embrace higher and loftier elements that could do, and did do, much for the culture and civilisation of Japan. But certain of the keener intellects in the official world judged not unreasonably or unrightly that they had good reasons for looking upon its progress with distrust and uneasiness. For one thing it had what Shintō never had,—a strong and evergrowing organised priesthood and a body of *religieux* who stood apart and separate from the bulk of the population, and whose interests were those of a special caste, likely to clash with those of the rulers and the people at large upon occasion. If virtue could look for such munificent rewards both in this and the future life, and if virtue was more and more to come to be identified with the tendering of a due reverence to the Three Precious Things,—Buddha, the Law, and the Priesthood,—the officials may well have felt that the advent of an *Imperium in Imperio* was something more than a mere possibility. Accordingly the more far-sighted among the legislators were quickly at work enacting what corresponded to our Statutes of Mortmain. For example, it is plainly laid down in the Code of 702 that no gifts or sales of land should be made to temples, while individual priests or nuns were prohibited from holding real estate. But both provisions were more honoured in the breach than in the observance, for in old Japan, as elsewhere, the enacting and the enforcing of a statute were occasionally vastly different things. Before this, Temmu Tennō (672-686) had taken means to curtail the holdings of the temples; yet when he fell ill and felt his end to be approaching we find him making extensive

donations not only in personalty but in real property to the Church. In ante-Reform Japan a tremendous amount of the national resources was consumed in the erection of mausolea, and on funerals generally. In 646 this abuse was grappled with pretty effectually, and in less than a quarter of a century afterwards mausolea ceased to be constructed, while a funeral no longer involved the surviving relatives in financial ruin. But the expenditure on the occasion of a death was now to a great extent deflected into another channel. It came to be the Buddhist *religieux* that profited mostly at such times. Instead of being squandered upon tombs, it was upon the erection of gorgeous fanes and the casting of gigantic idols that the wealth of the empire was presently lavished.* For this the nation got a certain, if not indeed an adequate, return. Apart from its ethical and spiritual influence upon the people, Buddhism did much to stimulate the artistic instincts of the Japanese. From the mausolea the nation had got no return whatsoever.

It was not until Tokugawa times that the Buddhist canon was translated into Japanese. Hence a knowledge of Chinese was indispensable to the priests, and so the leaders in the old Japanese Church were generally well acquainted with the classical books of the Middle Kingdom. There does not seem to have been any hostility between them and the laymen who made a specialty of the study of Chinese literature, such as prevailed during the Tokugawa age. Bin was by no means the only ecclesiastic whose services were enlisted by the authorities in consequence of his intimate acquaintance with Chinese institutions. This would naturally tend to make the superior priesthood respected by statesmen who continued to draw their inspiration from the ethical and political philosophy of the Chinese Empire. This formed the chief subject of the curriculum in the University, into which institution, however, Buddhism found no admittance. What perhaps contributed in no small measure to prevent any clash between Buddhist

* Under Jitō Tennō (686-697) the 46 temples of 622 A.D. had increased to 545. Although it was a far cry from this number to the 11,037 fanes of the year of the Mongol invasion (1281), yet it serves to show that the advance of Buddhism had not been inconsiderable during the two generations subsequent to the death of its great patron, Soga no Mumako. In 690 we hear of a "retreat" participated in by 3,363 priests of the seven metropolitan (Nara) temples. Each had thus the population of a considerable village.

priests and lay *literati* was that the latter never secured the material resources necessary for the maintenance of a caste. Fashionable as was the study of Chinese letters at Court and in aristocratic circles, proficiency in these letters brought but little advantage to the scholar, either of plebeian or of comparatively humble birth. It is questionable whether the total combined endowments of the University and of all the other educational institutions in old Japan were equal to those of an average second-class Buddhist fane. These endowments, too, meagre as they were, were frequently woefully mismanaged. In addition to these, we hear of occasional grants being made to meritorious savants, but these were generally so scanty as to be little better than doles. Only on three occasions in the course of centuries do we find men outside the favoured ring of courtiers raising themselves to the highest Ministerial office mainly by their scholarship.* Thus what was the almost general rule in China was the glaring exception in Japan. In the former country there was a strong and sometimes an all-powerful body of *literati*, with special vested interests of their own, whom it was extremely perilous to slight or to offend. In Japan there was no such body. A reputation for scholarship did indeed greatly enhance the prestige of a Japanese statesman; but his claim to office rested not upon his learning, but upon his descent and his family connections. Small wonder, then, that the Fujiwara house could count so many "men of distinction," for the Fujiwara very carefully saw to it that outsiders of any real ability should never be in a position to compete with them, or to contest their claims to "distinction."

In fine, then, Chinese literature was what mainly occupied the attention of aristocratic circles; and to these circles, and to the abler Buddhist priests, its study was confined for generations. The upper classes tended more and more to regulate their lives and their conduct by Chinese ideas. It was only gradually that these filtered down to the people below. Buddhism was also mainly a cult of the upper classes, although great pains were taken to diffuse it among the people at large. It was even used as a weapon of political propaganda among the wild and warlike Hayato of Southern Kyūshū, and the

* Kibi no Mabi (692-775); Sugawara no Michizane (847-903); Fujiwara no Arihira (891-970).

equally fierce and intractable Emishi of the North. To the former Buddhist missionaries were sent from Dazaifu in 692, while we meet with several notices of Emishi, turned Buddhist priests, being rewarded for meritorious work among their turbulent and savage fellow-countrymen. But withal, down to about 800 A.D. the common people appear to have remained wedded to the old aboriginal cult of Shintō. At Court and in official and aristocratic circles it was still recognised, if not very zealously or substantially encouraged. But inasmuch as it had no special priestly caste, no moral code, nothing to say about a future life, no Heaven, and, perhaps still more important, no Hell,* and no substantial endowments, it was, in the nature of things, bound to go down before the lately introduced continental cult. However, the Japanese have been at all times prone to "take their good thing wherever they find it"; and the lurking suspicion that there *might* be some benefits to be procured from the practice of the old national cult after all, restrained even the most devout of Buddhists from making war upon it. In comparatively modern times it has proved itself to be possessed of great potentialities as an instrument of government; and the more astute statesmen of a Sinicised Japan may very well have perceived that it could, on occasion, be utilised to serve their ends to very good purpose.

One item, but this an all-important one, remains to be considered in this chapter. How far was the position of the sovereign affected by the new doctrines imported from China? The Emperor in China was the Viceregent of Heaven, and held his throne by his Virtue or Virtues. When he failed in Virtue, there was a pretext for any subject, powerful enough to do so, to depose him and to assume his place; the usurper or the new sovereign likewise basing his title on *his* Virtue. There was no doctrine of right to the throne by hereditary divine descent, such as there is even now, and was then, in Japan. At all times it has been the wont of Chinese sovereigns to attribute national disasters and mishaps to their own lack of Virtue, and on the other hand the statesmen and warriors of Meiji are constantly found asserting that their efforts have been crowned by success merely on account of the Virtue of the

* Or Hells, with which popular Buddhism came to be richly furnished.

Emperor of Japan. But there is no reason to believe that language of this nature was in use in Japan, either by ruler or subject, before 600 A.D. The earliest authentic instance of the enunciation of this Virtue theory is to be found in the so-called "Laws" of Shōtoku Taishi, issued in 604. After the Reform of 645, language which implies a partial adoption of it at least is of comparatively frequent occurrence. But, at the same time, the native theory of hereditary descent from divine ancestors is not abandoned; indeed, we now and then find the two vastly different theories implied in the wording of one and the same decree. The truth would seem to be that the Japanese statesmen occasionally made the sovereign talk in the conventional language of the Chinese Court, a circumstance that is not at all strange when we remember that in most things Japan was then sitting as a humble disciple at the feet of China. But the "Virtue theory," which had served to justify so many revolutions and dynastic changes in the Middle Kingdom, was never pushed to its logical consequences in the Island Empire. Here, although its adoption may have been implied by the use of certain phrases and formulæ, it was never taken as anything more serious than ornamental trappings which might enhance the dignity of the ruler. It has never been used to justify the subversion of a dynasty, for from the beginnings of history until now there has been no more than one dynasty in Japan. On this circumstance the Japanese reflect with pride; and it seems to have excited the envy of certain Chinese Emperors. In 984, the monk Fujiwara Chōnen was very graciously received at the Court of the first Sung monarch. "His Majesty, understanding that the Kings of Japan had borne but one family name for generation after generation, and that all the Ministers' offices were hereditary in certain families, said to the Prime Minister: 'These are island barbarians, and yet their dynasty goes back to remote antiquity, whilst their Ministers also inherit office in an unbroken succession. This is simply the ancient way of doing. The T'ang Dynasty's Empire was dismembered, and the Five Dynasties of Liang, Chow, etc., enjoyed even a more limited dominion. It is sad to think how few of our official families can boast of a long hereditary line.'"

Article II. of the Japanese Constitution of 1889 lays it down that "the Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by

Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law." Article II. of this House Law asserts that "the Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by the Imperial eldest son," and Article III. that "when there is no Imperial eldest son, the Imperial eldest grandson shall succeed, and that when there is neither Imperial eldest son nor any male descendant of his, the Imperial son next in age, and so on in every successive case, shall succeed." In connection with this an authoritative commentary on the Constitution informs us that "as to the succession to the Throne there have been plain instructions since the time of the first Imperial Ancestor. In obedience to these instructions the Throne has been transmitted to the sons and grandsons of the Emperors. . . ." As we have taken some slight pains to deal with the exact circumstances of each individual succession to the Throne as set forth in the records, we leave it to the intelligence of the reader to decide how far this contention of the able and learned commentator is in accordance with facts.

Thanks to the provisions of the new Imperial House Law the succession question will henceforth decide itself automatically. In former times it certainly did not do so. In the following chapter the circumstances in connection with the accession of each new sovereign will incidentally be considered somewhat minutely.

CHAPTER VI.

FROM TENCHI TO KWAMMU.

(662 TO 782 A.D.)

THE Reformers of 645 may well have cherished the hope that a strong centralised government would enable Japan to resume the prosecution of her enterprises in the Korean peninsula and to carry them to a successful completion. At the very time of the great Japanese *coup d'état*, another Chinese attack on Koguryu was being foiled by the stubbornness of the warriors of Northern Korea. Shortly after the accession of the T'ang dynasty in 618 all three peninsular States had professed themselves to be the vassals of the Middle Kingdom, which continued for some time to extend its favours, or its indifference, to all three in tolerably equal measure. However, as usual, Silla diplomacy proved too astute for her rivals; and from about 640 Silla influence was in the ascendant at the Court of Hsian. Pakche and Koguryu now began to co-operate in their attacks on Silla; and the Chinese expedition of 644-5 was dispatched partly to relieve Silla, and partly to effect the conquest and the annexation of Koguryu to China. On this occasion the Chinamen received another severe lesson; and although they were minded to make an end of Koguryu, they became very cautious in their dealings with her. During the next few years China kept pressing on the north-western frontier of her daring little neighbour, but with little tangible results beyond making a diversion in favour of Silla, at war with both Pakche and Koguryu. So at last in 659 the T'ang Court adopted the counsel of Silla, and in conjunction with the latter resolved to make an end of Pakche, as a preliminary to attacking Koguryu from the south as well as from the north simultaneously.

A Chinese force of 130,000 men was transported to the Pakche coast in 659, and this, in co-operation with the Silla troops, effected the ruin of Pakche in the following year, 660. The King and four of his sons were captured and sent to China, while the country was divided into five prefectures, controlled

by governors selected from among the conquered people, with a Chinese Viceroy to superintend them. However, a son of the King had been living as a sort of hostage in Japan for a good many years; and when the Pakche patriot Poksin organised a revolt to some good purpose, envoys were dispatched to the Japanese Court to ask that this Prince should be sent over as King and at the same time to implore Japanese aid. The appeal was by no means fruitless; an expedition was equipped, and Saimei, the Empress, then 65 years of age, proceeded to Kyūshū to superintend its dispatch. However, her death at this juncture (661) delayed matters somewhat; but two months later the Korean Prince was dispatched with 5,000 Japanese auxiliaries to support his cause, while liberal supplies of provisions and munition of war were forwarded to the insurgents. As both China and Silla were now fully occupied with their joint attack upon Koguryu, the prospects of the Pakche patriots ought to have been more than fair. But just at this point an intrigue proved fatal to Poksin, who was ignominiously executed; and the death of Poksin rang the knell of the patriot cause. A Japanese expeditionary force of 27,000 men crossed the sea; but it met with premature disaster. A Chinese fleet of 170 sail encountered it at the mouth of the Pèkchon river, and practically annihilated it. And this put an end to all official Japanese attempts upon Korea for 930 years.

A few years later (668) Koguryu fell before the combined Chinese and Silla attack; and the latter State now found itself undisputed mistress of the greater part of the peninsula. A united Korea becomes so strong that from time to time we find her regarded as such a menace by Japan, that the national gods are invoked whenever a Sillan invasion threatens.

One result of the fall of Pakche in 660, and of Koguryu eight years later on, was the influx of considerable bodies of Korean immigrants into Japan. In 665 as many as 400 Pakche plebeians were assigned land and houses in the district of Kanzaki in Ōmi, while in the following year a still more considerable colony of them, 2,000 strong, was settled in "the East country. Without distinction of priests or laymen they were all maintained at Government expense for three years." Three years later still, 700 more were established in Ōmi. And these are only a few of the notices of immigrants we meet with at this time. From a decree of 681 it appears that

these new subjects were exempted from all taxation for a space of ten years; in 681 they were freed from the obligation of rendering forced labour for ten years more. As for the Korean nobles, they were put on the same footing as the Japanese aristocrats; in 671 we hear of official rank being conferred on as many as 70 of them at once. In short, the treatment meted out to the refugees was something more than merely hospitable; it was exceedingly generous.

In the feudal ages and down to the Meiji era we meet with frequent mention of the *Eta*, who formed a very considerable fraction of the pariah class in Japan. The origin of these people is mysterious and has been the subject not only of much curiosity, but of a good deal of lively debate. Some will have it that they were of Korean extraction. In the old records we have met with nothing that lends any support to this supposition. Koreans of gentle birth were invariably treated as gentlefolk in Japan; while their plebeian countrymen, so far from being discriminated against, were accorded immunities and privileges which must have made their condition a subject of envy to the native tillers of the soil and the native craftsman and trader. Their position in the country of their adoption was emphatically an honourable one,—honourable not only to themselves, but to Japan and the Japanese.

Tenchi Tennō, under whom this great influx of refugees took place, was perhaps the ablest man, and was certainly one of the most enlightened sovereigns that ever sat upon the throne of Japan. It was only, then, to be expected that his welcome to these intelligent Koreans should have been as warm as that extended by the Great Elector of Brandenburg to the Huguenots in 1685. Tenchi Tennō, as the Prince Naka no Ōye, had begun his public career with the assassination of Soga no Iruka (645). Subsequent events, however, bore eloquent testimony in support of the plea that the motive that prompted his crime was neither a personal nor an interested one. The Prince really aimed at nothing but the promotion of the public good, and the creation of a strong and just central power that could make itself feared and respected, and perhaps ultimately regarded with sincere affection by a unified and united people. He might very well have assumed the Imperial dignity in 645; but he refused to do so. In 654 it was his undoubted right to do so; but he once more stood aside, and reinstated his mother

on the throne, allowing her to enjoy all the glory and all the splendour of the position, while he contented himself with all the hard and thankless work. After her death in 661, he went on quietly as Prince Imperial for several years, and it was only in 668 that he consented to assume the style of an Emperor of Japan. And even then he continued to live in a house built of trees with the bark on. His premature death in 671, seemingly hastened by the fatigues of unremitting toil, was emphatically an irreparable national loss.

On this occasion there was yet another of those dire and deadly succession disputes. In addition to his Empress, Tenchi had had four consorts, by whom he had eight children, and besides these he had had six others by four of the palace women. Prince Ohotomo, the son of one of these women, seems to have been the ablest of the family, for shortly before his father's death he was appointed Chancellor of the Empire, although then only twenty-two or twenty-three years of age. But it was Tenchi's younger brother, afterwards Temmu Tennō, who had been nominated Prince Imperial. The latter, forty-five years old at the death of Tenchi in 671, had been careful to strengthen his position by marriage. Of his nine wives, four were daughters of Tenchi, and hence also nieces of his own, two were daughters of Kamatari, and yet another a Soga lady. Still, in spite of all this, his position was by no means a sure one; and when summoned to Tenchi's death-bed, he refused to accept the throne, and begged for permission to renounce the world and practise religion. Meanwhile the Ministers of the Right and of the Left and three other great nobles confederated with Prince Ohotomo to support his cause, no matter what might betide; and it was perhaps a knowledge of this that induced the messenger sent to summon Temmu to his brother's sick-bed to counsel him to "think before he spoke." Be that as it might, the future Temmu Tennō deemed it expedient to renounce the succession and the world,—for the time being at all events. On that same day he "collected his private weapons and deposited them every one in the Department" and "put on the priestly garb." Two days later he set out from the Shiga capital for Yoshino, escorted by the Great Ministers. When they bade him good-bye at Uji some one said: "Give a tiger wings and let him go."

A month later Tenchi Tennō died, and his son, Prince Oho-

tomo, became Emperor of Japan (Kōbun Tennō) at the capital of Ōtsu in Ōmi. The "winged tiger," his uncle, however, was merely biding his time; and was evidently in active communication with his partisans in all parts of the Empire. Six months later, on the plea that the Ōmi Court had designs upon his life, he left Yoshino for Owari and raised the standard of revolt. Then followed the most desperate and extensive civil war that Japan had yet seen. For some time it raged with varied but on the whole equal fortunes; but at last the rebel cause proved triumphant and Kōbun Tennō lost his life, while some of his surviving supporters were executed and the others banished. If Prince Itō's theory is correct, Prince Ohotomo, the son of Tenchi Tennō, had a much better title to the throne than Temmu, who was merely a younger brother of Tenchi's. It must not be overlooked that it was this Temmu who organised the historical commission of 681, and that it was under a daughter of his that the *Nihongi* was completed in 720. Hence the *Nihongi's* account of the events of this time must be regarded with a certain amount of suspicion.

"Treason doth never prosper. What's the reason ?

For if it prospers, none dare call it treason."


The *Nihongi*, compiled as it was by Temmu's orders, and completed under what was virtually a Temmu dynasty, naturally enough endeavours to exalt Temmu and the merits of his administration. Yet a careful perusal of the annals of Temmu and a comparison of them with those of his elder brother only serve to intensify our conviction of the extreme seriousness of the loss sustained by the nation in the death of Tenchi Tennō. Between 672 and 686 the Imperial mind was evidently much occupied with the grave question of millinery; even the dress of commoners, the method in which ladies should wear their hair, and their seat on horseback became subjects of legislation. In 681 a sumptuary law was promulgated, which ran to no fewer than 92 articles, and this was only one of many such edicts issued during the reign. Several times the Ministers were summoned to Court and "made to gamble"; and on another occasion they were called upon to solve conundrums! In more important matters there was a great deal of what the Japanese call *Chōrei Bo-kai* (revising in the evening the edict issued in the morning) legislation. For instance, in 683 "the Emperor made a decree, saying:

‘Henceforth copper coins must be used and not silver coins.’” On the very following day it was decreed that the use of the silver coins should not be discontinued!* Temmu’s inconsistent attitude towards the endowments of Buddhist temples has already been referred to.

On the death of this Emperor in 686 there was yet another succession difficulty. He had made six of his sons by different mothers vow eternal concord. But the succession went to none of these, and a month after Temmu’s death one of them, Prince Ohotsu, was “executed” because he aspired to the vacant throne. This was presently occupied by one of Temmu’s widows, who is known in history as the Empress Jitō. On Prince Itō’s theory she had no right to the position whatsoever. She abdicated in 697,—the second authentic instance of the abdication of a Japanese sovereign,—and was succeeded by Mommu Tennō (697–707), her grandson, a boy of fourteen,—the earliest case of a minor on the throne. On his demise in 707, his mother, a sister of Jitō Tennō, and at the same time her daughter-in-law, reigned for eight years (Gemmyō 708–715), and then abdicated in favour of her daughter (Genshō Tennō, 715–723), who in her turn surrendered the throne to her nephew, Shōmu Tennō. The latter, after a reign of 24 years, resigned the Imperial dignity to his unmarried daughter, who, like Tenchi Tennō’s mother, occupied the throne on two occasions. From the year 749 to 758 she appears as the Empress Kōken; from 765 to her death in 769 she is known as the Empress Shōtoku. The interval between 758 and 765 was occupied by the reign of the Emperor Junnin, a grandson of Temmu, and a son of Prince Toneri. At present, thanks to the Imperial House Law, the succession question decides itself automatically, as has been said. Twelve centuries ago this was by no means the case. In 756 the ex-Emperor Shōmu had died, leaving instructions that Michi-no-Oho, a grandson of Temmu Tennō, should be made Prince Imperial. His injunctions were indeed carried out; but in less than a year afterwards, the reigning Empress Kōken stripped him of the title; and when it was urged that the degraded Prince was her father’s nominee she merely replied that she was dissatisfied with him and

* These coins were probably Chinese. Silver had been discovered in Tsushima in 674; but there is no authentic mention of a Japanese mint before 708.

wished to have nothing more to do with him. The Prince now known as the Emperor Junnin was thereupon installed as Heir to the Throne; but when the Empress abdicated in his favour in 758, she kept control of all the most important affairs of State, including the right of punishing culprits and of according amnesty. And after a reign of six years Junnin gave such offence to the ex-Empress that she summarily deposed him, exiled him to the island of Awaji, where he was strangled, and reascended the throne herself as the Empress Shōtoku (765-769). Her death in 769 brought what may be called the Temmu dynasty to a close. In the course of it there had been eight sovereigns, four of whom had been females, four abdications, one re-ascension of the throne, and one minor sovereign. To elucidate matters more minutely we venture to trespass upon the patience of the reader by the insertion of yet another very dry genealogical chart.



On the death of the Empress Shōtoku (769) "the Minister of the Left, Fujiwara no Nagate, and the Minister of the Right, Kibi-no-Mabi, deliberated as to which of the Princes of the Blood should succeed her; but they found none of them capable of the position. Thereupon Fujiwara no Momoka and Fuji-

wara no Yoshitsugu proposed Prince Shirakabe, and he was proclaimed Emperor at the age of 62." He was the son of Prince Shiki, and the grandson of Tenchi Tennō. "In the troubles of 672 Prince Ohotomo (Kōbun Tennō) having been slain, and Temmu having been proclaimed Emperor, the relatives of Tenchi Tennō had been held in small esteem; with the elevation of Kōnin to the throne they regained their former splendour."

It was at this period in her history that Japan had her first great city and her first permanent capital. In 710 Nara* was laid out as a replica of the Chinese capital of Hsian, and with its seven great Buddhist fanes, its Shintō shrines, its palace and other public buildings, soon assumed an appearance of magnificence and splendour. With an interval of two years under Shōmu Tennō it continued to be the seat of the Court for three-quarters of a century,—from 710 to 784; and thus in the history of Japan, and especially in the history of Japanese literature, the eighth century is spoken of as the Nara epoch. It was at the beginning of this epoch that the *Kojiki* was committed to writing (712), and that the *Nihongi* was compiled and published (720), while this century has also given us the oldest Japanese anthology.† It has also given us some of our most valuable material for the history of old Japan in the Code of Taihō, which, however, having been issued in 702, ante-dates the Nara period by eight years. It was the work of a Fujiwara statesman who was the grandfather of the young sovereign (Mommu) he professedly served.

This Code of Taihō was, however, not the earliest body of Japanese law, for we are told that that great worker Tenchi Tennō had compiled a code of law in twenty-two books, which was revised and issued to all the provincial governors in the time of the Empress Jitō (686–697). But the Code of Taihō is the earliest body of Japanese law that has come down to us, although unfortunately it has not come down to us either in a complete or in its strictly original form. How far it incorporated Tenchi's code we are not in a position to say; but what can be asserted with some confidence is that it was

* The old capital lay mainly to the west of the present town of Nara; the great temples retain their original sites.

† See Aston's *Japanese Literature*; and Dr. Florenz's *Geschichte der japanischen Litteratur*.

largely based upon the famous Chinese Code of the Yung-Hwui period (650-5). The old Japanese Penal Code of 702 has been lost, and exists to-day only in scattered quotations in other old documents. The Civil Code has come down to us almost in its entirety, but not in the original edition of 702. What we possess is the edition of 833, which contains the text of 702 interwoven with the official commentaries compiled in 718 and in 833. To disentangle the text from the commentary is now and then a somewhat difficult task, but not an insuperably hopeless one. The Code, even as we possess it, covering as it does almost every branch of public and private law, from the organisation of the central and local government down to such matters as the regulation of markets and funerals and the practice of medicine, is an invaluable treasure to any painstaking historian endowed with a modicum of common-sense, and so, ever mindful of the fact that there is often a wide gap between the enactment and the enforcement of laws.*

* A word about the primary authorities for the history of the period subsequent to 697 A.D. may not be out of place. To begin with we have five official histories:

(1) The *Shokunihongi* (Continuation of the *Nihongi*), in 40 volumes—the first 20 being by Sugano no Mamichi, and the others by Fujiwara no Tsugunawa. It begins with 700 A.D. and brings the record down to 791. It was completed in 797.

(2) *Nihon-Kōki* (Later Annals of Japan), also the work of a Fujiwara (841). As we have it, it is incomplete. It gives the history from 792 to 833.

(3) *Shoku-Nihon-Kōki* (Continuation of the Later Annals of Japan). In 20 volumes, giving the annals from 833 to 850. Published in 859.

(4) *Montoku Jitsuroku* (850-858). Issued in 10 volumes in 878 by Fujiwara no Mototsune, Urabe no Yoshika, and the famous Sugawara no Michizane.

(5) *Sandai-Jitsuroko* (858-887). By Fujiwara no Tokihira and others. In 50 volumes, completed in 901.

In the year-period of *Engi* (901-922) the Emperor Daigo ordered Fujiwara no Tokihira to draw up another Code. Tokihira died in 909, but his work was continued by his younger brother Tadahira, and published in 927 under the title of the *Engi Shiki*. Owing to the centralised form of the government, this Code touches a good many phases of the life of the nation. From it we obtain among other things a fair notion of the extent to which the system of taxation had developed at the date of its compilation. It is, moreover, largely retrospective,—a compilation of existing laws, and so is more valuable for the eighth century than for the actual practice of its own time. Both it and the Code of *Taihō* (702) set forth many provisions that seem to have been more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

In addition to all this we have in the *Riujū-Sandai-Kyaku* the fragments of a classified compilation of Imperial Edicts (six incomplete books out of an original thirty-two), dealing with the periods 810-823, 859-876, and 901-922, a very important repertory of documents. These edicts were originally addressed to the local authorities, with a view to facilitating the operation of the Code, and of correcting official and popular abuses, and being mainly the outcome of petitions or sugges-

Two years before Nara was laid out as a replica of the Chinese capital of Hsian, the Japanese authorities reproduced another important adjunct of Chinese civilisation. In 708 the discovery of copper in the Chichibu range in Musashi made it possible for them to establish a mint and to strike coins of their own. This mint, which was in the province of Ōmi, began by striking both silver and copper pieces; but although there was another issue of silver coins as well as a first issue of gold ones in 760, copper became the current coinage of the realm almost exclusively. At first the ratio between silver and copper was one to four; later on, it was fixed at one to twenty-five, and finally at one to ten. In 712 an edict fixed the price of rice at six *shō* for one cash or *mon*. As a *koku* of rice, which now costs about 15 *yen* or 30s., contains 100 *shō* it could then have been purchased for 16 or 17 of the earliest copper coins, which must thus have had a purchasing value of about one thousand times what they would have at the present day. In this same year, 712, official salaries were partly fixed in terms of the new money; a holder of the eighth rank was to receive one *hiki* of cloth and 20 *mon* per annum. At the same time various grades of official rank were offered to such as had amassed amounts of cash from 5,000 *mon* upwards, while in the following year it was enacted that no official could hope to rise beyond the grade of rank he then held unless he was the possessor of 6,000 *mon*. In contradistinction to this legislation we find the Emperor Kwammu enacting severe penalties against hoarders of the coin of the realm (798)! Between 760 and 958 eleven new coinages were issued by the mints of Ōmi, Harima, Nagato, and Dazaifu. With the exception of that of 765, each new issue was valued at one to ten of the previous denominations, so that the Government, or those interested in the matter, must have made

tions which they incorporate in the text, they throw much light upon the actual conditions of things in the Empire.

Lately we have the *Dai Nihon Kobunsho* (Ancient Documents of Japan), at present being issued by the Imperial Historical Commission. They give much information about the working of the land-allotment and taxation laws; they indicate how the family was constituted and why it was so constituted, how the burden of taxation was adjusted, how the dead-rice loans, the destitute, and the outlaws increased on the one hand, and the untaxable population on the other; and they have much to say about the growing demands of the Central Government on the local authorities, and about the portentous growth of that devouring parasite, the Buddhist Church.

a huge profit out of the transaction, apart from the fact that the coins of the last eight issues were only about half the size of those of the earlier ones.

The establishment of a mint served to add not inconsiderably to the penal legislation of Japan. Within a year of its erection counterfeiters were busily at work. In 709 those who counterfeited silver coin were to be enslaved; and two years later all counterfeiters were to be beheaded, and those accessory to the crime made Government slaves. In the general amnesties of 784, 804, 827, 853, and 864 forgers were specially excepted.

With the year 958 the operations of the Government mint ceased for more than six centuries, no coins being struck by or for the Kyōto authorities until Hideyoshi's time in 1587. The fact seems to have been that by the middle of the tenth century the native supplies of the red metal had become exhausted. This may well sound strange when we are told that it was only on very rare occasions that the needs of the mint absorbed as much as 20 tons of copper per annum, and that for considerable periods it stood totally inactive. It was the Buddhist Church that made it impossible for Japan to maintain her metallic currency. Temple furnishings and utensils, bells, and idols came to absorb more and more of the necessary material for it. The great bell of the Tō-dai-ji at Nara, cast in 732, weighs 49 tons; and although this still continues to be the monster bell of Japan, and one of the monster bells of the world,* it was only the chief of many similar contemporary efforts. Altogether it is probable that in old Japan very much more copper was consumed in the casting of bells than in the minting of coin. And it must be remembered that bells were much less voracious than idols. The Tō-dai-ji bell of 49 tons contained less than one-eleventh the amount of copper that went to the fashioning of the Tō-dai-ji Daibutsu, which weighed something between 550 and 560 tons. Daibutsu and bell together might thus very well have sufficed to have kept the mint going for a full half-century more; and Daibutsu and bell together, although dwarfing all individual rivals by the mas-

* The Tsar Kolokol of Moscow, cast in 1733, weighs about 440,000 lbs., but it is cracked and has never been actually hung or rung. A second Moscow bell weighs 128 tons; the great bell of Peking, cast in 1406, 53 tons. After these comes the Tō-dai-ji bell, cast hundreds of years before any of them.

siveness of their proportions, represented but a mere fraction of the metallic wealth of the Buddhist Church.

Just as the Vatican Laocoön group provided Lessing with a starting-point for one of the most suggestive and luminous criticisms of the principles and limitations of the various fine arts ever written, it has often struck us that an ingenious writer might well contrive to mass a fairly complete account of eighth century Japan around the story of this Nara Daibutsu. For in one way or another it appears to come into contact with almost every phase of the contemporary national activity.

It will be remembered that the nascent fortunes of Buddhism in Japan depended in no small measure upon the efficacy or non-efficacy of the continental cult as a prophylactic against pestilence. Now, five generations afterwards, the first great epidemic of smallpox in Japan afforded it another rare opportunity to add to its prestige, its power, the revenues of its priesthood, and the consideration in which its *religieux* were held. This dire scourge had been introduced into Kyūshū by a fisherman who had returned from the Korean kingdom of Silla. Thence it gradually spread eastwards, and in 735 it began to devastate the aristocratic circles in the capital of Nara. Among the illustrious victims it claimed were the four Fujiwara brothers, all sons of Fujiwara no Fubito (the compiler of the Code of Taihō, and the grandfather and father-in-law of the reigning Emperor), from whom the various houses of Fujiwara stock descend. Every effort was made to check the ravages of the epidemic, and among other devices the propitiation of the gods was not neglected. Offerings were made at most of the temples by the Emperor, and the Buddhist High-priest was called upon to offer prayers in behalf of the sovereign and his people. It was at this conjuncture that Shōmu Tennō bethought himself of constructing a colossal Buddha. However, the native gods had to be reckoned with, and so the famous Gyōgi Bosatsu was sent to the Sun-goddess in Ise to present her with a *shari* (*sarira*), or relic of Buddha, and to ascertain how she would regard the Imperial project. After Gyōgi had passed a week at the foot of a tree close to her gate, her chapel doors flew open, and a loud voice pronounced an oracular sentence which was interpreted in a favourable sense. On the night after Gyōgi's return the Emperor dreamt that

the Sun-goddess appeared to him in her own form, and said, "The Sun is Biroshana (Vairōkana)," and at the same time announced her approval of his plan of erecting a Buddhist temple.

This Gyōgi, it may be remarked, spent the best part of a long life of 80 years (670--749) in promoting new industrial enterprises in Japan. He is generally credited, although quite erroneously, with the introduction of the potter's wheel into the country. What is tolerably certain is that he followed the tradition of Dōsho (the founder of the Hossō sect of Buddhists, of which he was the second patriarch) in building bridges, in scaling mountains, and in opening up the hitherto untrodden wilds of Japan to settlement and civilisation. His also was the idea of reconciling Buddhism and the aboriginal Shintō cult, and of making them lie down together like the lion and the lamb. The operation was to be performed with the strictest regard to the economy of space; and as a matter of fact that Shintō lamb pretty soon found ample accommodation in the interior of the Buddhist lion, for Gyōgi taught that the aboriginal divinities were merely so many Avatars or temporary manifestations of Buddha; and, as the result of this, numerous Shintō shrines presently assumed the appearance of Buddhist fanes, served by a staff of shaven-pated yellow-robed ecclesiastics, who got fat upon their revenues. This was the beginning of that Ryōbu Shintō or Shin-Butsu-Konkō, which continued to flourish down to the year of grace 1868.

But to return to the Nara Daibutsu. The Emperor's project was interrupted by a serious revolt in Kyūshū in 740; but, in 743, he issued an edict ordering the people to contribute funds for the undertaking. Gyōgi on his part scoured the greater part of the Empire collecting contributions. In 744 the Emperor in person directed the construction of the model; but this image, begun at Shigaraki in Ōmi, was never completed. In 747, after the Emperor had gone back to Nara, he began the casting of another image, when he carried earth with his own Imperial hands to help to form the platform. Seven unsuccessful attempts to cast the image were made; and then the services of Kimi-marō, *the grandson of a Korean immigrant*, as superintendent, were enlisted, and the huge idol was at last successfully cast (749). The image, which

represents Lochana Buddha in a sitting posture, is fifty-three feet in height; and we are informed that the metals used in its construction were 500 Japanese pounds of gold, 16,827 pounds of tin, 1,954 pounds of mercury, and 986,180 pounds of copper, in addition to lead. It is safe to assume that with the possible exception of the Byzantine Empire, no country in contemporary Europe could have been capable of such a gigantic effort. The question naturally arises, "How was it done?"

Ordinary-sized images were cast in a single shell. But the Daibutsu was not fashioned in this manner. The artists cast it in a number of segments,—plates ten inches by twelve, and of a thickness of six inches. They built up the walls of the mould as the lower part of the casting cooled at the rate of a foot at a time, there having thus been forty-one independent layers, for the head and the neck, some twelve feet in height, were cast in a single shell. It is not surprising, then, to learn that it was only at the eighth attempt that a full measure of success was achieved.

The 500 Japanese pounds of gold, as well as the mercury, were used for gilding purposes solely. The Emperor was greatly concerned as to how this amount of the precious metal could be procured, when a fortunate discovery set his mind at ease. At the beginning of 749 gold was sent to the capital by the Governor of Mutsu, in whose jurisdiction a mine had been found, and by the third month, as much as 900 ounces had been employed in gilding the great idol. Messengers were sent to all the temples to inform the gods of the lucky find, and the Minister of the Left, Tachibana no Moroye, went in person, and taking his stand before the Buddha specially communicated to him the good news.

In the following month Nara witnessed a strange and startling sight. Attended by the Empress, by his only daughter, and by all the grandees of his Court, Shōmu Tennō proceeded to the Tō-dai-ji,—and there before the Great Buddha, and facing him from the south,—that is, in the position of a subject at an Imperial audience,—the Emperor professed himself to be the humble servant of the Three Precious Things, —Buddha, the Law, and the Priesthood! After such an object-lesson as this, it is but small wonder that Shōmu's subjects should come to consider a breach of the Statute of Mortmain

to be, not a crime, but a highly meritorious and exceedingly pious and profitable act. We have inventories of the belongings of two of the chief metropolitan temples in 747; and it appears that besides immense treasures of various kinds, one of them held no fewer than 46 manors and 5,000 acres of the most fertile land in the Empire, while the other's landed possessions were almost equally extensive. Inasmuch as the monasteries and all their belongings were exempt from the attentions of the revenue officers, and from all national or local burdens, their domains, if only moderately well managed, must have brought them an immense annual return. Furthermore these estates were rapidly expanding. Peasant cultivators overborne with taxation were always eager to hand over their plots to a temple, and to hold them as its tenants. They paid a rent, it is true; but they no longer paid taxes, and the rent was to the taxes as the little finger to the thigh-bone.

The small-pox epidemic of 735-737 had been a rare godsend for the priests. In the latter year, in consequence of this visitation, the Emperor decreed that each of the provinces should erect a large monastery to be called Kokubunji, while shortly afterwards he ordered the construction of a seven-storied pagoda by each local government. Apart from the lucky chance of the outbreak of an epidemic, the ascendancy of the Buddhist priesthood was greatly favoured by the crude state of contemporary medical knowledge,—or, to put it more accurately perhaps, by the dense ignorance of the time. In the eighth century disease was attributed to two great causes,—namely, to evil spirits and to food and drink. Smallpox and intermittent fever and all nervous diseases were the work of the evil spirits of the dead or of demons; and in the treatment of these and of similar maladies exorcism was the supreme remedy. Hence the priest-doctor had abundant scope for the exercise of his craft—in the two-fold sense of the word. Under the Empress Kōken, the daughter and successor of that very pietistic Emperor Shōmu, there were no fewer than one hundred and sixteen of these clerical medicos attached to the Court, and every one of them with plenty to do in the matter of evicting devils and unclean spirits, and of propitiating avenging ghosts unmannerly enough to trouble the repose of the blue-blooded aristocracy of Yamato. To the reader of the twentieth century all this may savour of comedy; but in

old Japan it was really a very serious matter indeed, and the would-be historian who fails to appreciate this phase of the intellectual life of the time will assuredly misinterpret many of the most significant entries in the old chronicles of Japan. It is amusing to find the very highest ecclesiastics now and then figuring as the impotent victims of those evil spirits and avenging *manes* over which they claimed to exercise such a plenary power. What is to be made of the following notice, for example ?

“In 746 the priest Gembō died in Kyūshū. He had formerly been in China, whence he brought to Japan more than 5,000 Buddhist books and many holy images. The Emperor had granted him a purple *kesa*, and had bestowed on him many tokens of respect. Gembō treated everybody with disdain; he had forbidden the laity to imitate the manners and the usages of the monks. He was hated by everybody; and it is said that the spirit of Hirotsugu had killed him as an act of revenge.”

This Gembō was the Northern Patriarch of the Hossō sect.* After a sojourn of nineteen years in China he returned in 736, and soon contrived to make himself a power in the Imperial Court. As it was improper for the sovereign and his consorts to repair to temples frequented by the people, a chapel (Naidōjō) was erected within the precincts of the Palace, and priests were summoned to perform their rites there. Gembō was frequently employed in this office, and took scandalous advantage of his position to debauch the ladies of the Court. Overtures were made by him to the beautiful wife of the young and accomplished Fujiwara Hirotsugu, then acting as Viceroy of Dazaifu. Hirotsugu had petitioned for Gembō's removal before this; and on being informed by his wife of what had happened he mobilised the forces of the Viceroyalty to lend weight to his reiterated demands. An army of some 21,000 men was dispatched to deal with Hirotsugu, and he fell in making head against it. His spirit proved to be a very rough one indeed, working all sorts of mischief; and so a temple was erected to him in Hizen, and due provision made for appeasing his vindictive ghost,† which, as may be inferred from


* Gyōgi was the Southern one.

† The temples to Suguwara Michizane (d. 903) and to the rebel Taira Masakado in the Kwantō (940) were erected for analogous reasons.

the above citation, was popularly believed to have very effectually rid the lieges of Gembō and his sacerdotal arrogance.

Gembō, however, was by no means the most formidable priestly rival that crossed the path of the Fujiwara, at this time laboriously and strenuously engaged, not so much in consolidating as in laying a basis for their power. At this date the great clan, although indeed powerful, had by no means reached that position of omnipotence with which it is erroneously credited in the eighth century, and to which it actually attained in the middle of the ninth. The great Kamatari's son, Fujiwara Fubito (659-720), had been the father-in-law of one sovereign and the grandfather and father-in-law of yet another, and had certainly been influential in the councils of the Empire. But it was not till 708 that he became Minister of the Left, and his elevation to the position of Dajōdaijin or Chancellor was a posthumous one. This great office since its creation in 671 had always been occupied by Princes of the Blood; since Jitō's time (686-697) down to 745 by the sons and a grandson of the Emperor Temmu. The death of Fubito's four sons Muchimarō, Fusasaki, Umakai, and Marō, all then occupying high office, in 737 proved a serious check to the fortunes of the family.* Prince Suzuka, a

* The following table may be found convenient for reference:—



It was with MATATE'S great grandson Yoshifusa (804-872) that the unquestioned domination of the Fujiwaras began.

grandson of Temmu Tennō, then became Chancellor and held the office for eight years. In 738 the famous Tachibana no Moroye was appointed Minister of the Right, and after being promoted Minister of the Left in 743 he wielded all but supreme power down to 756, the year before his death. He was no deadly rival of the Fujiwara, however; in fact, it was to a very intimate and very peculiar blood and marriage relationship with the great rising house that he owed the opportunity for advancement which his sterling capacity as a statesman and administrator enabled him to turn to such good account. Yet withal he owes his niche in the Japanese temple of fame more to his literary than to his political abilities, for it is as the compiler of the oldest anthology, the Manyōshū—that his name is still a familiar household word in the Empire. Moroye's son was a man of promising parts, but his implication in one of those wearisome and ever-recurring succession plots occasioned his ruin in the very year of the death of his father, an event which removed a serious rival from the stage where several of the sons of the four Fujiwara who had died in 737 were now aspiring to the rôle of protagonist.

However, powerful as the Fujiwara were now becoming, they proved no match for an astute and aspiring Buddhist priest during the next decade. When Shōmu Tennō's strong-minded daughter professedly abdicated in 758, her successor the Emperor Junnin lavished favours upon Fujiwara Oshikatsu, to whom he mainly owed his position. But the real power in the land was not the young Emperor, but the ex-Empress Kōken, and Kōken's spiritual adviser and right-hand man was the handsome monk Dōkyō, whom certain English writers have somewhat amusingly dubbed the "Wolsey of Japan!" In 762 Fujiwara Oshikatsu had been promoted to the first grade of the first class of rank. When it is remembered that his was one of the only three instances in the whole course of Japanese history of a subject attaining this supremely exalted position in his lifetime, the importance of this very bald entry in the annals will perhaps be recognised.*

* The other two instances also belong to the eighth century. They were Tachibana no Moroye, 749; and Fujiwara no Nagate, 770. Oshikatsu's father, Muchimarō, one of the four Fujiwara who succumbed to the smallpox in 737, had also been raised to the first grade of the first class; but it was only when *in articulo mortis*.

This very unusual promotion gave great umbrage to Oshikatsu's brother and cousins and other relatives then all eagerly engaged in the scramble for power and place, and what was even more serious, it excited the bitter jealousy of the good-looking, albeit shaven-pated, favourite of the ex-Empress, who presently showed that he was even more adroit at political intrigue than his predecessor, Gembō, had been. Oshikatsu, learning of Dōkyō's manœuvres, secretly possessed himself of the Imperial seal, and issued a commission to raise troops with a view of making a summary end of the meddlesome monk. This step at once roused the ex-Empress to vigorous action; and officers, among them several Fujiwara, were charged with the punishment of Oshikatsu. In the civil war that followed there was a good deal of fierce fighting round the south-east corner of Lake Biwa before the Fujiwara chief was overpowered and executed with thirty or forty of his chief supporters. On the plea that the Emperor (Junnin) had entered into designs with Oshikatsu against her life, the ex-Empress now deposed the sovereign (765) and exiled him to Awaji (where he was shortly afterwards strangled), and emerging from her retirement ascended the throne for a second time (Shōtoku, 765-769).

Dōkyō was now the most powerful subject in the Empire,—head of the Church, spiritual director and chief physician to the Empress, with a controlling voice in the decision of all high questions of State, and feared and courted by every official minded to make his way in the world. The relations between the monk and the sovereign were perhaps even more equivocal than those which subsisted between Mazarin and Anne of Austria; in fact gossip did not refrain from asserting that Shōtoku Tennō was Dōkyō's Imperial mistress in more senses of the term than one. At last in 769 he was taken into the Palace and magnificently lodged there, made Chancellor of the Empire with the style of Dajō-daijin Zenji, and the title of Hō-ō, reserved for Emperors. Incredible as it may sound, the monk was aiming at nothing less than supplanting the line of the Sun-Goddess on the Imperial throne of Japan. It was a century when much could be effected by an adroit use of dreams and omens and portents,—an age when the very air men breathed was heavy with an enervating superstition in which the brood of the brazen-fronted charlatan found the

rarest and richest of opportunities. Dōkyō began by prompting an obsequious hanger-on of his own to assure him that Hachiman, the God of Usa in Buzen, had appeared to him in a dream, and announced to him that the land would enjoy everlasting repose if Dōkyō became Emperor. Twenty years before this, in 749, the Empress had also had a nocturnal visit from Hachiman Daijin, who instructed her to erect a temple to him in the district of Hirakori in Yamato. This fact no doubt bulked largely among the considerations leading Dōkyō to select the oracle of Hachiman as his instrument. The monk at once repeated the story of his confederate, or rather tool, to the Empress, who, however, proved less complaisant than he had expected. She told him that although she held him in the highest estimation, she had no power to make him Emperor, but that she would consult the god, and act according to his decision. She thereupon summoned Wake no Kiyomaro, and after telling him that Hachiman had appeared to her in a dream and ordered her to send him to Usa to consult the divinity about the choice of an Emperor, dispatched him on the mission. Before he set out, Dōkyō saw him privately, told him the Empress was deliberating about his (Dōkyō's) elevation to the throne, and that he (Kiyomaro) should be careful in his report. If Dōkyō became Emperor, Kiyomaro should be entrusted with the administration of the Empire; if he did not bring a proper report,—here there was an aposiopesis, and the monk glared fiercely and laid his hand on his sword-hilt. Kiyomaro saw through the intrigue, and like the fearless and daring man he was, he brought back the response: "In our Empire, since the reign of the celestial spirits, and under their descendants, no one not of their stock has ever been honoured with the Imperial dignity. Thus it was useless for you to come here. Retrace your steps; you have nothing to fear from Dōkyō." Thus baulked in his overweening projects the priest was furious. He had Kiyomaro mutilated and condemned to exile in the remote and inhospitable province of Ōsumi, meaning to have him killed on the way to his place of banishment, as was not unusual at the time. However, Dōkyō's kind intentions proved abortive, and Kiyomaro found a strong friend in Fujiwara Momokawa, "on whom the country of Higo depended." In the following year the Empress died; and Dōkyō's fall was then assured. At

first he took up his abode beside the Empress's tomb; but at the beginning of the new régime he was banished to Shimotsuke, where he became the priest of "the god who presides over remedies" (Abbot of Yakushiji).

This startling episode served to impress the statesmen of Japan with a due sense of the advisability of circumscribing the power and pretensions of the ecclesiastics. All the members of the Temmu dynasty had been far too much under the influence of their ghostly advisers. On the death of the Empress Shōtoku in 770 without children, there were several male descendants of Temmu with good claims to the throne; but they were all set aside, and a grandson of the great Tenchi was invested with the Imperial dignity. This Prince, known as Kōnin Tennō (770-782) was a mild and easy-going old gentleman of the age of sixty-two. He mainly owed his elevation to that Fujiwara Momokawa who had done honour to himself by espousing the cause of the disgraced patriot, Wake no Kiyomaro. Momokawa's rank was a comparatively humble one; but his probity and his force of character made him a man that had to be seriously reckoned with. In short, everything we know about him tends to strengthen the conviction that he was one of the most worthy descendants of the illustrious Kamatari. It is tolerably plain that it was not in the person of the good-natured old man he had contrived to raise to the throne that he expected to find the saviour of the Empire. It was Kōnin's successor that he had his eyes fixed upon. As Kōnin was old, it was all-important that the succession question should be promptly settled. The Empress at once began to plot in favour of her own son; and when the Emperor did not listen to her pleadings she tried to get him poisoned. As a result, mother and son were sent into banishment. Kōnin thereupon expressed the intention of transmitting the throne to his daughter. But Japan had had more than enough to do with female rulers. During the preceding seventy years or so, she had had four of them; and under every one of them there had been a great advance in the authority wielded by the priests. What was wanted upon the throne at this juncture was a man,—and not only a man, but a strong man. Kōnin then expressed the wish to make his second son, Hiyeda, Prince Imperial; and most of the Ministers were inclined to agree with the choice. But Momokawa

objected strongly. When it was urged that the eldest son, Prince Yamabe, was disqualified by reason of the low extraction of his mother, Momokawa hotly contended *that the rank of the mother did not enter into the question at all*; and so vigorously did he press the cause of the elder Prince, that Yamabe was designated as Kōnin's successor.

This Prince Yamabe, then thirty-four years of age, had for long been earning his own living by honest and honourable work. He held a very low rank,—no more than the junior grade of the fifth class. But as Rector of the University (in which institution, as has been said, Buddhism found no footing), he had showed fine ability as an administrator; and even at this date he had the reputation of a Nimrod, for Yamabe set small store by a certain one of the Buddhist commandments when he found himself in a game preserve. As things turned out, Momokawa died at the early age of 48, three years before his nominee came to the throne, for Kōnin Tennō lived longer than was expected. By no one was Momokawa's memory more fondly cherished than by the schoolmaster he had virtually raised to the Imperial dignity. And the schoolmaster Emperor, Kwammu, exerted himself to some purpose to vindicate Momokawa as a man of judgement and a reader of character. Kwammu must be counted among the very few Emperors of Japan who have *proved themselves to be statesmen, and men possessed of a degree of native or acquired ability sufficient to enable an obscure man to raise himself to a position of fame and influence*. Of the one hundred and twenty-three sovereigns of Japan Tenchi Tennō and the Emperor Mutsuhito alone have shown themselves possessed of an equal or superior measure of capacity as rulers.

Before taking leave of the subject of the Sinicisation of Japan, it may be well to advert to a few items of interest for which no place could be conveniently found in the preceding narrative.

And first as regards the names Nippon, Dai Nippon, and Japan. In the *Kojiki* not one of these names appears. In the *Nihongi*, "Nippon" does appear on several occasions before the seventh century A.D., but the use of the term is anachronistic. "Dai Nippon" first occurs in the *Nihongi* under the year 663 in a speech put into the mouth of the King of Pakche. In 671 the word "Il-būn" (Japan) makes its first

appearance in Korean annals, while at the same date the Chinese bestowed the name of Jeupenn (hence "Zipangu" and "Japan") or Source of the Sun upon the Archipelago in the Eastern Ocean. For the way in which this "Jeupenn" became "Nippon" on Japanese lips, see Professor Chamberlain's *Moji no Shirube*, p. 375. Thus the wholesale Sinicisation of old Yamato extended even to the very name of the country.

One thing which greatly exercised the official mind in this age was the correct pronounciation of Chinese. The earlier teachers of the classics had been Korean monks, who had adopted the Go-on, or pronounciation of Wu, an old kingdom in the east and south-east of China. But intercourse with the T'ang Court at Hsian (now Se-gan Fu in Shensi) had led the Japanese to believe that the Kan-on, or Northern pronounciation, should be adopted. So in 735 they brought over a Northern scholar, and the students in the University were ordered to place themselves under his instruction. He presently naturalised, took the Japanese name of Kiyomura, and rose to be President of the University, Head of the Gemba Bureau, and Governor of the province of Awa. This naturalised Chinaman probably owed his official advancement to the influence of his friend Kibi no Mabi, who after a sojourn of nineteen years at the Court of Hsian had returned to Japan in 735, bringing with him the game of *go* (Japanese checkers), the knowledge of the art of embroidery, and the *biwa* or four-stringed lute. To him also is sometimes ascribed the invention of the *Kata-kana* or Japanese syllabary. In 701 the fête in honour of Confucius had been celebrated for the first time, and it had been celebrated in the University yearly at the equinoxes since that date, but it was not till the ceremonies had been settled by Kibi no Mabi's dictation that "the forms and etiquette came to be performed with propriety." His appointment as tutor to the strong-minded lady who afterwards figures as the Empress Kōken and the Empress Shōtoku established his fortunes on a sure foundation. In 752 he again proceeded to Hsian as second Ambassador, and on his return he was appointed Viceroy of Kyūshū, where he worked hard to promote the prosperity of the provinces committed to his trust. Among his other services to Kyūshū was his organisation of the great school of Dazaifu, in which he did not consider it inconsistent

with his dignity to deliver lectures to appreciative classes of students. In 766 he rose to be Minister of the Left; and so became the first of the trio of outsiders who attained to Ministerial rank in old Japan by sheer native ability. In every respect he was a greater man than Sugawara no Michizane. And yet the latter is now a god, with scores if not hundreds of shrines on whose altars young Japan burns incense to him, while to young Japan the memory of Kibi no Mabi is of much less consequence than a *kibidango*.*

In the Middle Kingdom it has been the immemorial wont to reward meritorious services to the State by the grant of posthumous honours, or posthumous promotion in rank. This practice was introduced into Japan in 673, on the occasion of the death of a certain Sakamoto Takara no Omi, who was then advanced a step in consideration of his achievements in the great civil war of the preceding year.

In Marco Polo we meet with frequent mention of the burning of the dead in China, but such a custom is no longer practised there except in the case of priests. In Japan cremation is still practised, although inhumation is much more common. In this country cremation was unknown until 700, when the monk Dōshō left orders for his corpse to be committed to the flames. Two years later the body of the ex-Empress Jitō was cremated, and by the beginning of the ninth century the burning of the dead was a general practice throughout the Empire.

Still one point, but a very important point, remains to be noted. In the Tokugawa age, among the Samurai or two-sworded class the most important of all the virtues was loyalty; hearty, unquestioned, whole-souled devotion to one's feudal superior. But among the commoners who constituted nineteen-twentieths of the population of the Empire the virtue of loyalty was overshadowed by the claims of filial piety. And that, antecedent to the rise of that military class which it had been one of the aims of the Reformers of 645 to prevent, had been the virtue on which most stress had been laid by all classes. In ante-Reform Japan it had not evidently been of such transcendent consequence; at all events, under the year 562 the *Nihongi* tells us that "at this time between father and child, husband and wife, there was no mutual commiseration." Now, between 749 and 758, the Empress

* *Kibidango*,=a dumpling of millet dough.

Kōken ordered each household to provide itself with a copy of the Kōkyō, or Classic of Filial Piety, while every student in the Provincial Schools and the University was bound to master it. Of this Kōkyō (Chinese *Hsiao Ching*), which is assigned partly to Confucius and partly to Tsêng Ts'an, although it probably belongs to a much later date, Professor Giles remarks:—"Considering that filial piety is admittedly the keystone of Chinese civilisation, it is disappointing to find nothing more on the subject than a poor pamphlet of commonplace and ill-strung sentences, which gives the impression of having been written to fill a void." However, it ought not to be forgotten that what is the commonplace and the platitude of to-day may very well have appealed to the imagination and the moral sense of the age in which it was originally propounded with all the staggering force of a brilliant discovery or a divine revelation. "The Master said, 'There are three thousand offences against which the five punishments are directed, and there is not one of them greater than being unfilial.'" Din this into the ears of a child, day by day, from the time it begins to lisp, and think of the result! And forty successive generations of Japanese have been gathered to their fathers since Kibi no Mabi's pupil made the Kōkyō an indispensable item in the limited amount of furnishings possessed by every Japanese household.

CHAPTER VII.

THE EMPEROR KWAMMU.

(782 TO 805 A.D.)

AT the date of his accession in 782 Kwammu Tennō had a son (the future Emperor Heijō, 806-809) six years of age. If succession questions had been then ruled by provisions analogous to those of the present Imperial House Law, that young prince would at once have been recognised as Prince Imperial. But it was not his son, but his own younger brother that the Emperor designated as his successor; and it was only on the death of the latter in 785 that the son's rights were acknowledged. The Emperor's younger brother, enraged at having a cherished project thwarted by one of Kwammu's favourites, instigated the murder of the obstructive courtier, and for this crime his two tools were beheaded, while he himself was condemned to exile in Awaji. As a matter of fact he "died" soon after; and it is an indication of the deep hold superstition then had upon even the most powerful intellects of the time to find how hard put to it the strong-minded Emperor was to appease the wrath of his brother's offended and vindictive spirit. In 805, when seized with the illness that carried him off in the following year, the records tell us that Kwammu, not finding any benefit in the use of various remedies, caused sacrifices to be made, and prayers for his recovery offered up in all the temples. He also ordered the erection of a temple in Awaji to the manes of his younger brother, and the construction of granaries of plenty in all the provinces. At the same time he directed that the annual revenues should be charged with a contribution of fabrics and of provisions as an offering to the soul of his younger brother, which "had done the Emperor great scathe."

However, although in some respects unable to emancipate himself from the thralldom of the superstition of the age, Kwammu was far from being at the beck and call of the Buddhist priests, as his predecessors of the Temmu dynasty had been.

Much more attention was now paid to the old divinities of the land, while as might have been expected from an Emperor who had honourably distinguished himself as a highly efficient Principal of the University, the study of the secular learning of China was greatly encouraged. Nara, the first permanent capital of the Empire, was now threatening to become a sort of Mount Athos. The influence of its seven great monasteries, to say nothing of its convents, had become too strong for the best interests of the Empire; and Kwammu seems to have been determined from the first to remove the administration and its personnel from the dangerous proximity of the ghostly counsellors who tended more and more to become the real rulers of the Empire. The Emperor must have known that an open and declared breach with Buddhism would have been highly injudicious, if not utterly fatal to his rule, inasmuch as the foreign cult was now the professed religion of almost the whole governing class. All that he evidently aimed at was the lessening of the influence of the old Buddhist hierarchy, as it was then constituted. The priests could only remove their magnificent buildings with the greatest difficulties; the Emperor could remove the capital with comparative ease. In course of time monasteries would doubtless spring up in a new seat of government; but by astute management they, especially if reared by entirely new sects, could be utilised as a counterpoise to the proud and wealthy ecclesiastics of Nara.

Accordingly, in 784, Kwammu removed the Court to Nagaoka, a spot at the base of the mountains halfway between Yamasaki and Arashiyama,—a good thirty miles from what had been the capital of the Empire for the preceding three-quarters of a century. Nagaoka lay in Yamashiro, and so a solemn mission had been sent to apprise Kamo-myōjin, the tutelary Shintō deity of the province, of the Emperor's intention to settle in his domain and to invoke his beneficent protection. A few years later the young priest Saichō began to level the summit of Hiyēizan, as the emplacement for a new fane. To the south-west of this height lay a spacious and well-watered plain, some eight or ten miles from Nagaoka, and thither in 793 Kwammu determined to transport the seat of his Court. Everything was done in strict accordance with the requirements of the science of geomancy; the new Temple of Enryaku-ji on Mount Hiyēisan, on the north-east, the quarter whence ill

luck and evil influences came, was to serve as the indispensable outpost to deal with malignant demons. The site was found to be under the protecting influence of the four genii who preside over the cardinal points,—the Azure Dragon on the East, the White Tiger on the West, the Red Bird on the South, and the Dark Warrior on the North. A clay statue eight feet high, with casque and cuirass of iron, and bow and arrows in hand, was erected on a hillock to the east of the city (Shōgun-dzuka) to serve as a special tutelary deity—a Japanese version in clay of the Pallas Athene on the Acropolis. It was believed that when changes in the Empire were impending this image gave timely warning by bursting into song and moving of itself.

The Imperial Citadel, measuring 1,280 yards from north to south and 1,553 from east to west, and pierced by three gateways on each of its four faces, lay in the northern quarter of the nascent city. In the centre of this inner enclosure stood the palace, with the various administrative departments around it, and the assembly and audience halls in front. On the south the enceinte of the Citadel was approached by a spacious avenue 280 feet in width which ran right down the centre of the outer town to the moat and palisade that marked off the urban district from the open country beyond. On the north and south this rudimentary attempt at fortification extended for 5,027 yards; on the east and west sides it was some 800 yards longer. The city within these limits, which was laid out on a plan analogous to that of the modern Philadelphia, was thus more than four times as extensive as the Quaker City was before 1854. The great avenue leading up from the south to the main palace entrance divided the metropolis into two great sections,—an East and a West. Parallel with this ran three wide streets on each side, while the whole breadth of the city was traversed by nine avenues, varying in width from 80 to 170 feet, and intersecting the north and south streets at right angles. In addition to all this there were numerous lanes. In laying out the town, the house unit adopted covered 100 feet by 50. Eight of these units made a row, four rows a block, four blocks a division, and four divisions a district, of which there were nine. Altogether there were 1,216 blocks and 38,912 houses. What the population actually was it is difficult to say, for the Japanese household was then much larger than it is to-day, when it cou-

sists of about five individuals on the average. However, there is reason to believe that in the ninth and tenth centuries Constantinople and Cordova were the only two European cities that exceeded the Japanese capital in the matter of population. In magnificence, however, Kyōto could not aspire to vie with these, for the general aspect it presented must have been sombre in the extreme. The low one-storied flimsy houses, mostly roofed with shingles, opened upon inner courts of miniature gardens which indeed were pleasing to the eye; but the front effect was about as picturesque as that of a prison or a barrack wall. Some of the buildings did indeed boast roofs of slate-coloured tiles, while the glint of the green-glazed tiles of the palace imported from China must have imparted an element of cheerfulness into the prospect when the sun shone. In its architecture even the palace was more remarkable for its chaste simplicity than for its splendour. Such was the city founded by Kwammu in 794,—a city destined to be capital of Japan for the long term of 875 years.

Kwammu, like Tenchi, was, as has been said, a sovereign who not only reigned, but also ruled. He did indeed have his Ministers of the Left and of the Right,—Fujiwaras among them, but he was not slow to remove them when they gave cause for dissatisfaction; and on several occasions one or other of these posts remained without occupants for considerable periods of time, the work of administration being then conducted by subordinate officers under the Emperor's personal supervision. The patriot Wake no Kiyomaro, for example, rendered valuable services as the Head of the Home Department, perhaps the most important, and certainly the hardest worked, of all the Eight Boards at that exceptional time.

It was the Mimbushō (Home Department) that was responsible for the collection of the revenue, and everything connected with this. Now for long the sources of the national income had been drying up. This had been regarded as a serious matter in the time of the Nara administration; but it was under Kwammu that circumstances made it imperative that the actual facts of the situation should be frankly recognised, and that drastic remedies should be found for the long-standing and ever-growing agrarian abuses which menaced the Imperial authority with atrophy and disaster. The removal of the capital, first to Nagaoka and then to Kyōto, involving as it did

extensive building operations, especially in the latter place, proved a severe strain on Kwammu's financial resources; and when the Ainu revolt developed into a great war of several campaigns, demanding the mobilisation and maintenance of large masses of men in an inhospitable region where there was no hope of making the war support itself, the inconveniences of a depleted treasury into which taxation no longer flowed, but only trickled intermittently, made themselves felt so keenly that the Emperor and his able Home Minister were stirred to vigorous action. To meet the ready excuse of the provincial authorities that difficulties of communication made it impossible for them to forward the taxes to the capital, new routes were opened, old roads repaired, bridges built, and ferry-services improved, while the endless and ever-increasing abuses of the horse-post system received at least a temporary check. Strict regulations dealing with the office of provincial governor were enforced. This was nothing very new, for many such regulations,—all to become a dead-letter,—had previously been promulgated from time to time. What was decidedly novel was the attempt to abolish the hereditary tenure of office enjoyed by the district chiefs, or governors. Many of these had succeeded in founding houses that constituted a sort of local aristocracy, which really gave the law to the lieges in the districts where their estates were situated. In virtue of their office these petty magnates held grants of land; in virtue of their office and of their official rank they were exempt from taxation. Under the provincial governor, they had to act as tax-collectors for their districts; and furthermore they had what the provincial governor could not legally exercise,—at first at least,—the cognisance of suits. Thus it was the easiest thing in the world for them to bring judicious pressure to bear upon the non-privileged classes under their jurisdiction. They often did what we have seen the tax-free Buddhist monasteries doing. They induced peasants to surrender their holdings to them. These holdings then became exempt from taxation; but the peasant-cultivator paid a small rent in lieu of his previous Government dues, which with the rapidly decreasing number of taxable polls tended to become more and more onerous. Hence, of course, all the greater eagerness on the part of the tax-paying remnant of the population to place themselves under the sheltering wing of some one or other of the eight-and-twenty privileged "personali-

ties" exempted from all national fiscal burdens,—Buddhist monastery; Nara or Kyōto courtier; Imperial favourite enriched with a special land grant from the sovereign; or, what was a not uncommon haven of refuge, some local magnate exercising the functions of a district governor. A certain district in Bitchū in 660 had had as many as 20,000 adult males liable to conscription and hence to taxation; in 767 the tax-payers in it numbered less than 2,000, and yet the population had not diminished. Supposing the rate of taxation to have remained constant, this would seem to mean either one of two things. Either the national revenues from this district had meanwhile sunk to ten per cent. of what they had originally been, or the 2,000 tax-payers of 767 were contributing as much to the exchequer as the 20,000 of 660 had done. As a matter of fact, it was a compromise between the alternatives; while there had been a woeful shrinkage in the national receipts from this district, the burdens of those who had had to remain steadfast to their obligations as dutiful subjects had vastly increased. *Ab uno disce omnes* has at all times been a sophistical injunction; and to suppose that this Bitchū district was a fair illustrative instance of the state of affairs then prevalent in the 550 or 560 similar districts of old Japan would doubtless be a mistake. But even if we grant that this was an extreme case, it is nevertheless highly instructive, for the fiscal malpractices and maladministration here so luridly disclosed did undoubtedly, although in a minor degree, extend to every one of the sixty-five or sixty-six provinces of the time.

To deal exhaustively with all the various devices adopted to evade the incidence of taxation would require a monograph to itself. But to ensure the possibility of attaining a clear general idea of the situation, the leading features of the case may be briefly recapitulated.

In 645-6 the whole soil of the Empire was supposed to be surrendered to the central government, and by 650 most of this was, theoretically at least, distributed among peasants in approximately equal holdings of a few acres for each household. For this land the peasants paid, not rent, but national and local taxes. Their holdings consisted of land of various denominations, the bulk of it being supposed to be inalienable. But the house-lot as well as various other kinds of land were alienable, and thus there was an opening to change the denomination of

the inalienable portion for such as wished to dispose of their rice-lands to purchasers. Furthermore there was a rule providing for a six-yearly redistribution of the lands of such as had died, or disappeared. But this was enforced, if enforced at all, only at very rare intervals, and only in certain limited portions of the Empire. The peasants were organised in groups of five households; and the group was held collectively responsible for the default of any of its members. In spite of partial or even total remission of taxes in times of famine or great distress, the farmers very soon began to fall into economic difficulties and were compelled to have recourse to loans. Rice advanced by the authorities in spring was to be collected in autumn with 50 per cent. added. But as a matter of fact the debtors frequently got hopelessly in arrear. In connection with these Government loans, too, a gigantic system of fraud grew up; and the administration was time and again outrageously swindled by its own agents, who at the same time contrived to get the cultivators into their own personal power, financially speaking. Private lenders were also ready to make an exorbitant profit out of the peasant's dire necessity. Usury laws were of little avail; they were systematically evaded. By as early a date as 685, Temmu Tennō was constrained to make a clean sweep of all plebeian indebtedness. Although this is the earliest recorded precedent for what became not altogether uncommon under the Ashikaga rulers seven or eight centuries afterwards, the remedy was altogether too desperate a one to be frequently resorted to. Such relief as the measure afforded was merely temporary. Many of the over-burdened cultivators absconded, and became outlaws. We hear of these for the first time in 670, and again in 677 and 679; and in 731 an edict speaks of bands of vagrants, in some cases several thousands strong, roaming about the country and oppressing the lieges. Some of these bodies made their way to the remote confines of the Empire and founded peaceful industrious communities of their own. One such band, a thousand strong, settled in Ōsumi in 755; in 759 another twice as numerous established itself on the northern frontier, while in 753, 761, 762, and 769 similar migrations to that quarter are recorded. But the favourite haven of refuge for the outlawed landless man was the household of some grandee, to which he attached himself either as a servant in the capital, or as a retainer or tenant on a tax-free manor

in the country. In this way the untaxed dependents of the privileged great houses increased in numbers apace. This state of things must not be mistaken for feudalism, however, for the possession of weapons by private individuals had been strictly forbidden in 701; and in 757, when some of the grandees had ventured to defy the law and to arm their people, a fresh prohibitory edict was issued. In 784 Kwammu dealt still more drastically with a recrudescence of this abuse, in the course of his vigorous campaign against all forms of vagabondage and turbulence.

The reclamation of waste land and the extension of cultivation, so far from augmenting the receipts of the treasury, did much to impoverish it. This may very well seem a hard saying; but it is a perfectly accurate assertion. In 723 it was enacted that those who made new irrigation ditches and dams, and opened land to cultivation, should enjoy the use of the latter for three generations, while new lands cultivated near old ditches and dams should be held for life. Twenty years later, new lands of all kinds were declared to be the permanent and irrevocable possession of the first cultivator and his descendants. Those opened by the provincial governor were alone to revert to the Government at the end of his tenure of office. Every case of reclamation had to be sanctioned by the local authorities; and if the grant was left untilled for three years another person might apply for it. Poor peasants would often fail to comply with the conditions, and then neighbouring tax-free proprietors or their agents would claim the right of entering on the partially opened land, and the local officers usually gave way to them. With capital and abundant labour it was easy for the monasteries and grandees and their agents to open up great stretches of country. And these new estates—the *Shōden*, or *Shōyen*—the manors so famous in mediæval Japanese history, came to be all exempt from taxation. These estates in their turn constituted so many bases for encroachment upon the petty holdings of the impoverished and overburdened peasantry in the neighbourhood. In many districts whole villages were absorbed into these ever-growing manors. Thus the number of taxable polls rapidly diminished; while the burdens of those that still clung, or were forced to cling, to their holdings increased enormously. And withal there was a most serious shrinkage in the Government revenue.

However, the stream of provincial wealth, although thus diverted from the Treasury, was not entirely deflected from the capital. Many of the manors and the tax-free estates in the country belonged to the grandees and officers of the Court, and life in the country at this time possessed no charms for the courtier, who when banished by any chance from the luxury and refinement of Nara or Kyōto was wont to present a spectacle no more dignified or edifying than that of Cicero at Thessalonica, or Ovid at Tomi. So long as this state of things and this frame of mind prevailed there was no great reason to dread the rise of a feudal system. Kwammu evidently perceived that the great revenues of his courtiers would prove of material service when it came to rearing a new city worthy of being the capital of a great empire. At the same time he began to look narrowly into the agrarian question, and made an endeavour to check the ever-increasing *latifundia*. Outlaws who had attached themselves to great men were re-subjected to the burdens of the personal tax and of forced labour, and runaways were compelled to return to their holdings. Land without labour to work it was, of course, valueless.

Provincial governors, appointed for a short term of years, and removable at pleasure, were not in themselves dangerous. All that was necessary was to bring them more strictly under control, and to ensure a higher standard of faithfulness and efficiency in the discharge of their duties. The Buddhist priests were a menace indeed; so the law of *mortmain* was revived, and it was enacted that no new temples should be erected without the sanction of the Government. The chief source of danger was the district governor. These officials, of comparatively humble rank, had amassed great properties, and were continually adding acre to acre. Holding office from father to son as they did, they threatened to found families powerful enough to be able to disregard the mandates of the central authorities with impunity. From their wealth neither the treasury nor the capital-derived any advantage whatsoever. As has been said, Kwammu tried to break their power by abolishing their hereditary claim to office; but the attempted reform proved abortive, and the old order of affairs was reverted to under Kwammu's son, Saga Tennō (810-823).

It is not till the reign of Kwammu that we meet with the beginning of a distinct military caste and of that respect for

the profession of arms which are generally supposed to have been immemorial characteristics of Japanese civilisation. As a matter of fact, for the first five generations after the Reform of 645 the civil official had been what he is now in China,—almost everything. During that period there had been one great civil war, one considerable rebellion, and several lesser internal disturbances. But all these contests had been fought out by civilians armed for the occasion, and they had all without exception been of very brief duration. Such over-sea expeditions as there had been (in Tenchi's time) had ended in failure. In Junnin's time (759-764) a Korean expedition of 550 ships, 17,000 sailors, and 40,000 troops was in the course of equipment when that sovereign was deposed; but it came to nothing. In Genshō's reign (715-723) Tanegashima had been conquered and annexed, and the Hayato of Satsuma and Ōsumi had been at least nominally subdued; although as a matter of fact they had to be very tenderly dealt with and humoured and favoured in many ways before they became dutiful subjects.

In 720 the Ainu had made it necessary to call out the militia of nine provinces before Fujihara no Umakai, the civilian commander sent against them, could retrieve the situation. He succeeded in making many prisoners of war, who were distributed in small settlements over the Empire; and he built the fortress of Taga, some 50 miles north of Sendai, and garrisoned it with a force of farmer-soldiers as the extreme outpost of the Empire.* It was nominally the capital of the province of Mutsu, an immense tract of unsubdued and uncivilised country, which could then only by a great stretch of courtesy be characterised as a sphere of influence. Between this and the Sea of Japan lay the so-called province of Dewa, constituted in 712; but over it the Nara authorities exercised no more effective restraint than the State of Virginia did over the Indians on the left bank of the Mississippi in the year 1776. In the Nara times, the whole of the 110,000 odd square miles of the superficies of the Empire was portioned out into some 65 or 66 provinces, and of that the two so-called provinces of Mutsu and Dewa covered almost a fourth part! And these

* It ought to be stated that the Japanese learned the rudiments of the science of fortification from Korean refugees in the reign of Tenchi. See Aston's *Nihongi* for various references to this. The earliest Japanese forts were in Chikuzen, Yamato, Shikoku, and Tsushima.

great provinces were held, and stubbornly and tenaciously held, by an aboriginal race that obstinately refused to submit itself and its fortunes to the civilising influences of the Sinicised Yamato Empire. For centuries these aborigines had maintained a most determined contest against the Southern invader. On the whole they had been losers; but they had generally been able to follow up their worst defeats by desperate and formidable rallies. It was not a case of white man with firearms against Indian with tomahawk and bow and arrows. The weapons of the combatants were practically the same; while as a fighting-man the Ainu hunter was perhaps on the whole superior to the Japanese agriculturist, who constituted the bulk of the national Yamato levies down to Kwammu's times. Where the Ainu fell short was in the material resources necessary for the maintenance of a series of campaigns and in organisation.

In 776 some of the Ainu chieftains on the frontier reopened the strife; and although the Japanese commander sent word to Nara that he had reduced them to obedience, Taga and all its munitions of war and supplies were in their hands by 780. They massacred the Japanese commandant and most of the garrison, and spread terror through the whole of the Kwantō. In 781, 100,000 *koku* of rice were sent as supplies to the levies operating against them, which seem to have obtained some advantages in the course of the campaign of that year. Eight years later, in 789, the Ainu beat the Japanese both on land and sea. In a great engagement they lost only 89 men and killed as many as 3,000 of the Imperial troops. In the following year 400,000 *koku* of rice were forwarded for the use of the army in Ainu-land. A series of campaigns followed in the course of which Saka-no-Uye Tamura Maro rose to fame.

This Tamura Maro is one of the most picturesque figures in old Japanese story. Descended from that Achiki who had brought the Chinese books and the stallion and the mare from Pakche in 404, and who had then settled in Japan as Master of the Imperial Stables, he, in common with an elder brother of his, worthily maintained the traditions of his ancestors. They were both famous for their accomplished horsemanship, and the elder brother held command of the Imperial Guard at the time of his death in 786. Tamura Maro, we are further told, "was a man of a very fine figure. He stood five foot five,

and measured fourteen inches across the chest. He had eyes like a falcon's and a beard of the colour of gold. When he blazed forth in wrath he terrified birds and animals with his look; but when he jested children and women joined in his laughter." In a sense the originator of what was subsequently to develop into that renowned *samurai* class, he provided in his own person a worthy model for the professional warrior on which to fashion himself and his character. In battle a veritable war-god; in peace the gentlest of manly gentlemen, and the simplest and most unassuming of men.

The Kwantō, that is the eight provinces around and between the head of Tōkyō Bay and the Chichibu and Nikkō mountains, had been from the earliest times a great problem to the Yamato authorities. This expanse of 12,000 square miles of exceedingly fertile territory was nominally an integral part of the Empire. But, on account of the difficulties of communication, it really bore pretty much the relation to the Japanese capital that New England, Virginia, and the Carolinas bore to England about the middle of the eighteenth century. Like the American plantations, the Kwantō had problems and interests of its own. Its distance from the capital, its freer and rougher and more vigorous conditions of life, fostered a spirit of independence and self-reliance among its inhabitants that was unknown in the home provinces. It was the Kwantō that had to bear the brunt of the great Ainu raids, and the solitary settler had here often to trust to his own good right hand for protection. Any attempt to enforce the law forbidding the possession of arms by private persons would have been at once injudicious and futile. Hence a military spirit, in the very nature of things, had developed itself. The hereditary district chiefs were the natural leaders of the people; and the district chief, as a rule, was a patriarch with a very numerous household of sturdy sons and grandsons and relatives and dependents. Here was the very finest fighting material in the Empire; and Kwammu had the sagacity to turn it to the national advantage. From each of the eight provinces he raised a battalion of these local gentry, for permanent service against the Ainu. These battalions varied in strength from 500 to 1,000 men each; the whole probably mustered some 6,000 strong. However, this select legion embodied in 782 formed only a fraction of the forces that had to be mobilised before the Ainu were reduced

to even temporary subjection. In 789 a force of 52,800 men consuming 2,000 *koku* of rice per diem found itself effectually blocked at Koromogawa, and utterly unable to advance. As a matter of fact it was not till 802 that Saka-no-Uye no Tamura Maro could report that the war was over and ask to be relieved of his command. One thing that hampered the Japanese commanders seriously was the trade that went on between Japanese subjects and the Ainu. For skins and horses, of which they possessed plenty, the latter found it easy to procure weapons quite as good as those in the hands of the Imperial troops. Where the Ainu excelled was in long-range fighting; when it came to close quarters the Japanese claimed that the advantage lay with them. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the hairy aborigines were able to maintain the contest for twenty years, in the course of which they scored more than one considerable victory.

It had already become apparent that the military, or rather militia, system of old Japan stood in need of reform. The men called up for service in the provincial garrisons were supposed to receive a training without entirely ceasing work as farmers and craftsmen. As a matter of fact the only training they often received was in cutting firewood, running errands, and doing odd jobs for the provincial and district officers. In 792 Kwammu made a clean sweep of the whole system. His father, Kōnin Tennō, had made a tentative effort in the same direction, and had ordered that the so-called garrison troops should be greatly reduced in number, and that during their period of service the men should devote all their time to military duties. But now the *personnel* of the permanent local forces, still further reduced, was to be henceforth recruited from among the able-bodied sons or relatives of the district chiefs. Outside of Mutsu and Dewa, where an army of more than 50,000 men was operating, and of Kyūshū, where a special system was to be inaugurated a score of years afterwards, there were about 500 districts. But in some districts there were extra-chiefs, and as the result of Kwammu's legislation a good many ex-chiefs, and the sons of these were all equally eligible for enrolment in the new model. All told the number of men now enlisted for provincial service was 3,020, of whom 930 were assigned for duty in the eight provinces of the Kwantō. Kaga was not to become a province until 826;

and no mention of Hida or Shima is made in connection with this re-organisation of the military system. The Imperial Guards were not interfered with in Kwammu's time; in 807 and again in 811 they were nominally re-organised, but their ranks continued to be filled from the households of the district chiefs. In Kyūshū, under Saga Tennō (810-824), the Dazaifu command was fixed at 17,000; but it was shortly afterwards reduced to 9,000 men, none of whom, by the way, appear to have been levied from Satsuma, Ōsumi, or Hyūga, the country of the ancient Kumaso, whose unruly descendants it was still the best of policy to treat with the greatest circumspection. In 803 the Nagato garrison was raised from 50 to 500 men in consideration of the important strategic position of that province.

This very limited peace establishment was in a measure to serve the purposes of a police. Fires in the provincial granaries where the produce of the taxes was stored had become exceedingly frequent, and it had become the custom to attribute their outbreak to the anger of the native deities whose cult had been neglected. One strange result of the various edicts forbidding the taking of life,—such as that of 749,—had been to excite a great aversion to inflicting the extreme penalty of the law. Thus conscious of immunity from the most serious consequences of grave crimes, malefactors were increasing in numbers and audacity apace. Kwammu was minded to remedy this condition of affairs. He gave orders for the construction of an "earth-house" (that is, what is now known as a "godown" in the Far East) in each province for the reception of the taxes; and when the governors were found to be slow in erecting these, he abolished the provincial store-houses, and established a granary in each district in which its revenues were to be stored. Henceforth, too, the death penalty was to be inflicted when incurred; and, in the case of arson, immediately, and on the spot, without waiting for the regular process of law. Furthermore, in case of fires in public buildings, all the officials of the district where it occurred and also the provincial officers were to be henceforth held jointly responsible. The chief duty of the 3,020 men of the "New Model" was to guard these district depôts. In this "New Model" and in the eight Kwantō battalions levied for permanent service in Ainu-land we have the germ of the two-sworded privileged class

of feudal Japan. All these men, be it observed, were drawn from the households of the hereditary district chiefs, and these chiefs in their turn were generally the descendants of the country gentry of the pre-Taikwa Yamato.

It is in this reign that we first meet with mention of what was to become the title of the real rulers of Japan for centuries. In the twenty years' war with the Ainu the earlier commanders who had been tried had all been found unequal to the task allotted them. Saka-no-Uye no Tamura Maro (758-811) alone had given incontestable evidence of the possession of undoubted military ability, but down to 796 he had always had to serve in a subordinate capacity. Then he was appointed "Inspector" of Dewa and Governor of Mutsu, and later Great Barbarian-Subduing General (*Sei-i-tai-Shōgun*). Before this there had been hundreds of Shōguns (Generals) in Japan; and a little before there had been an appointment of a "Great East-Subduing General" and a "Great Barbarian-Subduing Commissioner." These all had been commissioned for a definite, limited, temporary purpose by receiving a *settō* ("temporary" or "occasion" sword) before their departure from the capital to assume command of the forces with which they were entrusted. On returning that *settō* to their sovereign their commission and their absolute power over their commands came to an end, and they were pretty much in the position of a retired general officer in the modern British army or an ex-President of the United States. The commission extorted from his sovereign by Tokugawa Iyeyasu and by him transmitted to a line of fourteen successors was something vastly different from this. It was a commission to rule the Empire and to maintain peace within its borders, a commission whose terms empowered the Tokugawa to make the throne of Japan a plaything and its occupants hapless and helpless puppets. However, it is the rule that men reap as they or their ancestors have sown (*Jigo jitoku*); with a succession of sovereigns of the calibre of Tenchi Tennō and the Emperor Kwammu, a Yoritomo, a Hōjō, an Ashikaga, a Tokugawa domination would alike have been unnecessary and—impossible.

During the century and a half that followed the Reform of Taikwa (645) no soldier had found it possible to achieve for himself a leading position at Court and in the councils of the Empire by military merit pure and simple. The few comman-

ders who had attained high rank and office had done so not in consequence of any brilliant exploits in war, but in virtue of their birth and family connections. Saka-no-Uye no Tamura Maro, the descendant of the Korean Achi no Omi, was not only the first to bear the title of Sei-i-tai-Shōgun, but he was also the first of the warrior statesmen of Japan. After his victorious return in 802 he was raised to the junior grade of the third rank, was made Minister of Justice, then Sangi, and shortly after Chūnagon. When civil war threatened in 810 he was entrusted with the supreme military command and advanced to the office of Dainagon. As at that date (and for a good many years before) there was no Chancellor of the Empire, and no Minister of the Left, the Dainagon was the second subject in the Empire.

Before passing on from the reign of Kwammu it may be well to advert briefly to the most serious administrative problems he had to grapple with. In 797 a decree was issued stating that taxes were collected in order to assist the people in times of drought or famine or such calamities. "Cash or cloth cannot be used as food. It is understood that at the present time the officials are receiving cash in payment of taxes, but they should bear in mind the reason for taxation and receive cash no longer." In the following year (798) another decree appeared asserting that the use of coin was to give general convenience to all alike, but that the officials and farmers in the five provinces around Kyōto were hoarding too much money while there was not sufficient in the city. "This is contrary to our intention to confer equal benefit on all, and it is strictly forbidden. All possessed of means must contribute money, and these taxes must be paid in cash. Those guilty of secreting money will receive the punishment of law breakers."

At first blush these edicts may well strike one as being glaringly inconsistent with each other. But they are really nothing of the kind. Kyōto was the one great entrepôt of the Empire, drawing annual supplies of one sort or another from every one of the sixty-five provinces of Japan. Not only were the Government storehouses well furnished with rice and the produce of other taxes, but the nobles and officials who owned large estates in the country were also receiving constant supplies from the provinces. In Kyōto there was likely to be little or no question of dearth. There it was not so much a matter

of the necessaries as of the comforts, and even the luxuries of life. The long list of shops for the sale of some eighty different articles in the two sections of the city is a most valuable document for the economic history of contemporary Japan. In a community which had attained to such a degree of wealth and culture, a mere natural economy was no longer possible, and hence a deficiency of metallic money as a circulating medium was a serious matter indeed.

But outside the capital and the home provinces the case was vastly different. In the provinces, each district,—nay, each village and not infrequently each household,—was dependent on its own resources alone. There was but little commerce; and such trade as there was could be conducted by means of barter without serious inconvenience. What here excited the apprehension of the authorities was something of vastly graver import than a deficiency of the circulating medium,—even in the capital. Droughts, floods, typhoons, locusts, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tidal waves,—all meaning the failure or destruction of crops—and then famine, when the mortality was tremendous, and cases of cannibalism were not unknown. And not infrequently famine was accompanied or followed by devastating plagues and pestilences. The Six National Histories are greatly occupied with the record of such calamities when they condescend to notice anything so very common as the common people who constituted more than ninety-nine per cent. of the population of Japan.

To provide satisfactory solutions for all the varied problems growing out of this condition of affairs proved a harder task than the curbing of the undue influence of the Buddhist priesthood and the subjection of Ainu-land. Hence Kwammu's strenuous road-making and bridge-building, his abolition of the barriers, and his untiring efforts to facilitate inter-communication throughout the Empire. Hence his dams and reservoirs and water-courses and irrigation projects. Hence his solicitude about the safety of the Government storehouses in the provinces, and, later, in the districts. And hence his eagerness to find honest and efficient men to serve as provincial and district officers, and his persistent endeavour to hold them to the faithful and intelligent discharge of their duties.

It was in Kwammu's reign that the due apportionment of the proceeds of the provincial land-tax or rice-tax was finally

settled. The generic name for this tax was *Sozei* or *Kwanto*; and it was distributed under the three heads of *Seizei* (principal tax), *Kuge* (Government Office), and *Zatto* (Miscellaneous Rice). The *Seizei* or principal tax was in its turn distributed into three portions. One of these had to be sent to the capital, another had to be stored permanently in the provincial (or district) granary, while the third could be advanced to needy farmers as a loan.

The third main division of the generic tax, the *Zatto* or "Miscellaneous Rice," was devoted to such purposes as the repair of the Government buildings and post-stations, of embankments, ponds, and ditches, the support of shrines and temples and the provincial school, official pastures, emergency fund, and the support of communities of Ainu prisoners of war (in some provinces). The *Zatto* or "Miscellaneous Rice" portion of the Land-tax was also available for loans to needy farmers.

It was the *Kuge* (Government Office) portion of the tax that proved, if not most important, at all events most troublesome to the secretariat of the Central Government in Kyōto. As a matter of fact its amount sometimes exceeded any one of the other two classes of the *Sozei*, which as a rule were generally equal to each other in value. But sometimes it fell much short of any of the other two divisions. Its purpose was to supply deficiencies, if any, in the other two classes; whatever surplus remained was divided among the Provincial Governor and his staff. It was, in fact, a kind of salary payable according to results. Dr. Asakawa has set forth the situation very lucidly indeed.* "The object of setting this class apart by itself was evidently to guard against negligence and corruption, and to encourage the honesty and industry of the local officers in matters of taxation, for the amount of their private incomes directly depended on their successful collection and honest use of the *So* (Land-tax). The edicts addressed to them continually referred to the *Kuge*, and appealed to their intimate interest in it. Granting the ingenuity of this arrangement, one will not fail to note what a strong incentive to abuses it was liable to prove. So long as the personal share of the officers in the revenue of this class (the *Kuge*) was elastic, so long as they at the same time had charge of all the three classes, and,

* *Early Institutional Life of Japan*, p. 305.

what is more, so long as they were authorised to loan the rice of this class, as well as nearly all of the other classes, it would have been untrue to their human nature not to attempt to appropriate the whole revenue of the *Kuge*, no matter whether there was a deficit or not, by manipulating the accounts of other items, and then to loan it to the people, and collect it and its interest before any other loan." Kwammu Tennō was fully alive to these very natural considerations, and appointed trustworthy officers to visit all the provinces and submit the Governors to a very strict audit of the *Kuge*. But unfortunately for the best interests of the Empire, Kwammu, the *ci-devant* schoolmaster, was one of the very few workaday sovereigns of Japan.

However, even by the time of Kwammu the Land-tax was far from furnishing the whole, or even the major portion, of the national revenue. Here we find another strange analogy between post-Taikwa and post-Tokugawa Japan. During the eleven and a half years between January 1868 and June 1879 the total revenue of the Empire amounted to 535,127,463 *yen*, and of this no less a sum than 405,402,922 *yen* was the product of the Land-tax. In 1905, the gross national annual revenue was returned at 280,000,000 *yen*, and of this amount less than 61,000,000 *yen* was credited to the *impôt foncier*! In other words, previous to 1879 the Land-tax had furnished 75 per cent. of the gross national income; in 1905 it contributed a little over 20 per cent. of the ordinary receipts of the Treasury. In 645 the Chō and Yō (*Corvée*) had not been very irksome. By the tenth century they had become the financial mainstay of the administration. Before Kwammu's time we hear of as many as 20,000, 30,000, and even 60,000 men being employed on *corvée* work in connection with embankments and irrigation works in various provinces. In removing the capital from Nara to Nagaoka no fewer than 314,000 men were held to forced labour for the space of seven months, all of whom had to be maintained by a commuted labour-tax levied on the villages and districts from which they had been drawn. The conveyance of the provincial taxes to the capital was a charge upon the tax-payers, and a very onerous charge it was.

—However in course of time it was the Chō, or tax in textiles, in tools, in metals, in coin, or in any of the various special staples of the provinces that furnished the major portion—as

much as four-ninths—of the revenue paid into the Government warehouses in Kyōto. In connection with this tax a constant and unremitting warfare against short weight, scant measure, and shoddy quality had to be maintained.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE LEARNED EMPERORS.

(806 TO 850 A.D.)

SINCE 645 one Emperor of Japan had been deposed and died in exile, while there had been six cases of abdication. In five of these the sovereign had been a female, and two of these ex-Empresses had reassumed the cares of State and had died in possession of the throne. So far, the only Emperor who had seen fit to retire to the ease of private life had been the ultra-devout and priest-ridden Shōmu, the professed servant of the "Three Sacred Things." Kōnin Tennō had not abdicated in spite of his three-score years and twelve, while Kwammu proved himself to be truly of the breed of those great workers whose fondest aspiration it is to meet their fate in harness at the post of duty. His three sons and successors on the throne were of much less vigorous fibre. All abdicated in turn—Heijō at 35, Saga at 37, and Junna at 47; and in 824 there were two ex-Emperors with their respective Courts. Among the several causes which led not merely to the decline, but to the utter wreck and ruin of the Imperial power and prestige, this tendency to shirk the onerous duties of the throne was surely not one of the least. It was well calculated to provide ambitious and unscrupulous subjects with the best of opportunities for self-aggrandisement. In the first half of the ninth century the evil effects of the practice were perhaps not so very conspicuously apparent. But within a hundred and fifty years thereafter it was impossible for even the dullest capacity to misinterpret the results. In 987, when the sixty-sixth sovereign, Ichijō, was placed on the throne at the age of seven, there were no fewer than three ex-Emperors. Of these Reizei had abdicated at 19, En-yū at 24, and Kwazan at 18. On the very face of it, it at once becomes evident that the sovereign is being used as a puppet; and that the king-maker is at work on a scale and with a dexterity that make the Soga of old Yamato appear in the light of crude and small-souled bunglers.

During the first year or so of the reign of Heijō Tennō (806-809) the nation had some reason to believe that the new sovereign was no unworthy son of his illustrious sire. Doubtless in accordance with the dying instructions of Kwammu, the work of retrenchment and reform was vigorously prosecuted, the two favoured and pampered departments of the Nakatsukasa-Shō and the Kunai-Shō coming in for a large measure of unappreciated attention. But Heijō soon fell under the spell of female society, and abdicated after a short reign of three years. This step was far from pleasing to his Fujiwara favourite, the Lady Kusuri, however; and together with her younger brother, Nakanari, she formed an intrigue to restore the capital to Nara, and Heijō to the throne. The ex-Emperor started for the Eastern country to raise troops, and a civil war seemed imminent. It was on this occasion that Saka-no-Uye no Tamura Maro and his lieutenant Fumiya no Watamaro proved themselves arbiters of the Imperial fortunes. They seized all the strategic positions, and effectually stamped out the incipient revolt. Heijō had to return to Nara and shave his head, Nakanari was put to death, while the Lady Kusuri poisoned herself.

Saga Tennō (810-823), Heijō's uterine brother and Kwammu's favourite son, was undoubtedly a highly accomplished man of brilliant parts. One of the finest scholars of the age, he was counted as one of the famous *Sampitsu* (Three Pens), the others being his relative by marriage Tachibana Hayanari, known at the Chinese Court as the "talented Tachibana," and the monk Kūkai, or Kōbō Daishi. All Kwammu's sons were deeply versed in Chinese literature, did everything to encourage its study, and exerted themselves to complete the Sinicisation of Japan. Unfortunately it was as much the luxury and the magnificence as the culture of the Chinese Court that appealed to them. Chinese dress and etiquette were now introduced into the palace of Kyōto, and the expenses of high life in the Japanese capital increased enormously. Princes and courtiers soon found the strain upon their ordinary and official incomes becoming excessive, and had perforce to cast about for some other means of procuring the additional revenue necessary for keeping afloat in the devouring whirlpool of Court and fashionable society. Most commonly relief was found in obtaining a special grant of tax-free land from the

sovereign. In Saga Tennō's time, thousands of acres of the best land in the home provinces had been alienated and withdrawn from obligation to the national fisc in this way. Under his brother and successor, Junna (824-833), vast areas in Musashi, Shimotsuke, Shimosa, Bizen, and Nagato had been granted away in a similar fashion, while under Saga's son, Nimmyō Tennō (834-850), the abuse became still more notorious. These luxury-loving sovereigns were indeed sowing the wind, and their ill-starred descendants and successors were destined to reap something worse than the whirlwind in consequence. These estates were the notorious Shō-en, or non-taxpaying manors. In the Nara age it was mainly the manors of the Buddhist temples that had been so extensive as to afford any grave cause for apprehension. Kwammu Tennō had taken due steps to render this special national menace innocuous, while he had also taken care to prevent the assignment of such estates to princes, or courtiers, or nobles. Before fifty years had passed since his ashes became cold, his excellent work in this respect had been virtually undone. Junna Tennō (824-833) still further depleted the national treasury by alienating the revenues of three of the most opulent provinces. Princes of the Blood were nominated Governors (*Taishu*) of Kōdzuke, Hitachi, and Kazusa, and the taxes of the finest half of the Kwantō were thenceforward supposed to be deposited in special warehouses in Kyōto, to enable a trio of the numerous Imperial relatives to maintain the dignity of their position in the capital.

All these Emperors,—Saga, Junna, and Nimmyō,—were men of more than average mental capacity; none of them were vicious, and all were workers. Yet it is they who must in no small measure be held responsible for the subsequent decline of the Imperial authority. It would be unjust to hold their Ministers to account for this, since there is nothing to indicate that during this half-century the sovereign was under the ascendancy of any servant. Nay, we find Ministers, Fujiwaras among them, pointing out the need of retrenchment and a stricter handling of the national resources.

The simple fact is that the energies of these three rulers were sadly misdirected. Their unbalanced craze for Chinese fashions, for Chinese manners, and above all for Chinese literature proved utterly detrimental to the best interests of the

throne of Japan. At the Court of Hsian learning was patronised and encouraged as it has rarely been at any Court. There the rewards of the exercise of supreme literary ability were truly munificent. For more than one aspiring plebeian it had opened the path to the highest office in the Empire. In Japan this never had been the case, for except in the case of the priesthood learning and office alike had been strictly confined to a numerically insignificant ring of courtiers and aristocrats. At this time the Japanese sovereigns were paying Hsian the sincerest kind of flattery, and hence the attention devoted to learning in Kyōto presently came to be all-engrossing. All claims to consideration and social distinction were based mainly on the courtier's ability to read Chinese fluently, to write Chinese characters artistically, to turn Chinese stanzas neatly, and to produce what passed for elegant Chinese prose composition in the latitude of Kyōto. Matter, real thought, was of the slightest consequence; what was all-important was what was regarded as refinement, polish, distinction of style. All this in truth was at best but a sterile culture. But for admission to office and advancement in the world it was now an absolutely necessary equipment.

In 757 the University—apart from the departments of music, astrology, and medicine, which each then received 25 acres—was endowed with 75 acres of rice-land. In Kwammu's time (794), yet another 250 acres in Echizen were added; and subsequently still further private and official endowments were contributed. Now in Junna's time (824–833), extra estates, 250 acres in extent, were granted to it.

But the University was soon destined to be eclipsed by certain of the private schools which were established about this time. The Bunshō-in, founded by Sugawara in 823, and placed under the superintendence of Ōye no Otohito and Sugawara no Kiyogimi, soon became filled to overflowing. In 825, Fujiwara no Fuyutsugu erected a special school, as well as a charity-hospital for the benefit of his poorer clansmen. A few years later it received an Imperial endowment; and "a ceremony of annually presenting its graduates for the public service was also introduced." Then there were the Sōgaku-in, founded in 831 by Arihara no Yukihira, a grandson of Heijō Tennō, and the Junna-in, the Palace of the Emperor Junna converted into a school, in 841. Both these institutions were for the educa-

tion of the sons of the less important Imperial relatives. Lastly, in 850, the consort of Saga Tennō erected the Gakkwan-in, "in which young persons of her family—that of Tachibana—might be educated in the Chinese classics and histories." All these institutions, be it observed, were for the official and aristocratic classes exclusively. At this time there was only one single school in the whole of the Empire open to vulgar plebeians—the Sō-gei-shu-chi-in, organised by Kōbō Daishi in connection with the Tōji monastery to the south of the capital.

What was especially needed at this time was a strong and efficient central administration with thoroughly capable and trustworthy agents in the various provincial posts. But during these three reigns there was no Chancellor of the Empire; down to 833, only a single one of the Two Great Ministers of the Left and the Right, while at one time all three great offices had been vacant for two years. For the sovereign to act as his own Prime Minister would have perhaps been highly beneficial if he had been a Kwammu and had construed the duties of his Imperial office as Kwammu had done. But Saga, Junna, and Nimmyō found it more congenial to act as the arbiters of taste and fashion in clothes and exotic *belles-lettres* than to spend laborious days holding provincial and district officers to a strict discharge of their onerous responsibilities. Instead of forming a school of administrators with a stern sense of public duty and a creed of honest work, they reared an ever-pullulating brood of greedy, needy, frivolous dilettanti,—as often as not foully licentious, utterly effeminate, incapable of any worthy achievement, but withal the polished exponents of high breeding and correct "form." Now and then a better man did occasionally emerge; but one just man is impotent to avert the doom of an intellectual Sodom. And the one just man not infrequently appeared in the shape of a portentously learned but hopelessly arid and frigid pedant. And it was from those formed in the great aristocratic schools of Kyōto that the public service was to be recruited. A pretty showing, indeed, these pampered minions and bepowdered poetasters might be expected to make as administrators in the wilds of Echigo or the Kwantō! Even if honestly inclined,—which in the majority of cases he was not,—such an official found himself unfitted by his training to grapple with the stern realities of the situation. One result was that great stretches

of the Empire were soon seething with disorder that occasionally threatened to assume the dimensions of anarchy. As early as 862, the Inland Sea pirates had had the audacity to pillage the Bizen tax-rice on its way to the capital, after killing the officer in charge. In 866, Settsu, Idzumi, Harima, Bizen, Bingo, Aki, Suwō, Nagato, and all the provinces of the Nankaidō were infested by swarms of freebooters, whose outrages were ceaseless. A little later on, and the state of affairs had become as bad in many other sections of the country. Just as the contemporary descents of the Vikings contributed to the growth of the feudal system in France, so this unbridled lawlessness greatly favoured the spread of those manors (*Shō-yen*) which ultimately rung the knell of the Imperial power and the old civilian government of Kyōto. The rampant disorder supplied an additional motive for, and intensified the natural tendency to, commendation. The peaceable cultivator, despairing of adequate protection from the responsible authorities, was only too eager to find a refuge as a thrall on one of those great tax-free estates where the strong man in possession, or his agent, was more or less capable of repelling force by force.

In Prince Ito's *Commentaries on the Constitution* we read: "In the reign of the Emperor Tenchi (662-671 A.D.), the Council of State (*Dajō-kwan*) was first established, and after that, the control over affairs of State was confided to the Chancellor of the Empire (*Dajō-daijin*), to the Minister of the Left (*Sa-daijin*) and to the Minister of the Right (*U-daijin*); while the First Adviser of State (*Dai-nagon*) took part in advising, and the Minister of the Nakatsukasa-*Shō* inspected and affixed his seal to Imperial Rescripts. Under the Council of State were placed the eight departments. Thus the organisation of the Government was nearly complete. In later times, Court favourites took sole charge of the affairs of State, and even such petty officials as *Kurando* gradually came to assume the issuing of Imperial Orders; and important measures of State were also executed on the authority of an ex-Emperor, or the private wishes of the Empress, or of written notes of ladies of the Court. The result was a complete slackening of the reins of power."

It was at this time that the *Kurando* were instituted; but they could not justly be characterised as "petty officials" at that date, nor indeed for several generations. In 810, after

Heijō's attempt to re-possess himself of the throne, Saga Tennō, finding that he could not rely upon the fidelity of many of the superior officials, entrusted the two Commandants of the Imperial Guards,—Fujiwara Fuyutsugu and Kose Notari,—with the duty of drawing up and seeing to the due promulgation of Imperial decrees and of taking cognisance of all suits. In 897, Fujiwara Tokihira was made Bettō of the *Kurando-dokoro*, an appointment which added greatly to the prestige of the Board. At first all the members were nobles of high rank; but later on three members of the fifth rank and four of the sixth rank were added to it; while a staff of sixty or seventy subordinates came to be employed.

The *Kurando* was not the most important administrative innovation of this half-century, however. The hopeless inefficiency of the police and the criminal courts made some serious attempt at reform imperative, and in 839 a special Board,—the *Kebiishi-chō*,—was instituted to meet the urgent needs of the situation. It had full power to arrest, to try, and to punish; and its officials (1 Bettō, 4 Suke, and 4 Tai-i) were provided with the means of making themselves respected by evil-doers. At first, its operations were confined to the capital; presently disturbances in the Kwantō led to the installation of some of its officials there, and in 857 a *Kebiishi-chō* was assigned to every province. Presently it was enacted that the ordinances of the *Kebiishi* should be of equal validity with those issuing from the Imperial Chancery. As the *Kebiishi* was—what the provincial governorship was not—a military office empowered and in a position to supplement the arguments of moral suasion when they proved insufficient with something more convincing, it became a position worth striving for. Contests for the post of *Kebiishi-Bettō* were frequent, and gave rise to more than one civil commotion. The institution of this office gave clear indication that it was coming to be recognised that Japan, and especially provincial Japan, could no longer be ruled by the ink-brush alone. As has often been insisted upon, one of the main objects of the Reformers of 645 had been to prevent the rise of a military class. For two hundred years their efforts had been crowned with success. Now, perforce towards the close of the ninth century, a large measure of authority has to be entrusted to the warrior in mail; and the ultimate rise, if not the

ascendency, of a military class becomes merely a question of time.

It was in this century that the age-long contest with the aborigines was brought to a close. In 812, ten years after Saka-no-Uye no Tamura Maro's triumphant return to the capital, the Ainu had once more risen and resumed their devastating forays. Funiya no Watamaro was dispatched against them in the capacity of *Sei-i-tai Shogun*, and succeeded in stamping out the revolt in a single vigorous campaign. About 855 a civil war broke out among the aborigines; and this so weakened them that when they again rose, in 878, they were comparatively easily dealt with. They then succeeded in burning the Castle of Akita, and in inflicting two subsequent defeats upon the Japanese commander, in one of which he lost 500 men. But when that excellent officer Fujiwara Yasunori was dispatched to deal with them, tranquillity was soon restored. By a rare display of firmness, tact, and magnanimity, Yasunori brought them to reason and subjection without the loss of a single Japanese soldier. And this was the end of the Ainu question; although Ainuland in possession of its new masters continued to be fruitful in vexed problems of its own, the solution of which exercised an important reflex effect upon the fortunes of the Empire at large.

At the conclusion of the campaign of 812, the northern aborigines were for the first time definitely placed upon the same footing as ordinary Japanese subjects. They were assigned *Kōbunden* (Mouth-share land) in their native seats, and organised in *mura*; or parishes, each with a headman, while over all these was a general officer (a Japanese) of tolerably high official rank. Previous to 812 the Ainu prisoners of war had invariably been distributed in communities among the several provinces of the Empire. In the eighth century we meet with instances of such settlements being established in the far-distant Shikoku and Kyūshū; and we have already seen that the provincial budgets now and then bore an appropriation for the support of the "barbarian prisoners of war."

It is with considerable diffidence that I venture to advance the hypothesis that it is in these transplanted and isolated communities of Ainu that we must seek for one, if not the main, source of the *Eta*, who formed a large part of the pariah class of feudal Japan. These "barbarian prisoners of war"

had all been hunters and flesh-eaters; their chief articles of barter with Japanese traders had been, we know, hides and skins and the trophies of the chase. They had none of the Yamato superstitious squeamishness about contact, either vicarious or direct, with the dead; while being almost entirely uninfluenced by Buddhistic ideas, they were equally ready to kill a mad dog or to decapitate a criminal. As has been already remarked, serious crime was then increasing apace in Japan on account of the reluctance to take life and of the difficulty of filling the position of public executioner. The captive Ainu would here be available to render highly necessary, but not very highly esteemed, services. In removing and disposing of the carcasses of oxen and horses and other animals that had died a natural death—as they were usually allowed to do—these strong-stomached savages would also find occupation; their chief or their only reward, perhaps, being the skin of the dead animal. At all events, dealing with skins or leather until after it was tanned was unclean in feudal Japan, and tanning was a monopoly of the *Eta*. So also was all the work in connection with the common execution-grounds.

What seems a fatal objection to this hypothesis admits of a very easy and a very ready answer. It is urged that there was little or nothing of the Ainu physiognomy to be seen in the *Eta* communities of 1898. How far that is really true I cannot pretend to say. But after 812, no more communities of Ainu prisoners of war were settled anywhere outside of the two provinces of Mutsu and Dewa. And Japanese outcasts and famine-stricken peasants now and then driven to cannibalism would be glad to pocket their pride of race, and with their female dependents take refuge in the Ainu communities (which as a rule appear to have been tolerably well off), and intermarry there. If this went on for centuries, it is easy to understand how the physiognomy of the *Eta*, although originally pure Ainu, would gradually approximate to that of the general population around them.

CHAPTER IX.

THE GREAT HOUSE OF FUJIWARA.

THE rise of the Fujiwara to supreme power in Japan was very much slower than it is usually represented to be by foreign writers. It was only in the sixth generation from Kamatari (died 669) that the fortunes of the great clan were placed on a sure and unshakable foundation.

The work of Fubito, Kamatari's heir, had been undone by the death of his four sons in one single year (737). In the next generation there had been no lack of aspiring, ambitious Fujiwaras; but they had to deal with formidable rivals. What proved most fatal to them, however, was internal dissension and mutual jealousy; Ōshikatsu at the plenitude of his power, in 764, owed his overthrow as much to the hostility of his brother and his cousins as to the state-craft of the monk Dōkyō. In the course of the next half-century certain members of the clan did indeed attain high and responsible office; but these were more remarkable for honest untiring work and ungrudging devotion to the best interests of the sovereign and the State than for aspiring personal or family ambition.

Two of Kwammu Tennō's consorts had been Fujiwara ladies; one of these was the mother of the Emperors Heijō and Saga, and the other of Junna Tennō. But Kwammu was not the man to be unduly dominated by any one, whether consort or Minister. His eldest son and successor Heijō, on the contrary, was entirely under the influence of the Lady Fujiwara Kusuri, who prompted him to make his abortive effort to regain the throne in 810. This proved to be a very unfortunate affair for the Fujiwara clan, since its chiefs again found themselves ranged in opposing camps. Nakanari supported his sister; Uchimarō held fast by the new Emperor, Saga. The death of Nakanari was a serious blow to the prospects of the house. Then, Saga's Empress was not a Fujiwara, but a Tachibana,—a lady of strong will and fine intellect. During the reign of her son Nimmyō (833-850), her brother, Ujigimi, was a power in the land.

Meanwhile the Northern branch of the Fujiwaras had been slowly consolidating their position. Uchimarō had been Minister of the Right from 806 till his death in 812; and, after much laborious and meritorious work in subordinate but very responsible positions, his son Fuyutsugu attained the same high office in 821. He died in 826, leaving several sons, of whom the eldest, Yoshifusa, was then 22 years of age. It was with this Yoshifusa that the real power and splendour of the great house of Fujiwara began.

Yoshifusa married a daughter of the Emperor Saga, and he was careful to keep on very intimate and friendly terms with her younger brothers. These four youths occupied a somewhat peculiar position. The support of the innumerable Imperial princes had become a serious strain upon the treasury, and it had long been felt that some device must be adopted to ease it. Saga Tennō accordingly bestowed a family name upon his seventh and subsequent sons, reduced them to the status of subjects, and thus left them free to make their own way in the official world. The name given them was Minamoto; and this was the origin of the clan that was destined to play such an all-important part in the future history of Japan.*

Three of these earliest Minamoto attained Ministerial rank and office, and were at one time or another the colleagues or subordinates of Fujiwara Yoshifusa in the Great Council of State. And very pleasant and accommodating and complaisant colleagues they proved to be in sooth! Without their connivance, if not their overt support, in his devious intrigues of the harem, Yoshifusa could never have soared to supreme power on unruffled wing so smoothly and so easily as he did. Of late the succession to the throne had been regulated in a very peculiar way. Saga Tennō, instead of nominating his own son as Prince Imperial, had abdicated and made way for his half-

* However, it was only one branch of it, and that by no means the most famous one, that was founded by Saga. It was to the Seiwa-Genji that Yoritomo, the Ashikaga, and the Tokugawa Shoguns belonged. Besides these two branches the Uda-Genji and the Murakami-Genji were of consequence. Of these four great lines, the Saga-Genji were civilians; the Seiwa, soldiers; the Uda and the Murakami partly civilians and partly soldiers. Besides these there were many other Minamoto families. The name was bestowed upon five sons of the Emperor Nimmyō (834-850), eight of Montoku (851-858), three of Yōzei (877-884), fourteen of Kōkō (885-887), four of Daigo (898-930), four grandsons of Sanjo (1012-1016), and upon a great number of princesses; but most of these lines became extinct in the course of a few generations.

brother, the Emperor Junna. This sovereign surrendered the throne, not to his own son, but to the son whom Saga had passed over in his (Junna's) favour. Now this son (Nimmyō Tennō) adhered to the same course and designated the Prince Tsunesada, Junna's son, as his own successor. Nimmyō, however, had an unusually large family of his own, and, unfortunately for Prince Tsunesada, some of his sons were the progeny of his two Fujiwara consorts, one of whom was Yoshifusa's sister. The main and deliberate purpose of the Fujiwara had now become to secure the ascendancy of their house. If the Prince Imperial, Tsunesada, became Emperor their rising fortunes seemed likely to meet with a set-back. However, during the first half of Nimmyō's reign of sixteen years two ex-Emperors had to be reckoned with; and Yoshifusa, still in a very subordinate position, was not prepared to risk any trial of strength with them. But when Junna died in 840, and Saga in 842, he began to intrigue. Certain of the Prince Imperial's too devoted adherents, on discovering this,—among them the "talented Tachibana" Hayanari—conceived the project of putting their master on the throne by force,—plainly without his cognisance, much less with his authority. The plot was communicated to the Tachibana ex-Empress, who at once sent for Yoshifusa (then a Chūnagon) and requested him to take proper measures to suppress it. He succeeded in making it appear that the Prince Imperial was implicated in it; the result being that Tsunesada was ousted from the Eastern Palace (the official residence of the Heir-Prince) and Prince Michiyasu, Yoshifusa's nephew, then a lad of fifteen, installed in his stead. This episode served to lift Yoshifusa from Chūnagon to Dainagon; and on the death of Tachibana Ujigimi in 848 he found himself Minister of the Right at the age of 45, his colleague being his very accomplished but somewhat weak-minded bosom friend Minamoto Tsune, eight years his junior.

Two years later (850) the Emperor Nimmyō died, and Yoshifusa's nephew, Prince Michiyasu, ascended the throne as Montoku Tennō (851-858). To still further strengthen his position Yoshifusa married his own daughter Akiko to the young sovereign, who by the way already had a consort and three children. Early in 850 Akiko gave birth to a child in the Fujiwara mansion; and nine months afterwards the baby, known as Prince Korebito, was nominated Prince Imperial.

Subsequently the Emperor wished to revoke this arrangement in favour of his eldest son Prince Koretaka; but the sovereign found himself helpless in the hands of Yoshifusa and of his subservient henchman, Minamoto Nobu. In 857 Yoshifusa was raised to the Chancellorship of the Empire (Dajō-daijin), a position that had not been filled since the fall of Dōkyō in 769. But Yoshifusa was still only on the way to the pinnacle of power and grandeur he was to attain.

When Montoku died, in 858, Seiwa Tennō (Prince Korebito) was only nine years of age, and a long minority afforded his grandfather the best of opportunities to consolidate his power. He at once assumed the Regency, and when the sovereign attained his majority in 866, Yoshifusa was by Imperial decree invested with continued authority and the formal title of Regent (Sesshō). In 871 his revenues were supplemented by the grant of a house-fief of 3,000 families; he was put on a footing of equality with the "Three Palaces" as regards precedence; his office was declared to be for life, and he was assigned a body-guard of between forty and fifty men.

Here we are face to face with a whole complex of innovations. Regents there had indeed been appointed before, but they had always been of the Imperial stock. Shōtoku Taishi had been responsible for the administration of the Empire under the nominal rule of his aunt the Empress Suiko, as Prince Naka-no-Ōye (Tenchi Tennō) had been under his mother Saimei. *But Seiwa was the first male sovereign to reign under any such tutelage. Furthermore he was the first child Emperor of Japan. And it was now for the first time that the great office of Regent was filled not by an august descendant of the Sun-Goddess but by a mere subject.* Furthermore, the precedence assigned to this subject, as well as the term of office and the body-guard, was something of grave constitutional import.

Thus was the basis of Fujiwara greatness and grandeur firmly laid at last. Thus the great clan came virtually to hold the throne of Japan in fee, and to occupy that position of supreme authority for which the Soga had erstwhile plotted and struggled and murdered in vain. Whatever may have been the vices or enormities of Yoshifusa and the long line of descendants that succeeded him in place and power, bloodthirstiness or bloodguiltiness cannot justly be reckoned among them.

The Fujiwaras rarely if ever sought the annihilation of opponents; they usually rested content with their removal. Banishment to some remote quarter of the Empire or immurement behind the gates of some convenient monastery was about the severest penalty they exacted from the very few daring spirits who showed any tendency to cross their path, or to thwart their purposes.

The Fujiwara power was maintained from generation to generation mainly by the unceasing exercise of the device which Yoshifusa had employed so adroitly and so effectively in laying a sure and stable foundation for the fortunes of his house. Fujiwara ladies were imposed as consorts upon successive Emperors or prospective heirs to the Crown; and it was only the progeny of these consorts that could hope to be placed on the throne. And the tenure of the Imperial dignity was precarious at the best, for any sovereign who showed an inclination to rule as well as to reign generally found himself constrained to retire to a monastery and accept the tonsure. The Fujiwara domination remained virtually unquestioned for 209 years—until Go-Sanjō Tennō asserted himself and the rights of the Imperial dignity, in 1069. Between Montoku and Go-Sanjō there were fifteen Emperors, and of these no fewer than seven were minors. And of these fifteen sovereigns as many as eight either abdicated or were compelled to abdicate. During these two centuries the Fujiwara ascendancy was exposed to only one danger,—occasional rivalry between the various branches of the clan as to which should furnish, not so much the Empress or the future Empress, as the mother of the future Emperor. The details of these domestic bickerings are often sordid and mean; and they are as often as not insufferably tiresome. Brief incidental reference to a few of those that led to more or less serious developments is all that can reasonably be attempted here.

Yoshifusa, as has been said, was Seiwa Tennō's grandfather. Shortly after attaining his majority the young sovereign wedded his own aunt, Yoshifusa's younger daughter, and thus became his mother's brother-in-law and his grandfather's son-in-law. As Yoshifusa had no son, he had recourse to adoption, and installed his nephew Mototsune (836-891) as his successor in the chieftainship of the clan. Mototsune was Minister of the Right at the death of his uncle and adoptive father in 872.

For the next four years Seiwa Tennō paid a good deal of attention to the work of administration, and Mototsune's position was not specially pre-eminent. But when Seiwa abdicated and took the tonsure in 876, and his son, then a child of nine, succeeded as Yōzei Tennō (877-884), the new Fujiwara chieftain became the real head of the State. He was at once appointed Regent; and this office as well as that of the Minister of the Right he held for the next three years—down to 880. Then he was advanced to the Chancellorship, and either at the same time or eight years later he was made *Kwampaku*.* This appointment made him the Mayor of the Palace and the real ruler of Japan. After 941, whenever there was a minority, the Fujiwara chieftain was made Regent, and when the sovereign attained his majority he invariably found it to be necessary to appoint the Regent *Kwampaku* if he wished to prolong his own tenure of the seat of the august descendants of the Sun-Goddess.

It is really somewhat difficult for a non-Japanese writer to arrive at any just or definite estimate of Mototsune. That he was a man of commanding force of character cannot be doubted for a moment. It is true that the historian of Mototsune's administration can scarcely be regarded as absolutely impartial, for that historian was Mototsune's own son, Tokihira. On the other hand, we must remember that this Tokihira is one of the most maligned and most unfairly dealt with of the many great men of Japan who have reaped nothing but ingratitude and insult from the small-minded pedants who have presumed to pose as historians. And all because Tokihira felt himself imperiously called upon to lay an ungloved hand upon an arch-pedant who was utterly incompetent to read the signs of the times, and who yet aspired to the administration of the Empire.

The young Emperor Yōzei soon became a very serious and a very troublesome problem. As a child his conduct had given

* Most foreign writers give 882 as the year in which the first *Kwampaku*, or Azukari-Mōsu, was appointed. The authority for 880 is the *Kugyō-Bunin*, pp. 142-3; for 887-8 see Ogino's *Nihon Tsūshi*, pp. 575-82. "It was through the *Kwampaku* that all the proceedings in the affairs of the State were brought to the knowledge of the Emperor. This office was usually combined in the person of either the Chancellor of the Empire, the Minister of the Left, the Minister of the Right, or the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The *Kwampaku* was the highest of the official positions; and consequently, when the Minister of the Left or the Minister of the Right or the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was appointed to this post, he took precedence over even the Chancellor of the Empire."—Prince Ito's *Commentaries on the Constitution*, p. 88.

signs of a cruel and depraved nature, and as he grew to manhood he began to emulate those wanton and disgusting outrages that have made the name of Buretsu infamous—making people climb trees and then bringing them down with his bow as if they were so many sparrows, and punishing onlookers who did not see fit to laugh at the sport; seizing girls in the street, tying them up with lute strings and casting them into ponds; running amok on horseback through the capital and lashing all and sundry with his riding-whip,—such were perhaps the most flagrant of his lunatic enormities, but they by no means exhausted the catalogue of his Imperial Majesty's peculiar amusements. In the circumstances Mototsune might very well be excused for coming to the conclusion that the only possible redeeming feature such a reign could present was that of a dry and prosy sermon,—brevity. Accordingly he took the momentous step of dethroning this budding Japanese Nero. This was the first instance of a practice that later became not uncommon under the Hōjō,—the deposition of the sovereign by a subject.

Kōkō Tennō (885-887), the new sovereign, a son of the Emperor Nimmyō and an aunt of Mototsune, was then fifty-four years of age. He had many children, but none of these were by Fujiwara mothers. On his death-bed in 887, he left the selection of the Crown Prince and his successor on the throne to Mototsune, who forthwith advocated the claims of Kōkō's seventh son, then a young man of twenty-one. This prince had already received a surname and descended to the position of a subject,—a fact that was held to debar the bearer of the name from all claims to the Imperial succession. This constitutional point was disregarded by Mototsune on this occasion, although he had used it as an effectual argument against the pretensions of one of the Minamoto two years before.

For the first three or four years of his reign, Uda Tennō, as the new sovereign was called, remained under the tutelage of the astute and all-powerful *Kwampaku*. On the death of Mototsune in 891 the sovereign's natural advisers would have been the Ministers of the Left and of the Right. But the greatest offices of State were then occupied by two decrepit dotards of seventy years of age, neither of whom had been remarkable for ability or force of character at any time. Between these and the youthful sovereign there was not much sympathy, and so the Emperor went elsewhere for advice. In 893, when a Prince

Imperial was selected and proclaimed, the only one who had been consulted about this very important matter had been Sugawara Michizane, then a *Sangi* or Junior Councillor of State. This brings us to one of the most singular episodes in the history of Japan.

The Sugawara family professed to be of old Izumo origin, deducing its pedigree from Nomi no Sukune, that doughty exponent of *savate*, who is credited with beneficial reforms in the matter of the evil burial customs of the mythical age. The first Sugawara, who received that name in Kōnin's time, had been tutor or lecturer at the Courts of Kōnin and Kwammu, and that post was transmitted to his son and grandson. This last, Sugawara Koreyoshi, was also head of the Bunshō-in founded by his father in 823, as well as Rector of the University. His third son, Michizane, is represented as having been a Shindō,—a god-child,—in plain language, an infant prodigy; and at an early age he had acquired the reputation of being one of the first, if not the very first, scholar in the Empire.

The circumstances of the time were exceptionally favourable for the prospects of the young and brilliant Michizane, for at no time in the history of Japan was scholarship held in such esteem as it was in the ninth century. Thanks to the tradition established by the learned Emperors, Saga, Junna, and Nimmyō, an ability to read Chinese books and to compose in Chinese had become indispensable for any one who aspired to employment and preferment in the public service. Hence the University and the great private schools became thronged with the sons of the privileged and official classes. Candidates for office were many, and positions were comparatively few in number. Hence the annual examination in the Shiki-Bu-Shō* came to be an event of grave importance. We hear of the great Mototsune, in the plenitude of his power, taking a straw mat into the courtyard of his mansion, going down upon it on his knees, and there praying to the gods for the success of the *alumni* of the Kwangaku-in, the college of the Fujiwara clan. This Shiki-Bu-Shō examination was not unlike certain University examinations of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in one respect: in it the composition (Chinese) paper was by far the most important. Now the speciality of the Sugawara and the Ōye

* Ministry of Court Rites and Civil Office.

families was *Kambun*, Chinese literature,—and especially Chinese composition. Thus we can very readily understand that Michizane's reputation as a Shindō, and as the finest scholar in Kyōto, must have stood him in the very best of stead. From an early date his lecture-hall was crowded to overflowing, and being in a position to select his own material, and to make an early end of dullards and blockheads, he proved to be a highly successful "coach." He doubtless knew his books thoroughly and he was reputed to be a great stylist in Chinese. But he had never been in China; and it is not unlikely that if he had been suddenly transferred to Hsian to pursue his avocation there he would have had an uphill battle to fight for some considerable time at least. However, as none of his rivals had been trained abroad, Kyōto was then in a fashion that "country of the blind, where the one-eyed man is King," and Michizane was fully able to hold his own among the competing doctors. Japanese schools and colleges are wont to develop a peculiar kind of politics of their own; and at this time, the various professors and their followings kept assailing each other in speech and writing with a virulence and an acrimony that amounted to a scandal. One or two of the more modest among them, however, held scornfully aloof from all criticism of their fellows, and pursued a course of their own with unruffled serenity. But Michizane was not one of these.

About the age of forty he was made Governor of Sanuki, and on returning to the capital he speedily acquired the confidence of the new Emperor, Uda. In 891, the year of Mototsune's death, he was made Chief of the *Kurando* Bureau, a position of great consequence, inasmuch as it gave him ready access to the Imperial presence. Two years later he was Sangi, Vice-Minister of the Shiki-Bu-Shō, and Tutor to the Prince Imperial, while other minor posts of considerable importance were at the same time entrusted to him. In this year, also, his daughter became one of the Imperial consorts. In 894, after a lapse of 55 years, it was arranged that another embassy should be dispatched to the Chinese Court, and Michizane was appointed head of the mission. But no embassy was ever sent either at that time, or indeed subsequently. Michizane presented a memorial urging the abandonment of official intercourse with the Middle Kingdom. At that time China,

he represented, was in disorder,* and travelling there was unsafe. Such benefits as might accrue from that or future embassies were slight when weighed in the balance against the attendant disadvantages. One possible motive actuating Michizane on this occasion was a reluctance to withdraw himself from the Court where his fortunes now seemed to be so promising. In 897 he became *Gon-Dainagon* (Acting First Councillor of State); and as both the Ministers of the Left and of the Right had died of sheer senility just before, Michizane found himself really, though not in name, one of the first two Ministers of the Empire. His colleague was the young Fujiwara chief, Tokihira, then twenty-seven years of age, who had just been gazetted *Dainagon*. At the same time, Michizane was also *Mimbukyō* (Home Minister) and—General of the Right!—certainly a peculiar appointment. At the same time he was made Chief of the Sugawara clan (*Uji no Kami*). This signified more than may appear at first. At this date only three clans had *Uji no Kami*, or official chiefs,—those of Fujiwara, Minamoto, and Tachibana, that of Tachibana finally passing by marriage into the house of Fujiwara. The comparatively obscure clan of Sugawara was thus to be put on a footing of equality with the three most illustrious houses of Japan. Small wonder, then, that the high-born Fujiwaras and Minamotos should be becoming restive!

In the following year, the Emperor Uda abdicated and took the tonsure. The devout Shōmu Tennō had done likewise a hundred and fifty years before, and Seiwa had done so in 876. Both these sovereigns had then ceased to interest themselves in the national administration. But Uda Tennō's course was different. The first of those Hō-ō or Cloistered ex-Emperors, who now and then came to be the real power behind the throne, he at first showed a strong inclination to interfere in the direction of affairs. In 899 Michizane had become Minister of the Right and Fujiwara Tokihira Minister of the Left. In the following year we find the young sovereign, Daigo Tennō, then fifteen years old, and educated or being educated by Michizane, consulting with his father about combining the two Ministries and putting the whole administration of the Empire into the hands of Michizane. When the subject was broached to

* As a matter of fact the T'ang Dynasty fell thirteen years afterwards, in 907.

Michizane, we are told he firmly declined to listen to the proposition. We also hear of him twice or thrice refusing to accept the various offices by the exercise of which he had risen to his commanding but highly perilous position. But such modesty was merely part of the game; it was in accordance with what the etiquette of the time and of the situation demanded from such as aspired to have their names transmitted to posterity as paragons of propriety. Reference has already been made to the supreme importance of the *Li Ki* or "Book of Rites" in Chinese culture. Nothing was of greater consequence than "good form"; and "good form" demanded the exhibition of a coy modesty in connection with the acceptance of even the most eagerly coveted office. If Michizane had really been serious in his refusals and resignations of offices, there is no reason why he should have been less successful in having them accepted than his contemporary Fujiwara Yasunori, the pacificator of Ainuland, was, whose sole reward remained the consciousness of having done good work in his day and generation.

The extraordinary rise of the *ci-devant* professor and successful "coach" occasioned jealous resentment in at least two different quarters. Michizane had been very ready to promote his former pupils and his own adherents, and this gave serious umbrage to the other civil service "coaches" and the candidates who did not come from the Bunshō-in. Against these envious and disappointed grumblers Michizane could doubtless very easily have held his ground, if he had had to face but these alone. But they were by far the less formidable section of his foes.

At the death of Mototsune in 891, the eldest of his three sons, Tokihira, was a stripling of twenty. One of two great Ministries was indeed occupied by a relative of his, but, as has been said more than once, this Fujiwara Yoshiyo was then little better than a dotard, utterly incapable of doing anything serious, either good or ill. The whole burden of maintaining the power and prestige of the great house must needs fall upon the youthful shoulders of Tokihira. From an early date he gave evidence that he had a fine capacity for hard work. At twenty-two he was a Chūnagon or Second Councillor, and Head of the very responsible Kebiishi office; and five years later, in 897, he was Michizane's colleague as Dainagon, then

the highest office in the State, for in that year there was neither Chancellor nor Great Minister. At this time the relations between Michizane and Tokihira appear to have been perfectly harmonious, and after both of them were invested with the Great Ministries in 899 we meet with nothing to indicate that there was any friction between them. Michizane had seen fit to snub Fujiwara Sugane, a relative of Tokihira's fifteen years older than he; while Minamoto Hikaru, a son of the Emperor Nimmyō, born in the same year as Michizane, had become very discontented at finding himself compelled to yield precedence to the *parvenu* professor. These two elder men had of late been eagerly endeavouring to catch Michizane tripping; and on learning of the discussion between the Emperor and his father about the Ministers they felt that their opportunity had come. They at once represented to Tokihira that he must take vigorous action if he set any store upon the maintenance of his position in the administration.

Just at this moment, Michizane was advanced to the junior division of the second grade of rank. Eighteen days after he found his mansion beset by guards, and an Imperial edict was tendered him ordering him to repair to Dazaifu at once, as Acting Viceroy of Kyūshū; while at the same time twenty-seven members of his family or personal adherents were banished to various provinces.* The ex-Emperor, hearing of this startling turn of affairs, immediately repaired to the Palace, but was refused admission by the Imperial Guards. After loitering in the neighbourhood over night his ex-Imperial Majesty had to retire without accomplishing anything; and this development put an effectual end to the endeavours of the first cloistered Emperor to direct

* The documents in connection with this episode were burned by the Emperor in 923; and so it is hard to arrive at the facts of the case. Accounts which became current later on represent Tokihira as having first vainly endeavoured to get rid of his rival by magic arts, and then having recourse to slander, "his sister's position as Empress giving him great facilities for pouring unnoticed into the Mikado's ear his malicious calumnies." An eclipse of the sun which took place on New Year's day in 901 afforded him a decisive opportunity. Persuading the Mikado that this phenomenon in which the female principle (the moon) obscured the male was the fore-runner of an attempt on Michizane's part to depose him and to place another Prince, his (Michizane's) own son-in-law, on the throne, he procured Michizane's degradation. Both Michizane and Tokihira were advanced in rank on the 7th of the first month; it was not till the 25th that Michizane was banished. It thus took Tokihira nearly a month to utilise his "decisive opportunity."

the policy of the State. Henceforth he retired deeper and deeper into solitude, faithfully practising the Law of Buddha, and died thirty years afterwards at the age of sixty-five.

At Dazaifu Michizane could have found a fine field for the exercise of his abilities. The fortunes of nine great provinces and two considerable islands were still committed to his charge. Kibi no Mabi had done real sterling service here four generations before him, and only a few years before Fujiwara Yasunori, the pacificator of Ainuland, had earned the heartfelt gratitude of the people by his wise and beneficent rule. Even if Michizane felt disinclined to devote attention to the commonplace details of taxation and local government, the re-organisation of the great school of Dazaifu, in which Kibi no Mabi had not scorned to teach while acting as Viceroy, might well have furnished him with a congenial occupation. But the interests of the University of Dazaifu appealed to him no more than did those of the people of Kyūshū. He shut himself up in the Government House, and spent most of his time in vain repining and the composition of piteous little poems which he forwarded to Kyōto in the expectation that they would effect his recall to the splendour and magnificence of the capital. In this he showed no foolishness, but rather a great deal of astuteness, for in those times a graceful poem was the most potent of arguments.* However, the device in this case proved ineffectual, and Michizane was left to die in what an American historian somewhat humorously calls "the horrors of poverty and exile" (903).

Now follows the strangest part of the story. In 908 Fujiwara Sugane died at the age of fifty-two, in 909 Tokihira died at thirty-eight, while in 913 Minamoto Hikaru was gathered to his fathers at the not unripe age of sixty-eight. Michizane had died at fifty-eight; yet in what was called the premature death of his foes the superstition of the time saw the intervention of a retributive and avenging Providence! Then during the next twenty years there were several terrible droughts varied by devastating floods, while there were fires in the capital and other minor calamities. In 923 the young Prince Imperial died; and his premature death was ascribed to the curse of Michizane's angry ghost. The Emperor repented bitterly of his conduct in sanctioning the decree of banishment in 901,

* See Brinkley's *Japan*, vol. I., p. 188-9.

burnt all the documents in connection with the case,—to the great inconvenience of subsequent historians,—and restored Michizane (posthumously) to his former position.* But this was not enough; in the popular imagination the outraged spirit still continued to scourge the Court and the nation. Subsequently (947) the temple of Kitano was reared in his honour and added to the official list of the twenty-two great shrines of the Empire, and Michizane was presently promoted to the highest grade of rank and to the Chancellorship.†

Much of the sympathy lavished on Michizane by foreign writers is excited by the tradition that he was a reformer who was bent on breaking the power of the Fujiwaras in the best interests of the sovereign and of the State. But he was in no sense a reformer; if the Fujiwaras had then gone to the wall the only administrative change that would have taken place would have been in the *personnel* of the executive. There is nothing to indicate that Michizane had any real grip upon the essentials of the great problem of the time,—the economic and local administrative evils that were rapidly sapping the foundations of the Imperial power, eating into the vitals of the State, and reducing it to anarchy from which it could only be rescued by the rise of the feudal system and that privileged military class it had been one of the main objects of the Reformers of 645 to prevent. Here Michizane appears to sad disadvantage

* "In the 5th month of 863 sacrifices were offered in the palace to the angry spirits of Sōra-no-taishi (Kwammu's brother), who died in 785, of Prince Iyo, who died in 807, of the Lady Fujiwara, who died in 807, of Tachibana Hayanari, who died in 843, and of Fumuya no Miyata-maro, who died in 843. This solemn fête was called Goryōye. For several years the country had been scourged by a contagious disease, which carried off many people in spring. These disasters were attributed to the influence of these angry spirits; so sacrifices were offered to appease them."

This extract furnishes further evidence of the deep hold the "offended ghost" superstition had upon the mind of the time. An adroit use of this in connection with the natural calamities and other portents of Daigo's reign would readily enable Michizane's friends and pupils to rehabilitate the memory of the fallen statesman. One incident they turned to specially good account. "On the 26th of the 8th month of 930, a black cloud coming from the direction of Mount Atago advanced, accompanied by terrible peals of thunder. A thunderbolt fell on the palace, and killed the Dainagon Fujiwara no Kiyotsura, and many junior officers. The Emperor took refuge in the Shūhōsha. The disaster was attributed to the wrath of Michizane's spirit."

The prevalence of this superstition may partly serve to account for the extreme reluctance of the Fujiwara statesmen to proceed to the last extremity against the rivals who presumed to cross their path.

† See Aston's *Shintō, The Way of the Gods*, pp. 179-183, 369.

alongside of Miyoshi Kiyotsura, while his record as head of a provincial executive is a barren one when compared with that of his elder contemporary Fujiwara Yasunori, who preceded him in the Governorship of Sanuki and the Viceroyalty of Kyūshū.

“Après cela (the banishment of Michizane) Tokihira gouverna seul à sa fantaisie,” writes a distinguished French author. If this means that Tokihira abused his power and position it is certainly unjust. Minamoto Hikaru, who succeeded Michizane as Minister of the Right, was influential down to his death in 913, and the Emperor himself was far from being the mere cypher in the administration of the State that the sovereign presently became. It is not difficult to account for the evil odour into which Tokihira fell with certain of his contemporaries. He was a reformer; and not merely a reformer, but a vigorous one who did not hesitate to grapple with abuses merely because they were profitable to those high in place and power. Before the removal of Michizane we find Tokihira dealing very drastically with corrupt practices among the officials and checking the arrogance and curbing the pretensions of the Imperial Guards, especially of the time-expired men who had returned to their native places and were there carrying things with a high hand. By this time it had become common for rich farmers in the country to bribe the officers to enrol them for nominal service in the Guards; as soldiers they were exempt from the *corvée*. In Harima in 900, more than half of the peasants had adopted this course; while similar complaints came in from Tamba and several other provinces. Later on, Tokihira made a sweeping attack upon the manor system, sparing neither princes nor Ministers nor courtiers nor monasteries nor shrines who were infringing the law. Peasants convicted of selling or conveying their lands to the owners of manors were to be flogged and the lands confiscated, while the erection of new manors was strictly forbidden. It is easy to understand that such a measure must have occasioned grievous discontent among the needy, greedy crowd of courtiers eagerly vieing with each other as to who should make the greatest display in the profusion of the luxury-ridden capital. Then under Tokihira it also seemed as though sumptuary laws, hitherto more honoured in the breach than in the observance, were to be rigidly enforced. After arranging the matter with

the Emperor privately beforehand, Tokihira appeared in full Court in a costume that set the regulations at defiance; and in full Court he received a stinging Imperial rebuke and was ordered to retire at once, and thenceforth to set a better example. Tokihira shut himself up in his mansion for about a month; and the example he thus made of himself produced a very excellent effect—for a time.

He was the editor of the *Sandai Jitsuroku*, the last and the longest of the Six National Histories; and it was he who began the compilation of the *Engi-Shiki*, that storehouse of documents so invaluable for the history of mediæval Japan. Tokihira died at the age of thirty-eight, having achieved no small amount of strenuous work in the comparatively short span of his life. Five years after, in 914, his younger brother Tadahira became Minister of the Right, and it is from Tadahira that the long line of Fujiwara Regents descends. Under his chieftainship the Fujiwara clan attained to a seemingly still greater measure of power than it had wielded in the days of Yoshifusa and Mototsune. In the year of his death (949), Tadahira was himself Kwampaku and Chancellor, his eldest son, Saneyori, Minister of the Left, and his second son, Morosuke, Minister of the Right, all the great offices of the State being thus for the first time monopolised by a single family. And yet, withal, Tadahira was neither a statesman nor a man of any very great ability; in every way he was vastly inferior to his much-maligned elder brother, Tokihira. The first sixteen years of his Ministry fell under Daigo Tennō, who during his unusually long reign of two and thirty years (898–930) kept a tolerably firm grip upon the administration. On his death, his eleventh son, a boy of eight, and Tadahira's nephew, ascended the throne (Shujaku Tennō, 931–946), and then the Fujiwara chieftain had full scope to display the depth of his incompetency.

Brigandage and piracy had been drastically dealt with in Tokihira's time, and allowance being made for the disturbing effects of a succession of droughts, famines, inundations, and similar natural calamities, order had been fairly well maintained under Daigo (898–930). Now, under the boy sovereign and the Kwampaku, robbery and outrage once more became rife. Tadahira paid but little attention to this; what excited his apprehensions was a series of absurd palace omens and portents, on which the diviners placed equally absurd inter-

pretations. According to them there was to be armed rebellion in the South-West,—a truly Delphic response inasmuch as the pirates had already made the Inland Sea impassable. Orders were at once dispatched to the Sanyōdō, to Shikoku, and to Kyūshū to levy troops, while offerings were sent to all the shrines in these quarters and prayers offered up for the prompt suppression of the disturbers of the public peace. But for these precious palace portents and omens Tadahira would have as surely left the South-West alone to settle things in its own way as he presently allowed the Kwantō to take care of itself when it was ablaze with palpable, open, grossly defiant rebellion.

The pirates of 934 were speedily brought to reason; but that was only the beginning of a farce that soon bade fair to assume the complexion of a national disaster. Fujiwara Sumitomo had been sent down from Kyōto to assist the Governor of Iyo to deal with the sea-rovers. This Sumitomo, instead of returning to the capital on the expiry of his commission, settled in the island of Hiburi in the Bungo Channel, and there established himself as a pirate chief (936)! By the year 938, when Tadahira was treating the young sovereign to a great exhibition of cock-fighting, Sumitomo had as many as 1,500 craft under his flag, and had practically made himself master of the Inland Sea, from the Straits of Shimonoseki on to the Island of Awaji. Down to 939, all the punishment that had been inflicted by the Court (by which, of course, Tadahira is meant) on Sumitomo had been to send him a letter of warning and to raise him one grade in official rank! Thus encouraged by the great Kwampaku, Sumitomo next year burnt the mint in the province of Suwō, the Government House in Tosa, and drove the Governor of Sanuki to take refuge in Awaji, while the Sanyōdo provinces were almost entirely at his mercy. At last, in 940, the Kyōto authorities appointed Ono Yoshifuru as Tsuibushi (Arresting-officer) to deal with the situation. The defection of one of his lieutenants who betrayed the secrets of the banditti and the weak spots in their defences led to the fall of Sumitomo. Driven from the Inland Sea he established himself in Hakata, and with plenty of support from Kyūshū made a determined stand there. It was only after a most desperate engagement that his fleet was either burned, or captured, or

dispersed, and Hakata taken by the Imperial troops. Sumitomo escaped to Iyo, but was there killed by the commandant Tachibana Tōyasu (941), who at once sent his head to be exposed on the pillory in the capital.

That the Kyōto authorities should have lost all command over the Inland Sea for a space of five years was a pretty sure indication that the machinery of the centralised monarchy established by the Reformers of 645 was beginning to break down. And this episode was far from being the most serious or the most significant sign of the times. "In Heaven there are not two suns; in a State there cannot be two sovereigns." This Chinese maxim propounded by Shōtoku Taishi in 604 was now after the lapse of three centuries boldly, openly, and categorically challenged.

It was from the Kwantō that the challenge came. As already pointed out, the conditions here were vastly different from what they were in the rest of the Empire. On account of its proximity to Ainuland and its exposure to Ainu forays, it was at once unreasonable and impossible to enforce the law against the possession of arms by private individuals in this wild country. Kwammu's famous Bandō Brigade had been dissolved; but its tradition remained. Land was at once plentiful and fertile; it was not necessary to sacrifice the whole of one's leisure in order to solve the problem of subsistence. Many of the richer farmers could handle a sword as easily as they could a mattock, and differences were now and then wont to be settled by a more primitive method than an appeal to the wisdom of the official representatives of law and order.

In 820, as already stated, the revenues of three provinces in this region,—those of Hitachi, Kōdzuke, and Kazusa,—were assigned for the support of as many Princes of the Blood who, while bearing the name of *Taishu* of one or other of them, remained in Kyōto, the actual work of administration being entrusted to a Deputy or Vice-Governor (*Suké*). The earliest *Taishu* of Hitachi was Prince Katsurabara (776–853), a younger son of the Emperor Kwammu. Of Katsurabara's two sons, the elder had received the surname of Taira and been reduced to the rank of a subject in 824. The issue of this first Taira did not become specially famous; it was from his nephew Takamochi, who assumed the surname in 889, that the main

branch of the great warlike clan descended. At an early period Takamochi's five sons settled in the Eight Eastern Provinces, where some of them rose to the chief posts in the local administration, while all of them set vigorously to work to erect manors, amass landed property, and attract adherents. At Court their official rank was low; but their blue blood gave them vast prestige among the Eastern Boors, as the Kwantō people were called by the courtiers of Kyōto—a prestige which was not a little enhanced by their proficiency in those manly sports and military exercises in which the local gentry delighted.

The Taira were far from sundering all connection with the capital, however. Their sons were regularly sent up to Court to serve as officers in the Guards, or in the households of the Fujiwara chiefs. Of the twelve grandsons of Takamochi there were several in the capital about the year 930. One of these, Masakado, had attached himself to the Regent Tadahira, in the expectation that by this means he could raise himself to the much-coveted post of *Kebiishi*. Tadahira did not encourage him in this ambition, however; and so with a cherished grudge Masakado retired to the Kwantō. There he presently became involved in matrimonial and succession disputes with one of his uncles and other relatives, the result being that in 935 he mustered a band of adherents, attacked and killed his uncle Kunika, then Vice-Governor of Hitachi, and slaughtered several scions of the family that afterward's became the Seiwa-Genji. This brought Kunika's son, Sadamori, from Kyōto to avenge his father's death; but Masakado proved more than a match for the forces of Sadamori and his uncle Yoshikane, Governor of Shimōsa. Formal complaint was now made to the central authorities. They indeed summoned Masakado to appear and answer to the charges; but he was adjudged to have done nothing wrong. Now, this was a very serious matter indeed, for here the Kyōto Government by implication sanctioned the right of private war, and in so doing showed itself prepared to abdicate one of its chief functions,—that of administering justice and maintaining public order.

On returning to the Kwantō in 937, Masakado promptly re-opened hostilities with his uncle and his cousin. Both parties officially appealed to the Governors of the neighbouring

provinces for aid to crush the "rebels"; but the latter did not see fit to take any part in the quarrel. Presently, however, others got implicated in this family feud. The Vice-Governor of Musashi (who later on, in 961, became the first of the Seiwa-Genji) was at variance with his official superior, Prince Okiyo; and in this Masakado saw his opportunity. He entered Musashi at the head of his troops, formed a junction with Okiyo, and made Minamoto Tsunemoto take to flight. The latter hurried up to the capital, then in a great ferment on account of the omens and portents which were exercising the wits of the diviners, and reported that the East was in rebellion. A high-born courtier was at once dispatched to investigate matters on the spot; but he also came to the conclusion that there was nothing blameworthy in Masakado's conduct.

Just at this time Yoshikane, who had been previously hunted from Shimosa, died (939); and Masakado, now virtually master of that province, found adventurers flocking from all sides to take service under him. Meantime, in the neighbouring province of Hitachi, a local official, Fujiwara Gemmyō by name, on being called to account by the Governor for long-continued malversation, appropriated the taxes of two districts and fled over the border line into Shimōsa. The Governor called upon Masakado to arrest him; but instead of so doing Masakado took him under his protection and at the head of a thousand troops advanced into Hitachi to restore him to his position. The Governor was defeated and taken prisoner; the public offices were burned, and the official seals carried off. This outrage was so flagrant that it was recognised that even the Kyōto authorities could be hoodwinked no longer; and Okiyo pointed out to Masakado that the punishment for seizing the whole of the Kwantō would be no greater than that for seizing a single one of its eight provinces. The argument went home, and Masakado promptly made himself master of Shimotsuke and Kōdzuke. Then, just at that moment, an unknown man appeared from whence no one knew and went about shouting, "I am the messenger of Hachiman Bosatsu, who bestows the Imperial dignity upon his descendant, Taira Masakado." Masakado, to the great joy of his following, at once assumed the style of the New Sovereign and sent off a dispatch to the Regent Tadahira informing him of the fact, and commanding him to bow to the inevitable,

Tadahira, who had painted a cuckoo on his fan, and imitated the cry of the bird whenever he opened it, no doubt fanned himself languorously as he perused the missive. Then, we are told, he broke out into a soft well-bred laugh of derision at the ridiculous absurdity of the whole affair. It sometimes took a newly-appointed Kwantō Governor, travelling post-haste, a matter of sixty days to arrive in his jurisdiction; and with communications in that state what could this lunatic Masakado hope to achieve against the sacrosanct capital or the home provinces! And to Tadahira's limited intelligence that was the only part of the Empire that was of any material consequence. So at first the New Emperor Masakado was allowed to organise his Court and his administration without any interference from Kyōto. As a matter of fact he very quickly overran the Eight Provinces, reduced them to subjection, and placed kinsmen or adherents of his own as governors over them. Furthermore he established a capital of his own, a Court of his own, and a central administration of his own, with its Ministers of the Left and of the Right, and its Heads of Bureaux, the only important official lacking being a Court Astronomer to compile the almanac and regulate the calendar.

This all now looks like so much *opera bouffe*; for Masakado was really a sort of Japanese moss-trooper who had all unthinkingly blundered into open rebellion and a mushroom sovereignty of his own. There is a good deal of truth in Cromwell's saying that he goes furthest who does not know where he is going.

Meanwhile Fujiwara Sumitomo,* the Pirate Chief, on hearing of events in the Kwantō, had grown still bolder, and had dispatched secret emissaries to fire the capital, and night after night the Kyōto sky was red with the glare of burning houses. Disorder in the provinces was of no great consequence to Tadahira, but this touched him home; and priests, and temples and shrines, Buddhist deities and Shintō gods once more profited richly. At last the Regent appointed a Generalissimo for the suppression of the Eastern revolt in the person

* There is no satisfactory evidence to support the story that Masakado while in Kyōto had one day gone up to the top of Hī-ei-zan in company with Sumitomo, and looking down upon the splendours of the capital had then arranged with his companion to revolt later on. The tale goes on to say that it was then agreed that Masakado should become Emperor and Sumitomo Kwampaku.

of Fujiwara Tadabumi, an old man of sixty-seven with no military experience.

Luckily, perhaps, for the aged Generalissimo there was no necessity for him to assume command, for on his way to the East he was met with the intelligence that Masakado had been killed and the rebellion crushed. This had been the work of one of the great national heroes, Fujiwara Hidesato, also known in history as Tawara Tōda. Descended from Uona, the son of Fusasaki, he had been banished to the Kwantō some ten years before, and had later on found official employment there. Upon Masakado's setting up as sovereign Hidesato had proceeded to his camp and asked for an interview. Masakado was then having his hair dressed, but he was so overjoyed at hearing of Hidesato's arrival that he at once jumped up and sallied out to receive him just as he was. This did not make a favourable impression upon Hidesato, who reasoned that a man so regardless of the proprieties would not be likely to accomplish great things. Accordingly, instead of casting in his lot with the New Sovereign, he returned and determined to make head against him. Hidesato's reputation quickly attracted a considerable force to his standard, and in conjunction with Taira Sadamori, who had meanwhile been biding his time, he broke Masakado's forces in two successive encounters, and following hard on the fugitive's traces shot him down and cut off his head, which was presently sent up to the capital. Like Fujiwara Fuyutsugu's and Michizane's, Masakado's ghost was a very rough and unruly spirit; so a shrine was promptly erected, where he was worshipped as a god.

Episodes such as these might very well have been expected to herald the speedy downfall of the civilian government of Kyōto. But the strange fact is that its existence was not seriously threatened for two centuries, and that it was not till the lapse of two hundred and fifty years that Japan was reorganised on the basis of a feudal polity. Indeed it was between 995 and 1069 that the house of Fujiwara attained to the full splendour of its power and magnificence. The explanation is at least partly to be found in the dissension and mutual jealousy of the rising military families, and in the adroit statecraft of the Fujiwara Regents, who made a point of conciliating the most powerful warrior-chiefs of the time and of enlisting their services in their own support.

This, however, among other things led to a thorough change in the old system of provincial administration. As has been repeatedly stated, the Provincial Governor and his staff were civil officers, and were forbidden to carry weapons. In consequence of the outrages of the bandits towards the middle of the ninth century, when several Governors were murdered by them, this prohibition was withdrawn; but again towards the end of the same century, in Sugawara Michizane's time, it was enacted that no civil officer should carry any weapon more formidable than a five-inch dirk. Now, after Masakado's revolt (940), the provincial officers were again permitted to wear swords. This did not indeed convert the provincial offices into military ones; but it became more and more common to appoint members of the rising military families to these posts. If appointed to office in provinces where their own manors lay, these quasi-military Governors had at least the nucleus of an armed force in their own retainers. In the tenth century individual fiefs were still comparatively small; a chief who could call out 300 men was exceptional, while 600 is the largest number we find owing service to one lord. Such were the Daimyō (Great Names) of the time; a Shōmyō's following would be counted by units, or at most by tens. Naturally enough there was a tendency for the larger estates to expand at the expense of their smaller neighbours, the owners of which often found it advisable to "commend" themselves in times of stress. But withal the day of great military fiefs was not yet come.


In some of the provinces, then, there might be a score or so of these petty local magnates all keenly striving for power and pre-eminence; and in cases where forces were very nicely balanced, a commission to act as Governor would prove of no small consequence. In the first place it carried with it the fifth grade of Court rank; and Court rank has always been eagerly coveted by the average Japanese. Then there were official emoluments; and although with the rapid rise of the manors and other tax-free estates these had become woefully scanty, a local potentate with 200 or 300 horse-bowmen at his back would not unlikely prove a much more successful tax-collector than a helpless civilian from Kyōto. But above all the commission would serve to invest high-handed proceedings with a show of legality, and so make the adding of acre to acre

and the increase of the retainers of the house and the peasants on the manor comparatively safe and easy.

It so happened that by this time it had become almost impossible for the central authorities to find competent civilians willing to undertake the duties of provincial administration. The fine gentlemen of the capital looked upon these appointments with contempt; if they deigned to accept them, they remained in Kyōto and had the real work done, or more likely scamped, by deputy, they themselves resting content with a percentage of the sadly minished and minishing official emoluments and perquisites. Thus luckily there was no real clash of interests between Kyōto and those military chiefs in the provinces who aspired to the glories of local administrative authority.

It is questionable whether the dull brain of the Kwampaku Tadahira ever grasped this consideration. But there can be no possible question that his great-grandson Michinaga greatly owed his commanding position to his early recognition of the change in the constitution of provincial society.

At this point it may be found advantageous to dispose of the history of the Fujiwara Regents as briefly as possible. The following incomplete genealogical tree may help to elucidate this dry subject.



On the abdication of Shujaku Tennō in 947, his uterine brother, the 17th son of Daigo Tennō, ascended the throne as the Emperor Murakami (947-967). After the death of Tadahira in 949, there was no Sesshō or Kwampaku, or Chancellor, for eighteen years. Then, with the accession of Reizei Tennō

968-9) the real autocracy of the Fujiwara began. It was nearly wrecked at the outset by a squalid quarrel between the two brothers Kanemichi and Kaneie, and again in 995 by another of those family squabbles which were ultimately destined to prove fatal to it (1155). But in that year of 995 Michinaga, the fifth son of Kaneie, thrust aside the real head of the clan, his nephew Korechika, and carried the autocracy of the Fujiwaras to its apogee. For more than thirty years (995-1027) his word was law, if not in Japan, at least in the capital.

In 999 Michinaga's eldest daughter was married to the Emperor Ichijō; and on the death of that sovereign in 1011, the Regent raised his cousin to the throne as Sanjō Tennō, and made him take his second daughter as consort. Sanjō became blind and abdicated in 1016, and then Go-Ichijō, the Regent's grandson (1017-1036) had to marry his own aunt, the third of Michinaga's five daughters. The fourth sister was married to Go-Ichijō's brother Go-Shujaku Tennō (1037-1045); while to make assurance more than doubly sure, the fifth was bestowed on Ko-Ichijō, a son of Sanjō who at one time was heir presumptive to the throne. This Prince had already been married to a Fujiwara lady, a daughter of Michinaga's cousin, Akimitsu. In wrath she at once returned to her father, whose hair turned grey at the shock, and who promptly went to work to make an end of Michinaga by magic. Michinaga intimidated all his possible rivals so thoroughly that none of them ventured to offer their daughters as possible Empresses or "National Mothers." He thus became the father-in-law of four Emperors and the grandfather of as many. Yet in 1069 the succession slipped from Fujiwara clutches for a season.

It would have been impossible for Michinaga to exercise the traditional Fujiwara device so effectually if he had not been able to read the signs of the times and to enlist the devoted support of the most powerful captains of the rising military families. It was upon the Minamoto of the Seiwa branch that he placed his reliance. This house was then of comparatively recent origin. From before the middle of the ninth century the Fujiwaras had acted harmoniously with certain Minamoto satellites with whom they occasionally shared the great offices of State. But these had been of Saga-Genji and Nimmyō-Genji stock,—scholars, courtiers, and peace-loving civilians like the Fujiwara chieftains themselves. From the

very first, the traditions of the Seiwa-Genji were vastly different. The first descendant of Seiwa to bear the name of Minamoto was that Prince we found acting as Vice-Governor of Musashi at the time of Masakado's revolt. It was not till twenty years later (961), in the very year of his death, that the surname of Minamoto was bestowed upon him. Before this he had served as Commandant in Mutsu and Dewa, and had held other military posts. It was his son Mitsunaka (912-997) who had the *Higekiri* and the *Hizamaru* blades, the famous heirlooms of the family, forged, and it was Mitsunaka's two sons Yorimitsu and Yorinobu, mighty men of valour in their day, who became the "Nails and Teeth" of the Kwampaku Michinaga.

By this date the central authority had ceased to have any trustworthy military force of its own. There were indeed the six companies of the Imperial Guards still in Kyōto ; but the so-called Guards had degenerated into a disorderly rabble of armed loafers. They were now mostly recruited from rich farmers, or the sons of rich farmers, who obtained admission to the ranks by the exercise of unblushing bribery,—their main object being to put themselves into a position to escape taxation and forced labour and to ruffle it among their neighbours on their return to their native villages after a brief term of nominal service. We have seen Sugawara Michizane acting as Commandant of the Guards, and the practice of giving commissions to such civilians, destitute of the least tincture of military knowledge or experience, tended to become more and more common. With the ranks filled with such materials, and with such officers to command, it is small wonder that all discipline presently disappeared. The men would roam about the streets and through the suburbs of the capital, forcing their way into private houses and there eating and drinking their fill; brow-beating and outraging the lieges in the street, extorting gifts of money or clothes or anything that took their fancy from those that were not strong enough to resist. Sometimes they were assigned the duty of patrolling the city and arresting thieves. The usual result was that the Kebiishi had to be called out to arrest the thief-catchers. But at this time the Head of the Kebiishi Bureau was a minor, a youthful Fujiwara minion with no earthly qualifications for the onerous post; and the Kebiishi was quickly becoming one more of

those administrative institutions that had broken down so hopelessly and helplessly.

What the state of discipline was among the Guards may be inferred from the fact that they had actually blockaded the Palace gates more than once, allowing no one to pass out or in, because their pay was in arrear. Sometimes it was the Chancery, or one of the Eight Boards, that they beleaguered in this fashion. Once, in 986, however, the usual proceeding was attended by consequences that can only be described as disastrous. Their rice-rations were a charge upon Echizen and a few of the neighbouring provinces to the north of the capital ; and about that time all these provinces had been famine-stricken, and so no rice could be sent. The Governor of Echizen, a Fujiwara, who was doing his work by deputy, was promptly besieged in his Kyōto mansion by the hungry guardsmen, who placed their camp-stools in the courtyard all round the porch, and vowed they would allow no one to enter or leave the house till they had got their dues. The Governor presently appeared with a huge tub of *saké* borne before him. This was ladled out and handed round, and the besiegers quaffed their bumpers and smacked their lips. Then the Governor began to address them in a long apologetic speech,—giving them the soft answer that turneth away wrath. Before he had spoken long an expression of pain—and wonder—marked the features of more than one of his audience. This quickly became general and intense ; and then one man arose, and leaving his camp-stool behind him made for the gate like Lot fleeing from the doomed city of Sodom. He was speedily followed by another, and another, and yet another, and presently the Governor's courtyard was a solitude, tenanted by nothing but lofty camp-stools. However, if we are to believe the realistic and Rabelaisian original account, the gallant warriors left more than their camp-stools behind them in their precipitate retreat, for that hospitable tub of *saké* had been well mixed with an exceedingly strong and quick-working purgative. Nothing in Japan kills so quickly and easily as ridicule ; and as next morning the gallant guardsmen were met with a universal roar of mocking laughter wherever they showed themselves, they were ruefully constrained to admit that they had met more than their match in his very soft-spoken Excellency, the Governor of Echizen.

It was only nine years after this incident that Michinaga

had to contend with his nephew Korechika for the chieftainship of the clan, and the chief post in the administration of the Empire. Michinaga had very quickly perceived that to trust to the Imperial Guards was to place his reliance upon a broken reed ; so he carefully provided himself with "Nails and Teeth" of his own, and it was to these "Nails and Teeth" that he owed his success in the very few open contests in which he had perforce to engage. These open contests came very early in his career; the knowledge that Michinaga's "Nails and Teeth" were very strong, very trustworthy, and always promptly available restrained more than one of his own kinsmen from entering the lists to oppose him. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." Nowhere has the truth of this hoary maxim been more exemplified than in the history of Japan, which almost from first to last has been the history of great houses.

Minamoto Yorimitsu (944-1021), who had already acted as Governor in some half-dozen provinces, was appointed to the command of the Cavalry of the Guards, and with the aid of his trusty henchmen, the "Four Heavenly Kings," Watanabe, Sakata, Usui, and Urabe, he soon made it a highly efficient force. It has been already remarked that one of the causes that made the feudal system not only possible but necessary was the mistaken mildness of the Penal Code, or rather of its administration. There was the greatest reluctance to inflict the death penalty, and some excuse for commutation of sentence was almost invariably found. General amnesties, often for the most trivial reasons, were frequently proclaimed. The natural result was that the contemporary annals are full of tales of robbery, arson, and murder, for the bandits on their part had often very little compunction about taking life. The capital was perhaps as bad in this respect as any part of the Empire ; not only private houses, but even the Government store-houses had been plundered, the Palace itself broken into, and officials slaughtered. Yorimitsu and his brother dealt with this state of affairs very drastically, for these warlike Minamoto had even less compunction about taking life than the bandits themselves. Towards the end of his life Yorimitsu's father, Mitsunaka, had "entered religion" and received the commandments of Buddha. When it came to the injunction against taking life, the old warrior pretended not to hear, afterwards

explaining to the Chief Priest that his acceptance of that special command would be prejudicial to the martial spirit it was the prime object of his house to foster among its members and adherents. The new military families established rules and regulations of their own for the guidance of their vassals, and when there was any clash between these rules and the law of the land or the precepts of the Church, it was the household regulations that were obeyed. The nation was thus drifting into a state of society analogous to that which prevailed before the Reform of 645, when the sovereign could address his mandates to his subjects only through the head of the *Uji*, or clan to which they belonged.

There was a strong tendency for the military men of the time to group themselves under the standard of some one of the many branches of three great houses. The latest of these, the Minamoto, had their manors in Settsu,* Yamato, and Mino, and in other provinces around the capital. At this date they were not strong in the Eastern Country, which later on was to become the chief seat of their power. At this time the Kwantō was largely held by the Taira with their eight great septs or sub-clans. However, they were not without very formidable rivals there, for there were Fujiwara there of a breed very different from that settled in the luxurious capital. The four great generals of the time were Minamoto Yorinobu, Taira Korehira, Taira Muneyori, and Fujiwara Yasumasa. This Yasumasa was one of the numerous descendants of the great Hidesato, from whom some half-score of powerful Daimyō families subsequently traced their origin. At this date Hidesato's grandchildren were exceedingly influential in the Kwantō and still more so in Mutsu, where they ultimately established a power that could afford to offer defiance to the great Yoritomo at the head of more than 200,000 men. The name of Fujiwara is generally identified with self-indulgent effeminacy. However, we are apt to forget that the clan was by far the greatest in Japan and that the ramifications of its various component houses were exceedingly numerous. The Fujiwara of the capital were indeed effeminate; but not a whit more so than their satellites the civilian Minamoto, with

* The famed Hirano Mineral Water is bottled on what was the manor of that Minamoto Mitsunaka who had compunctions about accepting what is our Sixth Commandment.

whom they shared the spoils and honours of high office and pre-eminent rank. On the other hand the Seiwa-Genji produced no more able and brilliant captains than the military chiefs that came of the stock of Fujiwara Hidesato. Only it was the policy of the Kyōto Fujiwara to rely upon the good offices of the Minamoto rather than on the services of their distant kinsmen, whom they were careful to keep at a respectful distance from the capital, where their presence might very well become highly inconvenient. A Minamoto could have no pretensions to the headship of the Fujiwara clan; but a Fujiwara captain with a thousand *Samurai* of his own behind him might prove a serious menace to the grandeur of a Michinaga or a Yorimichi.

Two points should here furthermore be noted. In the first place, although there was a growing tendency for the *Buké* to group themselves around the Minamoto, the Taira, and the military Fujiwara, these three families at this time held only a comparatively small portion of the soil of the Empire. In 1050 the largest single fief in the Empire belonged to none of these families, and there were many manors in various parts of the Empire with broader acres than those owned by the warrior-chiefs of Imperial or Fujiwara descent. And secondly neither the Minamoto nor the military Fujiwara nor the Taira as yet acted as a single clan, presenting a united front against a common foe. On the contrary; quarrels between the heads of the septs or sub-clans were frequent. This was especially the case among the Taira.

In 999 the Tairas, Korehira and Muneyori, two of the four great captains of their time, convulsed the Kwantō with their family feud. In 1028, at the other end of the Empire, the province of Higo was the scene of devastating frays and forays, in which Tairas and Fujiwaras were involved in inextricable confusion. At the same date Taira Tadatsune began that series of aggressions on his relatives that in three years' time reduced the Kwantō to a tangled wilderness. There in the province of Shimōsa in 1027 there had been as much as 58,000 acres under cultivation; in 1031 this had shrunk to 45 acres; and it was only in the course of several years that as much as 5,000 acres had been got under crop again. It was this episode that enabled the Minamoto to obtain their footing in the Kwantō, destined to become five generations later on the seat of their power.

Taira Tadatsune, whose manors were in Kadzusa, had acted as Vice-Governor of that province, and also as Constable of Musashi. While in office he had conceived a not unreasonable contempt for the weakness and inefficiency of the central authorities, and had come to the conclusion that it would not be a very difficult task to carve out a pretty extensive domain for himself in the peninsula between the Gulf of Tōkyō and the Pacific. So he set upon and killed the Governor of Awa, seized both Kadzusa and Shimōsa, and prepared to extend his "conquests" still further. It was a relative of his, Taira Naokata, the *Kebiishi*, that the Government sent to reduce him to subjection: but Tadatsune made very short work of his kinsman and his Tōkaidō and Tōsandō levies. After a long delay the central authorities commissioned the Governor of Kai, Minamoto Yorinobu, to bring Tadatsune to order, and Yorinobu gained a great reputation among the warriors of the Kwantō in consequence of the brilliant manner in which he executed the difficult task assigned him. Astounded at the skill and daring with which operations against him were now conducted, Tadatsune recognised that he had at last met with more than his match, and so he shaved his head and surrendered. Yorinobu started to conduct his prisoner to Kyōto; but on the way Tadatsune fell ill in Mino and died there. His head was then struck off and sent to the capital, where it was pilloried on the gate of the common jail. Exposing the heads of flagrant wrongdoers was a comparatively new feature in Japanese criminal practice. We hear of both Taira Masakado and Fujiwara Sumitomo being subjected to this indignity. But the practice did not become common till 986, when Fujiwara Nariakira was punished in this way for lopping off a few of Ōye Masahira's fingers in a brawl within the precincts of the Court. The traditional mildness of the mediæval administration was now giving place to a stern rigour that was soon to degenerate into ferocity, a remarkable index of the change that was coming over the ethos of the nation.

To the six old Buddhist sects with their seats in the ancient capital of Nara two newer ones had meanwhile been added. In 810 the famous Kūkai, afterwards known (since 921) as Kōbō Daishi, had been appointed Abbot of the Tō-ji in Kyōto, and six years later on he had founded the great monastery of Kōyasan in the wild but picturesque mountain-tract between Kishū and

Yamato. From these centres the Shingon doctrine was propagated. In the reign of Kwammu, the monk Saichō (Dengyō-daishi, from 866) had founded the Enryakuji, on the steep hill of Hi-ei-zan to the north-east of Kyōto, and had there become the head of the Tendai sect. This great Monastery on Hi-ei-zan was to bear pretty much the same relation to most of the later sects established in Japan that the Church of Rome bears to the various forms of Protestantism. It was to be at once the common mother and the enemy of them all. Its earliest offshoot was the temple of Onjōji, more generally known as Miidera, picturesquely situated at the base of the hills on Biwa strand, beside the city of Ōtsu. Founded in 858 by Enchin, it was not long before it found itself at deadly strife with the parent fane. High positions in the official hierarchy, the Abbacy of later established foundations in Kyōto and elsewhere, precedence and the right of officiating at certain Court functions, and occasionally such fleshly considerations as manors and other possessions, were the usual grounds of quarrel. If action be the criterion of belief, all this is a fine commentary upon the sincerity of the tonsured exponents of the religion whose central idea is the impermanency of all things and the vanity of human wishes.

In 961 Ryōgen (afterwards Jie Daishi), the Abbot of Hi-ei-zan, had a dispute with the head of the Gion Temple in Kyōto, and settled it by sending troops to drive out his opponent. His Eminence then proclaimed that it had become apparent that in that degenerate age the Law of Buddha had fallen into such contempt that it was hopeless to think of defending its interests by ghostly arms alone. Accordingly he mustered a number of stout fellows, had them thoroughly instructed in the handling of such carnal weapons as swords, bows, and spears, and established them as a permanent force in the service of the monastery. The example was speedily followed by the other great ecclesiastical foundations; and thus another cardinal source of unrest was added to the perplexities of the Central Government and the distractions of the already disordered country. In 968, two of the great Nara monasteries, the Tōdaiji and the Kōfukuji, had a disagreement about some rice-fields, and fought the matter out with sword and bow. In 989, the Government sent a messenger with a rescript appointing a certain priest to the Abbacy of Hi-ei-zan. The priests seized the document, tore

it to pieces, and drove the messenger off with contumely. The Government did absolutely nothing and the priests triumphed. As time went on, the priests waxed still more and more turbulent and audacious, and it was felt that something really must be done to check the evil. In 1039, some 3,000 Hi-ei-zan monks, dissatisfied with the Regent's distribution of ecclesiastical perferment, came down and besieged Fujiwara Yorimichi's mansion. The latter then appealed to Taira Naokata, and Naokata promptly raised the siege, killed a good many of the priests, seized the ring-leader and lodged him in prison. This was the beginning of the feud between the priests and the military men,—and especially with the house of Taira. With the ministers of religion thus recklessly appealing to the argument of the mailed fist on the slightest provocation, it is but small wonder that the long-engrained horror of taking life—to a very great extent the result of Buddhist teaching—should quickly disappear.

At no time since the Reform of Taikwa had disorder and outrage been so rife, at no time had the popular misery at large been so great as under Michinaga and his son Yorimichi, who was Kwampaku from 1018 to 1069. And yet at no time had the Fujiwaras held more sumptuous and ostentatious state; at no time had their chieftains made themselves more remarkable for luxury, profusion, and prodigality. Their mansions, which they were continually erecting or reconstructing, vied with the Palace in the splendour of their architecture and the magnificence of their appurtenances; their banquets and feasts and fêtes were conceived on a scale that dwarfed the most gorgeous functions of former times into meanness and shabbiness. The very prosaic question naturally arises as to how all the lavish expenditure thus involved could be met at a time when the sources of the national income had become exhausted even to the point of absolutely drying-up.

Some light upon this puzzling matter may be obtained by taking due account of a few incidents recorded by the gossip-mongers of the time. It was Minamoto Yorimitsu, one of the captains who figured as Michinaga's "Nails and Teeth," who provided all the magnificent inner furnishings of his patron's palatial mansion of Kyōgoku. At, or about, the same time, on the occasion of a great banquet, this same Minamoto presented Michinaga with 30 fine horses for distribution among the

guests. Michinaga's son, Yorimichi, would appear to have depended fully as much upon the Tairas as the Minamotos. About 1030, a Taira Viceroy of Kyūshū, and his brother, a Keibiishi officer, caused a huge tract of land in southern Hyūga to be reclaimed,—of course by forced labour,—and this they presented to the Kwampaku. He converted that into a manor—his Shimadzu Shōen,—and sent officers of his household to take charge of it. A little later these Taira brothers extended its boundaries into the adjoining provinces of Satsuma and Ōsumi. The alliance between the Fujiwara statesmen and the Taira and Minamoto captains was thus highly profitable for all parties to the pact. It brought the warriors military office in the capital and Court rank, and this added very greatly to their prestige in the various circuits of the Empire when they proceeded thither to occupy provincial posts. Moreover the connection with the Fujiwara covered a multitude of administrative sins; complaints and impeachments fell upon deaf ears, provided the interests of the Fujiwara patrons were duly promoted by their protégés. They, in their turn, were careful to see to it that whatever might be the case with the national taxes, there should be no falling-off in the Fujiwara tribute.

That great house now had its manors in almost every quarter of Japan. In the great mansion in the capital, a Bureau was established for the management of these. At its head was the House Bettō, who was invariably the most experienced and wily lawyer that could be found in Kyōto, and under him were stewards and other officers. By this Bureau, laws, regulations, ordinances, and what not were drawn up, jointly signed by the Bettō and a steward, and transmitted for enforcement on the various manors. Here again was another *imperium in imperio*, all the more dangerous that it commanded abundant resources. and that the increase of these resources meant a corresponding shrinkage in the revenue of the crown. A century later many of these manors were destined to repeat the history of the old pre-Reformation Imperial *miyake*. Then the Fujiwara were no longer served but dominated by their quondam military allies, the Taira and the Minamoto; and availing themselves of the changed circumstances of the time, not a few of the Jitō, or bailiffs of these Shō-en, disowned all connection with their Fujiwara masters and established themselves as Shōmyō or Daimyō, as the case might be.




M A P

Illustrating Subjugation of North Japan.

Provinces in Capital letters.

Modern cities in Italics.

All other geographical names in Roman characters.



Towards the close of Yoritomi's long administration of fifty years (1018-1069) there was yet another commotion in that great storm-centre, the North-East of the main island. The various accounts of it are at once confused and confusing; but they are of interest as they furnish certain details which serve to throw a valuable light upon the progress of the transformation the social and political fabric of the State was slowly but surely undergoing.

In the ninth century, when the Ainu submitted to be organised in settled communities, the head of the Abé family, which traced its descent from the eighth mythical Emperor and had long been domiciled in the far North, was appointed to the newly created office of General Superintendent of the Aborigines. In 1050 the position was occupied by Abé Yoritoki, who by this time had built up for himself the largest single holding in the Empire. What had formed the nucleus of the immense Abé estates we are not informed; probably it had been *Shinden*, newly reclaimed land, which was tax-free in Mutsu and Dewa. However that may be, we are met by the startling fact that in 1050 Abé Yoritoki was absolute master of six great districts practically identical with what is now the most extensive of the forty odd prefectures of modern Japan. From his central stronghold, not far from the present Morioka, Yoritoki dominated nearly the whole of the 5,400 square miles now administered by the Governor of Iwate Ken. This formed only a fraction of the superficies under the nominal jurisdiction of the Governor of Mutsu, but it was by far the richest and most densely settled section of the vast territory he was supposed to administer. And within this special district Excellency after Excellency had found that his writ was only so much waste paper, good for a paper handkerchief at the best. In this year of 1050 his Excellency,—a Fujiwara by the way,—made an unusually heroic effort to collect some taxes from the Abé domain; and advanced into it in command of several thousand armed men. All that his Excellency came by as the result of his unwonted zeal and enterprise was an abundance of hard knocks, ignominious defeat, and inglorious disaster. Complaint after complaint had been forwarded to Kyōto, but it was not till 1050 that that thunderbolt of war Minamoto Yoriyoshi was sent down as Governor of Mutsu and Chinjufu-Shōgun to put things into proper order in Northern Japan in

general, and in what is now Iwate Ken in particular. Yoriyoshi, then a grizzled veteran of 61, had won his spurs under his father Yorinobu, in the campaign against Taira Tadatsune a score of years before; and he now brought with him his own first and second sons, Yoshiie and Yoshitsuna, the elder of whom was then fifteen years of age. However, just at the time Yoriyoshi reached Mutsu, one of the frequent general amnesties had been proclaimed; and Abé Yoritoki, taking advantage of this, easily made his peace with the new Governor, to whom and his officers he made many valuable presents.

Next year, just as Yoriyoshi was on the point of returning to Kyōto, the camp of one of his lieutenants—a Fujiwara—was assailed by some horse-thieves, and the latter officer, wrongly as it turned out, suspected Abé Yoritoki's son, Sadatō, of the outrage, and induced Minamoto Yoriyoshi to dispatch a force to arrest and punish him. It was this ill-advised step that really occasioned the outbreak of the Nine Years' War. Abé Yoritoki was killed by a stray arrow in 1057; but his son Sadatō continued the defence of the Abé domains. At the beginning of the strife, old Abé, despairing of ultimate success against the renowned Minamoto captain, had determined to find some over-sea settlement where the family could find refuge, and had dispatched one of his sons on a voyage of exploration. After drifting on the open sea the exploring party at last sailed up a huge river for thirty days. From the details given this was probably the Amur. But there was no pressing need for the clan to emigrate, for in the early years of the war Sadatō plainly had the best of it. With 4,000 followers he had entrenched himself at Kawasaki; and here, in December 1057, he was attacked by Yoriyoshi at the head of a numerically inferior force of 1,800 men. The assault failed; and just when the beaten troops had retired to look to their wounds and recover from their fatigue, a terrific blizzard set in. Under cover of the driving snow Sadatō promptly swept out and practically annihilated Yoriyoshi's command; only the two Minamotos, father and son, three Fujiwaras, and two other officers being able to make good their retreat. It was on this occasion that the youthful Yoshiie's derring-do earned for him his sobriquet of Hachiman Tarō (the War-God's Eldest-born).

Yoriyoshi's second term of command expired with the Abés as defiant as ever. A blue-blooded Kyōto Fujiwara was

then nominated to succeed Yoriyoshi; but the new commander, very wisely perhaps, declined the appointment, and found employment in the Ministry of War in the capital. Yoriyoshi then received a fresh commission; but at the end of that Sadatō was still more than holding his own. A Tachibana was then sent down to supersede Yoriyoshi; but the troops insisted that they wanted no change of commander, and Tachibana had to return. Then Yoriyoshi, girding up his loins for a decisive effort, invoked the assistance of Kiyowara Takenori from the neighbouring province of Dewa. He came with 10,000 fresh troops; and Sadatō then found himself seriously out-numbered. In 1062, after being broken in two successive engagements, he was killed in the defence of his stockade at Kuriyagawa. This was a most desperate affair, mere children of thirteen or fourteen fighting like grizzled veterans, and even the women participating in the deadly fray, which raged for two successive days and nights without intermission. According to all the accounts Sadatō must have been no ordinary handful; over six feet in height, he was seven feet four round the chest, and it took six strong men to lift his corpse. He appears to have been a sort of rum-puncheon on legs. His head, and those of two of his brothers and Fujiwara Tsunekiyo, his ally, were sent to the capital, where everybody crowded to see them. His second brother, Munetō, was accorded quarter; after being taken to the capital he was banished to Kyūshū, where he became a priest. This did not prevent him from propagating his kind, however; for it was from him, according to the best authorities, that those Matsuuras of Hirado, so prominent in the story of early European intercourse with Japan, were descended.

Careful attention to the details furnished by the records of this struggle discloses the fact that at this date there were at least four great families in Mutsu and Dewa,—that is in Northern Japan. These were branches of the Taira, of the Fujiwara descended from Hidesato, the Abé, and the Kiyowara. It also appears that all these were intermarrying with each other, and that an ultimate fusion of the four stocks under a single head was not an impossibility. About the origin of the Taira, the Fujiwara, and the Abé enough has been said already. The Kiyowara were descended from the seventh son of Temmu Tennō,—that Prince Toneri who presided over the

compilation of the *Nihongi*. At this time, the Kiyowara chief, Takenori, did a very dastardly thing. Abé Sadatō's eldest son, Chiyo Dōji, a mere child of thirteen, had fought like a demon incarnate even after his rum-puncheon sire had been smitten stark and stiff. Minamoto Yoriyoshi, proud of his own Hachiman Tarō, had nothing but admiration for the young hero and was minded to spare him. But Kiyowara, related by affinity to the Abés, and with the possibility of profiting immensely at the expense of the ruined family, insisted that Chiyo Dōji in spite of his thirteen years would be the author of untold evils if spared; and so the gallant child was ruthlessly done to death. The result was that a score of years later Yoriyoshi's Hachiman Tarō had to enter upon another three years' struggle to reduce, not the Abés, but the Kiyowaras to subjection!

During the three centuries subsequent to the Reform of 645, the Japanese could not justly be described as a warlike people. In the new polity adapted from China, it was the civil officer that held the pride of place. If his pretensions were contested, they were contested by the priesthood, and not by any military class; indeed the soldier counted for almost nothing. Time and again ordinances were issued proscribing the possession of arms by private persons. As it has more than once been already remarked, this fact, taken in conjunction with the strange reluctance to inflict the death penalty on capital offenders, goes a certain way towards explaining the prevalence of burglary, highway robbery, brigandage, and piracy. Now from this date the cult of Hachiman, the War-god, gets firmly established in the land.


The original seat of the worship of Hachiman was Usa in Buzen. According to a very late legend, towards the end of the sixth century, a god had there appeared to a child, announcing himself as "Hiro-hata Ya-yahata Maro, the 16th of the Human Rulers," and in consequence of this the reigning sovereign, Kimmei, founded a shrine at Usa in his ancestor's honour (570). There is no mention of any such incident either in the *Kojiki* or the *Nihongi*, however. This shrine comes into prominence in the eighth century, when its oracle played an important part in the politics and political intrigues of the time. It is in 801 that we first find Hachiman, which name is the Chinese reading of the Japanese Ya-hata, "Eight Banners," venerated as a war-god. In that year after his vic-

torious campaign against the Ainu, Saka-no-uye no Tamuramaro founded a shrine in the district of Izawa in Mutsu dedicated to Hachiman in which he hung up his bow and arrows. As has been said, this Tamuramaro was one of the very few soldiers whom military exploits had sufficed to raise to power and place in the councils of the State, and it was he that furnished the model on which successive generations of aspiring warriors endeavoured to form themselves. Before starting on their expeditions, later Shōguns (Generals) invariably went to worship at his tomb and invoke the aid of his spirit, and of his special tutelary deities, Tamon Ten and Hachiman. In 860 the shrine of Iwashimidzu was erected to Hachiman in the environs of the capital, and it was in it that Minamoto Yoshiie underwent the ceremony of *Gembuku* at the age of seven in 1048. In the last desperate encounter in front of Abé Sadatō's stockade of Kuriyagawa, Minamoto Yoriyoshi had, in his direst need, invoked the name of Hachiman Dai-Bosatsu, and vowed the erection of a shrine to him if he deigned to listen to the prayer. Accordingly in 1063, before repairing to the capital with his trophies, Yoriyoshi proceeded secretly to Tsurugaoka, and there founded that shrine of Hachiman which the great Yoritomo was to convert into one of the chief glories of his new feudal capital of Kamakura five generations later on.

CHAPTER X.

THE CLOISTERED EMPERORS.

WITH the accession of Sanjō II. in 1069, the Fujiwara autocracy received its first serious check. The Kwampaku, Yorimichi, had duly married his daughters to the Emperors Shujaku II. (1037-1045) and Reizei II. (1045-1068); and yet he lived to see a non-Fujiwara Prince upon the throne. To elucidate this matter, as well as other important events in the history of the subsequent century, the following chart will be found of service:



In 1045, the Kwampaku, Yorimichi, had been hastily summoned by the dying Emperor Shujaku II., and informed by the sovereign that while his immediate successor was to be his eldest son, it was his wish that his second son, then a boy of twelve, should ultimately succeed his elder half-brother. Yorimichi's half-brother, the Dainagon Fujiwara Yoshinobu, hearing of this, insisted that a second Crown Prince should immediately be proclaimed, but Yorimichi argued that there was no pressing need for doing so. Yoshinobu carried his

point, however; and on the death of their father, one of the sons became the Emperor Reizei II., while the other was installed in the Eastern Palace as Heir to the Crown. During the odd twenty years of the reign of Reizei II., his younger half-brother lived in constant dread of being deprived of the succession; but as the Emperor's Fujiwara consort proved childless, the young Prince at last came by his own and ascended the throne as Go-Sanjō (Sanjō II.) in 1068. He had meanwhile married the adopted daughter of Fujiwara Yoshinobu, to whom he really owed his position, and who had been appointed his *major-domo* while Crown-Prince; and this lady became the mother of the next Emperor, Shirakawa. Yoshinobu's devotion to the Crown Prince may have been not altogether disinterested; yet the fact remains that it was really he who broke the power of the great house of Fujiwara to which he himself belonged, and once more placed a sovereign on the throne who aspired to rule the Empire.

The aged Kwampaku, who had misgoverned the State for half-a-century, now found it advisable to transfer his office to his younger brother, Norimichi, then seventy-five years of age,* and retire to his palace at Uji. But even there he was subjected to worries and mortifications. His brother Norimichi very soon made the discovery that the great office he held was nothing better than a dignified sinecure, for all the real work of directing the administration was undertaken by the new sovereign in person. Sanjō II., who had studied hard under Ōye Tadafusa and other distinguished and able teachers, had acquired a statesmanlike grasp upon the pressing problems of the age; and when he ascended the throne at thirty-five he was ready with very drastic solutions of his own for some of them at least. He promptly established a new Council of his own—the *Kirokusho*, or Record Office—in which he presided personally, toiling from morning to night in the endeavour to restore

* In a somewhat flamboyant chapter on the Heian Epoch, Capt. Brinkley writes:—"Sensual excesses, which were then without limit, supplemented this ever-present dread of the spirits of the dead and of evil, so that the span of life in the upper classes was shortened to thirty or forty years." In 1074, Fujiwara Yorimichi died at the age of 83, his sister, the consort of Ichijō, at 87, and his brother Norimichi at 80. Then take the Minamoto: Mitsunaka died at 85 in 997; Yorimitsu at 77 in 1021; Yorinobu at 80 in 1048; Yoriyoshi at 87 in 1082; while in the following century Minamoto Yoshifusa died at the age of 96 in 1131!

efficiency to the administrative and judicial machinery. One of the earliest enactments of this new board was a decree for the confiscation of all manors erected since 1045; a little later it issued orders that the title-deeds of the Shō-en created before that date were to be produced; if there were no title-deeds, or if those produced were not in order, the estate was to be forfeited by the holder. A special messenger with a copy of this enactment was sent to the ex-Kwampaku, Yorimichi, at Uji; but although Yorimichi said he had no documents to show, it was found impossible to deal with his vast domains. One of the chief evils lying at the root of the Shō-en menace was the extension of the Provincial Governors' tenure of office to a second, or even to a third or fourth term. In some cases governorships had become life-offices; in one or two instances they threatened to become hereditary. This was the reward for looking after the interests of the Kyōto Fujiwara in the provinces. Accordingly it was now enacted that no Governor should hold office for more than a single term. It so happened that just at this time the great Nara fane of Kofukuji had been building the Nan-en-dō, and the Governor of Yamato had been superintending the work. The Kofukuji, it will be remembered, was the ancestral temple of the Fujiwara; and the Kwampaku, Norimichi, now petitioned that the Governor of Yamato should be exempted from the scope of the new decree. The Emperor at first sharply refused; but as the Fujiwara nobles went so far as to threaten to withdraw from the Court in a body the sovereign had finally to yield. Yet although thwarted by the Fujiwara on these two specific occasions, Sanjō II.'s administration of four years (1068-1072) inflicted a blow on the prestige of the great clan from which it never recovered. Fujiwara Sesshō and Kwampaku were frequently, indeed almost regularly, appointed; but during the following century these great offices were little more than honorary distinctions. Yet, after Sanjō II., the real power was not with the sovereign actually on the throne; it was the Hō-ō, the Priest, or ex-Emperor who really directed affairs.

From a Sovereign who began his reign with a display of statesmanship, ability, and firmness of purpose the like of which had not been seen in Japan since the days of Kwammu, much—indeed, everything—was to be expected. If Sanjō II. had continued to sway the fortunes of the Empire for thirty or forty,

instead of for three or four years, it is possible to conceive that Japan would never have been ruled by Shōguns. But the accumulated evils of generations had become too deeply seated to be eradicated in such a brief reign as his proved to be. Unfortunately for the best interests of his subjects, Sanjō II. died at the early age of thirty-nine, in 1073. In the previous year, he had abdicated and placed his eldest son, a youth of nineteen, on the throne as Shirakawa Tennō, his intention being to govern through him. Shirakawa was titular Sovereign for no more than fourteen years (1072–1086); but he was the real ruler of the Empire down to his death forty-three years later on, in 1129. He was not the first Cloistered Emperor; but he was the first Cloistered Emperor who continued to direct the administration after receiving the tonsure. During the twenty years' reign of Shirakawa's son Horikawa (1087–1107), the sixteen years of his grandson Toba (1107–1123), and the first six years of his great-grandson, Sutoku (1124–1141), the titular Emperor wielded no authority. Then, on Shirakawa's death, his grandson, Toba Tennō, who had abdicated and become a Cloistered Emperor six years before, stepped into his position and really governed down to his decease in 1156, his two sons who meanwhile occupied the throne in succession being no more than figure-heads. Shirakawa II., another son of Toba's, succeeded to the throne in the year of his father's death (his elder brother, the ex-Emperor Sutoku, being still alive); and after a few months on the throne he also became a Cloistered Emperor who aspired to rule the State. But the day of Cloistered Emperors was past. Although Shirakawa II. continued to be a very prominent figure in Japanese history down to his decease in 1192, he was at no time the real ruler of the country, for from 1156 onwards Japan was governed not by the sceptre, but by the sword. In that year the great military family of the Taira became all-powerful; the years between 1181 and 1185 saw its overthrow and the swift rise of the rival house of Minamoto to supremacy. When a Japanese speaks of the rule of the Cloistered Emperors (*Insci*), he refers to Shirakawa I. and his grandson Toba. These really governed Japan from 1073 to 1156—a period of 83 years, during the first fourteen of which Shirakawa I. was not cloistered, but titular Sovereign.

One of the purposes supposed to be served by this new form

of administration was the curbing of the power of the Fujiwara Regents and Kwampaku; and in this special direction the device was eminently successful. Regents and Kwampaku and occasionally Chancellors were appointed; but they were attached to the Court of the titular Sovereigns. But Shirakawa I., the Cloistered Emperor, maintained a Court of his own, with officials and guards and all the state that surrounded the actual occupant of the throne. Moreover,—and this was the most important point of all,—he established in his retreat an administrative and judicial council of his own, at the head of which stood a Bettō; and it was by this machinery, and not by the old Council of State with its subordinate eight boards, that the Empire was now actually controlled. The Dajōkwan (Council of State) still issued its decrees. Where they did not clash with those emanating from the Chancery of the ex-Emperor they were valid; but in case of any conflict it was the ordinances sealed by the In Bettō that carried supreme authority. Shirakawa thus contrived to seize and to retain the power that had been wielded by the Fujiwara for generations; and so far succeeded in correcting one very grave abuse of long-standing. But the special remedy he provided for this evil gave rise to others infinitely worse. In a variety of insidious ways, the central stream of authority had been, and was being, deflected into numerous minor side channels. What remained of the main current was now further parted in twain. With conflicting decrees and ordinances emanating from two rival chanceries, public respect for the throne and its laws could not but be seriously impaired. The rise of two new parties,—an Emperor's and an ex-Emperor's faction,—could only be a question of time.

Had Shirakawa been a statesman of the calibre of his father, Sanjō II., the results of the *Insei* system might have very well proved much less disastrous than they ultimately did. But whatever he may have been, a statesman Shirakawa was emphatically not. Sanjō II., while grappling vigorously with the evils of the manor system, and providing for a sufficient national revenue, had insisted upon the strictest economy in the management of the finances, and curtailed all the luxurious extravagance of his Court and the capital. His son, Shirakawa, imitated him only in the simplicity of his diet. But unfortunately this was not from economic or political considerations; it was an outcome of superstition. The Bud-

dhist injunction against the taking of life was to be strictly enforced, and infractions of it rigorously punished. Eight thousand fishing nets were seized and burned; no gifts of fish were to be offered to the Court; hunting and hawking were rigidly proscribed, and the hawks set at liberty. Sanjō II. used to dine on a herring sprinkled with a little pepper, while his clothes had been of the simplest. Shirakawa would have nothing to do with herrings, or indeed with fish or flesh of any kind; but his extravagance and profuseness in other directions knew no bounds. There was indeed a certain amount of restrictive sumptuary legislation under his rule, but the edicts were rarely if ever enforced.

But it was not on the maintenance of a splendid Court that the rapidly minishing national revenue was most squandered and frittered away. Like his younger contemporary, David I. of Scotland—

Who "illumynd in his dayis
His landys with kyrkys and with abbayis"

--Shirakawa Tennō was "a sore saint to the crown." Immense sums were expended on temple-building, progresses to sacred places, masses and other religious ceremonies, while the harvest reaped by Buddhist artists and artificers at the expense of the nation must have been an exceedingly rich one. Besides 5,470 scrolls or hanging-pictures painted and presented to various fanes, Shirakawa was responsible for the erection of one huge idol 32 feet in height, of 127 half that size, of 3,150 life-size, and of 2,930 three-foot images. Then of seven-storied pagodas the tale was twenty-one, and of miniature pagodas as many as 44,630. To meet the costs of all this the revenue trickling into the national treasury was, of course, utterly inadequate.

Before this time the sale of offices had been not unknown; in fact it had occasionally assumed the proportions of a public scandal. But what had hitherto been an occasional practice now developed into a regular system. First,—for a material consideration, of course,—the Provincial Governors' term of office was prolonged from four to six years; next these posts could be purchased for life, and, finally, as many as thirty of them were allowed to become hereditary. Then the manor evil, which Sanjō II. had striven so hard to check, now became more pronounced than ever. In order to obtain ready money, or its equivalent, great stretches of valuable national estate

were once more wantonly alienated. On Shirakawa's death in 1129, as has been said, his grandson, the ex-Emperor Toba, stepped into his position, and Toba made it virtually impossible for any successor of his to create new Shō-en; for, before his demise, of the soil of the Empire not more than one per cent. remained under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Governors! Sovereign, ex-sovereigns, Empress, Imperial consorts, Crown Prince, Fujiwara and other courtiers alike drew the bulk, indeed, almost the whole of their revenues, from their manors. The theory of eminent domain, while still doubtless maintained as a theory by Court lawyers, had, as regards practice, been whistled down the wind. And there it was virtually to remain till the Revolution, or Restoration, of 1868. It was mainly the rise and spread of the manorial system that brought about the fall of the centralised government established by the Reformers of 645. It is to this that the decay and long eclipse of the august line of the Sun-Goddess, so much deplored by Japanese historians, is to be chiefly attributed. Such being the case, it is neither the Fujiwaras, nor the Tairas, nor the Minamotos, nor the Hōjōs, nor the Ashikaga, nor the Tokugawas that must be saddled with the wite. The Shō-en system began to be a danger under the three learned Emperors, Saga, Junna, and Nimmyō (811-850); it effectually and finally paralysed the old centralised administration under Shirakawa I. and Toba I. None of these five sovereigns were fools; not one of them was a weakling, for without exception they all had wills of their own, and when determined to have their own way, they almost invariably succeeded in making opponents bend to their purposes. But when a Japanese sovereign aspires to rule as well as to reign, it is well for him to be equipped with all the wisdom and attributes of a statesman. Of the one hundred and seven scions of the Sun-Goddess who have occupied the throne of Japan since the days of Nintoku Tennō, four, and four only, have shown themselves to have been so provided. These are Tenchi, Kwammu, Sanjō II., and Mutsuhito, who is probably the greatest of the four. Daigo II. (Go-Daigo) is usually spoken of as one of the "three great Emperors of Japan." As will be attempted to be shown later on, Daigo II. was a comparatively second-rate man; very much inferior to Daigo I., who *longo intervallo* comes after the four sovereigns just mentioned.

The strange feature in the case is that Japan became covered with this network of manors in the teeth of constantly renewed prohibitory edicts. Under the two Cloistered Emperors there was almost as much of this farcical legislation as before. For instance, in 1091, the farmers throughout the Empire were forbidden to "commend" themselves to Minamoto Yoshiie. Again, for instance, in 1127 new Shō-en were prohibited. In the decree of that year we are told that "the Shōji (officers put in charge of Shō-en by the owners) are earnestly inviting holders of public land to become tenants of the Shō-en"; and that "those who have become tenants on the Shō-en never return to their former status: and the Shō-en are all filled with farmers, while the public land in the districts (*Gun*) and villages (*Gō*) is left wild and uncultivated." These are fair specimens of the many anti-Shō-en decrees emanating from the Imperial chancelleries of the time. But the fact is that a gross mass of contemporary legislation was little better than dead-letter. The case of a certain Naitō, a retainer of Taira Tadamori, is instructive. Summoned before the *Kebiishi* board for an infringement of the anti-life-taking law, he at once pleaded guilty of the offence, saying he would cheerfully submit to the penalty. What that exactly was he did not know; at the worst it would be no more than banishment or imprisonment. It was his duty to supply his master's table with fish and game; if he failed to do so the punishment would be death, for a violation of certain of the House laws of the Minamotos and the Tairas was attended with consequences much graver than any infringement of the Imperial ordinances was. When reported to the ex-Emperor Shirakawa, the incident was passed over with a laugh, no penalty being inflicted. In these House laws of the Tairas and Minamotos we have a glaring case of an *imperium in imperio*. A century later, we shall find the great bulk of the Samurai class openly and avowedly exempted from the operation of the common law, and subjected to the provisions of a special code of their own,—the famous Jōei Shikimoku of the Hōjōs (1232). The nucleus of this may not have been the Minamoto and Taira House Statutes; but it is legitimate to surmise that these House laws furnished the Kamakura feudal legislators with valuable hints.

Although the great military families were now rapidly

rising in power and influence, we have many indications that their manors were as yet much less extensive than those of the Fujiwaras and other Kyōto courtiers. Minamoto Yoshimitsu had a dispute with a Fujiwara noble about a Shō-en in Mutsu. The case was submitted to Shirakawa, who after a long delay told Fujiwara that his claims were indisputable. However, to incur the enmity of Yoshimitsu would be a very serious thing. Fujiwara had many manors, and the loss of one would be of little consequence to him, whereas to Yoshimitsu, *who had scarcely enough to support his family and followers, even a single manor was an important consideration.* Therefore it would be advisable for Fujiwara to yield. Now, this Yoshimitsu was the brother of the great Yoshiie, the Uji no Chōja or head of the clan and all its branches ; the brother of *the* Minamoto, in short.

Where the military men often found their opportunity was when a dispute about their possessions arose between two unwarlike courtiers. In 1091, a Fujiwara and a Kiyowara could not agree about some estates in Kawachi ; one appealed to Minamoto Yoshiie, the other to his brother Yoshimitsu, and a small civil war seemed imminent. The Court then had to interfere, and forbid Yoshiie's troops to enter the capital, and the farmers throughout the Empire to "commend" themselves to that captain. In Toba's time a number of decrees were issued warning *military* men against becoming vassals of the Minamoto or Taira chieftains. But withal, during the *Insei* period (1086-1156), the power and possessions of these two great houses increased enormously.

At the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century we have seen the Fujiwara Regents using the Minamotos, whom they called their "nails and teeth," as a buttress for their power. The influence of their Fujiwara patrons was now at an end ; but the Minamotos were far from finding their occupation in the capital gone. The Cloistered Emperor established a guard corps of his own ; and in this the Minamotos at first found plenty of employment. At the same time they and the Tairas now discharged the duties of the old Imperial Guards, among whom, as we have seen, all discipline had so hopelessly broken down. However, as time went on, it was upon the Tairas that Shirakawa and Toba came more especially to place their trust.

The early seat of the Taira power had been the country around and behind Tōkyō Bay; and at this date the Heishi stock, when united (as it very often was not), was all-powerful in the Kwantō, and very powerful in Mutsu. However, it was neither from the Kwantō nor from Mutsu that the greatest of the Tairas came. Taira Korechika, one of the four great generals of the early eleventh century, had been punished for carrying on a civil war against his brother, the Governor of Shimotsuke, by banishment to Awaji. On his release he settled in Ise, and there founded a branch house of the Taira known as the Ise Heishi. It was with Taira Masamori's reduction of the revolt of Minamoto Yoshichika in Idzumo that the rise of the Ise Taira began. This Yoshichika was the second son of the famous Yoshiie, Hachiman Tarō. Yoshichika had been appointed Governor of Tsushima, but he found the limits of the island too narrow for his ambition. So passing over to Hizen, he intermarried with the great house of Takagi there, and proceeded to carve out a domain for himself, the title-deeds being his own good sword. Already jealous of Yoshiie and of the warlike Minamotos, Shirakawa jumped at the opportunity Yoshichika afforded, and sent Taira troops to crush him. His father vainly implored Yoshichika to submit; instead of doing so he killed the Imperial messenger sent to summon him to Kyōto. However, he soon had to yield. Sentenced to banishment to the island of Oki, he gave his guards the slip in Idzumo, killed the acting Governor there, seized the Government store-houses, and practically raised the standard of rebellion. In 1107, Taira Masamori with his retainers was commissioned to put down the revolt, and he did so effectually. His eldest son, Tadamori, then a boy of eleven, turned out to be a sort of Japanese Diomedes, and raised the lower stories of the huge fabric of Ise Heishi greatness on the foundations thus laid by Masamori. He governed Harima, Ise, and Bizen in succession; and in the capital he became *Kebiishi* and the *fidus Achates* of Shirakawa, keeping by his side night and day. In 1129 he gained much reputation by the prompt check he gave to piracy in the Inland Sea. On his return to Kyōto, he became henchman to the ex-Emperor Toba. His success naturally excited the jealousy of his rivals, but all their efforts to shake his position proved abortive. On his death in 1153, his son Kiyomori, who had served as Governor of Aki

seven years before, became head of the House ; and under him the Taira clan became virtually supreme in Japan, and governed the Empire according to its fantasy for fully a score of years.

Down to 1156, however, Taira prestige was more than equalled by that of the Minamoto. In connection with the rise of these two great military houses one peculiar fact must be noted. As has been asserted, the Taira were most numerous in the Kwantō, where, as well as in Mutsu, the various septes of the clan held a great, if not the greater, part of the soil. Yet it was by service in Western Japan and in the capital that successive Taira chieftains made the fortunes of the family. On the other hand, while the manors of the Minamotos mainly lay within a radius of sixty miles from Kyōto, it was in the extreme north of Japan, where they had little or no territorial foothold at all, that they mainly acquired their fame, and found their most devoted followers.

It will be remembered that for his services in the reduction of Abé Sadatō (1062), Kiyowara Takenori had been appointed Chinjufu Shōgun, and invested with the administration of the six districts in Mutsu composing the huge territorial domains of the Abé family. Takenori was succeeded by his son Takesada, and he in turn by his son Sanehira. Meanwhile administrative duties had become confused with proprietary rights, and Sanehira had developed into a semi-independent feudal potentate. His brother Iyehira and his uncle Takehira chafed at the vassalage he had imposed upon them in common with all the other landed proprietors in the six districts, and were on the outlook for an opportunity to assert themselves. About the year 1084, seemingly, this came. A relative of Sanehira's wife, a certain Kimiono Hidetake, came from Dewa to call on Sanehira, bringing valuable presents with him. At the moment of Hidetake's arrival, Sanehira was engaged in a game of checkers with a friend, and paid no attention whatsoever to the newly-arrived guest. In high dudgeon Hidetake threw away the presents and hurried home to Dewa. Sanehira, on learning this, became highly incensed, mustered men and advanced into Dewa to punish Hidetake. The latter sent messengers to Takehira and Iyehira exhorting them to rise in Sanehira's rear on their own behalf. Iyehira indeed needed but little prompting to do so ; and on

a sudden the greater part of Mutsu was furiously ablaze with the flames of civil war.

Either in 1086 or a little before, Minamoto Yoshiie (Hachiman Tarō), had come down as Governor of Mutsu; and to him Sanehira promptly appealed for aid, which was at once rendered. But when Sanehira and the Governor of Mutsu were engaged in operations against Hidetake, Takehira rose in their rear and joined forces with Iyehira. At this point the original authorities become exceedingly obscure and confusing in the details they furnish. Sanehira disappears from the scene and we hear no more of him. Iyehira and Takehira ultimately entrenched themselves in the strong stockade of Kanazawa in Mutsu, and here they were assailed by Minamoto Yoshiie, his brother Yoshimitsu—who in defiance of orders had thrown up his office in Kyōto and hastened to Yoshiie's assistance—by Hidetake, and by Fujiwara Kiyohira.* In the advance upon the stockade Yoshiie observed a flock of wild geese rising in disordered flight from a forest in the distance, and at once concluded that an ambush was being laid there. It was as he supposed, and his keen observation saved his force from what might have proved a serious disaster. Once in the capital he had called on a Fujiwara statesman and had given him an account of one of his previous campaigns. The great scholar Ōye Tadafusa happened to overhear the conversation, and remarked that it was sad to think that a man so ignorant of the art of war as Yoshiie showed himself to be should be entrusted with high military command. Yoshiie's retainers informed their master of this remark, and asked his permission to kill the impudent critic. But Yoshiie, so far from listening to their request, asked Ōye to let him become his pupil; and under him he read the seven Chinese military treatises. Of these the chief is by Sonshi, who lived about 550 B.C.† and in his ninth chapter he lays it down that "the rising of birds shows an ambush." All this is significant as indicating the rise of a military class that was beginning to take itself and the soldier's profession seriously. It also in-

* This Kiyohira, the son of Fujiwara Tsunekiyo and an Abé mother and a descendant of the illustrious Hidesato in the seventh generation, had been adopted by Kiyowara Takesada, the father of Sanehira and Iyehira.

† Sonshi has been excellently translated by Captain E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A.

icates that certain of the savants in the capital were now beginning to regard military treatises, and the principles of the art of war, as not unworthy of their attention. A few generations before such studies would have been scouted as vulgar and trivial, and a mere waste of time and effort. It must also be noted that it was by Ōye Tadafusa, and men like him, that the real work of administration and legislation in the capital was now conducted. They kept the accounts, and drew up all the decrees and edicts and other important Government documents on which the high-born *Kugé* Ministers placed their seal often without so much as a single glance at their text or purport. These men had perhaps as much influence as a British permanent Under-Secretary of State ; and when we find them thus seriously directing their attention to mastering the principles of the soldier's profession, hitherto so much despised, we can form some idea of the change that was coming over the spirit of the times.

In the long-protracted siege of Kanazawa, Yoshiie found the best of opportunities to imbue his troops with a sense of discipline and with a proper respect for the most important, albeit the most primitive, of military virtues. Day after day fierce assaults were delivered, and continued to be delivered, to but little purpose. Yoshiie in his camp set apart special seats for the brave and for the shirkers ; and after each assault, the soldiers were assigned their places according to their deserts. Soon even among those who were cowards by nature, life came to be regarded as of smaller consequence than honour ; while the brave were stimulated to achieve still higher feats. A youth of sixteen, a certain Kamakura Gongorō, a Taira by birth, and the ancestor of the Nagao of Echigo, received an arrow in the eye in the course of one of the assaults. He merely snapped off the shaft ; and then returned his enemy's fire, and brought down the man who had hit him. When he took off his helmet, he tumbled to earth with the barb still in his eye ; and when a friend, in extracting it, put his foot on his face to give himself a purchase, the youthful warrior swore he would have his life for subjecting him to such an indignity ; for to trample on the face of a *Bushi* was an outrage that could be expiated only by the blood of the offender. However, in spite of all the gallantry of his men, Yoshiie was forced to convert the siege into a blockade.

At last provisions in the stockade gave out, and Takehira asked for terms. Yoshiiye would give none. A little later the northern winter became so terrible that Yoshiiye's men begged him to withdraw. He told them to burn their shelters, and warm themselves well that night; to-morrow the stockade would surely be in their hands. That very night Takehira and Iyehira fired their huts, and made their escape. However, they were overtaken, captured, and brought before Yoshiiye, who, after bitterly upbraiding them, ordered their heads to be struck off. Eight and forty of their following shared their fate.


Yoshiiye had early requested the Court to forward a commission to him for the reduction of the two Kiyowaras. But the Kyōto authorities refused to do so; and when Yoshiiye's brother, Yoshimitsu, then in high judicial office in the capital, asked to be allowed to carry reinforcements to the Governor of Mutsu his request was refused. So leaving his insignia of office in the seat of judgement, he started off for the North on his own private responsibility. As the Central Government persisted in its refusal to issue any commission to Minamoto Yoshiiye, and furthermore declined to reward him in any way for tranquillising the province of which he was Governor (Mutsu), he threw the heads of the "rebels" away on the roadside and returned to Kyōto. He took good care, however, to reward his troops from his own private resources; and as a consequence the Kwantō warriors declared that in the case of any quarrel between the Court and the Minamotos, they would stand by the Minamotos!

From whatever point of view it may be regarded, the ex-Emperor Shirakawa's policy here must be unreservedly and uncompromisingly condemned. If Yoshiiye was really suppressing rebellion, he and his troops ought to have been rewarded, in consonance with a host of precedents. If, as the Court contended, he was engaged merely in a quarrel of his own, *then the Court by implication sanctioned the right of private war. For no punishment was inflicted on Yoshiiye for prosecuting what the Court chose to call a "private war"!*

At this date such power as the Minamoto wielded in the Kwantō and Mutsu was almost entirely the result of a moral ascendancy. As yet they had little or no territorial foothold in these quarters. On the conclusion of the Three Years' cam-

paign in the Far North, Yoshiye and his brother Yoshimitsu returned to the capital, where they continued to act as virtual military commandants. It was the disgrace of Yoshiye's third son, Yoshikuni, that led to the settlement of the Minamoto family in the Eastern provinces. In the course of his duties as commander of the Palace Guards, Yoshikuni on horseback met the cortège of the Minister of the Right, Fujiwara Saneyoshi, in a narrow thoroughfare ; and the Minister's followers pulled him (Yoshikuni) from his horse. Thereupon Yoshikuni's retainers promptly fired Saneyoshi's mansion and reduced it to ashes. For this outrage their master was banished to Shimotsuke, where he settled and became the ancestor of some half-dozen of the greatest feudal houses in Japan,—of the Ashikaga, Nitta, Tokugawa, Hosokawa, Yamana, and Satomi. As the great clans of the Minamoto and Taira diverged into septs, the chiefs of the various sub-clans came to be known by the name of the village or district where their domains lay.

The following abridged genealogical chart of the Minamoto family indicates the origin of nearly a score of the "great names" so prominent in the annals of the thirteenth and subsequent centuries :—



Then in the Eastern provinces the Tairas were represented by the Hōjō, Sōma, Miura, Kajiwara, Ōba, Hatakeyama; with Jō and Nagao in Echigo, and less influential septes in Mutsu and Dewa.

What prevented either the Taira or the Minamoto from making their influence fully felt was disunion and internal dissensions. No one chief was sufficiently powerful to command the unquestioning obedience of the whole body of his clansmen. Thus it came to pass that it was by neither of these houses that the first great military fief was consolidated. This was the work of the great Fujiwara of Mutsu.

We have already seen that Fujiwara Tsunekiyo was involved in the ruin of Abé Sadatō in 1062, and that his son, Fujiwara Kiyohira, was adopted into the Kiyowara family that succeeded to the Abé estates at that time. This Fujiwara had aided the Minamotos to reduce the Kiyowara (1086-1089). He was now made Inspector (Ōryōshi) of Mutsu and Dewa, and, later on, Chinjufu-Shōgun, while he at the same time succeeded to the lordship of what had been the domain of his maternal grandfather, Abé Yoritoki. Before his death, in 1126, Kiyohira had built up a semi-independent power, far greater and far more extensive than was to be found anywhere else in contemporary Japan. Thus it was in Ainu-land that the feudal system made its earliest appearance on any considerable scale. It will be remembered that from the ninth century it had been the policy of the Government to settle the Ainu in villages on the footing of ordinary Japanese subjects; that these villages were placed under head-men; and that a Superintendent-in-chief was appointed to exercise general control over the affairs of these communities. It was the holders of this office,—the Abés,—who laid the foundations of the great fief of Mutsu. The great bulk of the retainers must have been of Ainu, or mixed Japanese and Ainu stock. At the present day, marriages between Japanese and Ainu are generally sterile,—a thing not to be wondered at perhaps when we think of the vast difference in physical constitution occasioned by thirty or forty consecutive generations of savage life. But with the settled Ainu of the tenth and succeeding centuries the case might very well have been otherwise; among them the conditions of life were not so very dissimilar to those of their Japanese neighbours.

Thus, at the beginning of the twelfth century, there were three great military houses in Japan. The Taira and the Minamoto were weakened by chronic internal dissension; but on the other hand, the presence of their chieftains in the capital or its vicinity enabled them to play an all-important part in the astounding political developments of the century. The Fujiwara chief maintained strict control over his kinsmen and vassals; but the remoteness of his situation prevented him from exercising any great influence upon the course of national affairs at large. In addition to these three great clans, there was yet one more military power that had to be very seriously reckoned with,—that of the Great Monasteries.

About 970, as has been said, his Eminence, the Abbot of Hi-ei-zan, or Enryaku-ji, had formed a corps of mercenaries to protect the monastery and its possessions, and to prosecute its quarrels with its rivals and foes. The example had been promptly followed by several of the great religious foundations, among which the Monastery of Onjōji or Miidera, at the base of Hi-ei-zan, near Otsu, and the Kofukuji of Nara came to be the most notorious. By the end of the eleventh century any one of these great fanes could readily place several thousand men in the field at very short notice. Each of them had become a huge Cave of Adullam,—a refuge for every sturdy knave with a soul above earning a livelihood by the commonplace drudgery of honest work. Each of them had in truth assumed the aspect of a great fortress garrisoned by a turbulent rabble of armed ruffians. And each of them had degenerated into a hotbed of vice, where the most important precepts of the moral code were openly and wantonly flouted. In truth, at this date, 1100 A.D., Buddhism in Japan from a moral point of view was in not a whit better case than was the Church of Rome between the death of Sylvester II. (1003) and the election of Leo IX. (1049). And yet, in spite of the foulness of their lives, the prestige of the priests had never stood higher, while the resources of the monasteries had never been greater; and year by year they were adding to their wealth.

The years 1081 and 1082 were convulsed with armed strife between the Kofukuji and the monastery of Tamu-no-Mine on the one hand, and Hi-ei-zan and Miidera on the other. In the latter contest, Miidera was burnt to the ground, and the most valuable of its treasures carried off by the assailants. Then,

the latter year saw the beginning of a new terror. A priest of Kumano had been killed by an Owari official. Thereupon three hundred of the dead man's companions shouldered the *Jinyo*,—the sacred sedan in which the god is carried in procession on *fête* days,—marched to the capital, and there clamorously appealed for justice, or revenge. This practice was at once copied by the priests of Hiyoshi, Gion, and Kitano, and a little later on (1093) by the Kofukuji. It would have been a bold man indeed who would have dared to offer violence to the sacred car that bore the *shintai* or god-body, for to do so was an outrage no less heinous than presuming to lay sacrilegious hands upon the Ark of the Covenant. Henceforth it became common for the priests of all these temples to enter the capital sometimes thousands strong, and, with their sacred cars at their head, blockade the mansions of statesmen who had offended them, only withdrawing when their claims were satisfied. Now and then the Emperor and the ex-Emperor were the recipients of their attentions, and subjected to a blockade by these Japanese Dervishes. The nuisance presently was felt to be insufferable; and the protection of the Taira and the Minamoto was invoked. In 1095 a Minamoto killed eight of the leaders of one of these demonstrations and wounded as many. In 1113 Hi-ei-zan and the Kofukuji were on the point of fighting out their quarrel in the streets of the capital. Minamoto Mitsukuni was sent to hold the Hi-ei-zan troops in check, while Minamoto Tameyoshi advanced to Uji and came into conflict with the Kofukuji "army," some 20,000 or 30,000 strong. The result was that the priests had to throw down the car with the *Shimboku* (sacred tree) in the middle of the road and beat a precipitate retreat. These are only a few instances of sacerdotal riot and disorder culled from many. Time and again the capital was thrown into a ferment of panic by the truculence of the monks and their armed bands. The ex-Emperor Shirakawa once remarked that although he was the ruler of Japan there were three things in the Empire beyond his control,—the freaks of the River Kamo (which often inundated and devastated the capital), the fall of the dice, and the turbulence of the priests!

CHAPTER XI.

THE GREATNESS OF THE TAIRA.

FOR the maintenance of order in the capital and in the Empire at large, the Court had come to be entirely dependent upon the strong arms and trenchant blades of the Minamoto and Taira warriors. In this situation lurked, not one, but many elements of danger. Not the least of these was the possible appearance of chieftains strong enough to weld the various discordant septs of their houses into a single unit promptly obedient and readily responsive to the behests of the autocratic will of the head of the clan. It might safely be predicted that in the event of any such contingency, civil war would be the infallible result. It would then become a question as to which chief and which house—Taira or Minamoto—was to play the part of Protagonist on the political stage; and such a question could be settled by nothing but the sharp arbitrament of sword. And with the Imperial power and the civil administration fallen into such decrepitude, the result of any such contest would be to make the victor the real master of the Empire.

Whether the mind of Taira Kiyomori really grasped that fact it is impossible to say. The probabilities are that it did not,—for Kiyomori, like Nobunaga, his descendant in the twentieth generation, was more remarkable for strength of will than for intellectual subtlety or originality. The minds of Kiyomori and Nobunaga on the one hand, and of Yoritomo and of Hideyoshi on the other, were cast in vastly different moulds—Kiyomori and Nobunaga were Japanese of the breed of Attila; Yoritomo and Hideyoshi—the latter especially—have claims, both as statesmen and warriors, to be placed in a much higher class. Both of these were richly endowed with that constructive imagination the lack of which renders the achievement of any great and lasting work in the domain of statesmanship well-nigh impossible. Whatever may have been the mental endowments of Taira Kiyomori, this supreme gift

of the constructive imagination never became conspicuous among them.

When Kiyomori (1118-1181) succeeded his father, Tadamori, as Chieftain of the Ise Heishi in 1153 he was in the very prime of a vigorous manhood. Long before this, those elements of dissension and unrest that were to precipitate the great explosion of 1156 had been accumulating and multiplying apace. There were dissensions in the Imperial family, and there was yet another set of dissensions in the great Fujiwara household.

In 1123, Toba Tennō had abdicated in favour of his son, Sutoku Tennō, then an infant of five. There were thus two ex-Emperors,—a great-grandfather (Shirakawa) and the father (Toba) of the titular sovereign. In 1129, the great-grandfather died, and the father (Toba) at once stepped into his position and assumed the supreme direction of the affairs of the Empire: This, as has been already said, he continued to wield down to his death in 1156,—his most trusted henchmen being Taira Tadamori, and after the death of the latter, in 1153, his son, Taira Kiyomori.

About the date of the death of his grandfather, in 1129, the ex-Emperor Toba made four or five additions to the number of his secondary consorts. On one of these, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in, he lavished the greater part of his affections. The first issue he had by her were daughters; but, in 1139, she at last presented him with a son. Six months later, this baby was proclaimed Heir Apparent to the throne; and in 1141 the intrigues of the ex-Emperor Toba and his consort, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in, drove Sutoku Tennō, then 22 years of age, to abdicate in favour of this infant, who actually reigned for some fourteen years—down to 1155—as Konoye Tennō. From 1141 down to 1156 there were again two ex-Emperors,—a father and a son. Between these, relations were a good deal more than merely strained,—for Sutoku lived in constant dread of his life on account of the machinations of the titular sovereign's mother, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in. Thus at last appeared what was above all to be dreaded by the *Insei* system. It was not indeed an Emperor's and an ex-Emperor's party; but it really amounted to that in substance, for the titular sovereign, Konoye, who died at seventeen, after a nominal reign of fourteen years, was never of the slightest consequence

—except as a convenient puppet or figure-head. Meanwhile the young ex-Emperor Sutoku had begat progeny of his own; and he was not minded to have his beloved son, the Prince Shigehito, debarred from his rightful position of sovereign of Japan.

Here, indeed, were all the elements of yet another deadly succession quarrel. But the situation was still further complicated by discord in the house of Fujiwara, with which the Imperial family was still very intimately connected. Although, during the *Insci* rule, the Fujiwara Regents and Kwampaku and Chancellors wielded no real authority, these positions were still eagerly coveted, for, though they were little better than empty titles as far as the work of administration was concerned, they yet continued to confer the highest social prestige upon their occupants. At the accession of Toba Tennō in 1108, Fujiwara Tadazane (1078–1162), who had been Kwampaku since 1105, was made Regent; and when Toba attained his majority in 1113 Tadazane was again made Kwampaku, while he was also invested with the Chancellorship of the Empire. Eight years later on, he had the ill fortune to come into collision with the old ex-Emperor Shirakawa. The result was that he had to abandon official life and retire to his mansion at Uji, his eldest son, Tadamichi (1097–1164), then 24 years of age, replacing him as Kwampaku. Two years later, in 1123, on the accession of the infant sovereign Sutoku, Tadamichi became Regent; and in 1130, he became the youthful Emperor's father-in-law. Meanwhile his protector, the old ex-Emperor Shirakawa, had died in 1129; and the ex-Emperor Toba then became the real ruler of Japan. Toba very soon had reason to be dissatisfied with Tadamichi; and so Tadamichi was relieved of office, and replaced by his father, who continued to act as Kwampaku down to 1140. One consequence of all this was that the relations between Tadazane and his son Tadamichi became the reverse of friendly. Meanwhile, in 1120, another son had been born to Tadazane; and on this child,—Yorinaga,—Tadazane lavished all his affection. As he grew to manhood Yorinaga was rapidly promoted from one great office to another; and, in 1150, at the age of thirty, he became Minister of the Left. In this year his adopted daughter, Masu-ko, became the consort of the boy Emperor Konoye, then eleven years of age. A little later on,

Konoye Tennō married an adopted daughter of Yorinaga's elder brother, Tadamichi. The brothers had been on bad terms before; but this struggle for ascendancy in the Imperial harem,—or, to speak more correctly, in the Imperial nursery,—seriously embittered the quarrel. The father, Tadazane, threw all his influence against his own first-born, and actually went so far as to deprive him of the family heirlooms that were always entrusted to the prospective head of the great Fujiwara Clan.

Suddenly, in 1155, Konoye died at the age of sixteen. It will be remembered that Konoye was the son of the ex-Emperor Toba, by his favourite, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in. Her ladyship openly declared that her son, Konoye Tennō, had been poisoned at the instigation of his half-brother, the ex-Emperor Sutoku. During the last thirteen years, Sutoku's position had been a very unpleasant one; he now went about in abject fear of his life.

The Lady Bifuku Mon-in had extorted a promise from the ex-Emperor Toba that one of their daughters should ascend the throne on the death of their brother, Konoye Tennō; but the record of the Empresses of the Nara period had not been forgotten, and the national sentiment was found to be entirely averse to any more experiments in the matter of female Sovereigns, reigning in their own right. The succession question now narrowed itself down to a contest between three male candidates; or rather to two, for the ex-Emperor Sutoku was indifferent as to whether he or his son, the Prince Shigehito, should occupy the Imperial seat. Baulked in his project of making the Lady Bifuku Mon-in's daughter Empress in her own right, the old ex-Emperor, Toba, now wished to have his fourth son, Masahito, proclaimed Sovereign. In this aim he was supported by the Kwampaku Tadamichi. This fact alone sufficed to induce Tadamichi's brother, Yorinaga, and their aged father, Tadazane, to support the rival cause with all the influence, and all the resources, at their command. Their efforts proved abortive, however; and Masahito duly ascended the throne as Go-Shirakawa,—or Shirakawa II. At the same time his son Morihito, then twelve years of age, was proclaimed Prince Imperial.

This turn of affairs proved to be a serious blow to the prospects and projects of Yorinaga. He had asked to be entrusted

with the education of the Crown Prince; but not only was his request rejected, but he was further deprived of his post of *Nairan* in the following year, 1156. In consequence of this, he attached himself still more closely to the interests of the ex-Emperor Sutoku, and sedulously endeavoured to fan his ex-Majesty's discontent into a flame.

Just at this juncture, the old ex-Emperor, Toba, died (July 20, 1156); and when Sutoku went to attend the solemn funeral service that same night he was met at the entrance and informed that according to the dying instructions of his father, no place could be found for him there. Mortally offended by this deadly public insult, Sutoku hurried back to his palace, sent for Yorinaga, and at the instigation of the latter, forthwith determined to repossess himself of the throne by the strong hand. Urgent orders were at once transmitted to the landed gentry in the neighbouring provinces and to the monasteries of Nara to move troops up to the capital with all possible expedition.

Intelligence of this was not long in reaching the ears of Shirakawa II. and his advisers. During the last illness of Toba there had been rumours afloat to the effect that an attempt at a *coup d'état* might be expected upon his demise; and he had taken the precaution of sending for ten of the leading captains then in the capital, and making them subscribe to a bond pledging their loyal support to the Lady Bifuku Mon-in. The most prominent among these captains was the Governor of Shimotsuke, Yoshitomo, the eldest son and heir of Tameyoshi, the actual head of the house of Minamoto. Yoshitomo was now summoned in all haste; and he at once placed himself and a body of 400 picked men at the disposal of the Court. At the same time, troops under Minamoto, Taira, and Fujiwara captains were dispatched to seize strategic positions on all the avenues of approach to the capital, and there block the expected advance of the Nara Temple forces and the local *samurai* summoned to the support of Sutoku. On July 29, Taira Kiyomori (Governor of Aki) and his followers joined the Minamoto force under Yoshitomo.

Meanwhile two days before (July 27), Sutoku and Yorinaga had betaken themselves to the old palace of Shirakawa I.,—the vast enceinte of which they hastily strengthened as best they could. It was garrisoned by no more than a few

hundred men,—less than 150 Minamotos, and about an equal number of Tairas, perhaps. The Tairas were under the command of Tadamasa, the uncle of Kiyomori, who led the Taira in the opposing camp. As for the Minamoto, they consisted of the younger brothers of Yoshimoto and their adherents, the whole body being under the direction of Tameyoshi (Yoshimoto's father), the head of the clan.

This Tameyoshi had some reason to repine about the lot that had befallen him. Grandson of Hachiman Tarō, and son of that stormy-petrel Yoshichika, who had perished as a rebel in 1117, he had been constrained to take the field against his grand-uncle Yoshitsuna at the age of thirteen (1109). His victory in this family feud made him Chieftain of the great Minamoto clan. In 1123 he was made *Kebiishi* for the express purpose of dealing drastically with the turbulent monks of Hi-ei-zan. His reward for this was the lower division of the fifth rank,—a very modest recompense indeed. And this was the end of his official career. He had aspired to the Governorship of Mutsu; but this office was bestowed on that local Fujiwara magnate who was then engaged on consolidating the greatest fief in contemporary Japan. Since then, for a whole generation, Tameyoshi had been left in neglect by the Court; and now, in 1156, his brilliant son and heir, Yoshitomo, had outstripped him in the official hierarchy. Yet there is nothing going to show that the very able, though neglected, Minamoto chieftain and his eldest son and heir were on bad terms with each other. Besides Yoshitomo, Tameyoshi had eight or nine younger sons,—nearly all masterful, reckless, turbulent dare-devils. In the year before this (1155) one of these, Yoshikata, had been slain in battle by his nephew Yoshikura (a son of Yoshitomo), a boy of fifteen! The precocity of these Minamotos in the art of war, and in a minor degree in statecraft, is perhaps best illustrated by the instance of Tameyoshi's eighth son, Tametomo. While still a mere boy his immense physical strength and his rough unruly ways made him a terror to the household, and so his father was constrained to get rid of him, and sent him away to Kyūshū. This was in 1152, when Tametomo was no more than thirteen years of age. Arrived in Bungo he promptly set to work to attract followers, arrogated to himself the title of *Sotsuibushi* or General Superintendent of Police, and opened hostilities against some of the most pro-

minent local magnates,—the Haradas of Hizen and the Kikuchis of Higo among others. His chief ally and supporter was Ata, the Acting-Governor of Satsuma, whose daughter he married. Most of the former supporters of his grandfather, the turbulent rebel Yoshichika, also rallied around him. For a few years the greater part of the Nine Provinces was kept in an unceasing turmoil. At last the Court interfered, and sternly called upon Tameyoshi to recall this *enfant terrible* of his. Tametomo, however, paid no heed to his father's instructions, and as a consequence Tameyoshi was stripped of such modest rank and office as he held. Thereupon Tametomo, taking with him eight and twenty picked men, hurried up to Kyōto, and arrived there just in time to be able to join his father and his brothers in defence of the old palace of Shirakawa I. At that date he was only seventeen years of age; but even then he had attained a stature of seven feet, while his muscular development was prodigious. It took three or four ordinary men to bend the bow he used—a huge weapon 8ft. 6in. in length. His left arm was four inches longer than his right, and this enabled him to draw a bow-string eighteen hand-lengths (about 5ft.) and to release his bolts with terrific force.

In the council of war held on the 29th, Tametomo had advocated a night attack on the headquarters of the Emperor's adherents. But Fujiwara Yorinaga negatived the proposal. Meanwhile Yoshitomo and Kiyomori, on their side, had determined on a night-attack; and presently Sutoku's supporters found themselves invested by a force of 1,700 men. Tametomo with his eight and twenty men were holding the Western Gate, and it was against this portal that Yoshitomo advanced. He was warned off by Tametomo, who shot off one of the silver studs ornamenting his helmet, the bolt burying itself in the gate-post. Presently Taira Kiyomori launched his troops at the position held by Tametomo, with the brothers Kagetsuna at their head. Tametomo shot one of them through the body, the shaft being sped with such force that it went on and mortally wounded the other. The garrison, though outnumbered by five or six to one, made a most obstinate and gallant defence; and it was not until Yoshitomo succeeded in firing the wood-work that the assailants could make any headway. There had been no rain for some time previously and the attack had been delivered in a terrific dust-storm raised by a

strong west wind. The buildings caught like tinder, and the flames spread rapidly, lighting up the city for miles around with their lurid glare, while at the same time the palace of Sutoku, the great mansion of Yorinaga, and twelve other houses of the conspirators were blazing furiously. Presently the only resource left to the defenders was flight.

Yorinaga had fallen, struck by a stray arrow; but most of the other leaders escaped and went into hiding. It was announced that they were to be banished; and then many of them shaved their heads and came out and gave themselves up. Among these was Tadamasa, Kiyomori's uncle. The Emperor thereupon ordered Kiyomori to kill Tadamasa, and Kiyomori made no difficulty about carrying out his instructions. Yoshitomo was at the same time commanded to kill his father. But this Yoshitomo refused to do; and then the Emperor threatened to entrust the commission to Taira Kiyomori. Thereupon one of Yoshitomo's retainers pointed out that it would be a great disgrace to the clan if its head was executed by a Taira; and so at last, Yoshitomo allowed this retainer to carry out the Imperial commands. Altogether, about seventy of Sutoku's supporters were sent to kneel at the blood pit. Since the revolt of Fujiwara Nakanari in 810,—that is for a period of 346 years—the death penalty had ceased to be inflicted on Ministers and officers of the Court. What especially intensified the general revulsion occasioned by these wholesale executions was the fact that they took place during the mourning for an Emperor and an ex-Emperor, for it was contrary to all precedent to exact the extreme penalty of the law at such seasons. The man who was chiefly responsible for the severity shown on this occasion was Fujiwara Michinori, whose wife had been the Emperor's nurse, and who now enjoyed the full confidence of the Sovereign. On the other hand, one act of clemency has to be imputed unto him for righteousness on this occasion. The old Fujiwara chief, Tadzane, was to be rigorously dealt with, but Tadamichi induced Michinori to intercede for him. The long-standing breach between father and son was thus healed at last; and thenceforward they lived on the most affectionate relations.

Sutoku was banished to Sanuki, where he died in 1164 at the age of 46. His son, Prince Shigehito, was compelled to become a priest. Yorinaga's sons and about twenty other

members of his household were banished to distant parts of the Empire. Tametomo's bravery had excited the wonder and admiration of the Court; so when arrested he was not decapitated, but merely exiled to the islands of Idzū, the sinews of his arm being cut as a precautionary measure.

It will be remarked that at this crisis each of the three Great Houses of Fujiwara, Minamoto, and Taira alike found itself a prey to divided counsels and split into rival factions arrayed in opposing camps. We are sometimes told that all the Minamoto except Yoshitomo supported Sutoku. This is glaringly incorrect. What is true is that Tameyoshi and all his surviving sons except Yoshitomo did cast in their lot with the ex-Sovereign. The exception is all important, for it was on Yoshitomo the Minamoto clansmen in the wider sense of the term placed all their hopes and reliance. His following in the famous night-attack of July 29 was three or four times as numerous as that of his father; and among his officers were many subordinate Minamoto chieftains of high prestige and great ability. One of his lieutenants was the founder of the great house of Ashikaga, and another was that famous scholar and soldier, Minamoto Yori-masa, who twenty-four years later on was destined to make the Empire ring with the gallantry of a more than septuagenarian warrior. As regards the Taira, Tadamasa carried with him some of the best and most influential captains among the Ise Heishi. Thus the conflict was by no manner of means a contest between Minamoto and Taira as such. That was to come three years later on.

To all outward appearances, now firmly seated on the throne, Shirakawa II. took a firm hold on the reins of government. A determined attempt was made to revive, or revert to, the ordinances and machinery of Sanjō II. But Sanjō II. and Shirakawa II. were very different men. Shirakawa II. had indeed a strong will; but his likes and dislikes, and the indulgence of his personal caprices, were of far greater consequence to him than were the genuine national interests committed to his charge. He was the most devout of Buddhists; but the intensity of his devoutness soon proved to be not incompatible with disordered morals and a profligate life. He quickly wearied of the irksomeness of the Imperial office, and in 1158 he abdicated in favour of his eldest son

(Nijō Tennō), then sixteen years of age. Before his death, thirty-four years later on (1192), he was destined to see no fewer than five sovereigns ascend the throne,—two sons and three grandsons of his own. Some of these were nothing more or less than puppets of his own; but it was only during the first eight or ten years after his abdication in 1158 that his influence in administrative affairs was preponderant. The *Insei* system had indeed been of value as a makeshift; but with his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II. it got swept into the limbo of the expedients which have been tried and found wanting.

During Shirakawa II.'s brief reign of two or three years (1155–1158) the real power behind the throne was that Fujiwara Michinori—(also known by his ecclesiastical name of Shinsai, for he had taken the tonsure in 1140)—whom we have seen urging the ruthless execution of Sutoku's partisans even in a season of national mourning for a deceased sovereign. Taira Kiyomori's prompt execution of his uncle Tadamasa had recommended him to Michinori. Minamoto Yoshitomo's efforts to evade the invidious task of butchering his own father in cold blood had earned for him Michinori's aversion. Hence, as it was really by Michinori's advice that reward and punishment, promotion and degradation were meted out, Yoshitomo had to content himself with the modest recompense of the command of the cavalry in the Imperial Guard, while Taira Kiyomori was invested with the Governorship of Harima, and with the still more important office of Acting Viceroy of Kyūshū. From this moment a struggle between Taira Kiyomori, then thirty-eight years of age, and Minamoto Yoshitomo, five years his junior, began. It is only the suppliant who competes; and Yoshitomo was weak enough to put himself in the position of a suppliant. Furthermore this gallant and chivalrous warrior—for such indeed he was—bemeaned himself so far as to resort to the hackneyed Fujiwara device of making merchandise of his female offspring; and sent a middleman to offer his daughter in marriage to Michinori's son. The proffered alliance was rejected; and Yoshitomo's well-earned chagrin was presently intensified by hearing of the sumptuous banquet that was given in honour of the nuptials of a son of Michinori with a daughter of Taira Kiyomori.

Just at this juncture Yoshitomo met his evil angel in the person of a certain Fujiwara Nobuyori. This Nobuyori, a

descendant of Michitaka (who had been Regent and Kwampaku from 990 to 995), was then a handsome and graceful young man of six and twenty, with qualities, showy indeed, but entirely superficial. Thanks to the favour he had found in the eyes of Shirakawa II., he had early been invested with important offices both civil and military; and promotion had succeeded promotion with startling celerity. But the avidity and ambition of this spoiled child of fortune knew no bounds; and he was now importuning the ex-Emperor for the title and post of Commander-in-Chief of the Guards. The ex-Sovereign was inclined to gratify his favourite and was indeed on the point of expediting the patent when Fujiwara Michinori adduced such cogent reasons for staying his hand, that Nobuyori's hopes were blasted at the eleventh hour. Deeply chagrined at this, Nobuyori feigned illness, ceased appearing at Court, and devoted all his energies to knitting together a party strong enough to enable him to make away with Michinori and realise his prospects by main force. He found ready confederates among his own fellow-clansmen, the Fujiwara; but it was the services of the warlike Minamoto that he was most eager to enlist. Michinori and Taira Kiyomori were now hand-in-glove; Minamoto Yoshitomo had abundant reason for being dissatisfied with both of them. Accordingly Nobuyori "used sweet words" to Yoshitomo whenever they met; Yoshitomo was informed that in an alliance with Nobuyori lay the road to rich manors, high rank and office for himself and his sons, and a brilliant match for his daughter. An understanding was speedily arrived at, and the plot rapidly matured. At last all that was wanted was a favourable opportunity for action.

This presently offered itself when, on January 14, 1160, Taira Kiyomori and his eldest son, Shigemori, set out for Kumano with a few attendants. Five days later, on the night of January 19, 1160, the confederates, with 500 men, assailed the palace of the ex-Emperor, took possession of his person, cut down the guards, killed many of the inmates and finally fired the building and burned it to the ground. The ex-Emperor was taken to the Great Palace, while the Emperor Nijō was presently interned in the Palace of Kurodo and a strict guard set at all the exits. Next day Michinori's mansion was burned, and his consorts and concubines and female attendants ruthlessly massacred. As for Michinori himself, he had by a

lucky chance got a timely hint of what was to be expected. He at once rode off post-haste to the Emperor's Palace; sent in a warning by one of the maids of honour, and then whipped his horse off into the darkness of the night. He reached Nara, and hid in a cavern there; but his lurking place was soon discovered; and a day or so later his head was on the public pillory in front of the prison in the capital.

With the Sovereign and the ex-Sovereign safely in their power, the conspirators at once began to carry things with a high hand. Nobuyori appointed himself Chancellor and Commander-in-Chief; Yoshitomo was advanced in rank and made Governor of Harima, while all the subordinate chiefs received more or less important offices. Of course, they gave out that they were acting in accordance with the Imperial instructions, and it was not difficult for them to get the Sovereign to set his seal to the documents placed before him, for his refusal to do so would infallibly have cost him his throne. Everything seemed to bid fair for the success of the *coup d'état*, when the prospects of the conspirators were dashed by a very dramatic incident. They had issued a summons to all the chief officers to assemble for discussion on the 29th, failure to attend involving the penalty of death. Fujiwara Mitsuyori, the elder brother of Korekata, one of Nobuyori's most important lieutenants, and before the revolt Nobuyori's superior officer in the Guards, put on his ceremonial robes, and made his way into the Council Chamber. "There he found Nobuyori occupying the chief seat, and all the other officers not in their usual places. He at once stopped and called out loudly: 'How is it that you are all out of your places, and that the proper order of the Court is not observed?' He then passed on, and boldly took his seat above Nobuyori, who quailed at this fine display of moral courage. Mitsuyori, on seating himself, asked in a loud voice what the meaning of all this was. No one ventured to reply. Thereupon Mitsuyori threw back his dress, and standing upright turned to his younger brother Korekata and angrily asked him why he had joined the *rebels*, and assured him that swift punishment would overtake all concerned in the wretched business. Then with a few more blunt and bitter words, he passed out, none daring to stay him or to raise a hand against him." Six days later (February 4) the great

effect of Mitsuyori's bold front on this occasion became only too apparent.

Meanwhile, the all-important question had become what were the Tairas doing. On their way to Kumano, Kiyomori and his son had learned of the outbreak, and with the aid of the Bettō of Kumano they succeeded in getting about a hundred men together. With these they were on the point of returning to the capital, when it was reported that Minamoto Yoshihira was at hand with 3,000 troops. This Yoshihira (another Japanese Hercules), then 20 years of age, was Yoshitomo's eldest son, born when his father was a youth of eighteen. At fifteen Yoshihira had had to take the field against an uncle of his own in Musashi and, as already stated, had defeated and killed him. He had now hurried up from Kamakura; and at a council of war had asked to be entrusted with troops to waylay and kill the two Tairas. His request had been refused by Nobuyori; but the false rumour of his approach seriously disconcerted Kiyomori, who then thought of retiring into the Western Country to muster men there. But Shigemori would have none of this; they would certainly be outlawed as rebels if the conspirators were left to consolidate their position. So the Tairas, with their handful of men, boldly hastened back to the capital, and posted themselves in their Rokuhara mansion. Here they were presently joined by the nobles and functionaries in crowds, while their armed following soon assumed respectable proportions. And on the night of February 4, the Emperor, disguised as a maid of honour waiting upon the Empress, was borne along with her into the Taira stronghold! Fujiwara Korekata, overawed by his elder brother's reproaches at the memorable council of January 29th, had resolved to do something to atone for his conduct, and had succeeded in bringing the Sovereign safely through the gates and guards of his Kurodo prison. Almost at the same time the ex-Emperor made good his escape; and the conspirators' doom then became almost assured.

In the Kurodo Palace the flight of the Sovereign was soon discovered. But when it was communicated to Nobuyori, he was drinking deeply, if not actually drunk; and so he paid no attention to the communication. Next morning he speedily realised the extent of the disaster; and then he entirely lost his head, Yoshitomo kept cool, however; and ordering the

matter to be kept secret he at once threw himself into the Great Palace to await the inevitable Taira attack there. In two or three hours it came. A body of 1,000 men, in two corps, headed by Shigemori and his uncle Yorimori respectively, were launched against two of the gates. Shigemori at first had some success against Yoshihira; but after penetrating some way into the enclosure he was beaten out again. Yoshitomo was more than holding his own against Yorimori, when a feigned flight of the Tairas drew the defenders of the gate after them. Then all at once the Taira men turned, rushed through or past the pursuers, poured into the Palace, and occupied the gate. Thus dislodged from the Palace, the Minamoto assailed the Rokuhara. But just at this moment, Minamoto Yorimasa with his command of 300 men, hitherto camped outside the Palace, refused to move, and on being assailed by Yoshihira, passed over to the Tairas. The assault on the Rokuhara was a disastrous and bloody failure; and the Minamoto leaders had no course then open to them but to evacuate the capital.

In their retreat they found the road strongly held by the armed monks of Hi-ei-zan; and in this encounter the Minamoto lost heavily before they succeeded in breaking through. On reaching Seta, Yoshitomo ordered his men to disperse, and, attended by his sons Yoshihira, Tomonaga, and Yoritomo, and three or four followers, made his way through the storms and snowdrifts to Aohaka in Mino. Hence he dispatched his two eldest sons to raise fresh troops in Shinano and Kai; but his second son, Tomonaga, had been severely wounded in the encounter with the priests, and had to return. Yoshitomo then threatened to abandon him; but Tomonaga begged his father to kill him rather than to let him fall into the hands of their foes; and Yoshitomo actually complied with the request. Tomonaga was then a mere boy of fifteen. A little later his corpse was exhumed by Taira Munekiyo, who cut off the head, and sent it to be pilloried in the capital, along with that of Yoshitomo, who had meanwhile met his fate. He had got as far as Owari, on his way to raise a force in the Kwantō, when he was assailed and slain in his bath, by a retainer of his own who had proffered him a treacherous hospitality. This was on February 12, only twenty-three days after the assault on the ex-Emperor's Palace.

On learning of the death of his father, Yoshihira abandoned his mission to Shinano and returned to the capital with the intention of assassinating the Tairas. His host betrayed him, and 300 men were sent to effect his arrest. But he cut his way through them and escaped,—only to be caught two or three days later on in Ōmi. On March 3, he was publicly decapitated on the Rokujōgawara execution ground in the capital.

Meanwhile the headsman had been very busy, for thirty or forty of the conspirators had had to pay the extreme penalty. Among them had been Fujiwara Nobuyori; and he, the prime instigator of the whole disturbance, had made a pitiable appearance indeed. In the defence of the Great Palace, he had at once quailed at the stern clash of arms, and blenching before the Taira onset had precipitately abandoned the position entrusted to him and sought safety in the rear of Yoshitomo's command. On the retreat of the Minamotos, Nobuyori, instead of accompanying them, hastened to the Ninnaji, forced himself into the presence of Shirakawa II., and with much weeping and moaning abjectly implored the ex-Sovereign to obtain a pardon for him. Shirakawa at once sent a note to the Emperor beseeching mercy for the suppliant; but no reply was returned to it. Meanwhile Taira troops arrived, seized Nobuyori and took him away to the Rokuhara, where Kiyomori, after upbraiding him bitterly, promptly consigned him to a richly merited doom.

This *émeute* of 1160 was of even greater consequence in the history of the Empire than the great disturbance of the summer of 1156. It was the events of 1160 that finally opened the way to the establishment of a military despotism in Japan. It will be noted that in neither of the two outbreaks had the military class been the prime movers. The war of 1156 had been occasioned by a disputed succession to the throne, by dissensions in the Fujiwara House, and by the mortified vanity and thwarted ambition of a Fujiwara chief. The struggle of 1160 was mainly the outcome of a quarrel between two Fujiwara favourites. In both conflicts alike, the military men had been merely the tools, or, at best, the auxiliaries of ambitious and mutually jealous civilians. The contests had been by no manner of means contests of the pen with the sword; for the great warlike clans, so far from being able to combine and present a united front against the civilian authorities and magnates,

were hopelessly at variance. And not only were Minamoto and Taira not in unison with each other; both clans were dogged by that curse of internal dissension which had proved the bane of the great house of Fujiwara, and eke of the Imperial line itself. In 1156 it had been a case in the Imperial House of brother against brother, of Sovereign against Sovereign; among the Fujiwara of son against brother and father; among the Tairas of uncle against nephew; and among the Minamotos of son against brothers and father. In that dire contest, the Tairas had been the chief gainers, for the death of Tadamasa, Kiyomori's jealous rival, had made the latter undisputed head of the Ise Heishi, and removed a fruitful source of disunion and weakness in the counsels of the clan. On the contrary, Minamoto Yoshitomo was on the best relations with his father and brothers who perished on that fateful occasion; and the Minamotos had lost quite as much as the Tairas had then gained. Still the two great warlike clans remained fairly well balanced in strength and resources; and while this was so, any unquestioned domination of a military chief in the councils of the Empire was a virtual impossibility.

All that was altered by the events of 1160. When the heads of Yoshitomo and his two eldest sons had been placed on the public pillory, the Taira had good reason for believing that they had nothing more to dread from Minamoto rivalry, for with the ablest surviving adult Minamoto, the illustrious scholar and soldier Yorimasa, Kiyomori was on the best of terms, and could readily count on his loyal support. The Emperor Nijō, while by no means a mere puppet, had to bend to the will of his father, the ex-Emperor Shirakawa II.; and with Shirakawa II. Kiyomori's relations had always been satisfactory. Hitherto, behind his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II. had stood Fujiwara Michinori, a very able, very astute, and—when reasons of State demanded it—a somewhat unscrupulous statesman, ready in case of emergency to deal with opponents by the drastic methods of a Richelieu or an Ii Kamon no Kami. Michinori's head had lately been inspected on the public pillory by his chief rival in the affections and regard of Shirakawa II., Fujiwara Nobuyori, to wit; and now, in turn the skin was gradually peeling from the grisly lineaments of what had once been the handsome features of that very Nobuyori whose head had replaced the head of that rival

he had "inspected" with such well-bred and *insouciant* contempt. Where was his ex-Majesty now to turn for counsel? Without Michinori as Achitophel, Shirakawa II. could scarcely hope to restore and maintain the system and institutions of his great-great-grandfather, Sanjo II. As for the Fujiwaras, they were not now especially dangerous; for their chief, the Kwampaku Motosane, instead of being an old, experienced, and *rusé* politician as had been the wont in the heyday of the fortunes of the great house, was a callow youth of sixteen summers. To this young man, who held office from 1159 to his death at twenty-four in 1166, the Tairas were careful to show a becoming measure of deference and respect. But it was instinctively recognised by them that it was the whims and caprices of his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II. that had above all to be studied and consulted,—for the time being, at least. About the beginning of 1161, discord broke out between the ex-Emperor and his son, Nijō Tennō; but just when the son was attaining to years of discretion he died in 1166, and was succeeded by his son (Rokujō Tennō), an infant of two years! Three years later this baby Sovereign was virtually deposed by his grandfather (Shirakawa II.), who then placed his own favourite son on the throne as the Emperor Takakura. The new Sovereign was only eight years of age, and he occupied the throne for eleven years,—down to 1180, the year before his death. Now, the mother of the new Sovereign was Kiyomori's sister-in-law; and the Taira chieftain presently showed that it was his purpose to rise to supreme power by the exercise of traditional Fujiwara devices, backed by the substantial support of a now practically united military class.

As a reward for his services in February 1160, Kiyomori had been made Sangi and raised to the first grade of the third rank,—an exceptional measure of Court favour for a mere military man. At the same time, some of his sons and brothers* were invested with Provincial Governorships; an office now of little or no consequence to mere civilians, but of great and increasing importance to military men, whose influence depended not so much on mere Court rank as on the number of swordsmen and mounted archers they could bring into the field, when occasion demanded. The chief competitors of the

* He had four brothers, eleven sons, and several daughters,

Tairas for these posts had been the Minamotos; now the Minamotos had, to all appearance, been annihilated; and hence the Ise Heishi could lay a wide foundation for their power. Before the death of Kiyomori in 1181, more than thirty of these gubernatorial positions had passed into the hands of members of the clan,—mostly in Central, Western, and Southern Japan. What it is all-important to observe is that what was to become a noted feature of feudal Japan—*the confusion of administrative with proprietary rights*—was now beginning to make itself apparent, if not actually conspicuous. Hence these thirty odd Taira Provincial Governorships were really so many feudal principalities in the germ.

If Kiyomori had followed his natural promptings and utterly exterminated the progeny of Yoshitomo in 1160 the course of the social and political development of the Empire would have been very different from that which the historian has to record. But in 1160, in the person of Yoritomo, the fourteen-year-old third son of Yoshitomo, Kiyomori spared not merely a deadly future rival, but what he himself was emphatically not,—a master of statecraft of nearly, if not entirely and absolutely, of the very first rank.

This Yoritomo had an exceptional share of the traditional Minamoto precocity. Just before the struggle of 1160, he had gone through the *gembuku* ceremony,—the old Japanese analogue of the assumption of the *toga virilis* among the Romans, —had taken his place in the ranks, and in the defence of the Great Palace and in the subsequent encounters had fought like a seasoned veteran. At Aohaka, when Tomonaga, unable to execute his mission to raise fresh troops by reason of his rankling wound, returned to be killed by his father, among the many bitter things then said to him, perhaps the bitterest of all was that he *should profit by the example of his younger brother Yoritomo*, and try to play the man! Shortly after the assassination of his father, Yoritomo fell into the hands of that Taira, Munekiyo, who broke into Tomonaga's tomb in order to take his head and send it to be pilloried in the capital. Arrived in Kyōto with his captive, Munekiyo was ordered to keep him in ward for the present; in a short time he would be publicly executed. Meanwhile Yoritomo's grave demeanour had excited the compassion of his captor, who had asked him if he would like to live. "Yes," was the reply; "both my

father and elder brothers are dead; who but myself can pray for their happiness in the next world?" Struck by this filial answer, Munekiyo went to the Lady Ike no Gozen, Kiyomori's stepmother, who had become a nun after the death of her husband, Tadamori. She had borne one son of great promise, called Uma, on whom she had lavished all her affection, and whose early death had been the great affliction of her life. So, when in the course of his story Munekiyo told her that Yoritomo was the very image of what Uma would then have been had he lived, her feelings were deeply stirred, and her profoundest sympathy enlisted. She at once hurried off to Kiyomori to implore mercy for the youthful captive, lying under sentence of death. It was only after most importunate pleading that Kiyomori yielded, for he had counsellors about him who insistently urged the utter extermination of the whole turbulent Minamoto brood. At last, however, he reluctantly consented to mitigate the death penalty one degree: and so Yoritomo was banished to the wilds of the Idzu peninsula. Here he was placed under the strict surveillance of Taira partisans, on whose implicit fidelity Kiyomori flattered himself he could surely rely. In little more than a score of years it was to become abundantly manifest that the tears shed by the Lady Ike no Gozen on this occasion were destined to prove a veritable fount of calamity to the house of Taira.

Just at this juncture an incident occurred clearly indicating that the rough ferocity of Kiyomori's nature, the reputed inflexibility of his will, and the soundness of his judgement, were all alike liable to be affected by the charms of female beauty, no less than by maternal importunity. The lady Tokiwa, Yoshitomo's concubine, was perhaps the loveliest woman in the capital. She was the mother of three boys, all young,—in fact the last of them had been born only a few months before the great outbreak that proved so fatal to their father and their two eldest brothers. Tokiwa had got timely warning of the defeat and proscription of her lord and all his household; and with her youngest babe in her bosom, another strapped to her back, and with the eldest clasping her hand, she hurriedly passed out through a postern into the snowy roadway under the friendly cover of the blinding whirl of fleecy flakes. Instead of following her husband towards the North, she daringly set her face to the South, passed the great Taira mansion of Rokuhara

with its flaring lights, and made for Fushimi. After untold hardships and a series of romantic and thrilling adventures, she at last safely reached the village of Ryūmon in Yamato, and went into hiding there. Kiyomori's eager search for her was utterly in vain; so he seized her mother, and threatened to kill her unless Tokiwa appeared with her offspring. When Tokiwa heard of this, there was a keen and painful conflict between maternal instinct and the teachings of the Classic of Filial Piety. The latter conquered, and Tokiwa presented herself before Kiyomori, who was so overcome with her dazzling beauty that he at once resolved to make her his concubine. She at first absolutely refused; but her mother, weeping floods of tears, dwelt on the misery of disobedience and on her future happiness; and Tokiwa at last yielded, on condition that the lives of her children were spared. Again the Taira vassals were all for ruthless and unrelenting measures; but against Tokiwa, supported by the pleadings of the Lady Ike no Gozen, they were powerless. All three boys when grown were to be sent to a monastery to be trained for the priesthood,—such was the compromise arrived at. As a matter of fact, Tokiwa's relations with Kiyomori were comparatively brief; after bearing him a daughter, she became the spouse of a Fujiwara nobleman,—the Minister of Finance. It was an evil day for the Taira when the life of Tokiwa's youngest child was spared, for the brilliant military genius of Yoshitsune contributed as much to the fall of the Heishi as the statecraft of his elder half-brother Yoritomo did.

But all these were things of the future never for a moment thought of or dreamt of by Kiyomori. For long years the sole and single Minamoto that caused him any disquietude was that redoubtable archer of seven feet stature and four men's strength, Tametomo, who had been banished to the isles of Idzu in 1156, after having had the sinews of his arm cut. Nine years afterwards, in the spring of 1165 (we are informed by the Japanese annalist), "Minamoto Tametomo set out with some vessels for Onigashima (the Isle of Demons) and took possession of this island." Tametomo had opened up communication with Ata, his father-in-law, Acting Governor of Satsuma, and with his help had been able to make his way to the Lūchūs. Here he married the younger sister of one of the *Anzu* or territorial magnates who were then becoming

too powerful to be controlled by the King of the group, and were fighting among themselves; and by this lady he became the father of the founder of the new dynasty of Lūchū sovereigns.* Three or four years later he made his way back to Ōshima; and from this base he began to harry the shores of the opposite peninsula, and to levy blackmail upon the lieges. He was simply repeating the record of his grandfather Yoshichika and his own early record in Kyūshū, and endeavouring to carve out a principality for himself in Eastern Japan. In 1170, the Vice-Governor of Idzu, Kudō Shigemitsu, was commissioned by the Court to make an end of him. "The Kwantō troops were got under arms on the fourth month and attempted to carry his camp by surprise; but he defended himself valiantly with his archers. At last after most of his craft had been taken or sunk, and almost every one of his followers killed, he disembowelled himself at the age of thirty-three." This bald entry is unusually interesting inasmuch as it is the first authentic notice I have so far met with of that practice of *hara-kiri*, the

* "In the latter part of the 25th generation of the age of Tenson (1175-1177) the King became less powerful, and the *Anzu* began to contend for power, erecting strongholds for themselves. At this time there was a haughty subject called Riyu. Being a favourite of the King, he took charge of the administration of the country in his early years. Meantime he usurped the throne by assassinating the King. This caused the end of the House of Tenson.

"In 1189, King Shunten ascended the throne. He was the son of Minamoto Tametomo, who came to the islands to escape from some trouble, and married a younger sister of an *Anzu* of Tairi. She gave birth to a boy called Sonton. Afterward, intending to return home, Tametomo set sail with his family. The party encountered a tempest, which threatened the vessel with destruction. The sailors all said to Tametomo that Ryujin (or Ryūgu, the Far-Eastern Poseidon) had raised this wind, because there was a female on board, and implored him to send her ashore in order to save their lives. Tametomo was obliged to send his wife ashore at the Harbour of Maki. She took her infant son with her; and going to Urazoye, spent some years there in a humble cottage. Before the boy had attained his tenth year he had displayed talent and unequalled strength (true Minamoto precocity). In 1180, at the age of fourteen, he was elected *Anzu* of Urazoye. When Riyu usurped the throne, Sonton overthrew the murderer, and, ascending the throne at the request of the *Anzu*, became King Shunten. The King had a wen on the right side of his head, and in order to prevent it from being seen he dressed his hair. All the natives then followed the style set by the King, and dressed their hair in accordance with it. This was the beginning of the mode of wearing the hair in vogue among the Loochooans."

See Mr. Leavenworth's interesting pamphlet on the Lūchū Islands for an abstract of the MS. History in the archives of the provincial capital of the Lūchūs. In connection with the last two sentences, see Herbert Spencer's *Ceremonial Institutions*, Sect. 424.

“happy dispatch,” which was presently destined to become one of the most distinctive institutions of the feudalism of Japan.

Meanwhile with all dread of possible Minamoto rivalry thus thoroughly removed, Kiyomori found the ground cleared for a contest with the civilian Fujiwaras. For some time he abstained from any overt acts of hostility against them; his immediate intention being to work through and by them by means of that very device by which they had contrived to hold the titular Sovereign in their hands for generations. The circumstances of the time were highly propitious for such an attempt on Kiyomori's part. The Kwampaku, Motozane, the chief of the clan, was, as has been said, a stripling of sixteen when he was invested with this high office in 1159. He had married a Fujiwara lady; but Kiyomori presently succeeded in giving her a rival in the person of his own daughter. In a short time Kiyomori's ascendancy over his youthful son-in-law was complete. Then suddenly, in 1166, Motozane died, at the age of twenty-four, leaving only one infant son, the offspring not of Kiyomori's daughter, but of his Fujiwara consort. The boy was greatly attached to Kiyomori's daughter, however. By the right of primogeniture, so far as it was recognised, he was the head of the clan. But then it had become the custom of the Fujiwara house to regard that member of it who became Kwampaku or Regent as its head,—or *Uji-Chōja*. But to invest a mere baby with the Regency of the Empire was at this date still a moral impossibility; in fact Motozane's investiture with that great office at sixteen had given rise to much adverse criticism among the Court nobles, who still, to a great extent, formulated the public opinion of the times. So, on Motozane's death, his half-brother Motofusa, then twenty-two years of age, was made Regent. According to use and wont he should have become Bettō of all the ancestral temples and shrines, and of the great family college, while the treasured heirlooms of the house and all its numerous manors should have been at once transferred to him. But just at this point Kiyomori, at the instigation of a certain Fujiwara Kunitsuna, thought fit to interfere. Motozane's five-year-old son, Motomichi, was entrusted to the care of Kiyomori's daughter; and both were installed in a new mansion, which was entrusted to the watch and ward of stout and staunch Taira henchmen. The Regent, Motofusa, was deprived of the protectorship of certain of the an-

cestral temples and shrines, of all the Fujiwara manors in the west of Japan, and,—most important of all,—of the cherished family heirlooms and records which were invariably entrusted to the keeping of the *Uji-Choja*. All these were now transferred to the infant Motomichi, who was entirely in Kiyomori's hands. *Divide et impera*,—that was Kiyomori's policy towards the Fujiwara,—an astute policy enough, perhaps, but a policy for which his own unaided commonplace brain was not to be held accountable.

Meanwhile, this new arrangement had interfered with certain plans and projects of that *rusé* politician, the ex-Emperor Shirakawa II.; and his ex-Majesty had been injudicious enough to give his tongue free rein.

A year before, the Emperor Nijō, that son with whom Shirakawa II. had been on notoriously bad terms, had died a month or two after his abdication in favour of his baby son of two years (Rokujō Tennō). At his obsequies there had been a collision between the monks of Hi-ei-zan and those of the Kōfukuji of Nara over the very worldly question of place and precedence at the ceremony, with the result that they had appealed to arms and fought it out in the streets, several subsidiary fanes being then fired and not a little ecclesiastical blood spilt. Even before the monks and their retainers had appeared in mail, there had been rumours afloat to the effect that the priests had been commissioned by the throne to chastise the insolence of Taira Kiyomori. The net result of all this was that his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II. had to present himself before the redoubtable Kiyomori in what was virtually the guise of an abject suppliant! And Shirakawa II., in some respects, was remarkably astute, while Kiyomori was, if we read him right, exceedingly puzzle-headed. The stars in their (capricious) courses were fighting valiantly for Kiyomori!

One thing that induced his ex-Majesty to pay such undue deference to the humours of Kiyomori was that the younger sister of Kiyomori's wife was the mother of Shirakawa II.'s favourite son, and that the ex-Emperor was bent on placing that son on the throne at the earliest opportunity. In November 1166, three months after the death of the Emperor Nijō, and four months after the accession of his infant son, Rokujō (1166-1168), this lad, then six or seven years of age, was proclaimed Prince Imperial. A few weeks later, Kiyomori

was named Naidaijin; and then, on the 4th March, 1167, without passing through the posts of Minister of the Right and Minister of the Left, he rose at a single bound to the Chancellorship of the Empire and the Junior Grade of the *First Rank*! For such extraordinary promotion there had been no more than one single solitary precedent among the proud civilian Fujiwaras; and, of course, for a mere military man to obtain such office, and such rank, was so utterly unprecedented as to be revolutionary! The most illustrious warrior of whom Japan could boast, Saka-no-Uye no Tamura Maro, had reaped the richest meed ever bestowed upon a soldier; and he had been amply satisfied with the Third Rank and the post of Dainagon. Naturally enough, this astounding rise of a mere military parvenu (as they held Kiyomori to be) gave the deepest umbrage to the Fujiwara clansmen, whose material resources he was in a measure appropriating, and whose position he was sapping by the exercise of the traditional Fujiwara device of making profitable merchandise of the daughters of the house, backed by the strong and unanswerable argument of the sword.

Kiyomori had many moral and intellectual weaknesses, but what is often regarded as venial, although really deadly unless redeemed by a wholesome sense of humour, often indeed as fatal to greatness as his heel was to Achilles—vanity, to wit—was not particularly conspicuous among them. Accordingly he made his tenure of the great office of Chancellor a brief one, and resigned it in the course of three months. But a few weeks afterwards he was rewarded by the baby Emperor with the gift of immense tracts of Kōden in the provinces of Harima, Hizen, and Higo. As has been already explained, these Kōden were tax-free rice-lands granted as a reward for distinguished national services. Those Kiyomori now received belonged to the first of the four classes into which Kōden were divided; in other words, the vast and fruitful domains then bestowed on, or extorted by, the first Military Chancellor of the Empire were to be hereditary. Gifts of such Kōden had indeed been not infrequent; but they had been of comparatively limited extent, and their recipients for the most part had been civilian Fujiwara Ministers or courtiers. What was peculiar in this grant to Kiyomori was, in the first place, the extraordinarily spacious dimensions of the tracts then assigned him; and, secondly, the fact that it marked a not unimportant step in

the development of Japanese feudalism. The Fujiwara manors had been tilled by serfs and peasants superintended and governed by civilian stewards, whose chief duty it was to forward the revenues of the estates under their charge to the capital for the support of the civilian Fujiwara owners. These vast estates now bestowed upon, or extorted by, Kiyomori, were to a great extent portioned out among a fierce brood of stalwart fighting men as the guerdon of the armed support of themselves and their dependents in seasons of emergency. Here we meet with some of the most important notions of feudalism,—an element of contract, tenure of land by military service, and sub-infeudation. Moreover, the vast extent of these fiefs in the germ—for such indeed these estates were—and the formidable military power so unscrupulously wielded by their owner or his tenants, gave a fresh impulse to that tendency to “commendation” which it had been one of the chief concerns of the Kyōto government to check, a generation or two before.

Just at this point, a word of caution is necessary. This was by no means the beginning of the feudal system in Japan; it was only a very important step in its development in the West and South-West of the Empire. At the conclusion of the “Three Years’ War” in Northern Japan against the Kiyowara (1089), we have seen Minamoto Yoshiie rewarding his troops with grants of land from his own estates, being constrained to this unusual step by the fact that the Court, insisting that the whole contest had been a private quarrel, had refused to recognise the services of the victors in any way. Minamoto Yoshiie, however, was far from being a rich man; and such rewards as he could bestow, when fairly partitioned among his many deserving henchmen, must have been exceedingly moderate. It was not the extent of the material benefits they then received that Yoshiie’s devoted followers chiefly took into their consideration, however. The large-souled generosity of the act appealed so strongly to the imagination of the military class that the tendency to “commend” themselves to the Minamoto chieftains received a great impulse on this occasion. As has been said, about this time there was only one really great fief in Japan,—that of Mutsu,—and it belonged neither to the Tairas nor to the Minamotos. At the other extremity of the Empire in Kūyshū, the feudal system was also spreading. In Chikuzen were the great houses of Harada and

Munakata; in Iizen, those of Takagi and Matsuura; in Higo, the Kikuchi and the Aso; in Bungo, the Usuki, the Saeki, and others; in Ōsumi the Kimotsuki; and in Satsuma the Ata.

In the following year, Kiyomori's position was still further strengthened. The ex-Emperor Shirakawa II. was bent on deposing his infant son Rokujō (5 years of age), and replacing him by his own favourite son, only three years older. For this step Kiyomori's support was necessary; and it was readily enough promised, since the young prince's mother was Kiyomori's sister-in-law. Accordingly, in March 1168, Rokujō was deposed and his uncle, Takakura Tennō (1168-1180), ascended the throne.

In the following December, Kiyomori became seriously ill, and fancying himself to be at death's door, "he shaved his head and entered religion." The remedy proved effectual, and Kiyomori presently recovered. He had still thirteen years of life before him, and during that space of time he gave abundant indications of how very loosely his "religion" sat upon him.

" When the Devil was sick,
The Devil a monk would be ;
When the Devil was well,
The devil a monk was he ! "

It very soon became plain to the intelligence of Shirakawa II. that he had made a serious mistake in placing a relative of Kiyomori's on the throne, for in the household of the new boy sovereign, as in the administration at large, it was Kiyomori who really laid down the law. Mortified and chagrined in scores of affairs, Shirakawa II. shaved his head, and became Hō-ō, or Cloistered Emperor, in 1169,—six months after Kiyomori had taken the tonsure very much as he might have taken pills.

It was not for nothing that Kiyomori kept such a vigilant eye upon the youthful Sovereign and his entourage. We have already seen how very adroitly an elder daughter of Kiyomori's was utilised to partition the prestige and vast resources of the head of the Fujiwara house, and to put the greater part of his manors at Kiyomori's disposal. A still loftier destiny was in store for her younger sister, the Lady Toku. On February 9, 1171, Takakura Tennō, then eleven years old, was declared of age; and ten days later the Lady Toku, four years his senior, became his consort. Thirteen months after this (March 1172), she was proclaimed Empress of Japan!

This was indeed a terrible blow to the Fujiwaras. With the exception of a few of the favoured Fujiwara adherents of the Lady Toku's elder sister, the Fujiwaras were carefully excluded from the household of the Empress, in which nearly all the offices were now assigned to Tairas. In 1178, the pregnancy of the Empress was announced, and she was then removed to the mansion of her eldest brother, Taira Shigemori, where, on December 22, she was delivered of a son. "The Cloistered Emperor, the Kwampaku (Fujiwara Motofusa), and all the officers of the Court proceeded to the Rokuhara to felicitate Kiyomori upon the auspicious event." No great fetch of the imagination is necessary in order to figure to oneself what the intensity of the heart-burning must have been with which they proceeded to fawn and smile upon the upstart swaggering military parvenu, whose heavy yoke this "auspicious" event had done much to rivet upon every one of their necks. The whole thing was "mouth honour, breath which the poor heart would have fain denied but dared not"; and behind what corresponds to vigorous tail-wagging in the canine world when a stronger dog or the wrath of a master with a stick has to be appeased, were "curses not loud but deep,"—very deep. A fortnight or so later the Lady Toku's babe was formally proclaimed Heir Prince. Then in 1180, when the Emperor Takakura abdicated in favour of the Lady Toku's child of two years of age, Taira Kiyomori found himself in the proud and powerful position of grandfather of the reigning Emperor of Japan! The blue-blooded Fujiwara had, indeed, been very effectually hoist with their own petard!

But long before this Kiyomori's conduct towards his quondam patron and ally, Shirakawa II., and the Fujiwaras had been so outrageously insolent and aggressive that it was now generally felt the situation had become intolerable. In 1170, Sukemori, the son of Kiyomori's eldest son, Shigemori, had gone out hawking, and on returning had met the Sesshō Motofusa and his *cortège*. Since Sukemori did not dismount as etiquette demanded, he was summarily pulled from his seat. On hearing of the incident, Kiyomori flew into a terrible rage. "Who dares to lay a hand upon the grandson of the man that holds the position I now hold?" he shouted. And straightway he sent a body of his men to meet the Sesshō, drag him from his carriage, smash the vehicle to atoms, and to cut off the cue

of every member of his escort. In 1177, the office of General of the Left became vacant. The post of General of the Right was then held by Shigemori, Kiyomori's eldest son; and Shigemori was at once promoted to the senior command, while his former position was bestowed upon his younger brother, Munemori. Meanwhile no fewer than three Fujiwaras had been emulously striving and intriguing to obtain the appointment, and their resentment at being passed over was profound. Especially deep was the chagrin of one of them, Narichika. This Narichika, then a young man of twenty-two, had been one of the ringleaders in the great plot of 1160; and it was mainly owing to the fact that he was connected with Shigemori by marriage that his life was spared on that occasion. Returning after a brief term of exile, he quickly ingratiated himself with Shirakawa II., by whom he was promoted from one rather important office to another, till, in 1177, he was Dainagon. Among the priests by whom Shirakawa II. was constantly surrounded, it was a certain Fujiwara Moromitsu, known as Saikō, who was deepest in his confidence; and with this Saikō Narichika had become very intimate. At this juncture these two and a few others determined to attempt the overthrow of the Tairas. The seat of their plottings was a villa in Shishigadani, one of the sequestered recesses of Higashiyama. According to some accounts these conferences were once or twice attended by Shirakawa II.; according to others he was on the point of proceeding there, when he was dissuaded from going by his counsellors. What is perfectly plain is that his ex-Majesty knew very well what was in train in that lonely mountain retreat. In an evil hour for their fortunes the plotters invited a certain Tada Yukitsuna, a Minamoto, to join them. Yukitsuna very soon perceived that the success of the enterprise was hopeless, and that yet he could make exceedingly good capital out of it for himself.

Nearly a score of years before this Kiyomori had begun to erect his mansion of Fukuwara, where the city of Hyōgo now stands, and as he rose to greatness it began to assume the aspect of a magnificent palace. Hither he had retired upon laying down the Chancellorship, and here he was now living. His visits to the capital were only occasional, but nevertheless there was but little that went on there, or indeed throughout the Empire at large, of which he was not speedily apprised. In

the huge following he maintained were three hundred young pages whose special duty it was to keep him duly informed of everything they heard or saw; and besides these he had an elaborately organised secret service whose mysterious underground ramifications were everywhere. To elude the keen scent of Kiyomori's invisible sleuth-hounds had come to be regarded as next door to an impossibility. And yet, notwithstanding, the conspirators in the lonesome villa in the secluded recesses of Higashiyama had succeeded in doing so most effectually. In this circumstance Minamoto Yukitsuna saw a great opportunity for the advancement of his own interests. Stealthily making his way to the Fukuwara, and there obtaining an interview with Kiyomori, he divulged all he knew about the Shishigadani conferences.

A day or so afterwards Kiyomori was in his Kyōto mansion,—the Rokuhara,—whence he at once dispatched his men to bring the priest Saikō into his presence. His Reverence at first professed entire ignorance of the Shishigadani assemblies, but on being subjected to “forcible examination,” or, in plain language, to the torture, his fortitude gave way, and he dictated and set his seal to an accurate and exhaustive statement of all he knew about the plot,—which was, in short, everything. Kiyomori's next step was to send courteously worded invitations to Narichika and each of his fellow-conspirators to meet him in the Rokuhara, as he wished to have the pleasure of consulting them on some rather important business. Without the least suspicion of Yukitsuna's treachery, and knowing nothing of Saikō's arrest, much less of his damning confession, Narichika and most of his confederates hurried off to fawn upon the insolent upstart they hated with an unspeakable loathing and whose downfall they were sedulously plotting, with studied expressions of simulated delight. As soon as they made their appearance they were seized and bound. Then, after an anxious period of suspense, the dreaded Kiyomori came swaggering into the room, and addressed himself to Narichika: “In 1160 you aided and abetted Fujiwara Nobuyori, and for doing so your life was justly forfeited. But thanks to my son Shigemori's earnest entreaties your life was spared. After that you obtained governorships and manors, and have again become a great personage. What precisely is the grievance that has made you plot the ruin of my house?” Narichika

thereupon bowed his head to the ground, and by way of apology said : "Of course, I have no resentment against the Prince (Kiyomori). This must be some secret slander of some unknown enemy of mine." Thereupon Kiyomori produced the priest Saikō's confession from the folds of his dress, read it out in a loud voice, and after asking Narichika whether he was not ashamed to be found out practising such deception, struck him across the face with the document, and then ordered some of the attendant *Samurai* to take him out and cut off his head.

Meanwhile intelligence of what was toward had been transmitted to Shigemori, Kiyomori's eldest son, then Great General of the Left,—that is, under the Emperor, the Commander-in-Chief in Japan. He at once hurried off to the Rokuhara, where he arrived just in time to be able to save Narichika's life on a second occasion. However, Shigemori's intervention did not prove of any very ultimate advantage to Narichika, who, sentenced to be banished to Kojima in Bizen, was there put out of the way by special emissaries of Kiyomori a few months later on. Little commiseration can be extended to him; he was vain, pretentious, ungrateful, and, like Nobuyori (1160), at bottom that most despicable of all things in a man who aspires to political eminence, a thorough coward. He resorted as readily to the supreme argument of the weakest section of womankind—tears, to wit,—as Nobuyori did in 1160. Besides he proved himself to be deceitful and an arrant liar. To sympathise with the swaggering Kiyomori with his limited outlook upon life and upon the crying needs of the time is a difficult task; to sympathise with such adversaries of Kiyomori as the poltroon Narichika is absolutely impossible.

As for his Reverence Saikō, the especial confidant of his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II., his stature was minished by the length of his shaven pate. His two sons shared his fate, while all the other *habitués* of the Shishigadani villa found themselves confronted with all the sentimental horrors and real hardships of distant exile,—a lucky turn of the wheel of fortune for men of the true metal such as Fujiwara Hidesato, Minamoto Yoritomo, his uncle Tametomo, and Minamoto Yoshikuni among others, but deadly fatal to such hot-house plants as Sugawara no Michizane, and the average, commonplace, pampered Court grandee.

Kiyomori sent an official report of the whole affair to the Emperor; and then putting on his travelling attire he started on his return to his Fukuwara retreat. On his way, in the most unceremonious and *nonchalant* fashion, he stopped at the portals of the Cloistered Emperor's palace, and sent in a message by the officer on duty there that what he had just done had been done in the interests of the State and the Sovereign primarily; his own life was a secondary consideration. At first it had not been Kiyomori's intention to let Shirakawa II. off so lightly as he did; in fact he was on the point of proceeding at the head of an armed force to seize the Cloistered Emperor when Shigemori appeared on the scene and made him desist. Kiyomori had a wholesome dread of his eldest son, and when Shigemori was announced on this occasion, his father hastily threw his priest's robes over his armour to conceal it. But as he moved, his clothes kept opening, and so he had to explain why he was in war-harness. He was then told if he must needs perpetrate such an outrage as he was contemplating he had better first take Shigemori's head before attempting it. "I am an old man, and I was doing all this to see what metal my children were made of. If it seems to you that what I have done is bad, then take what measures you please to put it to rights." When their father left the room Shigemori sharply rebuked Munemori and his other brothers for lending themselves to any such enterprise.

Shigemori's regard for the law of the land, for truth, justice, and duty was as profound as was Kiyomori's contempt for all such considerations. Over and over again the son found himself called upon to remonstrate with the father, and to curb the latter's tendency to unbridled lawlessness and outrage. Of the two, Shigemori was really in several respects the stronger man. When Kiyomori's nerve failed him on hearing of Nobuyori's attempted *coup d'état* in 1160, it was the youthful Shigemori's resolution that saved the situation for the Tairas. Again, it was Shigemori who led the attack on the Minamotos in the Great Palace, while his father remained safely behind in the Rokuhara. When the Minamotos, dislodged from the Palace, made their abortive assault on the Rokuhara, whither the Sovereign had fled, Kiyomori lost his presence of mind utterly, and became so flustered that he put on his armour with

the back part in front. When this was pointed out to him he said that it was perfectly right; as the Emperor was coming behind he had put on his harness so as to have the front part facing his Majesty; since it would be improper to have the back part of the armour turned towards an Emperor! When Kiyomori lost his head, as he not unfrequently did, his shifts and excuses, while not exactly Falstaffian, were certainly amusing in their way. In crises of personal peril we never hear of Shigemori quailing or losing command over himself.

Yet withal Shigemori's character was not without a strain of weakness, while in certain matters his words and deeds exposed him to the reproach of narrow-mindedness. A week or so after the punishment of the Shishigadani conspirators, he retired from the command of the Guards, and early in 1179 he resigned the post of Naidaijin. He allowed himself to be beset with a haunting dread of what his father might do next, and of the probable consequences of the outrageous behaviour of the terrible old man, every year getting worse and worse. In the summer of 1179 Shigemori went to Kumano to supplicate the gods for—a speedy death! Such was the despairing view that he took of the situation. As if in answer to his petition, he contracted a malignant fever upon his return to the capital, and of this he died on September 3, 1179. A famous Chinese physician had just then arrived in Japan, and Kiyomori urged his son to send for him. But Shigemori stubbornly refused to do so, on the ground that if he were cured by a foreign leech when Japanese doctors had failed, it would be bad for the reputation of the Empire at large and of the Japanese medical faculty in particular. Besides, a mere roving vagrant foreigner should not be lightly admitted into the presence of one who had attained the rank of Minister of State!

“Shigemori was only 42, and he was greatly regretted by the Cloistered Emperor and by everybody.” Such is the entry in the record. Yet all the poignancy of Imperial priestly regret for the memory of Shigemori did not prevent his ex-Majesty from very promptly confiscating all Shigemori's manors in Echizen! Moreover, just a month before Shigemori's death, that sister of his whom Kiyomori had used so adroitly to partition the power and resources of the Fujiwaras, died; and, in collusion with the Kwampaku Motofusa, Shirakawa II. had seized all her estates and the manors assigned to her adopted

infant son, Motomichi, in 1166. Meanwhile this Motomichi, now 20 years of age, had been wedded to another of Kiyomori's very serviceable daughters! Motomichi had been made Uji-chōja, or Chieftain of the Fujiwara clan; but Moroiye, the 12-year-old son of his uncle Motofusa, was now promoted to the office of Chūnagon, to which Motomichi vainly aspired although backed by the strenuous support of Taira Kiyomori. With so much of preliminary explanation by way of a setting for it, the following entry in the "Annals" should have no difficulty in speaking for itself in a sufficiently intelligible manner. "In December 1179 Kiyomori came up from the Fukuwara to the capital and gave the Cloistered Emperor to understand that he was greatly displeased with several matters. In consequence of his complaints the Kwampaku, Fujiwara Motofusa, was banished to Bizen, the Chancellor of the Empire, Fujiwara Moronaga, to Owari, while the Dainagon, Minamoto Sukekata, and 43 officers of the Emperor were stripped of their ranks and discharged from their posts. On the same occasion Kiyomori obtained the promotion of his son-in-law, Fujiwara Motomichi. He then held the rank of Lieutenant-General of the Second Class; at a bound he rose to the great posts of *Naidaijin* and *Kwampaku*, although he was only twenty years of age. . . . Kiyomori caused the Cloistered Emperor to be conducted to the Toba Detached Palace. He confided the ward and surveillance of the capital to his son (and heir) Munemori, and then returned to the Fukuwara. All these evil designs of Kiyomori would have been carried out long before, but Shigemori had constantly opposed them. After his death, Kiyomori, seeing that nobody any more resisted him, had respect for nothing, and acted entirely upon his own caprice."

It only remains to supplement this account by saying that Kiyomori did not go up from the Fukuwara to the capital alone, but at the head of several thousand armed men; and that he had then made his old friend and patron, the Cloistered Emperor Shirakawa II., a close prisoner, severely separated from all his usual attendants, except one single concubine, a single priest, and two or three menials.

The young Emperor Takakura took his father's unfortunate position very much to heart, and by way of placating Kiyomori's wrath he abdicated early in 1180, in favour of his

own son and Kiyomori's grandson (Antoku Tennō), then a child of three. After his abdication it was customary for the ex-Sovereign to proceed in state to some one or all of the shrines of Iwashimidzu, Kamo, Hiyoshi, or Kumano. These all belonged to one or other of the great monasteries of Hi-ei-zan, Miidera, or Kōfukuji, whose priests profited by the Imperial largesses on such occasions. Great was the indignation of the bonzes of these temples when they learned that the new ex-Emperor had signified his intention of proceeding to worship the gods of Itsukushima or Miyajima, the lovely island in the Inland Sea some few miles distant from the city of Hiroshima. This unusual step was also prompted by the wish to conciliate Kiyomori, for the gods of Itsukushima were his tutelary divinities. As a young man of 28, Kiyomori had acted as Governor of Aki, in which province Miyajima lies; and during the third of a century that had elapsed since then (1146), he had continued to shower favours upon the shrine of the deities to whose gracious influence he mainly attributed his extraordinary good fortune. His visits to the island were frequent; to facilitate his goings and comings he had caused much money and labour to be expended upon increasing the conveniences of the sea route between the Fukuwara and Hiroshima, the excavation of the Ondo channel being an important feature in the work. The honour of the visit of a new abdicated Emperor to the abode where his tutelary deities were enshrined,—an abode on which he had lavished so much of his great resources,—delighted Kiyomori beyond measure. But just then, in the midst of all the joyous bustle of preparations for the journey, the priests of the three great monasteries, with their mercenaries in arms, and all the usual sacerdotal paraphernalia of a “clamorous appeal,”—their divine trees, their sacred cars, and what not,—poured into Kyōto determined to keep the ex-Emperor in their midst. Kiyomori sent emissaries to “reason with them.” After much parleying he finally did succeed in having his way; and he and his son Munemori with a great train of armed followers escorted the young ex-Sovereign to Miyajima and back again.

But this deviation from the traditional use and wont of confining the solemn progress of a newly abdicated Sovereign to shrines under the control of the three Great Monasteries of Hi-ei-zan, Miidera, and the Kōfukuji of Nara, and the admis-

sion of the upstart interloping family gods of the Taira to a share in the function and its substantial emoluments, had given dire offence to what when united was one of the three greatest military powers in Japan. At this time, of these the Tairas seemed to be easily the greatest; but as a matter of fact the Fujiyara of Mutsu in the extreme North could have very well held their own against Kiyomori and all his following in any armed strife, provided the Fujiwara of Mutsu acted on the defensive,—or rather on the defensive-offensive. Next in order came the Great Monasteries,—Hi-ei-zan, or the Kō-fukuji of Nara, the strongest among them,—but Miidera near Ōtsu not so very much the inferior of the two older fanes in wealth and military prestige. The weakness of these great priestly powers was that so far from acting in unison they were generally deadly rivals frequently at open war with each other. But for once this unwonted Imperial progress had united them by a common grievance; and all alike now cherished a grudge against Kiyomori and the Tairas, by whom indeed some of them had been not over-gently handled in 1177, and on other occasions.

And just at this very time a great plot for the overthrow of the Tairas was being woven under their very eyes,—as if in mockery of Kiyomori's omnipresent and omniscient secret service. We have already seen Minamoto Yorimasa acting with Kiyomori in 1156, and deserting to the Taira side on the field of battle in 1160. Yorimasa enjoyed a large measure of Kiyomori's favour and confidence; in short it was to Kiyomori's influence that Yorimasa owed his promotion to the third degree of Court rank early in 1179. At that date he had entered the priesthood. But in spite of his intimate relations with the Tairas and the favours he had received from Kiyomori, Yorimasa had for years been secretly brooding over the fallen fortunes of the Minamotos, and had long made up his mind to deal their hated rivals and oppressors a deadly blow before he died. He was now 75 years of age; the discontent of the armed monks furnished him with an opportunity he had long been eagerly looking for. However, nothing was said to them at first; it was to Mochihito, Shirakawa II.'s fourth son and Takakura Tennō's elder half-brother, that Yorimasa opened his mind. Mochihito's mother was of humble birth, and so although now thirty years of age he had never been

made a Prince of the Blood,—he was merely a Prince. Diviners, fortune-tellers, exorcists, and all that brood were in great credit in those days; and a certain Shōnagon who enjoyed an extraordinary reputation as a physiognomist had told Yorimasa that Prince Mochihito had the face of one who would surely be Emperor some day. Yorimasa now came to an understanding with the Prince. The former would summon all the Minamoto to rise and exterminate the Taira, and Mochihito would then be placed on the throne.

Early in May 1180, Yorimasa made his son Nakatsuna draw up and send out a summons to all the Minamotos in the Tōkaidō, Tōsandō, and Hōkurikudō to rise and chastise the Tairas. The three Great Monasteries were now appealed to, and they all readily promised their co-operation. But within a month Kiyomori got to know something of the plot; on his way to the East with the summons, Minamoto Yukiie had stopped at the shrines of Kumano in Kishū, where some of the priests were in the Taira secret service. One of these spies hurried off to the Fukuwara with the intelligence that there was an intrigue afoot in the capital, in which Prince Mochihito was involved. Kiyomori was promptly on the road to Kyōto at the head of several thousand men. His first step, on arriving there, was to convey the person of the ex-Emperor Shirakawa II. from his Toba prison into the city, where he was strongly guarded. Prince Mochihito was stripped of his name and rank, made a Minamoto, and sentenced to distant banishment. One of the officers sent to effect his arrest was Yorimasa's son Kanetsuna; and he was careful to give the Prince time enough to make his escape. His attendants made a stout defence; and when they were seized and "forcibly examined" they disclosed absolutely nothing. Presently the Tairas learned that the Prince had taken refuge in the monastery of Miidera; and troops were sent to bring him into the capital. But they were beaten off by the monks, who stood to their arms and refused to allow the Prince to be taken away. Kiyomori then determined to storm the temple.

How much, or rather how little, he really knew of the plot thus far, may be judged from the fact that it was no other than the arch-conspirator, the real ringleader in the whole affair, his trusted friend and protégé, Minamoto Yorimasa, that he now appointed to the supreme command of the attack-

ing force! Of the real true actual situation of affairs Kiyomori had no inkling, until suddenly, on June 16, Yorimasa, his two sons, and fifty retainers threw themselves into Miidera. Even then, for three or four days more, Kiyomori failed to grasp the position. The only thing he did was to conciliate the Hi-ei-zan monks by bribes and promises; the result being that they detached themselves from their league with Miidera and the Kōfukuji of Nara. This step was taken just about the time Yorimasa and his band threw themselves into Miidera; and when Miidera presently sent up urgent messengers requesting immediate reinforcements from the great mountain monastery, Yorimasa was terribly disconcerted by learning that the request had been curtly and peremptorily denied. To hold Miidera against the Tairas backed by Hi-ei-zan was impossible,—so much was plain. At the council of war held at this point, Yorimasa advocated a sudden inrush into the capital and firing it—at that very time there was a strong wind blowing—and seizing the persons of Kiyomori, Munemori, and the other Taira chiefs in the midst of the resulting confusion. This daring counsel of the old man of 75 was received with the silence of disapproval; and it was resolved to evacuate Miidera and hurry southwards to effect a junction with the formidable forces of the Kōfukuji of Nara.

So, with Prince Mochihito in their midst, a band of three hundred Miidera mercenaries, together with Yorimasa's fifty odd retainers, set out for the South. At Uji, destined to become the centre of the tea-growing industry of Japan, the Uji-gawa, which connects Lake Biwa with the Inland Sea, was spanned by a bridge which was of great strategic importance in those and indeed in subsequent days. In Uji also, on the southern side of the stream,—that is on the Nara, and not on the Kyōto side,—stood the Byō-dō-in, a Fujiwara chieftain's country villa converted into a monastery in 1052. It had passed into the hands of the Abbot of Miidera shortly afterwards, and it was now one of the branch fanes of Miidera. Here Prince Mochihito and his train rested on their way to Nara. Meanwhile Kiyomori in Kyōto had mobilised some 20,000 men and issued an Imperial Decree appointing his sons Munemori and Shigehira commanders to smite the rebels. While Yorimasa and his small band of 350 men had been rapidly traversing the distance between Miidera and Uji,



ECHIZEN

MINO

TANGO

WAKASA

TAMBA

OWARI

OMI

35

35

HARIMA

SETTSU

SHIRO

I GA

34

34

IZUMI

KAWACHI

IS

SHIMA

34

YAMATO

KYŌTO

AND ITS ENVIRONS



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this force of 20,000 men had been advancing from the capital.

As things turned out, Yorimasa had been lucky enough to get across the Uji River before the Taira van arrived. Arrived, not appeared, I say advisedly, for the morning was one of impenetrable fog, where a man's body at three paces' distance was nothing more than a mere blurred outline which might have been mistaken for anything. Yorimasa, then 75 years of age, be it remembered, had been vigilant in seeing to it that outpost duty for his little band of priest mercenaries and household followers had been duly done, and so was promptly apprised of the approach of the Taira host.. He ordered the planking of the greater portion of the bridge to be removed; and about 200 Taira horsemen galloped into space and were mostly killed by the fall. Presently a youth of sixteen, a certain Ashikaga Tadatsuna, succeeded in fording or swimming the stream at the head of three hundred of his Kumano retainers, and arrived in front of the Byō-dō-in. Here there was a terrific encounter, and while it was in progress, the main host of the Tairas began to find its way across. Yorimasa's chief concern soon became to get the Prince out of danger. The latter was able to slip off unperceived, Yorimasa acting as his escort. But they had not gone far before the old warrior was struck by a stray arrow.

Dragging himself back into the Byō-dō-in, he stripped off his armour, and, seating himself upon his iron fan, he calmly disembowelled himself,—the second authentic instance of *hara-kiri* I have so far been able to find in the annals. His two sons also perished here, while his followers fell almost to a man. Prince Mochihito never reached Nara; he was likewise hit by a stray arrow and fell into the hands of his pursuers, who at once cut off his head and sent it to Kyōto. Meanwhile an army of 30,000 temple mercenaries had set out from Nara to join Yorimasa; on learning of the death of the Prince they returned.

The strange thing is that so very little was done to punish the monasteries for their part in the rising. When the matter was debated in the Supreme Council, the Fujiwara courtiers insisted that Miidera and Kōfukuji should be left alone; and all that Kiyomori could do was to suspend their Abbots, confiscate certain of their manors, and deprive them of the control of some of their branch temples. And this was

only a temporary triumph; in two months the clamour over this became so loud that Kiyomori had to give way and restore matters to their former position. It is true that Miidera was actually sacked and burned by Kiyomori's son Tomomori, while Tomomori's brother, Shigehira, at the same time fired the Kofukuji and Tōdaiji of Nara and executed 200 of the monks there. But this did not take place until December 1180, a full six months after the affair of Uji Bridge and the death of Yorimasa. In the meantime, Yoritomo had risen in the Kwantō and was making such headway there that Minamoto partisans in other parts of the Empire were emboldened to appear openly in arms. In Ōmi, they had attacked the Taira, and Miidera had given them support. It was this fresh offence that brought its fate upon the great monastery by Biwa strand.

The Tairas were not long in finding that this burning of the great fanes had been a cardinal mistake. So keenly was it resented by the courtiers that they refused to appear at Court, where the most important functions and festivals were attended by none except some Taira officials. Next year there was a great famine, and this was followed by a terrible pestilence, and these and other calamities were attributed to the offended deities whose wrath should properly have fallen upon the Tairas alone.

Kiyomori's dread of the Great Monasteries constrained him to the bold step of shifting the capital from Kyōto to the Fukuwara, where during the previous year or two immense labour had been expended upon improving the anchorage. The Emperor, his mother, the ex-Emperor Takakura, his father, the Cloistered Emperor Shirakawa II.,—who, by the way, was kept a close prisoner,—the whole Court, in fact, and all its officials, except the Fujiwara Minister of the Right, who was bitterly opposed to Kiyomori, were brought down to what is now Kōbe, and housed in the Taira villas there. Presently the recalcitrant Minister of the Right had also to join the Court in the Fukuwara. But the whole proceeding had occasioned great and almost universal discontent, so profound that Kiyomori was fain to abandon the project after a six months' trial. In December 1180, the Court returned to Kyōto, Kiyomori meanwhile taking the misguided precaution of burning the nests of the turbulent monks he so greatly dreaded.

The temporary removal of the Court, while entailing much needless expense upon the courtiers, had plunged Kyōto into economic misery. The capital in these years was a sadly afflicted city. In 1177 a fire broke out while a typhoon was blowing, and the Palace and one-third of the citizens' houses went up in flame and smoke, several thousand of the population perishing in the conflagration. Two months before the removal of the Court in 1180 a tornado had laid low every house, great and small, in three or four of the wards. But worse was still in store. "In 1180-2," writes Chōmei in his *Hōjōki*, or Records of his Hermit's Cell, "there was a very wretched state of things caused by famine. Misfortunes succeeded each other. Either there was drought in spring and summer, or there were storms and flood in autumn and winter, so that no grain came to maturity. The spring ploughing was in vain, and the labour of planting out the rice in summer came to naught. There was no bustle of reaping in autumn, or of ingathering in winter. In all provinces people left their lands and sought other parts, or, forgetting their homes, went to live among the hills. All kinds of prayers were begun, and even religious practices which were unusual in ordinary times revived, but to no purpose whatever. The capital, dependent as it is on the country for everything, could not remain unconcerned when nothing was produced. The inhabitants in their distress offered to sacrifice their valuables of all kinds, but nobody cared to look at them. Even if buyers came forward, they made little account of gold, and much of grain. Beggars swarmed by the roadside, and our ears were filled with the sound of their lamentations. Amid such misery we with difficulty reached the close of the first year. With the New Year, men's hopes revived. But that nothing might be left to complete our misfortunes, a pestilence broke out and continued without ceasing. Everybody was dying of hunger, and as time went on, our state became as desperate as that of the fish in the small pool of the story. At last even respectable-looking people wearing hats, and not unshod, might be seen begging importunately from door to door. Sometimes while you wondered how such utterly wretched creatures could walk at all, they fell down before your eyes. By garden walls or on the roadsides countless persons died of famine, and as their bodies were not removed, the air was

filled with evil odours. As the corpses changed, there were many sights which the eye could not endure to see. It was worse on the river banks, where there was not even room for horses and vehicles to pass. Porters and woodcutters too became so feeble that firewood got scarcer and scarcer, and people who had no means pulled down their houses, and sold the timber in the market. It was said that a load for one man was not enough to furnish him with food for a single day. It was strange to see among this firewood pieces adorned in places with vermilion or silver, or gold leaf. On inquiry, it appeared that people in their extremity went to old temples, stole the images of Buddha, and broke up the objects used in worship, of which these were the fragments. Such mournful spectacles it was my lot to witness, born into a polluted and wicked world. As a matter of course, parents died before their children. Again, infants might be seen clinging to the breast of their mother, not knowing that she was already dead. . . . The numbers of those who died in central Kyōto during the fourth and fifth months alone were 42,300. To this must be added many who died before and after; while if we reckon those who perished in the outlying quarters, the number has no limit. And then the provinces!"

During the thirty-three weeks of the Great Plague of 1665 there were 68,800 deaths in the whole of London. Here in two months we have as many as 42,300 in one section of Kyōto! Throughout the Empire at large the mortality must have been immense and the misery profound. And during all this time the country was in the throes of one of the greatest civil wars by which it has ever been racked. The ravages of this all-devouring pest and the famine by which it had been preceded and accompanied evidently go a long way to account for the strange lull in the military operations of 1182, and of the preceding and following months. Plague and famine together were especially severe in the Home Provinces and the West, the seats of the Taira power, and made the mustering and maintenance of any overpowering force afoot almost an impossibility. The East meanwhile appears to have escaped comparatively unscathed, and here Yoritomo was busy establishing his position, consolidating his power, and organising for a supreme effort.

What it is important not to overlook is that by the priests

and the people at large it was the Tairas who were regarded as responsible for the terrible calamities with which the centre of the country was then being so mercilessly scourged. This circumstance, coupled with the difficulty of reasoning with the belly when empty, must have sent many recruits to the Minamoto standard in the Kwantō, Echigo, and elsewhere.

In the meantime the Tairas had been seriously weakened by the loss of their masterful chieftain, the terrible old Kiyomori. In March 1181 he had fallen seriously ill, and on the 20th of that month the end was seen to be at hand. All his family and the chief retainers of the house were assembled round the couch of the dying man, and respectfully inquired what he would say. Sighing deeply, he replied, "He that is born must necessarily die and not I alone. Since the period of Heiji (1159) I have served the Imperial House. I have ruled under Heaven (*i.e.* the Empire) absolutely. I have attained the highest rank possible to a subject. I am the grandfather of the Emperor on his mother's side. Is there still a regret? My regret is only that I am dying, and have not yet seen the head of Yoritomo of the Minamoto. After my death, make no offerings to Buddha on my behalf; do not read the sacred books for me. Only cut off the head of Yoritomo of the Minamoto and hang it on my tomb. Let all my sons and grandsons, retainers and followers, each and every one follow out my command, and on no account neglect to do so." With such words on his lips Taira Kiyomori passed away.

"Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon 'em." Such measure of greatness as may be conceded to Kiyomori would seem to be derived from each of these sources in fairly even proportions. The merit of Tadamori and his position of trusted henchman to the two ex-Sovereigns, Shirakawa I. and Toba I., had enabled him to lay a tolerably stable foundation for the fortunes of the Ise Hieshi; and when he died, in 1153, Kiyomori succeeded him as the *Fidus Achates* of Toba. Then came the great disturbances of 1156 and 1160; and both of these, especially the latter, turned out to be pieces of supreme good luck for Kiyomori. Both took him by surprise; the second found him utterly unprepared and in an apparently hopeless position of disadvantage. Indeed, but for the resolution of the youthful Shigemori, and the halting counsels of the conspirators, Kiyomori

mori would in all probability have been ruined. As it was, the net result of the two great *émeutes* was the removal of Kiyomori's powerful rival, his uncle Tadamasa, and the virtual extirpation of the Minamotos, the only counterpoise to the military might of the Tairas. Henceforth for a score of years the argument of the sword was in their hands alone; and this argument the Court and courtiers had time and again to recognise as unanswerable. With this argument in reserve, Kiyomori felt he could safely retort upon the haughty Fujiwaras their own traditional device, and ultimately oust them from the exercise of it. The marriage of two of Kiyomori's daughters to successive Fujiwara chieftains, still mere boys, and the astute counsels of that Achitophel, Fujiwara Kunitsuna, enabled Kiyomori to shackle the great civilian clan, and bend it more or less compliantly to his purposes. Then the ex-Emperor Shirakawa's fondness for his son by Kiyomori's sister-in-law, and his wish to place him on the throne, was another rare stroke of good fortune for the Taira chief, whose armed support for the success of this project was absolutely indispensable. For his services on this occasion Kiyomori had many rewards; but perhaps the greatest of them all was the marriage of yet another of his daughters with the boy Sovereign. When this daughter became the mother of the Crown Prince, the fortunes of the house of Taira seemed to be assured. Their only military rivals had, as they believed, been virtually annihilated, and their civilian rivals, the Fujiwaras, supplanted and reduced to impotence.

Against all this, however, at the death of Kiyomori, in March 1181, had to be set the following not inconsiderable items. In the first place the bitter hatred of the Cloistered Emperor, Shirakawa II.; the intense detestation of the Fujiwaras, with perhaps the exception of Kiyomori's tool and son-in-law the Kwampaku Motomichi, then about 20 years of age; the deadly enmity of the Buddhist sects whose great fanes had been given to the flames; the dislike of the citizens of Kyōto who had suffered severely by the temporary removal of the capital; and the resentment of the superstitious among all classes for inviting the wrath of the gods, and so afflicting the Empire with miseries such as it had not known since the introduction of Buddhism in the time of the Sogas. All these

elements of discontent and danger were indeed separate and distinct, and individually were perhaps each in themselves not so very formidable after all. But once bring them to a common focus! Just at this time, after the eclipse of a long night of twenty years, the sun of the Minamoto had again risen resplendently in the East. With that for a focussing point for all these elements of disquiet in the seats of the Taira supremacy, there was serious danger ahead indeed. At the same time, the infant Emperor (Antoku Tennō) was a Taira, entirely in the hands of his armed kinsmen, who held the capital and controlled all it contained,—Cloistered Emperor, Fujiwara courtiers, suffering citizens, and vengeful-hearted shaven-pated monks alike. Besides, more than thirty provinces were governed by Taira prefects; while the private estates and military resources of the clan, especially in the West and South-West, were immense. Under bold and able leadership the situation of the Tairas might well be regarded as the reverse of desperate, in spite of all the gathering, massing elements of unrest and menace by which they were now threatened. But for this bold and able leadership the Taira were very soon destined to find that they were utterly and sadly to seek, for Munemori, their new chief, was at once commonplace and poltroon. And meanwhile, sedulously gathering into his pitiless grasp of iron every item that might be bent to the supreme purpose of crushing the overblown power and pride of the brood who had massacred his father and kinsmen, and of making himself the real master in Japan, Minamoto Yoritomo was building his great city of Kamakura and thinking out the future.

In the following chapter, we shall endeavour to trace the course of events from a Minamoto and Eastern point of view.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FALL OF THE TAIRA.

YOSHINAKA AND YOSHITSUNE.

IT will be remembered that after the great cataclysm of 1160, which proved so fatal to the Minamoto, the life of Yoshitomo's third son was reluctantly spared by Kiyomori and that the youth was banished to Izu.

In the valley of the Kano-gawa, some seven or eight miles from the point where the Tōkaidō begins to scale the Hakone slope from the west, lies the village of Nirayama. At that date its site was occupied by the manor of Hiru-ka-kojima, of which a certain Itō Sukechika was lord. Although not a Taira, but a Fujiwara, he was an adherent in whom Kiyomori felt he could place a full measure of reliance. So it was in Sukechika's mansion that the young Minamoto exile was placed. In the valley, nearer the course of the stream, lay the estate of Hōjō Tokimasa, who, of Taira descent, had taken the name of the district he possessed as his own. This Tokimasa, a humble distant relation of the great Ise Heishi chieftain, was entrusted with the duty of seeing to it that his neighbouring "laid," Itō Sukechika, should be strict in the watch and ward he exercised over the boy committed to his charge. Accordingly Yoritomo, endowed with an unusual measure of Minamoto precocity, soon perceived that if he were ever to retrieve the disastrously fallen fortunes of the great and illustrious house of which he was now the head, he must be careful in all his goings and comings, and sayings and doings. So, as he grew to man's estate, his self-control, his mastery over his passions, or rather of the expression of them, his unflinching cheerfulness in all circumstances, and, above all, his unvaried courtesy towards, and consideration for, all he came in contact with, won him an astonishing popularity among the professed clients of the house which had wrecked his own. To say that he was of dauntless courage, that he made himself a master of all the arts and accomplishments of the warrior, is unnecessary; for he was of Seiwa-

Genji stock. But the untutored military ardour and gallantry of the warlike Minamoto had time and again been the source of their undoing; and this consideration Yoritomo took deeply to heart. So during his long exile of twenty years, he pondered profoundly over the lessons of the past and of recent history; and, reading the puzzling signs of the disordered times with astounding prescience, when the hour struck for him to emerge on the political stage to play his part in the national drama, he proved himself to be the possessor of, if not the best equipped, at all events the most original mind in the realm of constructive statesmanship that had hitherto appeared in Japan.

A few years before his great opportunity came in 1180, he had got into serious trouble with his warder, Itō Sukechika. His graces of person, his manly accomplishments, his polished and winning manners had easily enabled him to conquer the affections of Itō's daughter. When Itō learned that he had become the grandfather of a Minamoto, his wrath was unbounded, and Yoritomo had to flee for his life, and put himself under the protection of Hōjō Tokimasa.

Here again in course of time the relations between Yoritomo and Tokimasa's eldest daughter, Masa, by his first wife, became a good deal more than friendly. It is said that Tokimasa knew nothing of this; to judge from subsequent developments the probabilities are that he knew about it very well. However, any marriage alliance between his house and the head of the proscribed Minamoto clan might very well cost him his life. Accordingly, in the course of his return from one of his visits to Kyōto, he betrothed his daughter to the Acting-Governor of Izu, Taira Kanetaka. On the very night of the wedding the Lady Masa and Yoritomo figured as protagonists in an incident such as is commemorated in the Border ballads of "Lochinvar" and "Jock o' Hazledean." Like "Fosters, Fenwicks, and Musgraves," Kanetaka and his Taira kinsmen "mounted" and "rode and ran"; but in spite of all their spurring the Lady Masa "wasna seen." The Hōjōs, pretending to be hotly indignant, joined in the hue and cry; and most probably carefully confined their search to the wrong quarters. At all events, what is highly significant is that, when Yoritomo and Tokimasa rose in 1180, their first step was to send 80 cavaliers to kill the Acting-Governor

Kanetaka, and to fire his house. Then, shortly after this, the nuptials of Yoritomo and the Lady Masa were publicly celebrated.

In May, or June, 1180, Yoritomo's uncle, Yukiie, had arrived in the East with Prince Mochihito's summons to the Minamoto to rise in arms, and had handed a copy of the document to Yoritomo. The latter's first step was to show it secretly to his warder, Hōjō Tokimasa; and the two were preparing to move, when news came down about the affair of the Bridge of Uji and the subsequent death of Prince Mochihito. This might have served to keep them quiet; but a few days later, a message was received from Yoritomo's confidential agent in the capital that the Taira were about to exterminate the Minamoto, and that Yoritomo should at once make good his escape into Mutsu. This intelligence, backed by the robust counsels of His Reverence Mongaku Shōnin, who practically urged that

"He either fears his fate too much,
Or his deserts are small,
That dares not put it to the touch
To gain or lose it all."

decided the plotters; and in July, Yoritomo secretly dispatched trusty emissaries to summon all the Minamoto clansmen and dependants to arms.*

* This Mongaku Shōnin was a typical figure of the age. Endō Moritō, as he was originally called, lost his father at an early age, and was brought up by his uncle, Haruki Michiyoshi. Before eighteen he had got a commission in the Guards, and at that age he became enamoured of his beautiful cousin, Kesa Gozen, the wife of a fellow-officer, Minamoto Wataru. When the lady steadfastly rejected his suit, the foiled lover threatened to kill her aged mother if she did not yield to his wishes and consent to the death of her husband,—or even if she informed on him. Thereupon the Lady Kesa pretended to give way, and appointed a night when Endō might s'ay her husband. On that night, however, she persuaded her husband to be absent; and dressing her hair in male fashion, and donning his dress, lay down in his usual place. Presently the assassin stole into the chamber and severed the head of his victim at a blow. When he held it up and inspected it in the semi-darkness, and realised what had actually happened, his feelings may be imagined. In horror and remorse he rushed to a temple, confessed his crime, shaved his head, and though it was the very depth of winter, went out and stood for twenty-one days under the icy flood of a waterfall. His penance over, he took the name of Mongaku, and devoted himself to reconstructing the temple on Mount Takao. While on his rounds begging for this purpose, he had, after forcing himself into the residence of Shirakawa II., been disrespectful to that Sovereign; and for this offence had been exiled to Izu in 1179. It is said that while the ex-Emperor was strictly confined in the Fukuwara (June to December 1180) Mongaku found his way into his presence, and obtained a Decree from him commanding Yori-

Meanwhile Yoritomo was deep in secret counsel with some half score of the leading gentry of Izu and Sagami. A perusal of the list of their names reveals a highly significant, if not an astounding fact. There was only one or two Minamoto among them; two were of Fujiwara descent, while the Hōjōs, the Miuras, the Chibas, and the Dois were all Tairas ! And these were only a few of the Kwantō Tairas that arrayed themselves under the white banner of the Minamotos in the internecine strife against the red flag of their own house. On the other hand, many of the Kwantō Minamoto were at first distinctly hostile to Yoritomo's cause, and had to be reduced by force of arms.

This great contest was by no manner of means the simple struggle between Taira and Minamoto it is usually represented to have been. The fact is that without the whole-hearted and enthusiastic support of the most prominent of the Taira gentry in the Kwantō, Yoritomo's cause would have been even more hopeless than that of Yorimasa's had just proved to be. Among their other cardinal mistakes the Ise Heishi, on acquiring what was virtually supreme power in Kyōto, had assumed the insolent airs of the Fujiwaras and other Court nobles; and had time and again treated their country cousins from the Kwantō with the scant courtesy accorded to poor relations, whose roughness and rusticity of manner made them "impossibilities" in the fashionable aristocratic circles of the fastidious and luxurious capital. Besides, all those plums in the pudding of office—Provincial Governorships—as they were regarded by the Kwantō Taira, were, together with the still richer posts, carefully reserved by the Ise Heishi for themselves. For years before 1180, all this had been the subject of discussion and the origin of bitter remarks in many a Taira household in the Kwantō. Now, among all the favoured and pampered Ise Heishi, who had so very cheaply risen to supremacy in Japan, there was no one, and never had been any one, of the mental capacity of their obscure Kwantō cousin Hōjō Tokimasa, who had been "honoured" with the post of co-warder of Yoritomo in 1160.

tomo to take arms to free the Emperor from the tyranny of the Tairas. This account may not be altogether authentic; but what is certain is that Yoritomo repaired the temple of Takao, made Mongaku its superior, and always treated him with much regard.

At that date Tokimasa was a young man of twenty-two, nine years older than his ward. Each independently had kept watching and analysing the progressive phases of the political situation; and when nearly a score of years later on, as mature men, they frankly, though secretly, opened their minds to each other, they found that their views were identical and their interests the reverse of antagonistic. Besides, the masculine-minded Lady Masa was at once a model wife and a most dutiful daughter. Hōjō Tokimasa's alert intelligence must have been able to divine the real drift of the turbid stream of tendency long before the death of Shigemori on September 3, 1179. The premature and unfortunate death of that honest and capable, though not intellectually great, prospective Ise Heishi chieftain must have served to convince him that nothing under Heaven could now preserve Kiyomori and his heir, the commonplace poltroon Munemori, from riding for a fall. At this time, or even before this time, he must have come to a full understanding with his "prisoner"—and son-in-law. Tokimasa had acquired great influence among his Taira kinsmen in Sagami, and in the provinces across the Bay, who were frequently his guests. If we duly consider all this, it will perhaps become not very difficult to understand how it was that so much devoted Kwantō Taira support was accorded to Minamoto Yoritomo, whom the astute Hōjō Tokimasa had almost undoubtedly aided and abetted in playing the rôle of a Japanese "Jock o' Hazledean"—with his own strong-minded eldest daughter as the "bride, sae comely to be seen." It is usual to impute a large share of Yoritomo's administrative and organising success to Ōe Hiromoto, a descendant of the able and illustrious Tadafusa. It is impossible to question the political and administrative ability and originality of the distinguished Hiromoto, who attached himself to Yoritomo's fortunes in this year of 1180. But on the other hand, in all really large questions of policy and diplomacy it is equally impossible to deny the supreme importance of the services of that Taira Achitophel, Hōjō Tokimasa, to the cause of his son-in-law Yoritomo of the Minamoto.

At this date a certain Taira Tomochika, a relative of Kanetaka, the Acting-Governor of Izu, was harrying the country in pretty much the same fashion as Minamoto Tametomo had done ten or a dozen years before. So this was made an excuse

for arming by the conspirators, who forged an order from Prince Mochihito to punish him. With this document tied to his standard Yoritomo crossed the Hakone pass at the head of 300 men and advanced into Sagami on September 11, 1180. Three nights before, Hōjō Tokimasa with 80 men had burned the Acting-Governor's mansion over his head and killed him.

Yoritomo and his little band posted themselves on Ishibashiyama (Stone-Bridge-Hill); and here they found themselves confronted by a hostile force of 3,000 men under Ōba Kagechika, a Taira, whose brother was with Yoritomo*; while unknown to them a body of 300 under Itō Sukechika was advancing from Izu to fall upon their rear. The night of September 14 set in tempestuously with a rousing wind and a pouring rain. It was in the midst of this tempest that Ōba and Itō delivered their attack. Yoritomo's men fought desperately and held out till daylight. But numbers told at last; and the survivors had to flee. Yoritomo escaped with the greatest difficulty. After a romantic series of adventures, in the course of which he was on the verge of capture by his pursuers on more than one occasion, he at last found safety in the wild recesses of the Hakone mountain. Hence he worked his way towards the entrance to Yedo Bay; and joined by the Miura and various other adherents passed over to the Awa side. In Awa he found ready partisans in the Oyama, Shimakōbe, and others, while the Sagami gentry kept coming over the water to join him. In a few days he was strong enough to begin his march up the coast and round the head of the gulf. In Shimōsa, the Chibas and others came in; and by the time he reached the left bank of the Sumida he found himself in command of a force of 10,000 men. From Kadzusa he had not got the support he had expected, and he began to suspect the good faith of the Vice-Governor, Taira Hirotsune, on whose co-operation he had counted. However, while Yoritomo was encamped on the Sumida, Hirotsune appeared at the head of 20,000 troops. The army now crossed the stream and advanced into Musashi, where all the local chiefs hastened to join it. When it presently passed into Sagami, not only the waverers,

* Both these brothers, it may be remarked, had been staunch henchmen of Yoshitomo, and had fought gallantly under him in the great Kyōto disturbances.

but such former active opponents as Hatakeyama Shigetada rallied to the white flag. On reaching the Pacific coast again, Yoritomo established himself at Kamakura.

Here, however, his first sojourn was a brief one. From Awa, Hōjō Tokimasa had been dispatched on a mission to Kai, to rouse the Minamotos of that and the neighbouring provinces. The chief Minamoto family there was the Takeda; and round the Takeda chieftains the mountain warriors eagerly rallied. Hōjō Tokimasa was on the point of sending his force to join Yoritomo, then just crossing the Sumida, when instructions from the latter arrived requesting the Takedas to pour into Suruga, sweep it clear of Taira officials and partisans, and then retire to the Kise stream. Here, they were told, an army from the Kwantō would presently be thrown forward to join them. The Takedas overran Suruga easily enough. Soon the Kamakura troops, with Yoritomo in command, defiled across the Ashigara Pass; and by November 9, 1180, the combined forces, 27,000 strong, had advanced to the left bank of the River Fuji and encamped there. On the opposite bank the red pennon was gaily fluttering in the breeze; and under it were 50,000 tired and weary Taira troops, who had been hurried hot-foot up from Kyōto and the country beyond.

Kiyomori had been greatly pleased when Ōba Kagechika's messenger had brought him the news of Stone Bridge Hill. But when post after post from the Kwantō kept coming in with intelligence of nothing but defection among the most trusted, if not trusty, Taira partisans in that quarter, he was very disagreeably surprised. Then, to heap evil upon evil, came the news that in Shinano there was a separate and independent Minamoto revolt, and that Yoshinaka, the head of it, had not only beaten Ogasawara, the Taira Governor of the province, but that he had reduced Kōdzuke to the south, and might soon be expected to be raiding the Taira province of Echigo to the north. As Kiyomori was the grandfather of the infant Emperor, an Imperial commission to chastise the rebels was very readily procured for his grandson, Koremori, who, accompanied by Kiyomori's youngest brother, Tadanori, and other members of the Taira family, had now, on November 9, 1180, arrived on the right bank of the arrowy current of the Fuji.

The accounts of what then took place are obscure and conflicting. What seems probable is that the Takedas, on reducing Suruga to Minamoto subjection, had not fallen back to the

Kise stream. At all events it is likely that a part at least of their forces had remained in Western Suruga, and that these now found themselves on the left flank of the Taira army. What is clear is that November 13, 1180, had been fixed by the general staffs of both the armies as the day for opening an action with the usual preliminary arrow-flight, and that this action was never fought. On the night of the 12th-13th November, one of the Takedas came in on the Taira rear; and the resulting confusion was such as ensued when Gideon and his three hundred fell upon the hosts of Midian at the beginning of the middle watch. Just at this moment the Taira chiefs, who had been assembled in a council of war for hours, were approaching a decision. They had been astounded by the virtual unanimity and the enthusiastic devotion of the Eastern gentry in support of what they affected to call the rebel cause. For the Tairas to advance into a country where feeling was so plainly and so bitterly against them would be highly imprudent. Supposing they were to meet with a defeat beyond the Ashigara Pass, the Kwantō would simply prove a death-trap for them. Far better to fall back upon their base in the West, and there stand upon the defensive-offensive. Such seems to have been the general consensus of opinion arrived at the moment when the Takeda chief fell upon the rear of the Taira camp. This proved to be the clinching argument. When day dawned not a single red pennon was to be seen beside the Fuji stream.

Yoritomo was for pursuing and advancing upon Kyōto. But, fortunately for him, he listened to the remonstrances of his leading officers, who insisted that the better strategy was to return and make his base perfectly secure. In Shimotsuke were the Nitta, and in Hitachi the Satake,—Minamoto families both,—but both hostile to Yoritomo and his cause. Ultimately the Nitta gave in their adhesion without any fighting. But it was far otherwise in the case of Satake Hideyoshi, who in his stronghold of Kanasa held out stubbornly and gallantly against a strong investing force. At last the fortress fell through the treachery of one of Hideyoshi's kinsmen; but Hideyoshi himself succeeded in making good his retreat to the North. Soon after an arrangement was arrived at between him and Yoritomo, who however continued to stand in such wholesome dread of his northern neighbour that when first

summoned to Court in 1183 he dared not leave Kamakura lest it should be attacked in his absence. Before the year was out Yoritomo was in possession of Tōtōmi, Suruga, Izu, and seven of the eight provinces of the Kwantō. The remaining one, Kōdzuke, had meanwhile been overrun by Yoritomo's cousin and rival, the brilliant leader, Yoshinaka.

It will be remembered that Yoshitomo's eldest son, Yoshihira, had made his first campaign at the age of fifteen, when he vanquished and killed his own uncle Yoshikata, in Musashi. Yoshihira at that time instructed one of his retainers to kill his uncle's two-year-old son; but the retainer, not much in love with the commission, had the child safely smuggled out of the province, and reported that he had been duly made away with. Yoshinaka, as he was afterwards called, was consigned to the care of Nakahara Kanetō, whose estates lay in the mountain wilds of South-Western Shinano where the Kiso takes its rise and gathers its earliest affluents. Here Yoshinaka grew up to be a mighty man of war. When Prince Mochihito's summons reached him he was eight and twenty years of age, six years younger than his cousin, Yoritomo. He promptly responded to the appeal, routed Ogasawara, the Taira Governor of the province, and then pushed on into Kōdzuke and reduced the greater part of that province. When winter put an end to the brief campaign of 1180, the Minamoto chiefs had, indeed, ample reason for congratulating themselves on its results.

Next year, Kiyomori died in March; and about May the Tairas braced themselves for a great effort, and summoned all their clansmen to arms. As this was the year of famine and pestilence the result was disappointing; it was with great difficulty that a force of 20,000 men was set afoot. However it proved sufficient to inflict a crushing defeat upon Yoritomo's uncle Yuki-iyē, who had meanwhile seized the province of Owari, and to drive him back upon the Kwantō. After this there was a long lull of some fourteen months in military operations,—the pest was working its ravages in Kyōto and in the Taira country.

Echigo was the seat of the powerful Jō family, of Taira stock. Unlike the Kwantō Tairas, it had remained steadfast to the cause of its brethren, the Ise Heishi; and in response to an urgent appeal from Munemori, the Jō chieftain in July 1182

raised a great force and threw himself upon Yoshinaka. The results were terribly disastrous to the Taira cause. Jō was utterly beaten; and Yoshinaka promptly overran Echigo, and then, wheeling round to the left, he swept Etchū, Kaga, Noto, and Echizen clear of Tairas and Taira partisans. In a few months he had wrested 10,000 square miles of territory from the supporters of the red flag. As winter was then coming on, and the snow lay many feet deep in the Hōkurikudō and the passes leading thereinto from the capital, the Tairas had to resign themselves to the situation till the soft and balmy winds of spring were abroad. Meanwhile they worked hard at bringing up every available man from the West, where they had succeeded in crushing all the malcontents; and late in April, or early in May, 1183, a host of 100,000 men was poured into Echizen to make an end of Yoshinaka.

The position of the latter at this time was indeed perilous, for just a little before his own cousin Yoritomo had sent 10,000 men up the Usui Pass to attack him! Jealousy, envy, suspicion, and cold-heartedness were the great moral weaknesses of Yoritomo. Yoshinaka's sudden and brilliant success in Shinano and Kōdzuke, although at first relieving him from a great anxiety, had not been entirely pleasing to his cousin, for Yoshinaka had owed absolutely nothing to Yoritomo, and so had shown no very great inclination to be subservient to him. The Takeda chieftain had proposed a marriage alliance between a daughter of his house and Yoshinaka's son to Yoshinaka, but Yoshinaka had rejected the overture. This refusal gave great offence; and the Takedas, now meeting Yoritomo day by day, kept on slandering Yoshinaka to him. Yoshinaka was about to marry a daughter of Taira Shigemori, and to join the Tairas in crushing Yoritomo,—such was a fair sample of the tales the Takedas kept pouring into the ears of the envious, jealous, and profoundly suspicious Lord of Kamakura. How far Hōjō Tokimasa was concerned in all this it is difficult to say. One of his daughters had been married into the Takeda house; and Tokimasa's dearest and chiefest thought was to make himself the real master in the Minamoto counsels. It was of supreme importance to him that all inconvenient rivals of his son-in-law, Yoritomo, should be removed from the scene,—quietly and justly and decorously, if possible; but if not so possible, then removed anyhow. Then, just at this time, Yoritomo had difficulties with a certain Shida Yoshihiro; and the latter, getting

the worst of it, had fled up the Usui Pass and taken service with Yoshinaka. And as if all this were not enough, Uncle Yuki-iyē, who had been so handsomely and summarily beaten out of Owari by the famished Taira in the plague year, had contrived to add his quota to the embroilment of the cousins. After kicking his heels for months in Kamakura, he had pressed Yoritomo to give him the Governorship or Protectorship of a province. Yoritomo in reply told him to go and conquer provinces for himself as he (Yoritomo) and Yoshinaka had done. Thereupon Uncle Yuki-iyē also saw fit to take an abrupt departure up the Usui Pass. The worst feature in the proceeding, perhaps, was that he had taken a thousand horse-bowmen with him. The net outcome of all this was that a Kamakura force was sent up into Shinano to kill Yoshinaka. At this juncture Yoshinaka showed an unusual amount of good sense,—a quality in which he proved himself to be signally deficient a year or so later on when success had turned his head. When his retainers urged him to fight Yoritomo, he remarked to them that internal dissensions had reduced the house of Minamoto to impotence and made it the laughing-stock of the Empire. Accordingly, they must all promptly retreat into Echigo, and leave Yoritomo's men to do their will in Shinano. When Yoritomo heard of this, he recalled his troops. Yoshinaka was warned about Uncle Yuki-iyē's peculiarities; and in compliance with his cousin's suggestion sent his son, Yoshitaka, to Kamakura, to be betrothed to Yoritomo's daughter.

Meantime, while this comedy of family errors was being enacted the snows were melting, and presently the head of the Taira columns had defiled through the Ōmi-Echizen passes. Yoshinaka dispatched two of his best officers with very scanty forces to hold the strong strategic position of Hi-uchi-yawa at all costs. These men did their duty well; but they were finally overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. The loss of this fortress was a serious blow to the fortunes of Yoshinaka; it added immensely to Taira prestige, and all the *Samurai* of Echizen hastened to range themselves under the red pennon. A little later the Southerners encountered Uncle Yuki-iyē in Kaga, and pushed him into Noto, where he was beaten at Shio-san. While one Taira division was left to deal with him, the main body pressed on into Etchū. Meanwhile Yoshinaka had got his

forces together. Advancing from Echigo he caught the main Taira host in a trap at Tonami and cut it to pieces, some accounts putting its losses at the almost incredible figure of 50,000. The news of this relieved the pressure on Yuki-iye in Noto; and after Yoshinaka had again beaten the Tairas at the Kurikara Pass, uncle and nephew joined forces. At Shinowara the Tairas sustained another bloody defeat, and after this they were simply hunted along the road all the way to Seta, near the capital. From hence Yuki-iye advanced south towards Yamato, while Yoshinaka encamped on Hi-ei-zan. Taira troops had been dispatched from the capital to hold Seta and Uji, but their commanders lost heart and fell back. Meanwhile Minamoto Yukitsuna and Ashikaga Yoshikane were threatening the city from Kawachi and Tamba respectively.

Munemori had appealed to the monks of Hi-ei-zan for support, offering them tempting inducements; but so far from listening favourably to him, they joined Yoshinaka. Munemori now resolved upon flight; and in spite of the remonstrances of his stronger-minded kinsmen, the capital was evacuated by his orders on August 14, 1183. On that day Munemori fired his mansion; and, taking with him the boy Emperor, his eldest brother, the Emperor's mother, and the Sacred Sword and Seal, he set out for the West. It was his intention to make the Cloistered Emperor accompany him also; but on the previous night (August 13-14) Shirakawa II. escaped and took refuge on Hi-ei-zan. The Kwampaku, Motomichi, also made his escape, while the youthful Emperor's two youngest brothers were also left behind. On September 5, Munemori's party reached Dazaifu in Kyūshū, and there the Court was temporarily established.

Immediately after the flight of the Tairas, the Cloistered Emperor returned to the capital escorted by Yoshinaka at the head of 30,000 men, and assumed the direction of affairs. One of his first acts was to strip more than 200 Tairas of their ranks and offices, and to declare the possessions of the clan forfeited. Then came the question of rewards. Yoritomo was at once summoned to Court, it being Shirakawa II.'s intention to honour the cousins at the same time. But Yoritomo could not come to Court at that time on account of his apprehensions of what Satake might do in his absence. However, when it came to the publication of the rewards for meritorious

services, Yoshinaka was displeased to find himself placed second to Yoritomo. Yet, he had been handsomely dealt with on the whole. The fifth grade of Court rank was not much in itself perhaps; but Yoshinaka was accorded a special privilege of audience. At the same time he was appointed Commander of the Left Wing of the Cavalry in the Imperial Guard and Governor of Echigo. But what was most substantial of all perhaps was the free gift to him of no fewer than 140 of the 500 forfeited Taira manors. When he expressed his dissatisfaction with all this, he was made Governor of Iyo instead of Echigo. Iyo was in the hands of the Tairas, and Yoshinaka could find his profit in wresting it from them; Echigo he had already overrun, and was so strong there that it did not much matter to him who was the Governor.

But this was only the beginning of the troubles between the Court and Yoshinaka. The latter had risen at the summons of Prince Mochihito. Upon the death of that Prince (1180) his son had become a priest and retired to the Hōkurikudō for safety. This youth Yoshinaka had brought up with him to the capital, and he was determined to have him placed on the throne as a recognition of the distinguished services of his father. Now that the boy Emperor, Antoku, had deserted the capital, it was resolved that he should be replaced by a new sovereign. His third and fourth brothers, five and four years old respectively, were brought before their grandfather, the Cloistered Emperor. The elder commenced to cry, while the younger crawled up and began to play round the old man's knees. His tears on this occasion cost the elder boy the throne of Japan, and his younger brother was proclaimed Emperor (Go-Toba or Toba II.). But Yoshinaka had insistently pressed the claims of the Hōkuriku Prince, on the grounds of the merits of his father. The Cloistered Emperor caused it to be explained to him that the Prince was ineligible on two grounds: first he was the son of the son of a concubine, and secondly he had become a priest. Yoshinaka continued to press his point in spite of all this, however; and as it was ill work arguing with perhaps the ablest captain in Japan enthusiastically supported by 50,000 trenchant blades in Kyōto, where there was now no military force except those wild men from the Shinano and Echigo mountains, Shirakawa II. suggested that the question of the succession should be decided by

“divination.” Yoshinaka at once agreed, and his protégé won! When, in spite of all this, the Hokuriku Prince was set aside, Yoshinaka, we are told, gnashed his teeth with rage. This was on September 8, 1183, a little more than three weeks after the flight of the Tairas from Kyōto.

Yoshinaka's best troops were rough and rude mountaineers from Central Japan, whose appearance and mien and manners were far more uncouth to the citizens of the luxurious capital than were those of the Highlanders to the English in 1745. Yoshinaka himself was entirely country-bred; he was no scholar; and he cared nothing whatsoever for “polite accomplishments.” Hence he got laughed at by the well-bred, effeminate Court grandees and fashionable dandies of Kyōto; and he was weak enough and foolish enough to allow that to ruffle his equanimity. Purposely, perhaps, he allowed his troops to get seriously out of hand. In the capital they committed many outrages; and roaming about the neighbouring country they established themselves by force in the manors and villas of the courtiers, and lived there at free quarters. When Yoritomo sent word that he could not come up to Court, the Cloistered Emperor found it highly advisable to conciliate Yoshinaka, who was made Governor of Shinano and Kōdzuke in addition to his other posts. Meanwhile, his ex-Majesty sent down an order to Yoritomo to occupy all the manors and districts in the Tōkaidō, Tōsandō, and Hoku-rikudō which had been seized upon by the Tairas, and after due investigation to restore them to their original owners. Later on, when this came to the knowledge of Yoshinaka, his jealousy of his Kamakura cousin was still further intensified. Then, in October, Yoshinaka contrived to offend Uncle Yuki-iye very deeply; and Yuki-iye began to work against his nephew in secret. With no common enemy immediately in front of them the Minamoto chieftains had fallen victims to the great curse of their house,—internal dissension. Mune-mori's precipitate evacuation of the capital on August 15th had turned out to be no bad stroke of strategy after all! It had afforded the Minamotos an opportunity to fall out among themselves, while the Tairas were gathering strength for another great effort.

At Dazaifu, most of the local chiefs had at first rallied to the red standard, but a few weeks afterwards a force raised

in Bungo by the orders of the Cloistered Emperor drove the Tairas from Dazaifu to Hakata and thence to Hakozaki, and finally Kyūshū had to be evacuated. The opposite province of Nagato was friendly; and with the assistance of the Acting-Governor of it, Antoku Tennō was safely escorted to Yashima, in Sanuki, by water. Thanks mainly to the services of a certain Taguchi, the whole island of Shikoku declared for the Tairas, who now fortified themselves at Yashima and built a palace for the young Emperor there. The Sanyōdō also was favourable to their cause and by November there were strong Taira forces afoot in that circuit.

To deal with these, Uncle Yuki-iyē, who had been made Governor of Bizen, was on the point of being dispatched from the capital, when Yoshinaka pointed out to the Cloistered Emperor that while Yuki-iyē's courage could not be questioned, he was a most unfortunate commander, continually getting badly beaten, and that he would find the task too much for him. Yoshinaka was then pressed to assume command in person; and he dispatched three of his officers to deal with the Tairas in Bizen, while he got ready for a descent on Shikoku and for taking Yashima.

In December 1183, Yoshinaka's officers were completely routed by the Tairas at Mizushima on the borders of Bitchū and Bizen. At that date Yoshinaka was in Harima making preparations to cross to Yashima; but he had to hurry on towards Bitchū to repair the errors of his sub-commanders there. The first body of troops he dispatched deserted and went over to the red flag, and while he was engaged in reducing them he was startled by the intelligence that a Kamakura army of 30,000 men under Yoshitsune was approaching the capital. Although instructed by the Cloistered Emperor to remain on the spot to prosecute the campaign, Yoshinaka abandoned his projected descent on Yashima, and hurried up to Kyōto to prevent the Kamakura army from entering it. As a matter of fact, there was no Kamakura army at all approaching at that time; but Yoshinaka distrusted Yoritomo profoundly and dreaded him more than he did the Taira. He now privately consulted Uncle Yuki-iyē about the advisability of evacuating Kyōto, and falling back upon and holding the provinces they had conquered,—Shinano, Kōdzuke, and the Hokuikudō. Uncle Yuki-iyē promptly informed the

Cloistered Emperor of this, eking out the tale by saying that it was Yoshinaka's purpose to carry off his ex-Majesty's sacred person with him into the snowy wilds of the central mountains. When Yoshinaka found out that Uncle Yuki-ye had not only basely betrayed his counsels, but had slandered him grossly, Uncle Yuki-ye found it convenient to get out of Kyōto. With his own retainers he advanced into Harima to meet the Tairas, by whom, as usual, he was presently beaten disastrously. He then took refuge in Kawachi; and here Higuchi, one of Yoshinaka's four devoted companions, was looking for him, when Yoshinaka's fate overtook him.

It seems tolerably clear that Uncle Yuki-ye's character had been read correctly enough by the astute Yoritomo. In short, Yoritomo was simply a Yuki-ye on a much grander scale. Both were brave enough personally, neither one nor the other was a military genius, both were intriguers, but with this difference that while Yuki-ye's outlook was the outlook of that vulgar thing called a politician, Yoritomo could survey the whole general situation from the lofty and elevated point of view of the statesman. But by nature Yoritomo was cold-hearted, pitiless, ruthless,—as unscrupulous as Richelieu in his dealings with opponents, when there was any question of "reasons of State." Only too many had ultimately cause to speak of him as the gallant and chivalrous Lannes wrote about Napoleon during the siege of Dantzic:—"I have always been the victim of my attachment to him. He only loves you by fits and starts, that is, *when he has need of you.*" Such also at bottom was Uncle Yuki-ye's nature, but on a much smaller and meaner scale. He had very speedily found out that he had nothing to expect from Nephew Yoritomo; and he had sense enough to grasp the fact that Yoritomo never forgave. So when he sped up the Usui Pass with his thousand horse-bowmen to join Nephew Yoshinaka in Shinano, he was well aware there was henceforth but short shrift for him if he ever found himself at the mercy of the Lord of Kamakura. By the rough-mannered, simple-minded, straightforward, and chivalrous Yoshinaka, in spite of the warnings from Kamakura, Uncle Yuki-ye had been treated with the greatest kindness and forbearance, even when he had proved himself to be hopelessly impossible as a commander-in-chief. When Yoshinaka represented to the Cloistered Emperor that

Yuki-ye was unequal to the task of reducing the Tairas in the West (October or November 1183) he was strictly honest, and was acting in the real interests of Yuki-ye as well as those of the Minamoto and Imperial cause at large. Uncle Yuki-ye had meanwhile, and all along, been exerting himself only too successfully to embitter Yoshinaka against Yoritomo,—if the two cousins could be brought to eat each other up, Yuki-ye could then count on being able to play the leading rôle on the political stage. Hence the poisonous and insidious counsels poured into the ear of Nephew Yoshinaka. And behind Nephew Yoritomo in Kamakura stood Yoritomo's father-in-law, Hōjō Tokimasa, infinitely subtle in his devices for advancing his own interests and those of his house.

Some of the courtiers, exasperated by the excesses of Yoshinaka's troops, urged the Cloistered Emperor to muster a force to deal with them. The monasteries of Hi-ei-zan and Miidera were asked to send men to protect the ex-Emperor's palace of Hōshōji, whither the child Emperor Toba II. was presently removed for safety. The command of this garrison was entrusted to Taira Tomoyasu, the *Kebiishi*, one of the favourites of the Cloistered Emperor, who had shortly before come into collision with Yoshinaka and had got the worst of it. On January 4, 1184, Yoshinaka attacked the Hōshōji, slaughtered the garrison, fired the buildings, and carried off the Cloistered Emperor as a virtual prisoner. His ex-Majesty, now in mortal dread of Yoshinaka, did everything he possibly could to placate him; *all* the former lands of the Tairas were granted him, while an Imperial decree was dispatched to Fujiwara Hidehira of Mutsu ordering him to smite Yoritomo. The latter, instead of doing so, sent a copy of the documents to Yoritomo, who at once forwarded it to the Cloistered Emperor, asking whether it had not been forged by Yoshinaka. Shirakawa II. now gave Yoshinaka a commission to punish Yoritomo; but he secretly sent off two of his guards to request Yoritomo to send up troops to deal with Yoshinaka.

The latter had indeed been carrying things with a high hand. He had married the daughter of Fujiwara Motofusa and had thereupon made his new brother-in-law, Moroye, a mere boy of twelve, Kwampaku and head of the clan, Moto-michi having to make way for him in both capacities. Yoshinaka then caused the Naidaijin and forty-nine other officials

to be dismissed. Meanwhile Yuki-iyē had been beaten at Muroyama in Harima by the Tairas, who on their part had been uniformly successful since they established themselves at Yashima, and there were flying rumours that they would soon be in the capital again. It was even asserted that Yoshinaka had proposed to make common cause with them against Yoritomo, but that the overture, though favourably received by Munemori, had been rejected by the other chiefs of the party. It was at this point that the Cloistered Emperor made Yoshinaka Sei-i-tai-shōgun (Barbarian-Subduing Great General), while secret emissaries were on their way to Kamakura to urge Yoritomo to come and make an end of his cousin (February 1184)!

Meanwhile Yoritomo had been organising the administration of the provinces he had mastered. He had dispatched the year's taxes to the capital under the escort of his brothers Noriyori and Yoshitsune. They had got as far as Ise when the ex-Emperor's secret emissaries met them. Courtiers were at once sent off hot-foot to Kamakura, while the two brothers with their 500 men awaited instructions. Yoritomo at once sent off a huge force,—as many as 60,000 men according to some authorities. Its advance was so sudden and so secret that Yoshinaka was completely taken by surprise. He hastily sent a few hundred troops to break down the bridges at Seta and Uji, and to obstruct the enemy there. At Seta his foster-brother Imai Kanehira gallantly held the passage of the river against 30,000 Easterners under Noriyori for some time; but at Uji, Yoshitsune's cavalry swam the stream, and, breaking the scanty band of Northerners in front of them, came pouring into the capital in one great continuous overwhelming flood. Yoshinaka and his captains could only muster stray bodies of a few hundreds here and there; but almost as soon as formed they were shot down or ridden over in the streets. Yoshitsune soon contrived to get the person of the Cloistered Emperor into his hands, and thus baulked Yoshinaka's project of carrying him off to the North. Presently it became apparent to Yoshinaka that the only hope left him was to make good his flight. When, with about a dozen trusty comrades, he got as far as Awazu, he was joined by Imai Kanehira, who had just drawn back from Seta, where Noriyori's men were now finding their way across the river. Imai urged his friend and

lord to gallop off as fast as his steed could go. "Get back to the Hōkurikudō and Shinano, and hold that as your part of the Empire. Let the Tairas have the West and Yoritomo the East. I will stay the pursuit here!" Yoshinaka at once dashed off, but his steed "laired" in a half-frozen rice-field, and he himself was shot down. On seeing this Imai* put the point of his sword between his teeth, fell off his horse, and drove the blade into his brain. Yoshinaka's head was taken and sent to be exposed on the pillory in the capital.

Such was the lamentable and deplorable end of the brilliant Asahi Shōgun! Yoshinaka was the possessor of military genius of a very high order; in the field he was incontestably and immeasurably the superior of Yoritomo, while at his best he was perhaps nearly the equal of his cousin, Yoshitsune, by whom he had been caught napping, and undone. But a statesman he was emphatically not; and for Court and Court life he showed himself absolutely unsuited, while, for him and his sturdy mountaineers, Kyōto had proved to be a veritable Capua.

Meanwhile the Taira cause was prospering apace. In Kyūshū, the partisans of the red flag had recovered their ground, and Kyūshū troops had hurried up to Yashima, while the Sanindō and Sanyōdō were now entirely in Taira hands. Just about the time the Kamakura army was hurrying up to deal with Yoshinaka a great Taira host had established itself at the Fukuwara and was making ready for an advance on the capital. For seven miles its tents, or booths, or bivouacs stretched along what is now the course of the Sanyō Railway, while its east front extended as far as, and rested upon, the Ikuta wood, through which from the hills to the sea a strong line of fortifications had been hastily thrown up. On the west,

* Imai was one of the devoted Shi-ten-nō (Four Heavenly Kings) by whom Yoshinaka was constantly attended. The others were Higuchi Kanemitsu, Tate Chikatada, and Neno Yukichika. Imai and Higuchi were brothers, sons of that Nakahara Kanemichi by whom Yoshinaka had been brought up. Their beautiful sister, Tomoe Gozen, married Yoshinaka. She constantly kept by his side and commanded a body of troops in all the battles he took part in. She was one of the thirteen who accompanied Yoshinaka to Avazu, where she killed the Herculean Uchida Iyeyoshi, who tried to seize her. On the death of Yoshinaka she retired to Tomosugi in Echigo as a nun, and passed the rest of her days praying for the immortal welfare of Yoshinaka. Not a few of the women of Japan, in this the truly heroic age of the nation, were incontestably fine and great.

at Ichi-no-tani (West Suma), a huge earthwork faced with stone and crowned with wooden towers ran across the low ground down to below low-water mark. A great fleet of war-junks and transports, anchored close inshore, kept command of the sea. It is likely that the sea came much further up towards the foot-hills than it does at present, and that the hills were loftier and steeper and more impracticable than they are now, for the ravages of the rain-storms of more than seven hundred years must have worked serious changes on the contour and configuration of such loose-soiled, sandy country as lies behind and to the west of Kōbe. At all events, the Taira leaders considered the mountain rampart behind them sufficient defence on that side, and took no very special precautions there.

A few days after the death of Yoshinaka, the Cloistered Emperor resolved to employ the Kamakura army against the Tairas, and commissioned its commanders, Noriyori and Yoshitsune, to recover the Sacred Sword and Seal. On March 19, 1184, 76,000 Easterners started from Kyōto. As many as 56,000 of these under Noriyori took the direct Harima road; Yoshitsune with the remainder (20,000) advanced into Tamba, with the intention of fetching a compass and assailing the Taira entrenchments from the west. In two days both Minamoto armies were in position for a simultaneous assault on the Taira lines, both at Ikuta and at Suna. At the time the attack was delivered a strong wind was blowing, sweeping the dust of the plain before it in swirling, blinding clouds. The Tairas fought gallantly enough. During the last few months, they had fought several fierce and determined battles, and had won them all; they had forgotten all about their frantic race back from Echizen to the capital and had regained confidence in themselves. So neither Noriyori at Ikuta nor Yoshitsune's lieutenants at West Suma made any headway at first; the defence had all the best of it.

It was the genius of Yoshitsune that won the great battle of Ichi-no-tani. The youngest child of Yoshitomo and of the Lady Tokiwa, he was now between 24 and 25 years of age. How it came to pass that his life was spared by the fell Kiyomori in 1160 has already been told. In due course of time his locks were shorn, and he was placed as an acolyte in the Temple of Kurama. At eleven he had spelled out the

Chronicles of the House of Minamoto and determined to restore its fallen fortunes. It is not at all strange, then, that his preceptors found him a listless and unpromising pupil when they tried to drill him in the *Sutras*. The Abbot found there was only one way of keeping him out of mischief, and this was to read *Sonshi*, the great Chinese military classic, and such works to him. Then he was all attention. An iron merchant from Mutsu often had transactions with the monastery; and with him the unruly acolyte had made friends. In 1174, when he was fifteen, Yoshitsune, as he was afterwards called, induced this merchant to smuggle him away to Mutsu, where he was well received by the great feudal chief Fujiwara Hidehira. Along with him had gone the Herculean Musashi-Bō-Benkei, a more unclerical cleric even than Friar John of the Funnels, who one day in the pursuit of the gentle art of outpursing had attacked the harmless-looking young acolyte on Gojō Bridge in Kyōto and had got a terrible drubbing for his pains. Yoshitsune had been six years in Mutsu when he heard that his half-brother Yoritomo had risen against the Taira. During these six years he had assiduously practised and perfected himself in the military arts and in all warlike accomplishments. Before he was twenty-one he had acquired an extraordinary reputation for bravery and ability in Mutsu; and so, when he started to join Yoritomo, he was able to take 2,000 volunteers with him. The brothers, who had possibly never seen each other before, met on the banks of the Kise-gawa in Suruga, the day after Yoritomo had fallen back from the Fuji-kawa. Early in 1184, in company with his half-brother Noriyori, three years his senior, Yoshitsune was put in command of the thousand men Yoritomo dispatched to escort the taxes of the Kwantō up to Kyōto. How he and Noriyori came to find themselves at the head of a host of 76,000 men has already been told. In attacking the Taira at Ichi-no-tani they were acting under the instructions of the Cloistered Emperor, not of Yoritomo, who had merely commissioned them to crush Cousin Yoshinaka.

The valley of Ichi runs from the shore up to the foot of a gap in the steep hills behind, called the Hiyodori Pass. At this time the Hiyodori-goye was supposed to be impracticable for every four-footed or two-footed thing save perhaps wild-boar and monkeys. Yoshitsune's training in Mutsu had been stric-

ter even than that of a *Kwantō-bushi*, and he was more proficient than the best of them in mountain horsemanship.* Accordingly, learning that the Tairas had trusted to nature alone for protection to the north, he at once grasped that there was the key to the position; and so he resolved to attempt the passage of the reputed impassable Hiyodori gap. With seventy picked horse-bowmen he made his way to the head of the impracticable pass; and then all poured down into the head of the Ichi gorge like an avalanche of boulders. Yoshitsune's purpose in attempting the gap was to find a way of delivering what Sonshi calls the "attack by fire." While most of the band fell furiously upon the right rear of the defenders of the earthworks, others ran about applying the torch to everything that would burn. Soon that quarter of the camp was a raging sea of devouring flames; and the sparks and blazing *débris*, caught up and borne far and wide on the wings of the gale, presently started conflagrations in the Fukuwara and elsewhere. The uproar and confusion were terrible, and here and there sections of the Taira host fell into panic. The assailants meanwhile made a great effort, and swept over the entrenchments both at West Suma and Ikuta. To extricate themselves, the Tairas here and there began to cut each other down; and in the wild scramble for the junks that ensued many were drowned. But for these junks, the rout would have been a massacre. As it was, many of the best Taira captains fell, and their heads were duly collected and sent to the capital. Shigehira, that fifth son of Kiyomori who had burned the Kōfukuji of Nara four years before, was

* A contemporary author thus speaks of the *Kwantō-bushi* and their ways:—"Their ponderous bows are *san-nin-bari* (a bow needing three ordinary men to bend it) or *go-nin-bari* (five men's bow); their quivers, which match these bows, hold fourteen or fifteen bundles of arrows. They are very quick in their release, and each arrow kills or wounds two or three foemen, the impact being powerful enough to pierce two or three thicknesses of armour at a time; and they never fail to hit the mark. Every Daimyō (owner of a great estate) has at least twenty or thirty of such mounted archers, and even the owner of a small barren estate has two or three. Their horses are very excellent, for they are carefully selected, while as yet in pasture, and then trained after their own peculiar fashion. With five or ten such excellent mounts each, they go out hunting deer or foxes, and gallop up and down mountains and forests. Trained in these wild methods, they are all splendid horsemen who know how to ride but never how to fall. It is the habit of the *Kwantō-bushi* that if in the field of battle a father fall, the son will not retreat, or if a son be slain, the father will not yield, but stepping over the dead, they will fight to the death."

taken prisoner. Munemori, according to his wont, had made a speedy discretion the better part of valour; he escaped to Yashima, where the fragments of the beaten army presently began to re-assemble.

Disastrous as the rout of Ichi-no-tani had been, it was by no means fatal to the Taira cause. Its chief material result had been the loss of the five provinces of Harima, Mimasaka, Bizen, Bitchū, and Bingo, where Yoritomo presently installed Kajiwara Kagetoki and Doi Sanehira as *Shugo*, or Military Protectors. But the Taira still held Shikoku, part of Kyūshū, and the extreme west of the Sanyōdō, while their strong fleet of war junks gave them all but complete command of the Inland Sea. Apart from the loss of many of their best captains, and the depressing moral effect of defeat, the most unfortunate thing for the Tairas, in connection with Ichi-no-tani, was that the incompetent and white-livered Munemori had survived it, to mismanage and misdirect affairs till the end. Had his brother Tomomori, or his gallant young cousin Noritsune, been head of the clan in 1184 and 1185, the fortunes of the Ise Heishi would doubtless have been very different.

As has been implied, their command of the sea secured the Tairas complete immunity in Shikoku; and on the mainland nothing serious was attempted against them for a full six months after Ichi-no-tani and the loss of the five Sanyōdō provinces. Noriyori had gone back to Kamakura; and in October, he arrived in Kyōto at the head of a strong Eastern army, dispatched by Yoritomo to end matters with the Taira. On getting his commission from the Cloistered Emperor, he left the capital on October 8, his objective being Nagato and Kyūshū. Noriyori did not shine as a Commander-in-Chief on this occasion. Their command of the sea enabled the Tairas to land small bands on the left flank of the invaders to obstruct and worry their advance; and the greatest success Noriyori could boast of was a small affair against one of these parties at Kojima in Bizen. It was only on February 13th, 1185, that he reached the Straits of Shimonoseki; and when he arrived there, it was only to find himself outmanœuvred by the able Taira Tomomori. Tomomori's manors were in Nagato, and the Minamoto invasion touched him most nearly. So, with a fleet of war-junks he suddenly came down the Inland Sea, and fortified

himself in Hikoshima, the island at the outside (western) entrance to the Straits of Shimonoseki. As the Minamotos had no fleet they could not cross into Kyūshū; and Tomomori had been careful to have Nagato laid waste. Accordingly Noriyori had to fall back into Suwō perforce, where rations soon became so scanty that the Kwantō troops began to clamour for a speedy return to Kamakura. On March 4, 1185, Noriyori at last was able to lead his men across the water and land in Bungo.

Here, as shown by the extant dispatches he sent to Yoritomo, his position was the reverse of hopeful. The peasants had scattered to the hills; there were no provisions for his troops; the whole country was in sympathy with the Taira cause; and even the superior officers in the Kamakura army were urging a prompt evacuation of the island and a retreat to the Kwantō. Yoritomo, in several documents, urges Noriyori to hold on. But it is abundantly plain that Noriyori could not have held on much longer; in fact, but for most unexpected developments, Taira Tomomori, with his command of the sea, would have infallibly made Bungo and Kyūshū a death-trap for Noriyori and his Kwantō braves. Although an able officer, and a fine man, true and loyal to his friends and relations, as well as to his superiors, Noriyori had clearly shown himself to be no Yoshinaka, that brilliant military genius whom he had overpowered at Awazu by sheer force of numbers a year before. But meanwhile, all unknown to him, even a greater than Yoshinaka was hurrying to his rescue. At no time in the history of Japan,—not even in the great war of 1904-5,—has the transcendent value of supreme military genius been so signally made manifest as at this crisis. Under the direction of mediocrities like Noriyori and Munemori the war might have dragged on for years. The re-appearance of Yoshitsune on the scene sufficed to bring it to a brilliant and decisive conclusion in five short weeks.

After Ichi-no-tani, Yoshitsune, instead of accompanying Noriyori and the troops back to Kamakura, had remained in Kyōto. This, and other circumstances, made Yoritomo displeased with what he considered the self-will of his youngest brother; and when he submitted a list of names to the Cloistered Emperor for reward and promotion, Yoshitsune's was

not among them. However, by his own exertions Yoshitsune obtained a commission in the Guards, and the post of *Kebiishi*, in which capacity he was responsible for the maintenance of order in the capital. A little later on, he received the fifth grade of Court rank, and a special privilege of audience. All this made him so obnoxious to the Lord of Kamakura that Yoshitsune got no command in the new Eastern force levied to crush the Tairas.

When four or five months had passed without anything being achieved, and Noriyori's starving officers were urging the abandonment of the campaign, Yoshitsune represented to the Cloistered Emperor that unless things were pushed more vigorously the difficulties of reducing the Tairas would be enormously increased. Yoshitsune thereupon received a commission as Tai Shōgun (Great General); and after much difficulty was allowed to leave Kyōto. A fleet of 420 craft had been got together at Watanabe in Settsu, where the Military Protector, Kajiwara Kagetoki, was directing operations; and here Yoshitsune had just arrived, when a Court messenger appeared to advise him to entrust the expedition against Yashima to his second-in-command, Kajiwara, and to return to protect Kyōto. Kajiwara was unwilling to take orders from him; but Yoshitsune determined to proceed notwithstanding.

On March 21, 1185 (the first anniversary of Ichi-no-tani), there was a terrific tempest; and under cover of it, Yoshitsune proposed to run over to Shikoku and take the Tairas by surprise. But Kajiwara refused to expose the armament to what he considered certain destruction. Yoshitsune thereupon called for volunteers; and a small band of 150 devoted followers manned, and put to sea in, five of the war-junks. With the storm howling behind them, they made an unusually speedy passage; and all landed safely at Amako strand in Awa. Capturing the castles here by *coups-de-main*, they advanced hot-foot upon the Taira headquarters in Yashima. The towns of Takamatsu and Mure were fired; and the terror-stricken townsmen poured into Yashima with wild accounts of the great Minamoto host that was approaching. Munemori's consternation was overpowering; he at once issued orders for all the clan to embark and take refuge on board the fleet. The palace and the fortress were burned before their eyes; and Yoshitsune's

men posted themselves on the beach and began to rain arrows on them.

At this time, a trivial but picturesque incident did much to disconcert the Tairas. On his visit to Miyajima in 1180, the Emperor Takakura had presented the temple with thirty fans, each with the *hi-no-maru* (the sun's disc) upon them. When his son, Antoku Tennō, was taken there in the course of his involuntary wanderings, the priest gave him one of these fans, assuring him that the disc thereon was the spirit of his father, the late Emperor, which would cause the arrows of the enemy to recoil upon them. The Tairas now placed this fan upon the top of a pole erected in the bow of one of their junks; and a Court lady dared the Minamoto to shoot at it. At Yoshitsune's request, a certain Nasu no Yoichi Munekata accepted the challenge. Riding as far into the water as he could, he took cool and careful aim and launched his bolt. To the consternation of the Tairas the shaft smote the fan on the rivet, and brought it down in fragments. Omens and portents were of great consequence in those days; and this incident perhaps did more to take the heart out of the Tairas and their partisans than had the loss of their best captains a year before at Ichi-no-tani.

Yet in the ensuing battle some of them fought gallantly enough,—especially Taira Noritsune, a month or two younger than Yoshitsune, who brought down some of the best men in the little Minamoto band. However, the Tairas finally drew off, rounded the promontory, and anchored in Shido Bay. That night Yoshitsune was joined by Kōno Michinobu, the Minamoto partisan who had been twice hunted from Iyo by the Taira. He brought thirty war-junks with him; and next day (March 24), Yoshitsune embarked his men in these, and fell upon the Taira fleet in Shido haven. According to his usual wont, Munemori promptly took himself out of danger; and, with Antoku Tennō and the whole Taira clan, hurried down the Inland Sea to take refuge in Hikoshima, where Taira Tomomori had securely entrenched and fortified himself. When, on March 25, Kajiwaru Kagetoki arrived off Yashima with 410 war-junks flying the white Minamoto pennant, he was deeply mortified to learn that he must abandon all hope of reaping any crop of laurels in Shikoku. The palace and

fortress of Yashima were a smouldering heap of ruins; and the Taira fleet was madly and frenziedly racing down the reaches of the Inland Sea. Yoshitsune had most conclusively proved that there had been even more than method in his madness when he braved the typhoon on March 21; in three short days and nights he had accomplished the seemingly impossible. Yoshitsune was Napoleonic in many ways, not the least important of which was the unerring prescience with which he gauged the mental and moral qualities and capabilities or disabilities of the leaders pitted against him. Push Munemori boldly and unexpectedly, and he would not only infallibly "scuttle" himself, but he would take many ten thousand times better men along with him.

A month was spent in reducing and organising Shikoku and in re-organising and adding to the Minamoto fleet. It is to be observed that, in a rough way, the Minamoto were to the Taira as the Spartans were to the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. For generations the Tairas had been entrusted with the task of dealing with the troublesome pirates of the Inland Sea; and so, many of them had become expert sailors and naval tacticians. The Minamotos, called upon to reduce the North to subjection, had always fought on land. As horsemen the Minamoto were far superior to the Tairas; but on the blue water, where the Minamotos were no better than so many land-lubbers, the Taira supremacy had hitherto been unquestioned and unchallenged. The last week of March and the first three weeks of April 1185 were busy weeks for Yoshitsune, who, originally no sailor himself, was then assiduously converting Kwantō horse-bowmen into highly efficient marines.

He had early learned that Munemori had fortified the whole northern side of the Straits of Shimonoseki. Through this narrow sea-pass of from 700 to 1,700 yards in width, the tides ebb and flow with mill-race speed for seven miles; and these seven miles had been deliberately selected by the Tairas as their base. We are told that Munemori had intended to retreat into Kyūshū, but that Noriyori's force of 30,000 men in Bungo had prevented him from doing so. If the Taira Intelligence Service had been even half as efficient as the Japanese Intelligence Service has almost unfailingly been, Taira Tomomori, if not Taira Munemori, must have known perfectly well that Noriyori was in no position to prevent the

Tairas from going anywhere they chose to go. The purport of the extant dispatches of Noriyori to his brother, the Lord of Kamakura, has already been adverted to. If the Tairas had had a leader of the calibre of Yoshitsune, the fate of Noriyori and his famished, despondent, and disaffected host of 30,000 Kwantō braves would have been sealed—and that very speedily too. As things turned out, this Kyūshū army proved sufficient as a containing force, and held the Taira bottled up in the Straits, while Yoshitsune made ready to deal them the last staggering fatal blow.

That blow was delivered on the forenoon of April 25, 1185. It would have come a day or two earlier, but for the blinding deluge of rain that began to fall just as Yoshitsune's fleet was getting under way on the 22nd. His conduct now was exactly the opposite of what it had been a month before. In March the problem which he so brilliantly and daringly solved was the same as that which baffled Napoleon in 1804-5,—to make a descent on an opposite island whose coast was protected by a vastly superior fleet. At that date Yoshitsune wished to avoid a naval action at all costs. Now he was ready to encounter the Tairas on their own element, for in everything, except perhaps in seamanship, he was superior to them. Even in seamanship the inferiority of the Minamotos was no longer specially marked. The whole of Suwō and nearly the whole of Nagato had gone over to them; and from these provinces, as well as from Shikoku, they had been joined by many chiefs who brought war-junks manned by seasoned crews along with them. What the exact total of vessels under Yoshitsune was cannot be ascertained; most accounts put it at about 700; the *Azuma Kagami* raises the figure to 840. All agree that the Tairas had no more than 500 at this time. And the worst of it was that not all of these could be depended upon.

At the time they settled in Shikoku, after being hunted from Kyūshū, the Tairas had owed much to the services of a local magnate, Taguchi Shigeyoshi by name, who was in consequence entrusted by them with high command. Latterly, however, Taguchi had become disheartened by Munemori's incompetence and the disasters it had brought upon the Tairas. Taguchi had taken part in the general flight from Shikoku; but he had left his son with 3,000 men to hold his ground in

Iyo. This son soon surrendered, and was so handsomely treated by Yoshitsune that he was easily persuaded to write to his father urging him to abandon the Taira cause as hopeless and come over to the Minamotos, by whom he would be well received. Yoshitsune was presently assured of the co-operation of a powerful ally in the very heart of the Taira camp and counsels.

On the 22nd, the whole Minamoto fleet was at the island of Ōshima in Suwō. From here Miura Yoshizumi, who had been through the straits several times, and was well acquainted with the topography, was dispatched with a considerable squadron to make a reconnoissance in force. He advanced and anchored about two miles from the Taira outposts at Dan-no-ura. Intelligence of this at once brought the Taira Admiral, Tomomori, up from Hikoshima with every available craft; and a line of battle was formed just beyond the spot where the straits begin to widen out into the Inland Sea. In a stirring address to his assembled captains Tomomori gave them to understand that there must be no more retreating,—on this occasion it was simply “do or die.” His remarks were enthusiastically received by all, except by one, and that one was Taguchi Shigeyoshi. The Admiral went to Munemori and urged him to put Taguchi to death; but, as usual, Munemori could not make up his mind; and, the battle just then commencing, Taguchi was allowed to take his place in the line.

As the great Minamoto fleet came up, its vessels fell into position opposite the Tairas at a distance of about 350 yards from them. After a long and hotly contested archery duel, they came to closer quarters; and here the Minamotos had by no manner of means the best of it. They sustained heavy loss, and were driven back three or four times; for even the most effeminate of the Tairas, now that they found themselves in the position of the proverbial rat assailed in his hole, fought with the fierce and reckless ferocity of despair. So the day wore on, and up till a little before noon the Minamotos continued to sustain more damage than they inflicted. Then the tide showed a tendency to turn; and just at that moment Taguchi's squadron suddenly hauled down the red flag and went over to the enemy, Taguchi himself at once proceeding on board the Minamoto flagship!

This defection was fatal to the Tairas; in less than half-an-hour they were overpowered. Taguchi was eager to impart the intelligence to Yoshitsune that the boy Emperor, Antoku, his mother and grandmother, and many Taira Court ladies were on board one of the vessels, which he now pointed out. Where the Emperor was, the Regalia would be sure to be; and it was at once Yoshitsune's chief commission and great anxiety to recover the Regalia for the Cloistered Emperor and the Sovereign of his choice. Accordingly the main object now became to scatter the craft that surrounded and defended what was practically the queen-bee ship, and to capture it and the invaluable freight it carried. Presently the Admiral, Tomomori, went on board this Chinese-rigged vessel to make report that the battle was lost and that if they continued to live it would only be as the serfs and serving-maids of the Eastern boors. Meanwhile Munemori had fallen into the hands of the foe; but his capture had been too late to save the fortunes of the great house which his incompetence had done so much to ruin. Tomomori wept tears of rage when he learned that his elder brother had not had the courage to prefer death to surrender; and together with his uncle Noriyori he threw himself overboard and perished. His mother, the *Ni-i-no-ama*, Kiyomori's widow, seized the Sacred Sword and plunged into the sea with it, while the Lady Azechi caught up the young Emperor in her arms and followed her. The Emperor's mother also went overboard, but both she and the Lady Azechi were rescued with boat-hooks by the Minamotos, who had meanwhile captured the queen-bee ship, and completed the rout of the Tairas.

Yoshitsune's dispatch on this occasion,* although not so terse as the Spartan dispatch from Cyzicus in 410 B.C. and the still more laconic dispatch of Byng from Cape Passaro in 1718, is still concise and pregnant enough. It runs thus: "On the 24th of this month in Nagato at Akamagaseki we had 840 war-vessels afloat. The Tairas met us with about 500 craft. At noon the rebels were routed. *Item*.—The former Emperor has been drowned. Drowned also: the *Ni-i-no-ama* (Kiyomori's widow) and"—here follow the names and titles of six Taira chieftains, among them the Admiral Tomomori.

* *Azuma Kagami*, vol. i. pp. 144-5,

Item.—The young Prince and Kenrei-monin (*i.e.* Antoku's young brother and their mother) have been captured, and are safe. *Item.*—Taken prisoners: Tokitada, Munemori"—the names and titles of twelve more males, four females, and four priests.

This short campaign of five weeks, in which Yoshitsune had so brilliantly accomplished the task of crushing the Tairas in the West,—a task in which Yoritomo's commanders had failed so signally,—was so sound and original in conception, and so daringly masterful in execution, that it indisputably places Yoshitsune in the select company of Great Commanders. At this time, be it remembered, Yoshitsune was only a little over twenty-four years of age, three years younger than Napoleon and five years the junior of Hannibal when they opened their Italian campaigns. Whether Yoshitsune had that generally mutually exclusive combination of gifts, the political and the military, which was so remarkable in the personality of Napoleon, must be left open to doubt, for he was cut off at the age when Napoleon's political career began. What is indisputably beyond doubt is that in pure military genius Yoshitsune was nearly if not indeed fully the equal of the great Corsican, while in the sphere of politics, Yoshitsune's elder brother, Yoritomo, has abundant claims to be placed in the same class as Napoleon Buonaparte. In Yoshitsune we see military, and in Yoritomo, political Japan at its very best,—and at its *very* best, neither military nor political Japan has any reason to bow the head to any nation. In harmonious combination the two brothers were, indeed, perhaps greater than a single Napoleon. But unfortunately, just at this juncture, the house of Minamoto was as fatally dogged by its old curse of internal and internecine dissension and disunion as was the house of Atreus. Yoritomo's great consuming passion,—the lust for power,—made it impossible for him to tolerate the existence of any rival, or even possible rival, near his seat of authority. And in his youngest brother, with his extraordinarily brilliant military gifts, Yoritomo's cold and sullen jealousy, cruel as the grave, detected a formidable future competitor to power and fame. The Lord of Kamakura had taken serious umbrage at Yoshitsune's masterfulness in the Ichi-no-tani campaign, and his subsequent independent and self-reliant conduct in the capital. During the campaign of 1158, it would appear that

Yoritomo studiously ignored his youngest brother, and did not send him a single communication, while scarcely a week passed without an exchange of dispatches between Yoritomo and Noriyori. Yoshitsune's extraordinarily brilliant success in the meteoric Yashima and Dan-no-ura five weeks' campaign fanned the smouldering jealousy of Yoritomo into a lurid blaze which could be extinguished by nothing but the death, or at least the disappearance, of Yoshitsune from public life.

The evil angel of the two brothers was Kajiwara Kagetoki. This Kajiwara had fought against Yoritomo at Stone-Bridge Hill in 1180; and after Yoritomo's defeat there, he had been dispatched to search for and seize the fugitive. He came upon Yoritomo concealed in a hollow tree; but on looking into the retreat and seeing what it harboured he told his men there was nothing there, and sent them off to prosecute their search in quarters where they would be sure to find nothing. This incident was never, to his credit, forgotten by Yoritomo. When Kajiwara, a few months later, ranged himself under the white flag, he at once received the confidence of his new chief; and this confidence he retained till the end. Kajiwara had been attached to Noriyori in the Ichi-no-tani campaign, and with Noriyori his relations had been harmonious. But it was not Noriyori's and Kajiwara's host of 56,000 that had reaped the laurels of Ichi-no-tani,—these had fallen to the 20,000 men under Yoshitsune and Doi Sanehira, and above all to Yoshitsune and the seventy horsemen who had come down the Hiyodori gap into the centre of the Taira camp. Kajiwara's chagrin over this was deep; and he was base enough to allow it to colour all the reports of Yoshitsune and his doings he made to the Lord of Kamakura. Then when, a year later on, Yoshitsune, perceiving that his brother's trusted mediocrities would never be able to crush the Tairas, obtained a commission from the Court to undertake operations against Yashima, Kajiwara was greatly enraged to find that he had to act as his second-in-command, and did everything he could to thwart the projects of his superior officer. His opposition to Yoshitsune's descent on Shikoku in the midst of a terrific typhoon, and the amazing success of the Great Captain's daring venture on that occasion, had exposed Kajiwara to sarcastic comment; and Yashima and Dan-no-ura were gall and wormwood to him. On the 22nd of May 1185,

a dispatch from him arrived in Kamakura. This gave a long account of the battle of Dan-no-ura, and wound up with an invective against Yoshitsune, who was denounced as the deadly, though secret, foe of Yoritomo. "*Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands.*" Such, according to Kajiwara, was the tenor of the discourse people were then holding in the West and in the capital; and David (Yoshitsune) by speech and bearing was doing his best to propagate this view of the situation.

So when, after being fêted and caressed in the capital, Yoshitsune with his prisoners arrived at Koshigoye on the outskirts of Kamakura on June 14th, seven weeks after the battle of Dan-no-ura, he was there met by Hōjō Tokimasa, who informed him that he had come to take charge of Munemori and his son, and to tell him (Yoshitsune) that he must not enter the city. All Yoshitsune's efforts to obtain an interview with his elder brother proved utterly unavailing. Towards the end of his three weeks' sojourn at Koshigoye he penned and forwarded to Yoritomo one of the most pathetic documents in Japanese literature,—a letter in which he movingly recounted the untoward circumstances of his infancy,—that of a child who never knew a father's love—of his harsh upbringing of the services he had so ungrudgingly rendered—wherein he spoke

"of most disastrous chances,
Of moving accidents by flood and field,
Of hair-breadth 'scapes i' the imminent deadly breach"

and of his misery at finding all these rated at naught by reason of the venomous slander of cruel tongues, winding up by professing his deep and loyal devotion, and conjuring Yoritomo by all that was most sacred to dispel the groundless suspicions which he so sullenly cherished. Even this most piteous and pathetic appeal to fraternal affection was all in vain.

On July 7, 1185, after having had two interviews with Yoritomo, Munemori and his son were handed over to Yoshitsune, who thereupon sorrowfully turned his face to the west and set out for Kyōto. Twelve days later, at Shinowara in Ōmi, the Taira chief and his son were executed by the orders of Yoshitsune, and their heads sent to be pilloried in the capital. A day or two afterwards, that fifth son of Kiyomori, Shigehira, who had burned the Kōfukuji some five years before, was

surrendered to the monks of Nara, who now straightway put him to death. This was practically the end of the house of Kiyomori.

However, it is a great mistake to talk about the extirpation of the Tairas, for Yoritomo's most ardent supporters had been the chief of the great Taira septs domiciled in the Kwantō, who indeed, after his death, became all powerful in the Kamakura administration. Moreover, even the Ise Heishi were not completely extirpated on this occasion, for two members of that house lived to raise the standard of revolt in Ise and Iga in 1204, when they were crushed by Hiraga Tomomasa. Furthermore, the third son of the Admiral Tomomori who had commanded the Taira fleet at Dan-no-ura survived to found that house, of Sō, which ruled the island of Tsushima from 1245 down to the Revolution of Meiji (1868), while the great Nobunaga was descended from the second son of Taira Shigemori, whose eldest son, Koremori, and *his* son Rokudai, survived the rout of Dan-no-ura for several years. Again, the Taira ex-Empress Kenreimon-in, who was rescued from the waves on April 24, 1185, died peacefully in Kyōto in 1213. As for Yorimori, that brother of Kiyomori who had interceded for the life of the youthful Yoritomo in 1160, he was now invited to visit Kamakura, where he was treated with great courtesy and distinction. This by no means exhausts the list of prominent members of the Ise Heishi sept who survived the overthrow of their house. It is true that several Tairas were executed in 1185, and that several Taira partisans were then banished from Kyōto to remote parts of the Empire. But to talk of Hōjō Tokimasa proceeding to Kyōto to execute the mandate of his grandson "the Herod of Kamakura" is somewhat beside the mark. It was not so much towards the Taira foe as towards his own Minamoto kith and kin that Yoritomo showed himself cold-blooded, cruel, pitiless, and ruthless. In this respect, in spite of all his greatness in the sphere of constructive statesmanship, the Lord of Kamakura was much more of a Turkish Sultan than a true son of Yamato. How far his father-in-law the preternaturally astute Hōjō Tokimasa, of the house of Taira, was responsible for this, it is difficult to say.

For about twenty years, from 1160 to 1181, the Ise Heishi, under the chieftainship of Taira Kiyomori, had been the domi-

nant power in the Empire. As has been alleged, Kiyomori's sudden rise to power had, in the first place, been mainly owing to a lucky chapter of accidents and the nerve of his eldest son Shigemori in the great crises of 1156 and 1160, and, in the second place, to his turning the traditional Fujiwara tactics against themselves, and then still further supplanting the Fujiwaras in the exercise of their traditional tactics *vis à vis* de the Imperial House. What made this possible was the possession of broad untaxed acres and the support of thousands of tenants holding their lands from the Tairas on a military tenure. The manors of the Fujiwara nobles were even then much more extensive than those of the Ise Heishi; but they were managed on a different principle. What the Fujiwaras wanted was not so much a throng of armed followers, as monetary and material resources to enable them to maintain splendid and magnificent establishments in the capital, where they vied with each other in the lavish and sumptuous ostentation of their banquets and entertainments and other social functions—exceedingly effeminate and frivolous—in which pre-eminence conferred the supreme *cachet* of good form and distinction. Accordingly, when, in 1156 and 1160, the question of the supremacy in the councils of the Empire was put to the sharp arbitrament of the sword, the Fujiwaras, standing alone, found themselves helpless, and had perforce to appeal to Taira or Minamoto for support. In 1160, the Minamotos and the Fujiwara faction whose cause they had rashly espoused were utterly crushed; and the victorious Fujiwara faction presently found itself hopelessly at the mercy of the rising military caste—in the person of Taira Kiyomori—which it had hitherto been wont to treat as humble relatives and dependents. The net result of all this seemed to be that the civilian Fujiwaras, who had in reality governed Japan for nearly three hundred years, were to be supplanted by the Ise Heishi, who were to maintain their ascendancy by the traditional Fujiwara device of making the daughters of their house Empresses of Japan, buttressed by an unanswerable appeal to the strong argument of the sword. Most unfortunately for the warlike Tairas, in the persons of the effeminate Fujiwara courtiers,

Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit,

and in spite of all that the fearless, gallant, honest, but, at the same time, narrow-minded Shigemori could do or say, many of

the highest in position among the Ise Heishi began to vie with the soft-fibred Fujiwaras in all the arts of empty ostentation and display. For the house of Kiyomori this was the beginning of that descent to Avernus from which there is no return. While those spoilt children of fortune, the Ise Heishi, were thus carelessly, unthinkingly, and heedlessly allowing themselves to be sucked of all the virility of their martial marrow, their obscure Minamoto rivals were being kindly cradled in the rough and rude school of hardship and adversity. In the wilds of Kiso, Yoshinaka was growing up to become the bearer of a name to conjure with in Shinano and Central Japan; Yoshitsune in Mutsu was sedulously and unweariedly schooling himself in that art of war of which he became such a great master and such a brilliant exponent; while in Izu Yoritomo was gradually, but steadily, winning golden opinions from his jailers and neighbours, those mettlesome and robust Kwantō Taira, who could ill brook the cold and haughty treatment accorded them by the fashionable and pampered Ise Heishi in the capital, always giving them to understand that the visits of ill-bred country cousins were an intolerable nuisance. And by the astute and precocious Yoritomo every mistake committed by Kiyomori, his sons and kinsmen, was carefully noted and deeply pondered over. Kiyomori's insolent and overbearing attitude towards the ex-Emperor and the great house of Fujiwara; his weakness and lack of foresight in allowing himself to be inveigled into a competition with the pampered and effeminate courtiers in the unmanly arts of meaningless and wasteful display and ostentation, and, if not encouraging, at all events failing to check, his clansmen and followers in their eagerness to follow his most pernicious example in this respect; the reckless fashion in which he roused the enmity of the powerful priestly caste and shocked all the superstitious, if not the religious, susceptibilities of the nation at large; the arrogance with which he rode rough-shod over every interest that was in any way opposed to his own seeming interests and those of his house,—all these cardinal errors of policy, and many others besides, were carefully marked, learned, and digested by the apparently unthinking and unreflective exile in Izu, whose chief occupation seemed to be to get into amorous scrapes with the daughters of his guardians and their neighbours.

Where duller minds see nothing, great statesmen have always been swift to perceive that there are possible problems. Their first care is to formulate these problems in clear and lucid terms; this much accomplished, they have then to devise solutions for these problems. Every mistake committed by the not very astute Kiyomori was of the utmost service to Yoritomo. When he raised his standard at Stone-Bridge Hill in the early autumn of 1180, most of his problems had been formulated; and with the aid of some of the ablest administrators that Japan has ever produced he had found sound and brilliant solutions for nearly all of them before his death at the age of fifty-three in 1199. It was at the age of thirty that Napoleon began his political career; in 1180 Yoritomo was then three years older. The great Corsican reared the present institutions of France on the ruins of the feudal system; it was Yoritomo's task to organise the polity of Japan on a feudal basis.

The next chapter will mainly be devoted to a consideration of the methods and results of the constructive statesmanship of Yoritomo, who in originality and in mental grasp in the sphere of politics has a just title to be recognised as one of the three greatest statesmen that have appeared in Japan. He was fully the equal, if not actually the superior, of the great Kamatari, whose work, after a long five centuries and a half of life, was now decently but very unobtrusively buried. During the last term of its existence, that work, it must be frankly confessed, was moribund; and outside of Kyōto and the Home Provinces the authority of the august descendants of the Sun-Goddess could make itself felt only on sufferance. Yoritomo's originality manifested itself, among other things, in this: While making himself the Mayor of the Palace, he studiously kept at a distance of more than three hundred miles—a journey of four days for a swift courier—from the Court and its frivolities, and while professing to restore those old institutions of Japan which had hopelessly outlived their usefulness, he supplemented them by institutions which were so vitally necessary to the changed and changing spirit of the times that they insensibly supplanted them. Yoritomo's last wish was to be regarded as a revolutionist. Above all things he desired to be regarded as a conservative. Such, in some respects, he undoubtedly was; but his conservatism was so

largely adapted to the exigencies of the evolutionary changes of the preceding four centuries that it at bottom was really so far revolutionary as ultimately to impose upon the Empire of Japan a system of law and polity which superseded everything that had ever issued from Nara or Kyōto.

CHAPTER XIII.

YORITOMO AND HIS WORK.

IN the year 1590—about four centuries after the date with which we are now dealing—Hideyoshi, the greatest genius in the sphere of statesmanship and of practical action that Japan has ever produced, was pressing the leaguer of the doomed Hōjō cooped up in their keep of Odawara. One day the illustrious parvenu thought fit to solace himself by an excursion to Kamakura, and to the Shrine of Hachiman at Tsurugaoka, which, founded by Yoriyoshi in 1073 at Yui-ga-hama, had been transported by Yoritomo to its present site, and made the tutelary *miya* of his house. Stroking the back of the image of Yoritomo enshrined there, the monkey-faced dwarf burst out: “You are my friend. You took all the power under Heaven (in Japan). You and I, only, have been able to do this; but you were of an illustrious family, and not like me, sprung from the tillers of the earth. My ultimate purpose is to conquer not only all that is under Heaven (Japan), but even China. What think you of that?”

Here we have the most interesting and instructive of all criticisms—the passing of judgement by one great man on the work of another. It is not perhaps so luminous as Napoleon’s appreciation of Turenne, when the Great Corsican, sitting after dinner surrounded by his marshals between the first and second battle of Dresden (1813), was drawn on by that consummate master of the art of war, Marmont, to speak on the paramount importance to a soldier of the careful study of past campaigns; but it is sufficient to indicate that the most original mind that has ever appeared in this Empire frankly took Yoritomo as the only model to whom obligations were to be acknowledged.

Hideyoshi’s assertion that Yoritomo “took all the power under Heaven” is substantially correct. Yoritomo was not, indeed, the first Japanese subject to accomplish this feat. Cer-

tain Fujiwara chiefs, such as Michinaga, had been all but omnipotent in the Councils of the Empire, while Taira Kiyomori's word had more than once been more potent than any Imperial fiat. But Kiyomori had established his position by nothing more original than the traditional Fujiwara device of adroitly utilising his female offspring, and of appealing to the sword and riding rough-shod over all forms of legality when balked in the attainment of his purposes by peaceable means. Yoritomo never showed any desire to become the father-in-law or the grandfather of the titular Sovereign of Japan, while it was ever his keenest concern to convince all men that he must be regarded as a loyal subject of the august line of the Sun-Goddess, and a devoted upholder of the constitutional law of the Empire. Possibly no single man has ever done so much as Yoritomo did, not merely to modify, but actually to revolutionise the policy of the country. And yet with all his far-reaching, but at the same time very unobtrusive administrative innovations, the Lord of Kamakura professed himself to be a strict conservative, a Pharisee of the Pharisee in the realm of constitutional use and wont. In the history of Europe his nearest analogue is perhaps to be found in the person of the Emperor Augustus,* while Yoritomo's device of employing *Shugo*, or High Constables, in the provinces, to supplement the activity of the Civilian Prefect appointed by the Kyōto Court, anticipates the *Intendants* of Louis XIV. by a stretch of four centuries and a half.† This High Constable assigned to most of the provinces was no new office; in the guise of *Sōtsuibushi*, by which name Yoritomo's appointees were indeed at first known, it had existed for centuries. The plain matter of fact is that the Lord of Kamakura instituted very few new offices; his innovations mainly consisted in utilising the traditional institutions of the Empire for new purposes. On the other hand, he abolished little or nothing. The Court of Kyōto still continued to have its *Kwampaku*, its Chancellor of the Empire, its Ministers of the Left and the Right, its Imperial Guards, with their Generals of the Left and of the Right, its Ministers and officials of the Eight Boards, and its Pro-

* Japanese readers will find a perusal of the first forty-four pages of Bury's *Student's Roman Empire* to be most instructive.

† About the *Intendants* there seems to be some misapprehension in certain quarters. For exact details see Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, Tome Sixième, II., pp. 408-9. Tome Septième, I., pp. 166-8.

vincial Governors and other local officers. But the authority wielded by all these was insidiously but surely transferred to the occupants of the co-ordinate offices through which Yoritomo chose to work; and in due course of time, the old central administration of Kyōto found itself confronted with a euthanasia from sheer atrophy and inanition.

The Kwantō and its administration, as has been repeatedly said, always had constituted a serious problem to the Kyōto authorities. One of the most original things that Yoritomo did was to give this remote district a capital city of its own,—a city which was not only the metropolis of Eastern Japan, but a headquarters for the military caste. The supreme importance of this step can hardly be over-estimated. For Yoritomo to have stepped into the position formerly occupied by Taira Kiyomori in Kyōto would have been the easiest and simplest thing in the world; and this is doubtless what he would have done if he had been gifted with no greater measure of political sagacity than Kiyomori possessed. But in Kyōto, all social prestige went to effeminate civilian courtiers; to the Fujiwaras and others of the *sangre azul*, whose lives were generally one long round of elaborately decorous dissipation, of giving and assisting at sumptuous and luxurious functions, where childish and frivolous diversions and pastimes were taken with a seriousness passing belief. With such an example set by the highest in the Empire and its Councils ever before the eyes of the citizens, it is not difficult to infer what the general moral and social tone of the capital must have been, without any very deep delving into the wearisome details of the sumptuary legislation of the time. Stately mansions, elaborate equipages, fine clothes, polished manners, and proficiency in frivolous polite accomplishments,—such were among the objects for which the homage and admiration of the ordinary citizen of Kyōto were reserved. The country gentleman from the provinces was as a rule the possessor of none of these things; and virtually autocratic, as he was upon his own estate and among his followers and tenants, his pride was wont to be sorely ruffled by the scant measure of courtesy accorded him by the shopkeepers of the gay metropolis. Such of the *bushi* as were drafted for their term of three years' service in the Guards were often constrained to ape the airs and graces and frivolities of the curled darlings of the Court (who treated them at best

with a pitying and contemptuous condescension) merely in order to secure a measure of popular consideration and respect. As has been pointed out, Kyōto became a veritable Capua for Kiyomori's clansmen. In the luxurious capital, with its unworthy and effeminate ideals, the simple and strenuous life so necessary for the development and maintenance of the robust military virtues was impossible.

So much Yoritomo had no difficulty in grasping. But this was by no means the only consideration that constrained him to keep severely aloof from the capital. If he established himself there in person, he would lose much in prestige, for he would be outranked not by one, but by many; and he would be sure to come into collision with one or other of those factions which were continually appearing, disappearing, and re-appearing among the courtiers. It had been the traditional policy of the Fujiwara and of the Cloistered Emperors to divide the *Bushi*, and to play off one great military chief against another. Should Yoritomo be constrained to cast in his lot with one of the contending Court factions, its rival would inevitably endeavour to find a counterpoise to him in the person of some other military magnate. At the best, if he established himself in Kyōto, he could hope to make himself supreme in the Empire only by adopting the primitive tactics of Kiyomori, and of riding rough-shod over all legal and constitutional precedents by the exercise of brute force. Now, this was the very last thing he wished to do,—an open and forcible breach with the past, and with all that had hitherto been use and wont in the Empire, was what the Lord of Kamakura showed himself, from first to last, most anxious to avoid. If any one ever successfully accomplished the supposed impossible feat of putting new wine into old bottles, it was Yoritomo of the Minamoto who did so.

At this date, be it observed, there was really only one great city in Japan, for the population of Nara, though not inconsiderable, was mainly ecclesiastical. What the population of the capital amounted to it is really hard to say; but all things considered it certainly must have exceeded 500,000; and possibly, including its fluctuating population, at times approached double that number. Kyōto was to Japan in those days far more than what London is to the British Islands at present. In 1190 Kyōto did not as a matter of fact con-

tain one-sixth of the subjects of the Emperor of Japan. But on the other hand it counted at least ten times as great a population as its nearest rival urban community, the city of Nara, mainly tenanted by *religieux*. At this time, neither in Kyōto nor in Nara was the *Bushi*, or warrior class, of any importance. In Kyōto the civilian was supreme; in Nara, the priest. In Yoritomo's new city of Kamakura, it was neither the civilian nor the priest, but the *Bushi*, or warrior, who bore authority. No blue-blooded civilian courtier exercised the least influence in the new metropolis of the East; while such authority as was wielded there by shaven-pated priests was moral, or ghostly, merely. As for merchants, and traders, and hucksters, while welcomed and protected, they were carefully regulated and supervised by officials of the military caste. In the new city of Kamakura, the *Bushi* had to give the *pas* to none. This nascent city of Kamakura was, with modifications, a veritable camp of the Guardians*; only, a camp not "Without the Walls," but actually more than 300 miles removed from the seat of the interests it was supposed to protect.

Under the surveillance of its two-sworded guardians this military camp on Sagami Bay easily became the second city in the Empire. That it at any time actually rivalled Kyōto in wealth, magnificence, and extent we cannot believe; while the assertion that it at one time numbered as many as 1,000,000 inhabitants must be summarily dismissed as a mere figment of the luxuriant imagination of writers who hold that to stop and think is no part of their business. At the very largest estimate, the site of Kamakura, much of which was unsuitable for building, covered considerably under 5,000 acres of superficies. The most densely populated County Borough in England in 1906 (West Ham), with an area of 4,683 acres, had no more than 302,000 inhabitants. Japanese indeed do huddle together more closely in their so-called rooms than Occidentals are wont to do; but then, on the other hand, the Japanese huddling is all done on the ground floor; for except in restaurants and brothels, upstairs quarters, at this date at least, were almost unknown in the Empire. Accordingly, all things considered, if at the heyday of its prosperity we allow a population of from 200,000 to 250,000 to the military camp of Kamakura—

* See Plato's *Republic*, Book III.

for such in effect it really was—we are treating it with a certain amount of liberality in the matter of figures. In the great earthquake of 1293, as many as 23,000 of its inhabitants are said to have perished, and this was probably about one-tenth of the total.*

But it was neither in its extent nor its magnificence that the profound importance and significance of Kamakura lay. In the heyday of his power and glory Hideyoshi assiduously laid himself out to dazzle the popular imagination by the embellishment of the capital, the erection of magnificent palaces and massive strongholds, the rearing of sumptuous fanes and shrines, the giving of gorgeous pageants and elaborate entertainments. In all this he was certainly not imitating Yoritomo, who carefully saw to it that everything in Kamakura was ordered with the utmost simplicity, frugality, and restraint. It is true that Yoritomo lavished much care and attention upon the Shrine of Hachiman; that he founded some considerable fanes in his new city; and that he caused numerous temples and shrines in Kyōto and Nara, and throughout the Empire generally, to be rebuilt, or renovated. But all this was merely the outcome partly of sincere religious conviction, partly of well-thought-out policy. At this date the priesthood was a great power in the Empire; and one of Kiyomori's cardinal mistakes had been the reckless contempt with which he had treated it. From first to last Yoritomo showed an extreme anxiety to conciliate it. The least complaint from temples about the truculence of military men was promptly and carefully attended to, and the delinquents sternly and severely punished. The time that Yoritomo and his consort Masako devoted to religious functions is almost incredible; possibly a full third of the records of the age is occupied with accounts of their visits to temples, and what not. We continually hear of such and such a fane or shrine being made to offer up prayers for the speedy capture of Yoshitsune, for Yoritomo's success in the field against Fujiwara Yasuhira, to avert impending mischief from comets and other similar portents, and so on, in monotonous and

* Even here, the very best informed European writer, whose command of Japanese is indisputable, has been led astray. After a collation of all the contemporary records, I find that these 23,000 victims of the Great Earthquake of 1293 perished, not in Kamakura alone, but in the Kwantō at large,—a vastly different proposition.

interminable succession. For his erection of huge fanes and costly shrines Hideyoshi had no such excuse. In his day the power of the priests had been thoroughly broken, and he had no need to exert himself to conciliate them; while, personally, he was a downright free-thinker, without the slightest belief either in *Hotoke* or *Kami*, the latter of whose ranks he proposed himself to enter as the New Hachiman. In many of his gigantic undertakings the Taikō was actuated to a great extent by a vainglorious desire to transmit his name to posterity as that of one whose achievements had been unique, surpassing those of all predecessors, unsurpassed and unsurpassable. Yoritomo cherished no such ambition. His dominant passion was the passion for power; but he had the self-restraint to satisfy himself with the possession of the real substance, caring but little for pomp or display of any kind. And yet, on those very rare occasions when there was any useful purpose to be served by a display of pomp and magnificence, the Lord of Kamakura, as will appear presently, could show himself a past-master in the organisation of those processions and pageants and fêtes in which Nobunaga, and still more Hideyoshi, delighted.

Although virtually autocratic on their own manors, and powerful in their own localities, the military men down to the time of Taira Kiyomori had counted for almost absolutely nothing in the Councils of the Empire. During the twenty years' ascendancy of the Ise Heishi, Kiyomori's clansmen had to a great extent accepted the ideals of their civilian rivals, and had given mortal offence to the military caste at large by the arrogance of their pretensions and the insolence of their demeanour. Between the favoured Ise Heishi and the *Buké* at large, armed strife was sure to follow; and the civilian courtiers would infallibly endeavour to profit by any such occasion, and do their best to reduce the warrior to his original position of insignificance. On the other hand, firmly united under one great chief of their own, drilled and disciplined according to their own distinctive ethical code, held fast to those ideals of their own which had been evolving during successive generations, the *Buké* could certainly aspire to constitute themselves into an *imperium in imperio* of their own, and, possibly, even to give the law to the Empire at large. But to accomplish this much, the first and indispen-

sable requisite was that there must be absolutely no factions and no dissensions among them. So much Yoritomo had early discerned; and hence his strenuous endeavour to prevent any of his own vassals, or indeed any military man at large, from having direct communication with the Court of Kyōto. Hence, too, in a great measure, his intense jealousy and hatred of Yoshitsune, who was undoubtedly in high favour with the Cloistered Emperor Shirakawa II., and whose military genius, if placed at the disposal of the civilian Kyōto authorities, who were showing themselves more and more distrustful of Yoritomo, might very well bring his elder half-brother and all his projects to premature wreck and ruin.

After his abortive visit to Kamakura, in the summer of 1185, Yoshitsune had returned to Kyōto in no very pleasant frame of mind. Shortly afterwards Yoritomo induced the Court to reward some of his adherents who had rendered meritorious service; but Yoshitsune still found himself studiously passed over. At last, in September, when six Minamoto clansmen were made Governors of as many provinces, Yoshitsune, as one of them, was charged with the administration of Iyo. But Yoritomo promptly sent Jitō, or stewards, of his own to deal with all the numerous manors in that province, and made other arrangements there, which reduced the power of the new Governor to a mere nullity.

Just at this juncture, Uncle Yukiye thought fit to reappear on the scene. After his defeat by the Tairas, two years before, he had gone into hiding and kept there, for he was well aware that if he fell into the power of his nephew, the Lord of Kamakura, he would get but short shrift after the dire offence he had given in that quarter. With Yoshitsune, Uncle Yukiye got on far better than he had done with either Yoritomo or Yoshinaka; in fact, the two seem to have been sincerely attached to each other. On hearing of their intimacy Yoritomo was profoundly incensed; one emissary was dispatched to seize Yukiye and kill him, while the son of Kajiwara Kagetoki was sent to Kyōto to commission Yoshitsune to do the same. Yoshitsune was under medical treatment at the time, and therefore begged to be excused from meeting his brother's envoy; and upon the latter's return to Kamakura, his father, the old Kajiwara, sedulously and strenuously exerted himself

to induce Yoritomo to put the very worst construction upon the incident.

It was presently determined, in the councils of Kamakura, that Yoshitsune must be "removed,"—in plain language, assassinated. But among the assembled vassals no one showed any great eagerness to undertake the mission, for all felt that the venture was a very desperate one. At last the ex-priest Tosa-bō Shōshun excited the admiration of all by coming forward and offering to proceed on the mission. He was careful enough to stipulate that his family must be provided for beforehand; and Yoritomo at once bestowed two manors upon his heirs. On November 2nd, 1185, Shōshun left Kamakura with 83 cavaliers. They must have marched well, for it was on the evening of November 10th that sixty of them delivered an assault upon Yoshitsune in his Kyōto mansion. Before this, Shōshun had had an interview with his prospective victim, who, suspecting sinister purposes, had made his visitor swear by all that he held most solemn that his intentions were at once pacific and friendly. The night-attack of November 10 was an utter failure; with but only seven attendants Yoshitsune kept the whole troop at bay, until Uncle Yukiie in the adjoining ward, hearing the shouts and clamour, gallantly hastened out with a few retainers, fell upon the rear and flanks of the assailants, and cut most of them to pieces. A few days later Shōshun and some of his surviving followers were captured lurking in the suburbs of the capital, and their heads were promptly sent to grace the public pillories.

Naturally enough, Yoshitsune felt that this was altogether a little too much to be borne with patience; and Uncle Yukiie, who on this occasion undoubtedly saved his youngest nephew's life, had nothing to say against the correctness of this view of the situation. Yoshitsune laid the facts of the case before the Cloistered Emperor, and asked for a commission to chastise the Lord of Kamakura for the crime of outraging the lieges by military violence. The request occasioned many Cabinet councils and much discussion; but when Yoshitsune at last gave the civilians to understand that in default of any such commission as he had humbly asked for, he would simply carry off the Emperor, and the ex-Emperor with him, into the West until he could muster forces there to make headway with, a commission to punish Yoritomo

for his misdeeds was promptly issued to Yoshitsune and Uncle Yukiye, of the Minamoto. Intelligence of this was conveyed to Kamakura by relays of fleet-footed couriers with extraordinary promptitude. The dispatch was handed to Yoritomo while he was arranging the details of the solemn dedicatory ceremonies of one of the principal fanes of Kamakura. He looked over it leisurely, put it away, and went on with the work in which he was engaged, as if the communication from Kyōto was of no earthly importance whatsoever. And yet a calm and sober perusal of the subsequent records conclusively demonstrates that this dispatch was regarded by Yoritomo as among the most weighty and fateful that he ever received.

It seems that from first to last Yoritomo feared no more than five men; and these were that Taira Hirotsume who joined him at the Sumida River in 1180 with 20,000 troops, and whom he did to death shortly afterwards, Satake Hideyoshi, whom he eventually conciliated, Fujiwara Hidehira, the Lord of the 30,000 square miles of Mutsu and Dewa, his own cousin, the brilliant Morning-Sun Shōgun, Yoshinaka from Kiso, and his own youngest half-brother Yoshitsune. Of the real inherent rottenness of the Taira domination, Yoritomo seems to have been well apprised long before he reared the flag of revolt on Stone-Bridge Hill in 1180; and his ultimate triumph over the effeminate and generally detested Ise Heishi he regarded as assured from the very beginning of the struggle. Of his treatment of Taira Hirotsume he professed to repent in sackcloth and ashes; Satake Hideyoshi, by his loyal co-operation in the great Mutsu campaign of 1189, disarmed all suspicions effectually; Kiso Yoshinaka had paved the way to his own undoing in the autumn of 1184. From 1185 to 1189, Yoritomo's great objects of dread were his own half-brother Yoshitsune, and Fujiwara Hidehira of Mutsu. And of these twain it was the brilliant Yoshitsune, who although with scarce a score of devoted henchmen, and a proscribed fugitive with a great price set upon his head, that was the chief cause of the sleepless nights of the great Lord of Kamakura.

As a matter of fact, however, neither Yukiye nor Yoshitsune was in a position to make any head against Yoritomo. Uncle Yukiye was notorious as the best beaten and most consistently thrashed general-officer of the time; besides a score or so of immediate followers of his own he had no resources

whatever. His very name was regarded as synonymous with ill luck; and the average *samurai* was unwilling to take service under him at any price. Yoshitsune's, on the other hand, might well have been regarded as a name to conjure with, for victory had invariably sat perched upon his banner. But all his triumphs had been won if not as Yoritomo's lieutenant, at all events with Yoritomo's troops; and after Dan-no-ura Yoritomo had given his vassals to understand that if they wished to enjoy his favour they must have but few dealings with Yoshitsune. Hence at this juncture they all held aloof. Yoshitsune could indeed trust implicitly in his own personal following; but it was insignificant in numbers, since he had never possessed more than a score of not very extensive manors, and of these he had been stripped by his brother a few months before. His attempt to muster troops in the neighbourhood of the capital proved a failure, for it quickly leaked out that his commission to chastise Yoritomo had been to a great extent extorted by the threat of carrying off the Sovereign and the Cloistered Emperor to the West. Shirakawa II. and the courtiers were exceedingly anxious to have no more fighting in Kyōto; and so, when Yoshitsune spoke of retiring to the West to muster powers there, he was at once granted the taxes of the Sanyōdō and Kyūshū for military purposes, while he himself was appointed Jitō of Kyūshū, and Yukiye Jitō of Shikoku, each severally armed with instructions to summon the *samurai* of these quarters to their standard.

On November 26, Yoshitsune and Yukiye left Kyōto at the head of no more than 200 men. Before they reached the coast of Settsu, where they were to take ship, they had to fight two actions with some vassals of Yoritomo who made a strenuous effort to bar their way and cut them off. Just as they put to sea on November 29, they encountered the full force of a terrible typhoon; and their flotilla was utterly broken up and dispersed. At first it was reported, and generally believed, that all on board of it had perished. But both Yoshitsune and Yukiye had escaped with their lives, although the one knew nothing of the other's fate; and Yoshitsune, landing at Tennōji with his spouse, Shizuka Gozen, the ever-faithful Benkei and a few other attendants, made his way through Izumi into Yamato and went into hiding in the wilds of Yoshino.

Meanwhile Yoritomo had mobilised his vassals in the Tō-

kaidō, Tōsandō, and Hokuikudō and had launched them against Kyōto in three great converging columns. A little later he took the field in person and advanced as far as the Kisegawa in Suruga, where he stopped to await developments. Kyōto, of course, was occupied without striking a blow; and thereupon a counter-decree was promptly issued, charging Yoritomo with the duty of arresting and punishing Yoshitsune and Yukiie.

It was at this point that Yoritomo got Imperial sanction for introducing one of the most important of his great, but unobtrusive, innovations into the administration of the Empire. He was exceedingly anxious about the possibility of Yoshitsune escaping into Kyūshū, and there ultimately arraying the West against the East; and on returning to Kamakura he held many consultations with his advisers as to the most effective means of providing against the contingency. It was the long-headed Nakahara Hiromoto who propounded the best solution of this problem;* and the adoption of the measure he then proposed not only served to render Yoshitsune impotent, but also to rivet the shackles of the Bakufu upon the Empire at large. Nakahara's scheme was that Imperial sanction should be obtained by Yoritomo for placing a High Constable (Sōtsuibushi, or Shugo) in every province, while Jitō (Land Stewards) should be appointed to superintend the administration of justice, the maintenance of order, and the collection of taxes in all the manors of the Empire, irrespective of their holders, whether military men or civilians, and of the particular tenure by which they were held. Furthermore, on all these manors the new Land Stewards were to levy a *new* tax of 5 shō of rice per *tan* (roughly equal to one bushel per acre) for purely military purposes,—to be devoted to the support of the men drafted for service in the Imperial Guards or levied for the suppression of disturbances.

To obviate certain serious misconceptions, a somewhat detailed discussion of this dry subject may be found necessary and beneficial. The administrative system or systems of Old Japan are often regarded as wonderfully symmetrical and simple. But symmetry and simplicity, on closer examination, will be found to be equally illusory. The attempt to adapt

* In foreign histories of Japan it is ō-e Hiromoto who is credited with this great stroke of policy. As a matter of fact Nakahara Hiromoto and ō-e Hiramoto were one and the same person. Before this date, ō-e Hiromoto had been adopted into the house of Nakahara, and it was only in 1216 that he resumed his own original family name.

a symmetrical series of governmental institutions from China was never more than a partial success at best; and since the eighth century the actual policy of the nation had been developing with all the irregularity of the famous British Constitution. Thus it is possible to indulge in the luxury of universal propositions about the administrative institutions of Old Japan and their practical working only at the expense of the best interests of accuracy and veracity.

We are generally told by non-Japanese writers that Yoritomo on this occasion appointed and stationed a High Constable in each of the six-and-sixty provinces of the Empire. But he did nothing of the kind. He indeed did obtain the sanction of the Court to do so. But he simply could not dare at this date to presume to intrude any such functionaries into the huge provinces of Mutsu and Dewa, where the will of Fujiwara Hidehira was virtually omnipotent. Over some provinces such as Noto and Hyūga he contented himself with placing merely a Jitō or Land Steward. In others, notably Bungo and some of the Kwantō provinces, he established Kuni Bugyō. In others again, such as Yamato, there was no High Constable at all, the *Shugo* established in the capital being supposed to keep a watchful eye upon it and the other Home Provinces in the case of any necessity to do so. In some cases, such as that of Satsuma, the *Shugo* appointed did not proceed to occupy his post until years afterwards. Especially misleading is such a statement as that at this time "Doi Sanehira received five provinces of the Sanyōdō in fief." Doi was simply made High Constable in these provinces,—a mere administrative functionary, with strictly limited duties, and no proprietary rights over the soil whatsoever. A few manors in them may have been assigned to him for the support of his position in the discharge of his functions; but as to his receiving that huge tract of country as a "fief" at this date, the statement is a glaring anachronism. That there were "fiefs" at this time is perfectly true; but in one celebrated document Yoritomo speaks of 500 acres of rice-land as a very large holding for a military man to possess. Upon the overthrow of the Tairas, the only great feudatories in Japan, besides Yoritomo, were Fujiwara Hidehira, Satake Hideyoshi, and certain Buddhist monasteries. In short, to confound the position of one of Yoritomo's *Shugo* with that of one of Hideyoshi's *Daimyō*, four hundred years later on, is a huge historical blunder.

Hideyoshi's Daimyō had proprietary rights, the all but unlimited rights of administration in their fiefs, the power of legislation for their vassals, tenants, and thralls, and also the power of life and death over every one on their estates, and of adjudicating either in person or by deputy all suits, criminal and civil, within their domains. Furthermore, their position was supposed to be hereditary,—one transmitted from sire to son, or from the holder to his lawful heir. It is perfectly true that not a few of Hideyoshi's Daimyō were the direct lineal descendants of certain of Yoritomo's High Constables, or of the most considerable of his Jitō or Land Stewards. However, in order to convey some approximate idea of the huge gap that has to be bridged in the evolution of a Kamakura High Constable of Cœur-de-Lion's time into a Daimyō coeval with the Elizabethan age in England, it may be sufficient to cite a *locus classicus* from Mr. John Carey Hall's excellent translation of the first attempt at a Feudal Code in Japan—the famous *Jō-ei Shikimoku* of 1232.

“Article 3.—*Of the duties devolving upon High Constables.*

In the time of Yoritomo it was settled that those duties should be the calling out and dispatching the Grand Guard for service at the capital, the suppression of conspiracies and rebellion, and the punishment of murder and violence [which included night attacks on houses, robbery, dacoity, and piracy]. Of late years, however, Official Substitutes (*Daikwan*) have been taken on and distributed over the counties and townships and these have been imposing burdens (*corvée*) on the villages. Not being Governors of the Provinces (still, in theory, civilians appointed by the Kyōto Court), they yet hinder the (agricultural) work of the province; not being Land Stewards they are yet greedy of the profits of the land. Such proceedings and schemes are utterly unprincipled. . . . In short, conformably to the precedents of the time of Yoritomo, the High Constables must cease altogether from giving directions in *matters outside of the hurrying-up of the Grand Guards and the suppression of plots, rebellion, murder, and violence.* . . . In the event of a High Constable disobeying this article and intermeddling in other affairs than those herein named, if a complaint is instituted against him by the (civilian) Governor of the Province (appointed by the Emperor), or the Lord of a Manor, or if the Land Steward (*Jitō*) or the folk aggrieved petition for redress,

his downright lawlessness being thus brought to light, he shall be divested of his office, and a person of mild character appointed in his stead. Again, as regards Delegates (*Daikwan*), not more than one is to be appointed by a High Constable.

“Article 4.—*Of High Constables omitting to report cases of crime (to Kamakura) and confiscating the succession to fiefs, on account of offences.* When persons are found committing serious offences the High Constables should make a detailed report of the case (to Kamakura) and follow such directions as may be given them in relation thereto; yet there are some who, without ascertaining the truth or falsehood of an accusation, or investigating whether the offence committed was serious or trifling, arbitrarily pronounce the escheat of the criminal's hereditaments, and selfishly cause them to be confiscated. Such unjust judgments are a nefarious artifice for the indulgence of licence. Let a report be promptly made to us of the circumstances of each case and our decision upon the matter be respectfully asked for; any further persistence in transgression of this kind will be dealt with criminally.

“In the next place, with regard to a culprit's rice-fields and other fields, his dwelling-house, his wife and children, his utensils and other articles of property. In serious cases, the offenders are to be taken in charge by the Protector's office; but it is not necessary to take in charge their farms, houses, wives, children, and miscellaneous gear along with them.

“Furthermore, even if the criminal should in his statement implicate others as being accomplices or accessories, such are not to be included in the scope of the High Constable's judgment, unless they are found in possession of the booty (or other substantial evidence of guilt be forthcoming).”

As for the *Jitō* or Land Stewards, a good deal has already been said in previous chapters when dealing with the important question of manors. We have spoken of these manors as being tax-free; but the peasants and farmers settled on them were by no manner of means tax-free. Only their taxes were paid not to the Imperial revenue officer but to the proprietor of the estate. The *Jitō* at this date was not a proprietor; in theory he was simply an administrative officer appointed by the proprietor to represent him, to collect the dues, and to manage the property. But there was a strong and increasing

tendency for Jitō to act as if they were proprietors. During the supremacy of the Ise Heishi, many of the largest owners of Shō-en had been constrained by force of circumstances to appoint men of Taira stock as their Jitō. On the overthrow of the Tairas not only were all their own manors confiscated; wherever a Taira had held a Land Stewardship, this office was also declared to be forfeit. These manors and these offices were at first bestowed partly on Yoritomo and partly on Yoshinaka; on the death of the latter they all went to Yoritomo, who at once filled the vacant posts with his own vassals. What was now done in 1185, was to deprive the proprietors of Shō-en of the right of appointing their own Land Stewards (Jitō), and to transfer that right to the Lord of Kamakura. His Jitō, after deducting their own salaries, were to hand over the produce of the taxes to the proprietors, whoever they might be; to administer justice, and be generally responsible for the maintenance of peace and order within the bounds of the estates committed to their charge. Some of the Jitō of Yoritomo were responsible not for one manor, but for many; as Jitō, Hasebe ruled the greater part of manorial Noto, Itō the whole of manorial Hyūga, while about one-half of manorial Hizen was under the superintendence of the Jitō of Ryuzōji.

Outside the manorial tracts lying in his province, the Provincial Governor was still supposed to be supreme. Theoretically this official was a civilian appointed by the Court of Kyōto, to whom alone he was directly responsible. As a matter of fact, even at this date, we meet with not a few instances of military men appointed to this civilian post. In times of commotion and strife, the Provincial Governor would naturally find himself helpless, for he had no military force at his disposal. The control of that had passed into the hands of Shugo and Jitō; and these bent not to the will of Kyōto, but to the behests of Kamakura. The Court could not interfere directly with either High Constable or Land Steward. If complaints about these were received, they were forwarded to Yoritomo, who alone could decide as to their reasonableness, and who alone could take practical action in the matter. In reality, he showed himself wonderfully attentive to the incessant reports of misconduct with which he was assailed, and very prompt to redress grievances and to punish offending subordinates. In a few months, however, he realised that he had carried his Jitō

project too far; the troubles between his appointees and the owners were numerous and serious; and the new system was undoubtedly most unpopular in certain quarters. Now, at this time, what Yoritomo desired above all things was popularity. He had caused the *Kirokusho* established by Sanjō II. in 1069 to be re-organised for the purpose of dealing with civil suits between owners of *Shō-en*, and of owners of *Shō-en* and the *Jitō*; but its commissioners proved to be dilatory and timid, and its working was the reverse of satisfactory. In a few months, he asked leave to abolish the special military tax of four bushels of rice per acre; and soon afterwards he withdrew his Land Stewards from nearly all the manors, except those that had been either owned by the *Tairas*, or administered by them. He could the more readily afford to make this concession, since these *Taira* manors in Western Japan were so numerous and so extensive, that his possession of them practically ensured his supremacy there, while at the same time his *Shugo* had complete control of the military affairs of the provinces in which they lay.

Shortly after the *Kamakura* troops had occupied *Kyōto* towards the end of 1185, *Hōjō Tokimasa* had been sent up to the capital to represent Yoritomo there; and it was during his three months' stay at the seat of the Court that all these new arrangements were effected. But all this was only part of his commission. On three separate occasions Yoritomo had been publicly proclaimed a rebel by the Court; and he was determined that his fortunes and fair fame should not be any longer exposed to the caprices of the ex-Emperor and his factious advisers. Certain of the functions of the *Kwampaku* were now entrusted to a *Nairan*,—an officer who was really to watch the doings of the *Kyōto* authorities in Yoritomo's interests, and to keep him duly apprised of what was toward in the capital. Furthermore, a *Shugo*, or High Constable, was stationed in *Kyōto*, with the duty of attending to the neighbouring provinces in case of need. In many respects the functions of this official were identical with those of the *Kebiishi*, the High Commissioner of Police and Criminal Law, appointed by the Sovereign. But the *Shugo* was not supposed to displace the *Kebiishi*. In fact, shortly afterwards we read of the *Kebiishi* putting some *Bakufu* men under arrest for negligence in the discharge of their duties, and of Yoritomo punishing the latter

severely when the incident was brought to his notice. The truth is that what with orders and decrees emanating from so many different sources,—the Imperial Chancery, the Palace of the Cloistered Emperor, the *Kebiishi* Board,—and all of equal authority, concurrent jurisdiction had become the rule rather than the exception in the administration of the capital and of the Empire. Hence this invasion of the traditional sphere of the activity of the *Kebiishi* by Kamakura officers did not occasion any particular surprise or uneasiness in Kyōto at first. As a matter of fact, the Court continued to appoint its own *Kebiishi* without any reference to Kamakura, for long years after this. But in little more than a generation after the Bakufu established its first *pied à terre* in Kyōto, in 1186, the once all powerful *Kebiishi* had come to be little more than an empty titular distinction, for by that time the Hōjō Regents had got their hands so securely upon the throat of the Court, that by tightening their grip they could virtually strangle it with all its officials at any moment. But it was no part of the policy of Yoritomo to offend the susceptibilities of the Cloistered Emperor in any way, when such a course could be avoided; and he was extremely careful to see to it that his officials in the capital should be as unobtrusive as possible in all the steps they took for the establishment of Kamakura influence there.

During the next three years—1186 to 1189—the Lord of Kamakura was mostly occupied with two problems, which ultimately resolved themselves into one. In the summer of 1186, Uncle Yukiiye had been at last captured in Izumi; and his head after being exposed in Kyōto was sent on to Kamakura for Yoritomo's inspection. But Yoshitsune still continued to be at large; and so long as his head and shoulders remained undivorced this most brilliant of all the Great Captains of Japan was regarded by Yoritomo as the direst of menaces to himself and his projects. And then, to the north lay the vast estates and thronging vassals of Fujiwara Hidehira, the Lord, or rather the King, of the 30,000 square miles of Mutsu and Dewa. Until Yoshitsune was safely and securely under the mould, and Mutsu and Dewa reduced to subjection, Yoritomo felt that he could not hope to sleep in peace.

The anxiety felt by the Lord of Kamakura about what his youngest half-brother might possibly do was plainly not only

intense, but actually overmastering and overpowering. A rich harvest to priests and temples it proved; for, with all his greatness, Yoritomo was the abject slave of superstition,—as much so, indeed, as was Louis XI. of France. In 1186, Yoshitsune's spouse, or better perhaps, devoted female friend and companion, Shizuka Gozen, was captured by Hōjō Tokimasa's emissaries. After being subjected to a rigorous but unsatisfactory examination by Hōjō she was sent on to Kamakura,—pregnant with child by Yoshitsune. Shizuka was the ablest and most fashionable *danseuse* in Kyōto; the brilliant victor in the great Dan-no-ura fight of 1185 had at once captivated her heart, when, summoned to perform in a function given in his honour, she had first met him. Henceforth her devotion to him had been at once sincere and profound; henceforth she incontestably proved herself to be

“Bold, cautious, true, and his loving comrade.”

Had it not been for the loving and anxious forethought of Shizuka, Yoshitsune must inevitably have fallen a victim to the assault of the vile and foresworn Toshabo Shōshun, the miserable tool of the still viler Lord of Kamakura, who employed his dirty services and rewarded them liberally in advance. In this connection, a fearless and impartial historian has not the slightest need to stop and pause and consider and mince his words. In spite of all his great intellectual and administrative abilities, Yoritomo was morally as great a criminal as were Richelieu or Colbert, when what he, or they, were pleased to consider as “reasons of State” were involved. On arriving at Kamakura, Shizuka was subjected to another searching examination; but as to the whereabouts or the probable whereabouts of the much-dreaded Yoshitsune the inquisitors learned simply nothing. Then nothing would serve Masako but that the famous *danseuse* should give an exhibition of her skill before her. Shizuka flatly refused to do so; but at last Yoritomo found means to induce her to comply with the mandate. Accompanied by Hatakeyama Shigetada with the cymbals and Kudō Suketsune with the tambourine, she danced, improvising a song of love and regret for her proscribed lover. Masako, in this, did not come off with any very great advantage; certain of the deft allusions in the bold improvisation stung too keenly. Shizuka was kept in ward till she was delivered of her child. It was

a male; and Yoritomo at once ordered one of his satellites (Adachi Kiyotsune) to make away with it, while the mother was set at liberty. It will be remembered that Kiso Yoshinaka's boyish son had been sent to Kamakura to be wedded to Yoritomo's daughter. Shortly after the fall of Yoshinaka, Yoritomo had this boy put to death in cold blood. It is things of this description that excite our detestation and loathing for certain phases of Yoritomo's character. What makes the matter infinitely worse is that it was towards those of his own flesh and blood,—towards his own kith and kin,—that the great Lord of Kamakura was so unrelentingly pitiless and cruel.

On the other hand, towards the hereditary enemies of his house,—the Ise Heishi,—he was not particularly vindictive, if we take into account the manifold causes for a just resentment they had furnished. Part of Hōjō Tokimasa's commission, on going up to Kyōto, at the end of 1185, had been to search for the remnants of the Tairas still lurking in the capital; to see to it that most of those found should be sent into a safe exile; and that the more dangerous among them should be killed. Yet we read of no more than two of the infant descendants of Kiyomori being butchered on this occasion. However, there is some reason to believe that this unwonted measure of clemency must be attributed to nothing loftier than a grovelling superstition. In the autumn of 1185, Kyōto had been visited by a series of terrible earthquakes which had done immense damage, and the surface of the ground had kept on shaking and quivering for weeks. To the excited popular imagination it seemed as if the ghosts of the Taira host that had got whelmed in the waves at Dan-no-ura, and so defrauded of last obsequies, were now wreaking a deadly revenge, from which the sole prospect of escape lay in appeasing the wrath of the offended disembodied spirits. That this view of the matter was transmitted to Kamakura by Hōjō, we know from contemporary records. Now, as has been said, Yoritomo was profoundly superstitious; and the popular desire to placate the "rough spirits" of the drowned Heishi, no doubt, did much to stay him from pushing matters against the scant survivors of the erstwhile all-powerful house of Kiyomori to extremities. Besides all this, the Ise Heishi had been so effectually and thoroughly crushed, that long generations must pass before

they could again become formidable. They had almost entirely ceased to be objects of anxiety to the Lord of Kamakura. What occupied his thoughts night and day was what the man who had done most to bring about their fall—his own youngest half-brother, Yoshitsune—might be ultimately able to effect against him.

Down to March or April 1187,—for fifteen months,—Yoshitsune succeeded in eluding the Kamakura sleuth-hounds in the wilds of Yamato, Kishū, and Ise. During a portion of this time he actually contrived to lurk in Kyōto, or its vicinity. Then at last, disguised as a Yama-bushi, or strolling begging Friar, accompanied by Benkei and others, he struck out for the coast of the Sea of Japan, and after a series of thrilling adventures in traversing its littoral towards the north, he at last found himself once more safe under the protector of his youthful days, Fujiwara Hidehira, the virtual King of Mutsu and Dewa. At this time Hidehira was an old man of ninety-one, and he knew that his end was at hand. One of the last things he did was to charge his sons to stand by Yoshitsune on all occasions to the last, and to exert themselves to aid him to obtain the office of Shōgun. A few months after Yoshitsune arrived in Mutsu, the patriarchal Hidehira was gathered to his fathers; and his eldest son, Yasuhira, ruled in his stead. By-and-by rumours began to reach Kamakura to the effect that Yoshitsune was being harboured in Mutsu; and when the truth of these rumours was presently confirmed emissaries were dispatched requesting Yasuhira to put the fugitive to death (April 1188). As little notice was taken of this request, Yoritomo began to put pressure on the Cloistered Emperor to send a special decree to Yasuhira enjoining him to carry out the order from Kamakura; and when, even then, the Mutsu chieftain was slow to bestir himself, the Lord of Kamakura began to insist upon receiving a commission to chastise Yasuhira himself. It was with great reluctance that such a commission was at last issued by the Court of Kyōto, where, even then, Yoshitsune had strong and not altogether unimportant sympathisers, some of whom were presently banished for attempting to thwart Yoritomo's projects. On learning of all this, Yasuhira lost heart, and resolved to endeavour to avert the storm threatening to burst upon him by executing the mandate from Kyōto. With overwhelming numbers he

suddenly attacked Yoshitsune's residence at Koromogawa, and although the latter made a most gallant defence he was ultimately overborne. Seeing that escape was impossible, he first killed his wife and children, and then committed *hara-kiri*. Hidehira's youngest son, true to his father's dying injunctions, had stood manfully by Yoshitsune to the last; and Yasuhira did not scruple to forward the head of his own brother together with that of Yoshitsune to Kamakura, with the view of still further placating the resentment of Yoritomo.

One authority alleges that "this barbarous action irritated Yoritomo to such a degree that he assembled a great army to punish Yasuhira for the crime, and although the Cloistered Emperor forbade him, he refused to listen to his commands." Seeing that the Lord of Kamakura was notoriously guilty of similar barbarities on a much more extensive scale, it is not likely he was at all seriously or profoundly affected by the death of Fujiwara Tadahira at the hands of his elder brother. The lively indignation he expressed was doubtless entirely feigned,—simulated for "reasons of State." What he wanted above all things was a plausible excuse for attacking Yasuhira and reducing Mutsu and Dewa to subjection. The fact is that when Yoshitsune's death was reported to the Kyōto Court, Yoritomo's commission for operations against Yasuhira was cancelled. But Yoritomo's agents insisted that his preparations for the campaign were so far advanced that he could not afford to abandon it; and judicious pressure in the proper quarters occasioned the prompt re-issue of the decree for the reduction of Mutsu. Presently three huge armies were converging upon the doomed provinces from as many widely separated bases. While the levies of the Hokurikudō under Hiki and Usami entered Dewa by the Japan Sea coast route, two great columns advanced upon Mutsu from the south. One followed the Pacific sea-board, the other directed its course through Shimotsuke. With the latter of these Yoritomo went in person. When the three forces ultimately formed a junction in the centre of Mutsu, towards the end of the campaign, they were found to amount to the immense total of 284,000 men. At all events such is the assertion of the *Azuma Kagami*,—which must be admitted

to be on the whole a sober, unimaginary, and well-informed record.

The strategy of the Bakufu commanders was at once simple and sound, and the immense masses of men they had at their disposal were handled with no mean amount of tactical ability and skill. Before the overwhelming numerical superiority of the invaders the men of Mutsu could do little more than stand passively on the defensive. There was a good deal of dour and dogged and determined fighting, but the northerners were driven from one entrenched position to another, some of the most considerable of their stockades being captured with all their garrisons, and by the end of two months or so. it had become plain to Yasuhira that all hopes of a successful resistance were at an end. He therefore sent envoys to Yoritomo's headquarters to negotiate terms of surrender. But the overture was brusquely repulsed; and it then became plain that Yoritomo would rest satisfied with nothing less than the death of Yasuhira, and the complete overthrow of the great house of Fujiwara of Mutsu. Yasuhira in despair abandoned the contest on the mainland, and fled over the straits to Yezo, where he was presently assassinated by one of his own retainers, a certain Kawada, who carried his master's head to Yoritomo. No doubt the latter was deeply gratified in the innermost recesses of his heart by the sight of the grisly trophy; but he rewarded Kawada in a very characteristic fashion,—he at once ordered him to be put to death for treachery! Pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the Lord of Kamakura was at all times a hazardous and unprofitable venture.

In the immense hoard of metallic and other treasures accumulated by the Fujiwaras of Mutsu in the course of three generations Yoritomo found a ready and easy means of recompensing the services of his officers; and all proffer of reward from the Court of Kyōto was respectfully declined. Presently, however, Yoritomo requested to be allowed to undertake the administration of the conquered provinces; and the petition was granted. For the preservation of order and the decision of suits, two officials, who soon came to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, were established in Mutsu, while later on a Shugo was specially assigned to Dewa. Their instructions were to conduct affairs as they had been conducted by Hidehira, a certain indication that the administration of that great chief

was regarded by Yoritomo as at once highly efficient and a model worthy of imitation. At the same time everything possible was done to conciliate the good-will of the new vassals of the Bakufu. Temples and shrines were repaired and renovated, their revenues confirmed and in certain cases considerably augmented, while special efforts were made to relieve destitution and distress. In a short time, after the vigorous suppression of an abortive revolt in the following year, when an adventurer endeavoured to personate Yoshitsune, the new provinces were as orderly and contented as they had been under the beneficent patriarchal rule of the illustrious Hidehira. And this was the end of the earliest great fief in Japan,—a fief which in territorial extent covered a full fourth of the total superficies of the Empire.

From the autumn of 1189, the Lord of Kamakura could afford to sleep soundly. In that year both Yoshitsune and the Fujiwara chieftain had perished; and instead of being a deadly menace to Yoritomo's rear whenever he contemplated operations in the West, Mutsu and Dewa would henceforth supply him with the support of an additional 50,000 or 60,000 horse-bowmen or footmen in case of need. Of the five men who had at any time inspired Yoritomo, if not with mortal fear, at all events with wholesome dread, four could henceforth work him scath as disembodied spirits merely; and the Lord of Kamakura was, above all things, exceedingly careful to stand well with Buddhist priests and the heads of Shintō shrines. As for the erstwhile redoubtable Satake Hideyoshi, he had brought a strong following to join Yoritomo's flag at Utsunomiya on September 7, 1189; and in the subsequent Mutsu campaign he had done yeoman's service in the cause of the Kamakura Bakufu.

Here it may be well once more to insist upon a point—and a cardinal point too—which Western readers will infallibly overlook, unless it be insisted upon with almost nauseous and damnable iteration. Under the Tokugawa *régime*, the rights of the Great Daimyō over their territories were twofold,—proprietary as well as administrative, although, as a rule, these two very distinct and distinctive prerogatives were wont to be blended in blurred, if not actually inextricable confusion. Now in Mutsu and Dewa Yoritomo's rights were not proprietary; they were administrative purely and solely, at least in

their origin. But even with the clearest and cleanest of title-deeds of the very most superfine quality of parchment, it is but ill having to argue with an offended administrative authority, who can at an extreme pinch contrive to throw a matter of some 350,000 fully armed men upon your just but defenceless back. What the Lord of Kamakura filched, not from the Emperor, but from an ex-Emperor of Japan, most dutifully and with the most elaborate show, or simulation, of constitutional means and methods, was not provinces, or even acres or roods; but simply administrative rights and prerogatives over perhaps some eighty per cent. of the military caste, then rapidly increasing in influence, prestige, numbers, and material resources. Here another word of caution is imperatively necessary. The military caste had no monopoly of the use of lethal weapons of offence or defence at this time; or indeed for a full four hundred years afterwards. The very hucksters and pedlars, who humbly hawked their wares about from one door to another in the great *Buké* capital of Kamakura, from first to last carried a well-tempered keen-cutting blade in their girdles, and the records conclusively show that some of them at least did not carry that blade as a mere ornament.

Since he raised his standard on Stone-Bridge-Hill in 1180, Yoritomo had been, not once, but several times summoned to repair to Kyōto; but he had invariably been able to devise some excuse for his non-appearance there. This persistent aloofness on his part was no doubt the outcome of carefully studied and deeply pondered policy. The unknown, and still more, the mysterious unknown, readily passes for the magnificent; and as it was and had been the wont of the polished courtiers and of the citizens who took their tone from them to treat military men with a tolerant condescension at the best, the great War-Lord of Kamakura was in no haste to expose himself to the risks of that familiarity which so easily bred contempt. Time and again the people of Kyōto had seen the fierce Kwantō horse-bowmen defiling through their streets in all the stern panoply of war in seemingly interminable troops and squadrons; and these overwhelming displays of military power and resources began to impress even the incurable levity of the gay metropolis with an uncomfortable sense of awe and respect. Then

followed the reflection that those huge masses of invincible warriors constituted an engine merely; and that behind it and far greater than it was the brain who had forged it, and who continued to control all its movements from the mysterious remoteness of the nascent capital of Kamakura, about whose magnificence strange fables were rapidly getting afloat in Kyōto. Again, latterly, the very palaces and fanes of Kyōto had one after the other been either rebuilt or renovated by the resources of the Kwantō, dutifully proffered by the great War-Lord for these beneficent objects. Then with his *Shugo* in Kyōto, with the *Nairan* looking after his interests amid the devious intrigues of the Court, it presently began to dawn upon the consciousness of Kyōto that the arm of the new War-Lord was at once long and powerful. In the Empire of Japan all this was entirely new and unprecedented. Since Kwammu founded his new metropolis of Heianjō in 794, Kyōto had continued to be the centre of the universe. Whoever aspired to play any considerable part in the councils of the nation had, since that date, inevitably endeavoured to be in, or near, the gay and frivolous capital. The highest ambition of great captains and of successful military adventurers had unfailingly hitherto been to participate in the gaities of Kyōto, whether as humble satellites of Fujiwara magnates like Michinaga, or as the trusted henchmen of Cloistered Emperors. Taira Kiyomori had indeed so far broken with immemorial tradition, in this respect, as to endeavour, with no mean measure of success, to dispense with all patronage from civilians, and had boldly challenged their lofty pretensions to the monopoly of high office and exalted rank. Yet, like almost every great military chief before him, Kiyomori himself, and his clansmen in still greater measure, had succumbed to the siren-like enchantment of the magnificent and luxurious city on the banks of the Kamo. And now in these later years a War-Lord had arisen in the barbarous wilds of the East, far greater than Kiyomori had ever been, whose numerical following was such as was unknown in Japan in the very hey-day of Kiyomori's power, a War-Lord who all unseen and unknown had forged an engine which had tumbled the huge structure of Ise Heishi grandeur and greatness into irrecoverable and irredeemable wreck and ruin. And yet to this War-Lord the brilliant centre of the Japanese

universe was without interest or charm; time and again he had turned a deaf ear to the most flattering commands or invitations to honour it with the light of his countenance. All this could scarcely fail to impress the imagination of even the most giddy-minded among the courtiers and the citizens who aped them and their ways. Curiosity about the mysterious Lord of Kamakura had for long been intense; and when it was known that he had at last fixed a date for his appearance in their midst the whole city was in a turmoil of excitement and expectation.

In August, 1190, architects and artificers were busily at work rearing a magnificent hostel for the reception of Yoritomo during his sojourn in Kyōto, on the site of Taira Kiyomori's Rokuhara mansion. When news reached Kamakura that this structure was all but completed Yoritomo set out, on November 2, escorted by a numerous and magnificent cavalcade. Nearly five weeks were spent on the journey, for Yoritomo, besides looking carefully into the conduct of his administrative agents along the route, devoted considerable time to revisiting the scenes made memorable by the hardships he had endured as a boy of fourteen during the disastrous flight from Kyōto thirty years before. At last, on December 5, his cortège arrived in the suburbs of the capital; and through long lines and lanes of gaping citizens it wended its way to the Rokuhara. So overwhelming was the curiosity of the Cloistered Emperor that his ex-Majesty is said to have gone out *incognito* to view his formidable subject and his magnificent train, whose splendour astonished even the oldest courtiers, accustomed as they had been to pomp and pageants from their youth. They could scarcely believe that such wealth and such knowledge of the art of display were to be found in the Kwantō. During his five weeks' stay in Kyōto on this occasion, Yoritomo rained costly gifts and presents upon the Sovereign, the Cloistered Emperor, the courtiers, and the leading fanes and shrines of the city.

Yoritomo was already invested with very high Court rank; about two years before this date he had been advanced to the first grade of the Second Class. But hitherto he had held none of the ordinary great Court offices. He was now made Gon-Dainagon, or Acting Councillor of State,— the Dainagon (of whom there were several), it will be remembered, ranking

after the Minister of the Right or the Naidaijin, when there was a Naidaijin. A few days later, he was gazetted Great General of the Right, and accorded the privilege of wearing a sword of honour when he appeared at Court. As propriety demanded, he had at first declined both offices; but they were pressed upon him. However, he held them for no more than a few days, his resignation being graciously accepted when he presented it. It is strange to read of Yoritomo being rewarded on this occasion with a gift of 250 acres of Kōden (Merit-Land) for his distinguished services.

This visit to the capital did not enable Yoritomo to attain the object on which he had set his mind for long. He had for years been desirous of obtaining an Imperial patent investing him with the office of Sei-i-Tai Shōgun (Barbarian-Subduing Great General). But the Cloistered Emperor looked askance at the request; and was careful not to grant it. The fact is, that in spite of Yoritomo's professed dutiful submission, his obtaining Court decrees to sanction even the least of his projects before undertaking them, and his almost punctilious regard for constitutional precedents, his ex-Majesty continued to regard the Lord of Kamakura with a very considerable measure of deep-rooted distrust. If we consider the rough and rude fashion in which the Cloistered Emperor had been coerced by former virtually military dictators, Kiyomori, Munemori, and Yoshinaka, there is nothing to be surprised at in this, perhaps. Schooled by the long series of mortifications he had had to endure at the hands of great chieftains, during his rule of more than thirty years, Shirakawa II. was evidently astute enough to divine that the issuing of any such commission as the great War-Lord of the Kwantō wished to obtain could not fail to be pregnant with disaster to the interests and authority of the Imperial line. At all events, as long as he continued to live, Yoritomo had to rest contented with his office of Lord High Constable of the Empire.

But the days of Shirakawa II. were rapidly drawing to a close, and he passed away in the spring of 1192, at the age of 67. Thereupon, his grandson, the titular Sovereign, Toba II., assumed the supreme direction of affairs. But as Toba II. was no more than thirteen years of age at this time, he was at first almost entirely in the hands of his Ministers; and these Ministers were all more or less under the influence of Kamakura.

It is not strange, then, that Yoritomo was presently gratified with that special Imperial patent he had hitherto vainly endeavoured to obtain. In August 1192 two commissioners were dispatched to Kamakura to invest him with the long-coveted office of Sei-i-Tai Shōgun. Clothed in their robes of State, the commissioners proceeded to the shrine of Hachiman on Tsurugaoka, where they were solemnly received by Yoritomo's representative attended by a throng of warriors, all in full panoply. There the new Shōgun's delegate was handed the Imperial patent, presented a hundred ryō to each of the commissioners, and returned to Yoritomo's palace. Yoritomo, who during all this time had remained in the palace, came out as far as the porch and there received the Imperial order. Such was the simple ceremony by which Yoritomo was formally confirmed in the all but supreme and absolute sway he already wielded over the military class in the Empire.

In connection with this unpretentious, but all-important, episode in the history of Japan, two points must be briefly adverted to, but strongly insisted on. In the first place, the appointment of a Sei-i-Tai Shōgun was in itself no novelty, for Shōguns there had been in scores before this date; and even of Barbarian-Subduing Great Generals there had been several since the days of Saka-no-Uye no Tamura-marō, who had been the first to receive such a title. But the commission of all previous Shōguns and Sei-i-Tai Shōguns had been for a strictly limited special purpose, on the accomplishment of which the commission had to be returned to the Emperor or his representatives. Furthermore, the authority of these commanders had extended only to the troops under their flag for the time being, and the district that was the seat of war or disturbance. Now, the authority bestowed upon Yoritomo was general,—to provide for the defence and tranquillity of the Empire at large; and as such a duty was permanent, there could be no question of his having to surrender his patent upon the accomplishment of the object for which it was issued. Moreover, in case of need, it put the whole military class and the whole military resources of the Empire at his disposal.

The second point to be briefly dwelt on is this: As Lord High Constable of the sixty-six provinces of Japan Yoritomo had undoubtedly exercised a commanding authority over the military class; and it might very well appear at first blush

that his new commission as Sei-i-Tai Shōgun added to or reinforced that authority in no appreciable manner. But such an impression is a mistaken one. The office of Lord High Constable of the Empire, with Imperial permission to place a High Constable in each of the provinces, had indeed enabled Yoritomo to extend his authority over some 80 or 90 per cent. of the military class of Japan. But that office was felt to be anomalous; and at best an ingenious temporary makeshift. It might be revoked at any moment; and for almost every individual proceeding he had taken in the exercise of its functions, the Lord of Kamakura had either been constrained, or had felt it to be expedient, to appeal to the Court for its sanction or instructions. Down to 1192 the contemporary records are replete with representations by Yoritomo to the Cloistered Emperor, and the Imperial replies to these communications. Now, one great peculiarity in a Shōgun's commission had invariably been that, from the moment he received his official sword from the hands of the Sovereign till the day that he returned it thereto, he was free to act on his own initiative, to punish or reward, to slay or to save alive within the assigned and legitimate sphere of his operations. Naturally this was a prerogative that appealed strongly to the imagination of military men, and ensured their respect for the office. Now, this all-important feature in the temporary commission of a Shōgun for a special limited purpose was of course reproduced in Yoritomo's patent of Sei-i-Tai Shōgun, appointed to provide for the permanent defence and tranquillity of the Empire. To be directed by a Lord High Constable, who was perpetually appealing to the Court for permission to do this or that, and from whom permission was not unfrequently withheld, was one thing, and to be absolutely at the orders of an autocrat within his own sphere, free to act on his own untrammelled initiative, and from whose orders and decision there was no appeal to any higher authority, was another. And a vastly different "another," too. It need excite no great measure of surprise, then, to find that *Samurai* presently began to regard the situation from the standpoint of Oba Kageyoshi, who asserted that while in the army officers and soldiers were bound to obey the orders of the Shōgun, but not the decree of the Emperor.

Such language, however, was nothing specially novel in the Japan coeval with Richard I. of England. It had been held more than a century before by the devoted followers of Minamoto Yoriie, when the Court had refused to reward their captain for his suppression of the disorders in Mutsu and Dewa. Somewhere about the same date we have found a Taira retainer roundly giving the ex-Emperor Shirakawa I. to understand that in the event of a clash between statutes of his ex-Majesty's making and the House-Code of the Ise Heishi, it was not the latter that was to be thrown overboard. Here be it said, however, that Yoritomo was exceedingly careful to check all language of this kind. His Reverence Chōgen once addressed him as *Kimi* (Lord); and the Shōgun at once forbade him to do so a second time, for the term *Kimi* should only be applied to His Majesty, and not be loosely used. The young Sovereign, Toba II., although later on he showed himself possessed at once of ability and of a masterful temper, at first showed a greater fondness for pleasure and dissipation than for cares of State; and His Reverence, the turbulent and strong-willed Abbot, Mongaku Shōnin, strongly urged his friend Yoritomo to depose him summarily, and replace him by his brother Morisada Shinnō. But, we are told, much as the Shōgun respected his old ally and benefactor, the Abbot Mongaku, he recoiled with horror from his suggestion. To the Lord of Kamakura it seemed like laying a profane hand upon the Ark of the Covenant. But in spite of all this, just let us throw a glance forward to what we are destined to see in 1221,—scarcely a quarter of a century from this date, when Yoritomo professed himself so scandalised and horrified at the mere suggestion of his ghostly friend Mongaku Shōnin. The titular Sovereign, Chūkyō Tennō, a babe of less than three years of age, still in his swaddling-clothes, summarily deposed after a "reign" of 70 days, one ex-Emperor (Juntoku), then 24 years, summarily exiled to Sado; his elder brother and immediate predecessor on the throne, Tsuchimikado, then 26, deported to Tosa, while the father of the latter two, Toba II., whose shortcomings and faults Yoritomo had endured so dutifully and meekly, was now most unceremoniously relegated to the lonely islands of Oki, to spend the last eighteen years of his allotted span among the fishy smells of Amagori. Such a state of things was doubtless no outcome of

Yoritomo's own personal teaching; but on the other hand it was the logical and practical result of his statecraft.

To carry on its work the new *Bakufu* needed a highly efficient if not very elaborate administrative machine of its own. As a matter of fact this had been already installed in Kamakura, either in, or before, the year 1184. Its chief component parts were the three great sections of (1) the Samurai-dokoro, (2) the Kumonjo, which title was altered to the Mandokoro in 1191, and (3) the Monchūjo.

The first of these, the *Samurai-dokoro*, established in 1180, was largely of the nature of a General Staff, although its functions were more extensive. In the great campaigns of 1184 and 1185, we have seen the President (Bettō) and the other members (Shoshi) of this board detailed for service with Noriyori and Yoshitsune respectively, with the duty of advising these commanders and of punishing and rewarding the officers and men serving under them. When sitting in Kamakura it had to deal with all questions of promotion and degradation, and to act as a sort of moral police over the conduct of the *Samurai*. Naturally enough, the President of this Board occupied a position of great authority and influence. The first to hold this office was that Wada Yoshimori who was the first to break through the Taira line of battle at Dan-no-ura. After the death of Yoritomo in 1199, Wada's power became more and more formidable, and he at last challenged the rapidly rising Hōjō ascendancy in the field of battle. He was defeated and slain (1213); but at first the contest bade fair to be no unequal one. From that date the Hōjō Shikken, or Regent, was careful to assume and keep the Presidency of the Samurai-dokorō in his own hands.

One thing that honourably distinguished Yoritomo's rule from first to last was the extreme and constant anxiety he evinced that the administration of justice should be at once pure, prompt, and efficient. Time and again we read of him hearing evidence and deciding suits and disputes in person. In 1184 he erected the *Monchūjo* as a Supreme Court for the decision of all civil cases in the last resort. Its first president was Miyoshi Yasunobu, the son of Yoritomo's old nurse, who had acted as his secret agent in Kyōto during his years of exile in Izu. In 1220, when 81 years of age, Yasunobu transmitted his post of *Shitsuji*, or President of the

Monchūjo, to his son Yasutoshi; but a little later on the Hōjō Regent appropriated this post also.

The *Kumonjo*, established in 1184, but known from 1191 onwards as the *Mandokoro*, had to deal with general administrative business and measures. Its first Bettō or President was that Ōe Hiromoto whom we have seen suggesting to Yoritomo the astute device of placing Shugo in the several provinces and Jitō in the manors. Its first Vice-President (Fujiwara Yukimasa), as also its two secretaries Fujiwara Toshinaga and Nakahara Mitsuie, were, like Ōe Hiromoto himself, either Kyōto lawyers or *literati*, or the descendants of such. In 1225 the Mandokoro was re-organised. In or before that year the Hōjō Shikken (Regent) assumed the Presidency in it, and under him met 15 or 16 Hyōjōshū or Councillors. Of these a full half were *literati*—Ōes, Kiyowaras, Nakaharas, Miyoshis, Nikaidōs, Saitōs, and so forth—whose tenure of office was not merely for life, but actually hereditary; while the other members were selected from the principal Daimyō according to their aptitude for the duties of the post.

The new administration of the Bakufu was successful and efficient from its inception, and it continued for the best part of a century at least to be successful, efficient, and on the whole highly beneficent to the interests of the great bulk of the Japanese people at large. A careful examination of the personnel that directed its chief organs will help very much to enable us to understand why this should have been so.

As has been already remarked, not only all the great offices of State, but even the chief and only lucrative positions in the Eight Boards of the old Kyōto Government, had for generations been monopolised by fashionable blue-blooded courtiers, principally Fujiwaras and civilian Minamotos, whose notions of conducting administrative business were limited to affixing their seals to documents whose contents and purport they scarcely ever glanced at. All the real, hard, honest work was performed by the members of certain obscure families of *sarants*, Ōes, Miyoshis, Kiyowaras, Nakaharas, and others. No matter what their attainments, merits, or length of service might be, a career for these men in the capital had long been impossible. The University, in which their ancestors had held

important posts, had been gradually stripped of nearly all its endowments, and existed merely in name. In their own houses, these *savants* continued to give instruction in what had been the traditional and hereditary lore of their family, by way of eking out the scanty perquisites of routine official work. Now, it is not too much to say that, albeit held in such low esteem, the services of these men in the Chancelleries and Bureaux were, and had been for long, simply indispensable. Some of them were skilled mathematicians, accountants, and financiers; others were the sole depositaries of the legal knowledge of the time; most of them were experts in the drafting of public documents in the proper form. Of all these important matters the Ministers and titular heads of Departments and Bureaux as a rule knew absolutely nothing. Besides, not a few of these learned drudges had from time to time developed no mean measure of political and administrative ability; now and then there were undoubtedly men of real original organising power among them. In the halcyon days of the scholar-politician, the age of Sugawara Michizane, three centuries before, some of them might have well aspired to the name and fame of statesmen. But the days of Michizane and of Uda Tennō had come and gone; and for the scholar, unless of Fujiwara or Imperial descent, there was henceforth no open place in the Councils of the Empire,—at least in Kyōto. At the best the highest post he could aspire to was that of “dry-nurse” to some high-born frivolous, ignorant, spoiled child of fortune, who might, luckily for the learned drudge only too glad to have an opportunity of supplying his Fopship with surreptitious store of wisdom, contract an itch for renown and glory as a statesman of great and original ability.

Yoritomo showed himself very prompt to profit by this peculiar situation. In Kamakura a large staff of men accustomed to and acquainted with the routine of administration in all its branches was urgently needed; and such men were not to be found in the Kwantō, for the Kwantō from time immemorial had been a land not of scholars, but of soldiers, most of them hopelessly illiterate. Accordingly at an early date he exerted himself to enlist the services of some of the able but ill-requited *savants* and learned experts who really carried on the business of the old central government in Kyōto. When the latter learned that there was actually such a thing as a

career open for them in the East, and that they could safely count upon finding a field for the display of their abilities there, they at once left the incompetent Court nobles to their own unaided devices, and flocked to the new city on Sagami Bay, where they met with an appreciation all the more delightful to them because of its novelty. In Kyōto they had been so many mere clerical drudges; in Kamakura they filled the most important posts in two out of the three great Boards through which the Bakufu was destined to rule the Empire. This exodus was a most serious blow to the Kyōto administration. It will be remembered that the effort to revive the old *Kirokusho* there was to a large extent a failure; and one reason for this doubtless was that the high-born commissioners placed at the head of it could no longer exploit the brains of the humble, but indispensable, experts they had formerly treated with such scant measure of consideration. What was Kyōto's paralysing loss, was Kamakura's inestimable gain, for it would be hard to overestimate the value of the services rendered by the Ōes, the Miyoshis, and their confrères to Yoritomo and the Bakufu. In the task of organising the administrative, judicial, and legislative machinery of the new system which was destined in a great measure to supplant that of the Reformers of 645, the duties of these Kyōto *savants* were nearly as onerous as those of Bin and Takamuku had been five centuries and a half before.

In a broad survey of the general characteristic features of the political developments of the middle of the seventh century and those of the end of the twelfth, in the midst of glaring antitheses, we meet with some curious analogies. In both cases a great centralising effort had been successfully accomplished. In both cases the effort had been accomplished through the same agency. The Reformers had worked through the institution of the Emperor. Yoritomo had worked through the institution of the Throne, for during the first decade of his power he had to deal not with an Emperor, but a Cloistered Emperor. On the other hand, among the prime objects of the Reformers of 645 had been the overthrow of the Clan and Group systems, the bringing of the throne into contact with the whole body of its subjects through its own properly appointed officers, and the prevention of the rise of any feudal system or specially privileged military class. The first two

objects were successfully attained; as regards the third the march of time and the logic of facts had abundantly demonstrated the futility of the measure of precaution that had been taken. Not only had a military class arisen which, as a rule, refused to contribute to the fiscal burdens of the State, which had usurped criminal and civil jurisdiction over the occupants of its manors; but this military class had in its native seats in the provinces virtually emancipated itself from all control by the lawfully appointed officials and representatives of the central administration. The only safeguard the civilian authorities had against the violence of this military caste was the dissensions and mutual jealousies of its members; and for generation after generation, a measure of authority had been maintained by the not very profound device of playing one military chief off against another. In defiance of the Reform institutions, Japan was rapidly drifting back into social conditions somewhat analogous to those which had prevailed in the pre-Taikwa age, when the throne could address most of its subjects only through the heads of the clans and groups to which they respectively belonged. Now, with the vast bulk of the *Buke* practically the vassals of one single great chief of their own class, with their affairs administered and regulated by the *Samurai-dokoro* and the other two great Boards of Kamakura (acting through their *Shugo* and *Jitō* in the provinces) and expressly and emphatically forbidden to hold any direct intercourse with either the Court or the Court functionaries of *Kyōto*, the extent of the breakdown of the Reform system becomes conspicuously clear.

A distinguished authority has remarked that "if we take a broad view of Japanese history, we shall recognise in it a constant oscillation between two forms of government. At one time there is a strong central authority with local governors removable at pleasure or at short intervals. By degrees, the latter offices become hereditary and more independent of the throne, so that eventually a sort of feudal system is the result. Then the pendulum swings back again, and under a strong ruler the old centralised government is restored, while the local nobles, deprived of effective authority, retain their titles only. . . . The Revolution of 1868 is a remarkable example of a rapid change from a feudal system to a strong

central government. The converse process is always more gradual."

In their broad outlines these remarks are not amiss. But a somewhat closer inspection of the channels actually traversed by the course of Japanese history serves to indicate that, to be in accordance with all the requisites of a general proposition consonant with fact and truth, they must, at all events, be amplified, if not actually modified. In the first place it was not so much the Provincial Governors that founded feudal families between the tenth and the twelfth centuries. Under Shirakawa I., when the sale of offices was at its worst, a good many of these posts were supposed to have become hereditary. But even so, only a very few of these hereditary Provincial Governors transmitted their offices to descendants, and perhaps not half-a-score of them became territorially influential. The exceptions were military men, who, as we have seen, were occasionally invested with these civilian posts. It was from the class of District Governors (about 600 in number) that the great bulk of the later feudal gentry descended. Then, again, among the Sovereigns, Kwammu and Sanjō II. were almost the only "strong rulers" who took effective means, if not to restore the "old centralised government," at all events to stay its decline. The "strong ruler" who first actually succeeded in arresting the process of disintegration, and of making it no longer possible for petty local potentates simply to do what was right in their own eyes, was not an Emperor; and although he effectually rescued the Empire from impending chaos and anarchy by establishing a strong central authority over the most turbulent class in it, it was not exactly the old centralised government that Yoritomo restored. That, indeed, with all its machinery was professedly left intact. For long it had shown itself incompetent to control that military class which had arisen in spite of all the projects of the Reformers of 645 to prevent such a contingency; and, in giving the Lord of Kamakura what was virtually a permanent commission to control that class, it was merely divesting itself of functions which it had become incapable of discharging.

The collateral centralised administration of Kamakura continued to be wonderfully efficient down to a few years before its overthrow in 1333. Then there was an actual at-

tempt to restore the sway of the old centralised government of Kyōto in all its plenitude; but in less than five years this ended in disastrous failure. One outcome of the attempt was a new line of Shōguns, and another was a long succession war of 56 years. During this time a number of great feudatories arose, who now, and during the next two or three generations, succeeded in emancipating themselves from the control of Emperor and Shōgun alike; and, at the date of the arrival of Europeans in Japan, there was practically no such thing as a central government in the Empire. To restore this was the work,—not of any strong Sovereign, but of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu Tokugawa; and the polity of the Empire, instead of then reverting to the old centralised government of 645, became a centralised feudalism. And one of the prime objects of the Reformers of 645 had been to prevent the appearance of any feudal system in Japan!

About the last years of Yoritomo there is not much to be said. The chief point to note is that the Empire now enjoyed the unwonted boon of peace within its borders for a season. Yoritomo made another visit to Kyōto in the spring of 1195; but during the four months he stayed there, there were no specially startling developments.

It was early in 1199 that he met his death, at the age of 53. He had gone to attend the ceremony of opening a new bridge over the Sagami River; and on his return journey he was thrown from his horse and sustained injuries which soon proved to be fatal. Tradition has it that he had been so startled by the sight of the ghosts of Yoshitsune and Yukiiye which rose from the waters of the river that he fell from his steed in a swoon, while the animal leaped into the flood and perished. Although the legend is evidently based on a *Volksetymologie* to account for the origin of the name Ba-nyū, by which the Sagami is known, it also indicates that in the popular judgement the death of his half-brother, Yoshitsune, must have lain heavy upon Yoritomo's soul. In 1193 his other half-brother, Noriyori, who at one time had enjoyed so much of Yoritomo's confidence, was also made away with for "reasons of State." Yoritomo "encouraged each of his followers to believe himself the sole confidant of his leader's schemes, and in this cunning manner separated their interests and made them his own. Nearly all of those around him

who became possible rivals in power and popularity were cruelly handled when he had exhausted the benefit of their service." Such is one Japanese estimate of the Lord of Kamakura; and as regards his own relatives, at least, the indictment would seem to rest on a substantial foundation. Doubtless it was in the prospective interests of his own children that Yoritomo proved so unrelentingly cruel and pitiless towards his kith and kin of Minamoto stock. And yet, withal, he did not succeed in founding a house. What did perpetuate his memory was the system he organised and the administrative machine he created,—the Bakufu, to wit.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU.

(1200 TO 1225 A.D.)

IN even a cursory perusal of the history of Japan, the reader must be forcibly struck by one feature which at first blush seems very puzzling and confusing. To assert that individuality and personal ability have counted and count for but little in this Empire is utterly at variance with fact, for the Japanese have been at all times notorious for their hero-worshipping proclivities, while the national polity has from time to time been profoundly modified by the genius of great warriors and statesmen. But the strange thing is that the national heroes have rarely, if ever, occupied the very highest rank and position. The grand exception to this is that Reform Prince Naka-no-E, who later on ascended the throne as Tenchi Tennō; and for long years this Prince persisted in doing his work not as Emperor, but through the institution of the Throne, and of the two harmless figure-heads he successively placed upon it. In China, and indeed in most European countries, it is almost certain, new Imperial or Royal dynasties would have been established by such men as Taira Kiyomori, Yoritomo, Ashikaga Takauji, Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Iyeyasu; Hideyoshi having indeed been actually counselled by the Emperor of China to depose the Dairi and to instal himself in his seat. But not one of these great and illustrious Japanese subjects ever thought for a moment of usurping the throne. If constrained to do so by the exigencies of the situation, some of them, such as Ashikaga Takauji, would have small compunctions about replacing one titular Sovereign by another. But the new and rival Emperor was invariably selected from among the lineal descendants of the Sun-Goddess. The simple fact of the matter is that the institution of the Emperor has always been a most convenient one through which to work in Japan. If the titular occupant of the throne proved refractory, it was, as the Fujiwaras had

conclusively shown through successive generations, the easiest thing in the world to find some plausible excuse for either inducing him to abdicate, or for actually deposing him, and replacing him by another of his kith and kin more amenable to the sweet reasonableness of the suggestions proffered by his maternal relatives.


Furthermore, the fact must not be overlooked that besides the Empress,—sometimes indeed two Empresses at the same time,—the Sovereign had always a liberal allowance of secondary consorts, and that some one or other of these handmaidens might not unreasonably hope—as in the case of the mother of the great Kwammu—to give birth to the future Sovereign of Yamato. To illustrate by a concrete case: if the Japanese Imperial succession practices had prevailed in the England of 1685, it is highly probable that there would never have been any Hanoverian Dynasty on the British Throne, for the Duke of Monmouth would then have easily been recognised as King. If we coolly reflect upon the infinite precautions that were taken to keep the male members of the Imperial line well furnished with consorts of one kind or another, we shall find no room left for wonder at that phenomenon of an Imperial line unbroken for ages on which Japanese writers so often descant. Hence the Fujiwaras and other powerful and ambitious subjects had at all times a sufficient personnel at their disposal from which to select a successor to replace any Sovereign who showed himself unduly restive under the curb they placed upon him and his actions. Moreover, the Imperial Succession Law was, in practice at least, exceedingly loose and indefinite; and this still further facilitated recourse to the highly convenient device of Puppet Emperors. Hence Japanese King-makers,—whether civilian Fujiwara autocrats or military Mayors of the Palace,—have never thought of dispossessing the August Line of the Sun-Goddess of the Throne of Yamato. It has always better served their purposes to work through that line and that institution as their instruments.

Now, with the establishment of the new Shōgunate in 1192, the throne had divested itself of all direct control over the greater portion of the military class, which, now thoroughly organised and reduced to strict discipline and control by a master hand, had become the dominating force in the Empire.

In plain language, a great deal of the most essential administrative, judicial, and legislative authority had been transferred or delegated to the Shōgunate. Now, in connection with this great office, we witness yet another instance of the notorious tendency of able and ambitious subordinates to effect their purposes through institutions. The Reforming Prince, Naka-no-E, who had died as Tenchi Tennō in 671, had been a man of rare and super-eminent ability. But between his death and the accession of Kwammu in 782, the throne had been occupied by a succession of mediocrities. And yet, during most of these 111 years, the government of Japan had been tolerably efficient and fairly satisfactory. Yoritomo, the founder of the new Shōgunate, was undoubtedly one of the greatest and most illustrious statesmen that Japan has ever produced; and through the Shōgunate he established in 1192, the Empire was, with two brief interruptions, destined to be governed for the best part of 700 years. And yet, only one of Yoritomo's immediate titular heirs or successors showed the faintest spark of ability, or exercised any considerable measure of authority. In fact, we have to pass over 140 years before we again meet with a Shōgun who was so in reality as well as in name. Notwithstanding, during the greater portion of these 140 years, the Shōgunal administration was at once strong, efficient, and on the whole highly beneficent. The secret is that it was the office of Shōgun itself, and not its titular occupant, that counted. Under the cover of the name of the latter, the able and ambitious subordinate was doing the work.

At his death in 1199, Yoritomo had left two legitimate sons, --Yoriiye, a youth of seventeen, and Sanetomo, a boy of seven.

The following chart may be found serviceable:—



Under the title of Sō Shugo-Jitō (practically Lord High Constable), the elder of these succeeded to his father's power. But his mother, the masterful and masculine-minded Lady

Masa, was not inclined to entrust him with authority prematurely; and a special council of thirteen members, selected from the personnel of the three great permanent Boards of Kamakura, was established for the provisional conduct of affairs. At its head stood Masako's father, Hōjō Tokimasa; and under him served the Kyōto *savants* Ōe Hiromoto, Miyoshi Yoshinobu, and Nakahara Chikayoshi, and eight or nine military men, among whom were Miura Yoshizumi, Wada Yoshimori, Hiki Yoshikazu, Hatsuda Tomoye, Adachi, and Kajiwara Kagetoki. The last-named, whose ill services towards the gallant Yoshitsune have been already dwelt upon, at once proved a disturbing element, bringing unfounded accusations of treachery against some of his fellow vassals. The result was that Miura, Wada, and others formed a league against him and resolved to put him out of the way. He escaped into Suruga to raise forces there; but next year (1200) he was overpowered and killed, together with his son, Kagesuye. Even with the opportune removal of Kajiwara, however, the new Council of State was far from being a united and a harmonious body. Its civilian members, who appear to have kept on the best of terms with each other, and constantly acted in concert, were time and again sorely put to it to smooth over the mutual jealousies and to compose the acrimonious quarrels of their hot-tempered military colleagues. Even when Yoriie's patent of investiture as Sei-i-Tai Shōgun at last arrived in Kamakura, in August 1202, their anxieties were by no manner of means at an end, for a few months in actual office served conclusively to confirm the already prevalent impression that the young chieftain would prove but a degenerate successor to his illustrious father.

Yoritomo had attended with the greatest care to the education of his eldest son, and had been delighted to witness the zest with which the boy had devoted himself to the acquisition of those martial accomplishments for which the Minamotos had always been famous. Yoriie had indeed given early promise of becoming an excellent soldier. But from first to last that is really all the good that could, or can, be said of him. The one single other direction in which he showed any indications of having inherited his father's extraordinary precocity was in the evil art of seducing the wives or daughters of his vassals. Shortly after his father's death he surrendered

himself into the hands of a few unworthy favourites, whom he insisted upon shielding from the consequences of their outrages and crimes, in spite of all remonstrances. Latterly he had been fascinated by the charms of hand-ball; had brought down its great and chief exponent from the capital to Kamakura; and had spent more than three solid months, day after day, from morning till eve, in the court-yard. Strange, indeed, it is that a son of Yoritomo and Masako should have shown himself intellectually torpid and indolent; but the fact is that Yoriiye simply could not concentrate his attention upon anything except the pursuit of his own physical pleasure. On a certain occasion, a boundary dispute between two landowners in Mutsu was submitted to him for adjudication, as many such suits had been put before Yoritomo for settlement. Both litigants were fortified with numerous witnesses and documents; but Yoriiye simply called for a map of the two fiefs. Thereupon, without hearing witnesses or examining documents, he took up an ink-brush, drew it across the middle of the sketch, and assigned a section to each of the parties to the suit, impatiently remarking that if litigants were not satisfied to have their differences settled in that manner, they simply must refrain from having disputes! One great saving and redeeming feature had characterised Yoritomo's usurpation—(if such, indeed, it may be called)—from beginning to end. From first to last that great ruler had insisted that the administration of justice must be pure and impartial, and that the sifting of all evidence must be thorough and painstaking. On the seat of judgement, he had repeatedly shown himself to be a model of all that a judge should be. Bearing this notorious fact in mind, is it strange that the Kyōto jurists in the Kamakura Council of State should have found their vitals churning within them with indignant apprehension at such a decision as this of the strong-thewed, intellectually-torpid young profligate who had succeeded to the all-important positions of Head of the Minamoto stock, and Sei-i-Tai Shōgun?

To these most astute administrators and jurisconsults it very soon became hopelessly and appallingly clear that a very few years of this thick-headed muscular wastrel as Lord of Kamakura would infallibly relegate them to their threadbare hackwork as humble official scribes and givers of private

tuition in the gay capital of Kyōto, where life would be one continual struggle against the importunities of the pestilent collector of over-due bills. Still greater than theirs must have been the anxiety of the Lady Masa and her father Hōjō Tokimasa. But, while up to a certain point the aims of daughter and father were identical, beyond that point they became divergent to the extent of being irreconcilable. Undoubtedly what Masako thought of chiefly was the interests of her husband and of his and her own progeny; what occupied the chief place in the mind of her father, Hōjō Tokimasa, was the conservation and utilisation of the institution of the new Shōgunate. More than once it has been insisted on that this Tokimasa was one of the most astute, if not indeed the astutest politician of his times. It is beyond question that not on one, but on several fateful occasions, he prompted his son-in-law, Yoritomo, with all the proverbial wisdom of an Achitophel or a Cineas. How far Yoritomo's great and original idea of the re-casting of the office of Shōgun with a permanent commission was actually the creature of the brain of his father-in-law it is now hopeless to attempt to ascertain. But any one who undertakes the drudgery of reading the dog-Chinese of the *Azuma Kagami*, and the more worthy task of putting things together and reading between the lines, will, I am convinced, admit that from first to last Yoritomo's most trusted and most potent and most unfailing *kuromaku* was the father of his spouse, the Lady Masa. It is tolerably safe to conclude that the untimely and unexpected death of Yoritomo was regarded as no matter for secret rejoicing by his father-in-law, for the fortunes of the latter were not a whit bettered by it. True, as President of the new Council of Regency, he occupied a great and a prominent position. But even in the Council of Regency he was far from being supreme; and his sagest counsels were often neglected or negated. While Yoritomo had been alive, they had been almost invariably adopted. Now, when the *kuromaku* is compelled to appear in the open, and to assume the direction of affairs with all its responsibilities, he is wont to find himself and his projects opposed and hampered in multifarious unexpected directions. Where formerly by the simple means of dropping his words into the ears of a seemingly all-powerful chief, who thought it a privilege to listen to them, he could accomplish all that he thought highest and

best in the sphere of constructive statesmanship, he now finds himself seriously fettered,—if not actually in the position of a Samson shorn of his locks. Instead of having to carry conviction to one single master mind, ready to lend itself to be dominated by him, he is now called upon to argue at length with jealous rivals, to explain laboriously to mediocrities who fancy themselves as good or even better than he,—and eke to slow-witted, short-sighted, puzzle-headed coadjutors whose assent has somehow or other to be extorted. Small wonder, then, if by 1203 Hōjō Tokimasa found himself profoundly dissatisfied with his apparently magnificent position, and with the general trend of affairs, which seemed to be placing the institution of the new Shōgunate on the very brink of the descent to Avernus.

In the September of that year (1203), Yoriie became so seriously ill that the succession question became vital and all-absorbing. Yoriie's eldest son was not yet three years of age; while his own brother, Sanetomo, was scarcely eleven. Both had their claims and supporters. It was finally resolved that there should be a partition between them: Sanetomo to receive the administration of the military class in the 38 provinces to the west of the Ōsaka barrier (in Ōmi); while Ichiman, Yoriie's eldest son, was to become Lord of Kamakura with sway over the remaining 28 provinces of the Empire. Now, Ichiman's mother was the daughter of Hiki Yoshikazu, who had been one of Yorimoto's ablest and most trusted Captains.* In the event

* Yoritomo had seduced Yoshikazu's sister,—who, by the way, was a professed nun at the time,—and by her he became the father of a child who was destined to found one of the very greatest feudal families of Japan, and to transmit his blood to this very day. The strong-minded Masako was at all times very jealous of any invasion of her conjugal rights; and, to save her life, the hapless nun who had been favoured with Yoritomo's attentions had to flee westward and take refuge in the wilds of Kyūshū. Here she gave birth to a son, who was named Tadahisa, and who on reaching manhood married the daughter of Koremune Hidenobu, and assumed the name of his father-in-law. In 1186 he received the manor of Shioda in Shinano, and was shortly after appointed *Shugo* (High Constable) of Satsuma. Honda Sada-chika was sent to that province as a deputy, while Tadahisa remained behind, and served under his father in the great Mutsu campaign of 1189. It was not until 1196 that he betook himself to Satsuma. Soon after, he reduced Ōsumi and part of Hyūga; and on the confines of the latter two provinces he reared a castle for himself in the old Fujiwara Shō-en of Shimadzu, about the origin of which details have already been furnished. From this illegitimate son of Yoritomo's (Koremune Tadahisa) has sprung the illustrious house of Shimadzu of Satsuma.

of the death of Yoriie, Hiki saw a splendid vista opening up to him as the grandfather and prospective guardian of an infant Shōgun. Great, then, was his wrath and chagrin when intelligence of this partition project reached his ears. Determined to have it frustrated at all hazards, he burst into Yoriie's sick-room, and vehemently urged him to make away with Sanetomo and all his relatives and supporters. If he had known that Masako was then behind a folding-screen, listening to every word he said, he might have escaped his impending doom. Shortly afterwards, he was informed that Hōjō Tokimasa wished to consult with him on certain ecclesiastical matters. On being ushered into Tokimasa's house, he was promptly cut down by Amano Tōkage and Nitta Tadatsune. On hearing of his father's assassination, Hiki's son, Munetomo, at once assembled all his relatives and with them threw himself into Ichiman's palace. Thereupon Tokimasa dispatched his son Yoshitoki, his grandson Yasutoki, Hatakeyama, and Wada with a strong following to make an end of the business at once. Munetomo, seeing that resistance was hopeless, set fire to the mansion, and together with Ichiman and most of his adherents perished in the flames, while such of his followers as tried to escape from the burning building were summarily put to the sword.

Yoriie was terribly incensed at all this; and he at once sent for Wada Yoshimori and Nitta Tadatsune, and ordered them to bring him the head of Hōjō Tokimasa. The former, being on the best of terms with Tokimasa, refused to move in the matter; the latter lost his life when he attempted to carry out the commission. Masako thereupon counselled the Shōgun to shave his head, and retire to Shūzenji in Izu; and Yoriie deemed it advisable to accept his mother's advice. With the consent of all Yoritomo's former great vassals, Sanetomo (eleven years of age) was then made Head of the House of Minamoto; and before the end of the year (1203) he received

The house of Koremune, into which this son of Yoritomo's was adopted, is interesting. In the reign of the mythical Emperor Ōjin, the Prince Koman, a descendant of the Chinese Emperor Shikō (Chin Dynasty) is said to have settled in Japan with a large body of followers. His successors received the family name of *Shin*, and, about 880, this was changed to Koremune. In 958 the head of the Koremune house was that Kinkata, Doctor of Chinese Law, who filled the offices of *Kebiishi* and *ōkure-zon-daisuke*, and who drafted all the public documents and all the laws issued about that date.

his patent as Sei-i-Tai Shōgun. At the same time, his grandfather, Hōjō Tokimasa, was made *Shikken* (Regent), or Administrator of Affairs, till the young Shōgun attained his majority. Here we have the very modest and very unobtrusive origin of yet another extraneous institution that was soon destined to bring those of the Throne and of the new Shōgunate to hopeless ineptitude and impotence. In reality, the *Shikken* and his successor the Kwanryō were the true analogues of the Merovingian Mayors of the Palace in Japan; for while the *fainéant* Puppet Shōguns were the nominal Mayors of the Palace to the legitimate Sovereign, the *Shikken*, and, latterly, the Kwanryō, were for ages the makers and unmakers of Shōguns, and eke of Emperors.

However, the efforts of the first *Shikken* at Shōgun-making were completely and ingloriously abortive, while his tenure of the newly created office was of the briefest. As has been said, the strong-minded Lady Masa was the offspring of her father's first spouse. Her step-mother, the Lady Maki, also a strong-minded woman, cherished ambitions and projects of her own. Her daughter had been wedded to Hiraga Tomomasa, in whose veins flowed the blood of the Minamoto, and who on more than one fateful occasion had proved himself in "close fight a champion grim, in camps a leader sage," while at the Council-board his words were not destitute of weight. At this date he was titular Governor of Musashi and *Shugo* in Kyōto, where he was then residing.

The Ise Heishi had not really been so bitterly hounded to earth as is usually represented; the great Kyōto earthquake of 1185, and the superstitious interpretation placed upon it, had done not a little towards saving the hapless remnants of the great house of Kiyomori from extermination. Since then, a new generation had grown to manhood. The great Lord of Kamakura had passed away, and bitter intestine strife had broken out between his apparently incompetent successors, or between their respective partisans and supporters. A bold and determined push might very well effect a happy turn in the wheel of fickle fortune, and restore the Ise Heishi to their own. So reasoned the two chieftains Motomori and Moritoki; and they resolved to attempt in Ise what Yoritomo had accomplished in Izu a quarter of a century before. Their initial efforts were crowned with a rapid success. When the red flag was

once more flung to the breeze, the two chiefs speedily found themselves at the head of a much greater following than that with which Yoritomo had vainly endeavoured to hold Stone-Bridge Hill, in 1180. In a few days, the whole of Northern Ise was in their hands, and the neighbouring province of Iga reduced. The news of this wholly unexpected outbreak excited great apprehensions in Kamakura, while Kyōto was in an uproar. There, however, the Commandant, Hiraga, proved to be fully capable of grappling with the emergency. Rapidly mustering what forces he could in the capital, he at once advanced upon Iga, picking up troops on the way; and, after some very hard fighting, he was soon able to dispatch couriers to Kamakura announcing the suppression of the revolt.

This episode did not a little to add to the growing reputation of Hiraga; and his mother-in-law, Tokimasa's second wife, began to press her husband to make him Shōgun. Possibly as a preliminary step, Yoriie was put out of the way. Three months after the suppression of the Taira revolt, Tokimasa's emissaries murdered the ex-Shōgun at Shūzenji; and when his personal attendants endeavoured to avenge him, they were cut to pieces by Sagami troops. Some time after this, certain probable opponents to the scheme, such as the Hatakeyamas, were "removed" on one plea or another. Then one day, in August 1205, Sanetomo went to Tokimasa's mansion; and the Lady Maki urged Tokimasa to seize the opportunity to kill him. Meanwhile, the suspicions of the ever-watchful Masako had been excited; and she suddenly appeared and carried off Sanetomo to the mansion of her brother, Hōjō Yoshitoki, where troops were hastily mustered. Damning evidence in connection with the intrigue was presently laid before the Council of Regency. The result was that Hōjō Tokimasa had to resign the post of *Shikken*, to shave his head, and to withdraw to his manors in Izu, while Kamakura troops invested Hiraga in his Kyōto mansion, and put him to death.

That the able Hiraga would have proved more competent to discharge the onerous duties of the Shōgunate than any of Yoritomo's progeny can hardly admit of any question; and it was probably this consideration that weighed most with Tokimasa when he set the intrigue afoot. If the plot had succeeded, the Council of Regency would have been dissolved, as a matter of course; and Tokimasa would, doubtless, have reassumed that

rôle of *kuromaku* for which his talents so eminently fitted him. But beyond this, it is really difficult to see what he could have gained personally by the success of the project. With the fashion in which things had been going at Kamakura since the death of Yoritomo, he had abundant reasons to be dissatisfied on public grounds; for the rank incompetence of Yoritomo's titular successors threatened to wreck that great institution of the new Shōgunate, which had already conferred upon the Empire the great benefit of a decade of unwonted tranquillity, and from which so much future good might be looked for. If Tokimasa, then an old man of 67, had been thinking chiefly about the aggrandisement of his own house, it would have naturally been the interests of his own son, Yoshitoki, which he would have consulted before all things. Now, with an able and vigorous Shōgun in the seat of authority at Kamakura, Yoshitoki's prospects could certainly not have been improved; and, possibly enough, they might have suffered disastrous eclipse. Certain non-Japanese writers appear to have done a serious wrong to the reputation of the Lady Masa as well as that of her father. Writes one of them: "The parental authority and influence in Japan, as in China, is often far greater than that of any other. Not even death or the marriage relation weakens to any great extent the hold of a father on a child. With affection on one hand, and cunning on the other, an unscrupulous father may do what he will. We have seen how the Fujiwara and Taira families controlled Court, Throne, and Emperor, by marrying their daughters to infant or boy Mikados. We shall now find the Hōjō dispensing the power at Kamakura by means of a crafty woman willing to minister to her father's rather than to her son's aggrandisement."

Now, one of the great surprises in store for any one who is to devote laborious days to an examination of the records of the age, is the very high position occupied by the women of the military class under the Kamakura *Bakufu*, during the earlier half of its administration, at least. It was certainly as high as that of the women of contemporary feudal Europe, which, it must not be overlooked, had risen immensely since the eleventh century. Not a few of the dames of the Feudal Japan of the age of Yoritomo had a marvellous power of thinking and acting for themselves. Some of them were sheer viragos; actually, like Tomoe Gozen, appearing in the field in command of squad-

rons of cavalry which they handled with rare ability and dash, or, again, like Shiro Nagamichi's aunt,* defending fortified posts with all the fierce courage and undismayed doggedness of a Black Agnes of Dunbar. Others of them showed possession of administrative ability of a very high order; about 1191, we find Yoritomo appointing the widowed mother of one of his best captains (Oyama) to the responsible post of Jitō over a whole county in the province of Kōdzuke, as "a recognition of her great merit." Now, among the strong-minded females of the time, the Lady Masa had always occupied a notorious place. At no time had she been the mere plaything of her very able and very astute father. How she began wedded life and set up house-keeping on her own behalf has been already told; it was about as rank a defiance of parental authority as could possibly be conceived. At that time, Yoritomo of the Minamoto was of vastly more consequence to her than all the fathers in the Empire. And her vigorous action in August 1205 conclusively showed that she set but little account upon the Japanese equivalent of the Jewish Fifth Commandment when the legitimate interests of her dead husband's legitimate offspring were vitally at stake. Luckily for her, the interests of her very astute younger brother, Yoshitoki, happened to jump very nicely with those of her son, the minor Shōgun, Sanetomo, on that fateful occasion. From that date till their deaths, a score of years later on the accord between sister and brother was complete. During the last ten years of his life (1205-1215) their father was kept aloof from Kamakura, carefully attended to in more ways than one, and restrained from all interference in the administration of that Bakufu system he had done so much to help to establish.

For a matter of eight years Masako, Yoshitoki, and their councillors had no very serious problems to face. Then, in 1213,—the year before *Magna Charta*,—came something in the

* In 1201, this Shiro was involved in a plot against the Bakufu *Shugo* in Kyōto; and lost his life in consequence. He owned the castle of Tori-saka-no-seki in Echigo; and this fort was now manned by his aunt, and held against all the assaults of the levies of Echigo and Sado for more than three months. When she yielded at last she was conducted to Kamakura, where, "in spite of her ugliness," she was eagerly espoused by one of the most valiant warriors of the time, "on account of her great courage."

nature of a political cyclone. In the general massacre of Yoriiye's personal adherents in 1204, a certain Izumi Chikahira, who owned large estates in the province of Shinano, had escaped. In an age when many things were decided by the primitive means of personal prowess on the battlefield, he counted for a good deal, for Izumi was one of the odd half-dozen of contemporary Japanese Goliaths, who were undoubtedly regarded with a wholesome measure of respect and awe by all who had to deal with them. He was profoundly dissatisfied at seeing his master's sons set aside in favour of their accomplished but unwarlike uncle, Sanetomo; and he now deemed the time propitious for an attempt to instal Senju-Maru, Yoriiye's youngest son, in his father's office. No great scholar himself, Izumi got His Reverence, the priest Annen, to do what penwork was necessary in the course of knitting his conspiracy, in which as many as 130 military chieftains were involved. Somehow, the lynx-eyed Bakufu councillors had their attention directed to His Reverence Annen's activity; and he was at once arrested and questioned. His replies being not entirely satisfactory, he was put to the torture. Then, the ghostly flesh proving weak, everything was divulged. Officers were sent to summon Izumi to appear and answer for himself; but his answer was simply to cut down the emissaries. As President of the *Samurai-dokoro* Board, Wada Yoshimori, then 66 years of age, found himself saddled with the responsibility of dealing with the conspirators. But, to his consternation, he soon learned that two sons and a cousin of his own were among their number. He at once implored mercy for his misguided sons; and when his petition was granted, "in consideration of the great services he had formerly rendered," he exerted himself so vigorously that in a short time 98 of the 130 malcontents were lying fast bound in the dungeons of Kamakura. Then Wada begged for the life of his cousin; but Sanetomo ordered Hōjō Yoshitoki to put this cousin in fetters and banish him to Ōshū. This irritated Wada exceedingly. Shortly afterwards, he asked the Shōgun to put him in possession of his cousin's mansion and estates,—most probably, with the view of keeping them and their revenues safe for him against his return from exile. At first, the petition was granted; but, shortly afterward, Sane-

tomo went back upon his word, and assigned the property in question to Hōjō Yoshitoki. With Hōjō Tokimasa, as has been said, Wada had been on the best of terms; but during the last few years there had been friction between him and the new *Shikken*, Yoshitoki, Tokimasa's second son. This episode of 1213 raised Wada's resentment against his rival to boiling-point, and brought him to the conviction that Kamakura was becoming too small to hold both of them. On May 24, 1213, Wada suddenly invested the mansions of Sanetomo and Yoshitoki. Asahina Saburō, Wada's Herculean son, forced the gate of Sanetomo's palace, killed such of the inmates as failed to make good their escape, set fire to the buildings, and burned them to the ground. At Yoshitoki's mansion, the defence was exceedingly vigorous: and the assailants were beaten off. Next morning, troops from the neighbouring districts began to pour into Kamakura; and before night fell, Wada and his adherents had been effectually disposed of,—the only member of his family to escape death either on the field of strife, or at the hands of the executioner, being Asahina Saburō, the hero of so many romantic legends.

The net result of this abortive, but bloody *émeute* was a great accession to the already strong and rapidly rising influence of Yoshitoki. The only really formidable rival he had to fear was now removed with all his following: and not only that,—but Yoshitoki at once stepped into Wada's former position of President of the *Samurai-dokoro* Board, while still continuing to hold the office of *Shikken*. One possible future rival had also been removed from the path of Sanetomo, for Yoriie's third son, Senju-maru, was put to death on account of the use made of his name by Izumi in forming his conspiracy. As regards the late Shōgun's second son, Masako had placed him in Tsurugaoka, and had induced him to abandon the world, and become a priest; while a still younger illegitimate son of Yoriie's was similarly disposed of in a Kyōto monastery. But as the young acolyte in Tsurugaoka grew towards man's estate: his mind began to run upon other than purely ghostly things. Kugyō, as he was now called, kept brooding over the fact that the great and splendid position occupied by his uncle was his own by hereditary right; and as the months and years passed on, his resentment at being kept out of his own became passionate and overwhelming. To form any party of his own was

impossible, for he was too closely watched. His only hope lay in acting for himself, and removing the usurper with his own hand.

At last, when he was about seventeen years of age, the opportunity he had long been looking for presented itself. Early in 1219, Sanetomo had been made U-Daijin, or Minister of the Right; and it was arranged that he should pay a solemn nocturnal visit to the Shrine of Hachiman, to thank the tutelary divinity of his house for his gracious favour and protection. The night of February 12 was the date appointed for the function. Before setting out the Shōgun had been strongly counselled by Ōe Hiromoto to don armour; but Sanetomo refused to do so, and went forth in great state. Everything went well till he was descending the stone staircase on his return. Then suddenly, some one,—apparently a woman,—darted out from behind a tree, cut down first the Shōgun, and then his nearest attendant, and vanished into the darkness with Sanetomo's head! The astounded escort hurried back into the shrine; but not a trace of the assassin was to be discovered. The only clue was that he had been heard to call out "Enemy of my father, receive your punishment!" Kūgyō, meanwhile, had taken refuge in the Yuki mansion, the chief of which great family he fancied to be devoted to him. Here food was set before him; and he devoured it without relaxing his hold of the grisly head for a moment. The Miuras, after the Hōjōs, were now the most powerful house in Kamakura; and Kūgyō sent an urgent messenger to Yoshimura, the chief of that house, appealing to him for support. Presently, an emissary from Yoshimura appeared. This was Nagao Sadashige; and he, in accordance with his master's instructions, at once cut Kūgyō down, and carried his head to Hōjō Yoshitoki.

If ever there was a blood-boltered stock, surely it was that of the Seiwa-Genji. All its traditions were cruel and ferocious,—sometimes pitilessly and unrelentingly so. But its cruelty and ferocity were not unlike those of the modern Frenchman. Towards its open and avowed enemies of other blood, it was not incapable of a considerable measure of leniency,—now and then, it must be frankly confessed, of real generosity, while kindness from opponents or outsiders was seldom, if ever, allowed to pass unrequited. It was for his own kith and kin, for those who were bone of one bone and flesh of one flesh with

himself that the Minamoto Chieftain's cruelty and ferocity were usually reserved.* Of the intestine broils and battles of the Seiwa-Genji, before the rise of Yoritomo, enough has already been said. How Yoritomo hounded his uncle Yukiye, his brothers Yoshitsune and Noriyori, his cousin Yoshinaka and Yoshinaka's guiltless son, and Yoshitsune's new-born infant to death needs no recapitulation. And now, in a score of years from his own death, a worse than Atreidan curse, after dogging his line only too sure-footedly, has fallen upon the last of his seed. The only vestige of it remaining, the bastard orphan of Yukiye, even now immured in impotence in a Kyōto fane, will be summarily made away with in a year or two from now, for "reasons of State,"—that Moloch to whom so much that is best and most promising for the advance of true civilisation has been, and has still to be, sacrificed. As for Yoritomo's collateral descendants, Noriyori had left sons behind him; but they had less than their father's limited ability, and this proved to be their salvation. One of Yoshitsune's brothers, Zenjō, was the father of a son (Tokimoto) of some mettle, who now aspired to the position of Shōgun. His ambition cost him his life; when he began to muster forces in Suruga to back him in his pretensions, Hōjō Yoshitoki promptly overwhelmed him and his meagre following.

The fortunes of the Bakufu were now in a somewhat critical condition. But, since the death of Yoritomo, the Shōgun had been not very much more than a figurehead; although Sanetomo now and then did actually contrive to assert himself, and make his councillors bend to his will. But it was not with the titular chief of the Kamakura Bureaucracy that the real power lay; it was the Bureaucracy itself that was all-important. However, a nominal Shōgun, in whose name it could professedly act, was absolutely necessary; and the filling of this position was now a very serious question indeed for the Lady Masa, her brother the *Shikken*, and their advisers. At first, the ex-Emperor, Toba II., was petitioned to allow one or other of his two younger sons to be nominated to the office; but he

* "There is a nation to the members of which Frenchmen are more revengeful than to Germans, more irascible than to Italians, more unjust than to English. It is to the French that Frenchmen display animosity more savage, more incessant, and more inequitable than to people of any other race." Bodley's *France*, p. 170.

refused to grant the request. Thereupon, the Bakufu authorities were constrained to turn their attention to the great house of Fujiwara. Yoritomo's elder sister had married that Fujiwara Yoshiyasu who, during his closing years, had done his brother-in-law such important service as a sort of Bakufu watch-dog in Kyōto. Their daughter had wedded Saionji Kintsune (1171-1244), who, by the way, was now on notoriously bad terms with the ex-Emperor Toba II., having actually appealed to Kamakura against His ex-Majesty, two years before. Kintsune's daughter had become the wife of Fujiwara Michiye (1192-1252), now Minister of the Left, and had borne him three sons. Kamakura now proposed that the youngest of these should be sent down to the Kwantō to become the Head of the House of Minamoto, and the future Shōgun. The overture was accepted; and Yoritsune, a child of two, was consigned to the care of the Lady Masa. It was not till 1226, however, that he received his patent of investiture; and thus, for some six or seven years the Bakufu Ship of State continued on its course without any figurehead.

On the surface all this seems very simple; but, as a matter of fact, these incidents were so many astute manœuvres in the contest of wits which had been going on between Toba II. and the Bakufu for a score of years, and which was soon to be decided by an appeal to the sword.

In many ways, this Toba II. is one of the most interesting Sovereigns that ever sat upon the Imperial Throne of Japan; and, in spite of all his terrible mistakes and his ultimate failure as a ruler, one can hardly help suspecting that he might very well have been as great as Kwammu Tennō if he had been chastened by Kwammu's long years of drudging for his own livelihood before he became Emperor. The strange tale of how Toba II. was "selected" to occupy a throne, which was not really vacant, at the age of four has already been told at length. As a child and a youth, Toba II. was vigorous at once physically and mentally; and almost as precocious as one of the warlike Minamotos. That he had real natural ability appears to be beyond question. But what can be expected of a child Sovereign surrounded by venial lick-spittle flatterers and sycophants of both sexes,—all emulously intriguing for their own advancement and that of their relations? To say nothing of the upbringing of Tenchi or Kwammu, just think of that of

Hōjō Tokimasa, of Masako, of Yoritomo, of Yoshitsune, of Ōe Hiromoto, and the other astute Bakufu Councillors! The marvel is, not that Toba II. made such a comparatively poor showing when pitted against the counsels of men like Ōe Hiromoto, but that he made any showing against them at all! And yet the truth seems to be that he would infallibly have succeeded in overthrowing the Bakufu system but for the lack of the two qualities of self-restraint and judgement. And it was just these two all-important qualities that his position of child Sovereign made it impossible for him to acquire and develop.

As has been stated, he succeeded to the throne at the age of four, in 1184. Down to his twelfth year, his grandfather, Shirakawa II. (d. 1192), merely used him as a tool, according to the traditional wont of Cloistered Emperors. During the next five or six years, he appears to have thought out matters for himself so far as to perceive that, if he wished to be master in his own Empire, he must promptly abdicate the throne. Meanwhile, before he was nineteen, he had become the father of at least three sons by different consorts. Which of these was the heir to the throne nobody knew; so Toba II., remembering, perhaps, the circumstances of his own accession, called in expert diviners and lot-casters to decide the knotty question. The lot repeatedly came out in favour of his first-born; although it was His Majesty's dearest wish that it was another son, by a different consort, that should be the winner in this strange Imperial lottery. However, the difficulty was solved by a very astute politician, Michichika,—of which more anon. The favourite son was to be at once declared Kō-Tai-Tei; or "Younger Brother Successor to the Throne." All this took place, in 1198, without any consultation with the Bakufu; and it gave Yoritomo so much concern that he caused it to "leak out" in Kyōto that he meditated a third journey to the capital in the following year. Meanwhile, in Kyōto things were carried out in ostensible order and decency according to precedent; and in the following year (1199), Yoritomo met his death by a fall from his horse.

The next few years (1199-1202) are interesting enough to any one who can probe below the surface. In Kyōto, an ex-Emperor of some twenty to twenty-three years of age, whose early training had not been so much neglected as utterly spoiled

and perverted, his immature sexual instincts and appetites having been most disloyally abused by parasitic aristocratic tuft-and-place-hunters, who had been only too ready at all times to lend themselves to the most outrageous whims and freaks of the boy Sovereign. In Kamakura, a youthful Shōgun of about the same years, whose training in all the martial accomplishments of the age, and eke in statecraft, had been carefully attended to; but who, in spite of all that, was showing himself the hopeless slave of unworthy favourites,—intellectually torpid, and criminally negligent, in the discharge of the most important duties of his high and responsible office.

At first blush, it might very well seem that there was but little to choose between the Shōgun in Kamakura and the ex-Emperor in Kyōto. Both alike had their worthless and vicious and expensive favourites; both alike were allowing their sensual appetites to run unseemly riot; and, if the Shōgun Yoriie had become so infatuated with the fascinations of Japanese tennis that he could attend to nothing else, Tōba II. had meanwhile become one of the most expert exponents of Japanese football that were to be found within the four seas surrounding his Empire. But a little deeper inspection serves to disclose the fact that the advantages, after all, were immensely on the side of Kyōto. In Kamakura, a grand mass of muscle, and an abundance of hungry appetites, and nothing more. In Kyōto, there was all this indeed; but there was very much more besides, for the brain of Toba II., so far from being torpid, was preternaturally active and alert at all times. In some respects, he makes us think of Yūryaku and Buretsu, although he was guilty of but few of the atrocities attributed to the latter. The worst that can be said of him,—and this is indeed tolerably bad,—is that, like James II. of England, he could “assist” at the examination of witnesses or prisoners by torture unmoved. On the other hand, little emerges to indicate that he was either faithless or a hypocrite. He has sometimes been called the Japanese Nero; but this is a great compliment to Nero, and a gross injustice to Toba II. All Nero’s artistic instincts and acquisitive ability he had in much greater measure than the Sovereign who fiddled while his capital was burning; but of Nero’s vanity and sickly sentimentality he was guiltless. The fact seems to be that the youthful ex-Emperor was simply the victim of his early breed-

ing and his exalted position. After all said and done, after a close consideration of the terrible and regrettable irregularities of his private life, and of the untoward calamities in which these ultimately involved him, it seems to be tolerably plain that of the hundred odd Sovereigns of Japan who have occupied the throne since Nintoku Tennō, Toba II. is one of the very few who could have made a great career for themselves if compelled to compete with the ordinary lieges for a livelihood. His great claim to fame is his eagerness to *know*, and his cheerful willingness to undergo any toil or drudgery,—no matter how menial or repulsive,—necessary for the attainment of excellence in any of the multifarious arts, pastimes, and occupations which successively attracted his attention and absorbed his energies. He was at once poet, musician, sword-smith, a great hunter, and many other things besides. A great patron of cock-fighting, horse-racing, of the wrestling-ring, of archery with fugitive dogs as moving targets, he was also addicted to betting and gambling; in short, he had all the vices and not a few of the virtues of what is known in the slang of certain modern circles as a “good sport.” In sport—or sports—as in almost any individual thing on which he chose to concentrate his attention for the time being, he quickly and readily achieved mastery and proficiency. The shortest method of giving an approximately correct idea of the character of this extraordinary and most exceptional Emperor of Japan is by saying that he was, on the whole, the almost complete antithesis of the illustrious Tokugawa Iyeyasu. Of all polite accomplishments, of all brilliant or showy qualities, the latter was almost entirely destitute. But reared in the hard school of adversity, where life was one continual struggle for survival, he had mastered the great principles of the art of war, of the art of making ends meet, of statecraft, and of the supremely important art of managing and using and ruling men. The extraordinary, but long-delayed, success he finally achieved was owing to the masterly fashion in which he contrived to co-ordinate and synthetise these very prosaic, work-a-day faculties. In other words, he owed his great position mainly to his far-reaching and sure, albeit somewhat slow-footed, judgement. There was scarcely any art or accomplishment then known in Japan that Toba II. showed himself incompetent to acquire; but inasmuch as the synthetising judgement and self-restraint were alike

lacking, the superb natural endowments of this most exceptional Japanese Sovereign proved not so much valueless and ineffective as positively fatal and mischievous,—fatal and mischievous not only to himself but to the subsequent fortunes of that Line of the Sun Goddess of which, with a happier breeding, he might perhaps have been the brightest and most illustrious ornament.

For the first three or four years after his abdication, Toba II. was in tolerably safe and able hands. The mother of the child Sovereign, Tsuchimikado, was an adopted daughter of Minamoto Michichika (of Murakami Genji stock), who, although only about fifty years of age, had held office during six consecutive reigns. It is true that the posts he had filled had been largely subordinate ones; but his ability, and his experience, now made him the most influential of all the Imperial officers. He was advanced to Ministerial rank, made Bettō of the ex-Emperor's Palace, and tutor of the infant Prince who had been designated as successor to the child Sovereign. Michichika's efforts were greatly directed to emancipating the Court from all Kamakura influence, with a view to the possible eventual overthrow of the Bakufu system. Time and again, he over-reached the Shōgunate and its Councillors; and at his death, in 1202, the influence of Kamakura in Kyōto, at all events, did not amount to very much; and for years afterwards the Bakufu was very chary about intermeddling with Court affairs. In 1210, for example, when Toba II. virtually compelled his eldest son to abdicate in favour of his younger brother, Juntoku (1210–1221), Kamakura was not consulted about the matter; and it did not dare to interfere, although Toba II.'s conduct on this occasion was, on the face of it, most arbitrary and unwarranted. By this time, the young Shōgun, Sanetomo, had attained his majority; and from first to last, Sanetomo showed himself eager to court the good graces of Toba II., and very ready to further all his projects and humour all his whims and fancies. More than once, when the Kamakura Councillors refused to entertain requests from Kyōto, the Shōgun himself overrode them, and directed them to comply with the ex-Emperor's mandate. With the many-sided, versatile Toba II., the young Shōgun had at least one bond of sympathy and community; both were extremely fond, if not of literature, at all events of playing with ink-brush

and paper; and Sanetomo was no doubt greatly flattered to find his "poem" so much appreciated and praised by the Imperial arbiter of taste and style.

It will be remembered that one cardinal point in the polity of Yoritomo had been that none of his vassals, or of the military class, should have any direct relations or intercourse with the Imperial Court. Should any cases of misconduct on the part of *Shugo* or *Jitō* be reported to the Kyōto authorities, the action of these latter was strictly limited to transmitting a request to the Bakufu to investigate and deal with the matter. Furthermore, no military vassal was allowed to accept any Court office or rank, unless specifically recommended for the same by the Lord of Kamakura. One of the chief causes of Yoritomo's enmity with Yoshitsune had been that the latter had presumed to solicit and obtain Court rank, office, and preferment on his own initiative. On Yoritomo's visit to Kyōto in 1192, the ex-Emperor, in honour of his visitor, wished to confer the usual marks of Court favour on some thirty of the latter's officers. Yoritomo promptly declined the proffered honours; and finally, when the offer was pressed, grudgingly submitted a list of fourteen names only for Imperial recognition. Moreover, in the instructions he left for the guidance of his descendants and successors, he laid it down that the Shōgun should accept no high Court office or rank until so advanced in years that the close of his career seemed to be in sight.

It was against these specific institutions of the Bakufu that the astute Minamoto Michichika had chiefly directed his able and insidious attack. Complaints against *Shugo* and *Jitō* were, whenever it possibly could be done, dealt with directly, instead of being referred to Kamakura. Nor was this all. The ex-Emperor, Shirakawa II., had at one time formed a special guard of his own, the "North-face Warriors" (Hokumen Bushi); and Yoritomo exerted himself to get this body disbanded. Now, under the name of "West-face Warriors" (Saimen Bushi), this corps was re-organised, and soon became formidable. We presently read of it arresting high Bakufu officials in the capital, of driving out objectionable *Jitō*, and of even threatening *Shugo* in the surrounding provinces. At the same time, instances of military men receiving honours from the Court directly, without any recommendation from Kamakura,

become not infrequent. The truth would seem to be that during the three years before his demise in 1202, Michichika had made a promising beginning of the work of sapping and mining the outworks of the Bakufu, at least. However, the mantle of the astute Michichika fell upon the shoulders of no successor, for the two or three Court grandees possessed of any real ability were on good terms with Kamakura, and not at all averse to furthering its projects. As for the ex-Emperor himself, his attention to affairs of State was distracted by perhaps a dozen rival interests and pursuits, each in its turn all-engrossing and, as a rule, more fascinating than the wearisome and wearying game of politics and statecraft. Provided His ex-Majesty was left unfettered in the prosecution of his hobby for the time, and provided he was supplied with the funds necessary for the realisation of certain of his projects—for some of them were indeed costly,—he did not seem to trouble himself very much about the Bakufu and its relations to the Court.

Meanwhile, the Bakufu from time to time was fully occupied with the settlement of its own bloody internal dissensions; and the cautious and clear-headed councillors of Kamakura deemed it prudent to abstain from giving any offence to Kyōto when their own house was so liable to be divided against itself. After the extermination of Wada and his partisans, in 1213, the Lady Masa, Hōjō Yoshitoki, and their advisers felt they could at last afford to begin to assert themselves; but whenever they did venture to thwart his ex-Majesty's will and wishes, Sanetomo, now grown to man's estate, stepped forward and asserted *his* will in favour of his Sovereign friend, fellow-bard, and most appreciative critic. On such occasions,—not by any means infrequent,—there was doubtless much glooming and glowering on the wrinkled faces of the grey-beards assembled in council in Kamakura, for men like Ōe Hiromoto and Miyoshi Yasunobu must have clearly discerned that, unless all this complaisance was exchanged for a strong and stern policy, the Bakufu of the last seven years of Yoritomo had gone for ever.

At the death of Sanetomo in 1219, Ōe Hiromoto was one, and Miyoshi Yasunobu nine, years beyond that span of three-score and ten when even patriarchs must be expected to be gathered to their fathers. Both these great and illustrious men had come to what was then the wilds of the Kwantō

almost forty years before; and during all these years since the foundation of Kamakura their whole heart and soul had been devoted to the construction and the manipulation of that at one time wonderfully efficient machine, the Bakufu administration. Both now knew that they were presently destined to go down to the grave; and both seem to have felt that after-ages would say that they had lived in vain, for their best work of brain and hand now seemed to be threatened with imminent wreck and ruin. Somewhere about 1216 or 1217, Ōe Hiromoto had been deputed by his colleagues to remonstrate with Sanetomo about the wanton manner in which he was infringing his father's instructions forbidding the acceptance of Court rank and office; but his remonstrance had fallen upon deaf ears. Although Sanetomo did not actually purchase his honours by hard cash, or its equivalent, he felt in duty bound to testify his gratitude by something more substantial than neatly turned eulogistic verselets. Among Toba II.'s many crazes, his mania for building was one of the most expensive; and some of the most costly of his architectural enterprises were either carried through entirely or completed by means of Bakufu contributions.

Mention has already been made of the huge proportions the scandal of the actual sale of Court rank and offices had assumed under certain former Sovereigns,—notably under Shirakawa I. Under His ex-Majesty Toba II. the evil again revived and became as pronounced as ever. Provided with the necessary funds, even the most incompetent, or the most worthless in character, might safely aspire to official employment; especially if they had wit enough to make their approaches through the "proper" channels. As a matter of fact, these "proper" channels were most highly improper; for certain Ladies of the Court, notably the Lady Kane, amassed huge fortunes as brokers in this shameful and demoralising traffic. Then, if perchance a candidate found himself repelled by the Lady Kane, or her fellow high-born dames, he might count upon effecting something by getting one of His ex-Majesty's favourite Shirabyōshi to speak a word for him in proper season. These Shirabyōshi ("white measure markers") were the dancing-girls of the time,—the prototypes of the modern geisha; and not a few of them in their way were highly accomplished and fascinating women. At all events,

Toba II. appears to have found certain of them abundantly entertaining, and to have spent a good deal of his leisure in their company. As a matter of fact, it was one of these highly-favoured members of the Kyōto *demi-monde*—the notorious Kame-giku—who proved to be the spark that set alight the great mass of political and social combustibles which had been accumulating for years, and which blazed out in the great commotion of 1221.

As has been alleged, Sanetomo's assassination took place early in 1219; and before that year was out, Toba II. had abundant reason for concluding that dealing with a youthful Shōgun who was a fellow son of the Muses was one thing; and having to treat directly with the clear-headed, cold-blooded sagacity of the old foxes who manipulated the Bakufu machine was quite another and a vastly different affair. Instead of having all his requests entertained with ready complaisance, he now found them almost invariably repelled, the bitter pill being usually gilded with nothing better than prosy dissertations on constitutional law and practice. One of these nettled him greatly. He had asked the Bakufu to remove their Jitō from two extensive manors in the province of Settsu, inasmuch as he wished to put his dancing-girl favourite, Kame-giku (Tortoise Chrysanthemum), in possession of them; and Kamakura had replied with a lecture on some of the principles of feudal law. Some months before, the reply would almost infallibly have been a neat set of verses, and the prompt transference of the Jitō to better positions. This, together with other incidents, served to convince His ex-Majesty that, for the time being, he must perforce abandon many of the pursuits and interests most congenial to him, and concentrate his attention upon the banal and repulsive game of politics and statecraft. Down to 1219, this game had to him been nothing more than an insignificant *Nebensache*; now, at the age of forty he found himself compelled, not only to learn its elementary rules, but to play it against some of the finest and most mature intellects in Asia. It is true that when things were brought to a head in the summer of 1221, the failure of Toba II. against the Bakufu machine was at once sudden, complete, and disastrous,—not only to himself, but to the fortunes of the Imperial House of Japan. But it is equally true that the efforts of this very exceptional Im-

perial amateur in the game of statecraft, suddenly called upon to match himself against such life-long professional proficient as Ōe Hiromoto, Miyoshi Yasunobu, Hōjō Yoshitoki, and his elder sister, the Lady Masa, Yoritomo's widow, came within an ace of success. But while according Toba II.'s magnificent natural abilities a just meed of admiration, the unprejudiced, unbiassed, cold-blooded foreign writer cannot refrain from expressing the honest conviction that His ex-Majesty's success in 1221 would have been utterly fatal to the best interests of the Empire whose throne he had solemnly abdicated three-and-twenty years before. Fifty-three years later on, the first wave of Mongol invasion was to threaten the shores of Japan; seven years later came Kublai Khan's really great effort to reduce this Empire to his yoke. As things turned out, between 1221 and 1281, Japan was blessed with one of the justest, the most honest, the most economical, the strongest, and, at the same time, the least tyrannical and repressive, administrations that have ever been known in Asia. The lieges were during these two generations in such peace and harmony and ordered security as had been undreamt of in the Empire, for three centuries at least. Thus when the foreign invader appeared, a great united national effort was not merely possible, but actually easy. Had the Bakufu gone down before Toba II. in 1221, all the probabilities are that the land would have been presently re-subjected to all the horrors and miseries of misgovernment and anarchy; and in such a condition Japan might very well have fallen a comparatively easy prey to the Mongols and their allies.

When, on the death of Sanetomo, Masako and Hōjō Yoshitoki begged Toba II. to appoint one or other of his younger sons to the vacant Shōgunate, His ex-Majesty was prompt to discern the snare, and curtly refused the request. A Prince of the Blood as nominal head of the Bakufu machine would enhance not only the prestige, but the power of Kamakura. A mere youth would be nothing but a tool in the hands of the *Shikken* and his coadjutors; and such a tool might very readily be utilised for far-reaching purposes. In the event of any deadly clash between the Court and the Bakufu, a Shōgun of Imperial stock might even be set up as Emperor; and Toba II. was firmly resolved to keep the making and unmaking of Emperors in his own hands, as long as he lived. Kamakura

then turned its attention to the great house of Fujiwara; and the infant Yoritsune was conveyed to the Kwantō as Shōgun designate. The object was to attach a section of the Court nobles to the interests of the Bakufu; and so to restore its influence in Kyōto, where its power and prestige had latterly fallen very low indeed. Toba II. saw through the manœuvre readily enough; and while keeping his own counsel, began to prepare for the struggle he perceived to be inevitable.

A strange episode happened just a little later on. Minamoto Yorimochi, the grandson of Yorimasa, who had perished at Uji Bridge in 1180, was Shugo of the Great Palace. Suddenly, without any warning, he found himself beset by Toba II.'s "West-face Warriors," who had been hurriedly dispatched to put him out of the way. He retired into a wing of the Palace, and made a stubborn fight of it; but at last seeing escape impossible, he fired the building and perished in the flames. The reason for all this remained a mystery; the most probable conjecture is that Yorimochi knew too much of what was really in the ex-Emperor's mind, and that it had been discovered that his relations with Kamakura were too intimate.

News of this incident seems to have given the Bakufu great concern. A month or two later on, Yoshitoki's brother-in-law, Iga Mitsusue, appeared in Kyōto with instructions to keep a strict watch upon the Court and the nobles. But this emissary appears to have been completely outwitted and hoodwinked by Toba II., who, under Iga's very eyes, succeeded in the course of the next year or so in attaching almost every military man in the capital to his interests by his robust affability. During all this time there was little or no apparent change in His ex-Majesty's way of life outwardly. The only remarkable point, perhaps, was the extent to which his attention was occupied with ecclesiastical affairs. But even this was nothing specially new or unwonted, for even in his very worst seasons of orgy and excess, Toba II. had been neither remiss in the matter of his devotions, nor unmindful of the claims and interests of the Church.

In Japan, the opening years of the thirteenth century had been marked by an intense religious ferment, similar to that witnessed in contemporary Europe, where the Dominicans and Franciscans were soon to begin preaching their great revival.

Several new sects,—among them the Jōdo and the Zen—arose in quick succession, and made such rapid headway that those already in possession of the field became seriously alarmed and exasperated for various reasons, among which the economic bulked largely. The result was a persecution (1206), to which Toba II. lent support and countenance. But what was known as a “persecution” in mediæval Japan was of a comparatively mild nature. Into the punishment of heresy, the rack, the stake, and the faggot never found any entrance; banishment to some remote part of the Empire was the severest penalty inflicted; and it was inflicted, not so much for preaching new and strange doctrines, as for provoking popular tumults and breaches of the peace. It is true that for generations the priests had been the most turbulent class in Japan, and that, when the Great Monasteries in the Home Provinces were not at actual warfare with each other, their mutual relations were little more satisfactory than those of an armed truce. But to dignify their broils and squabbles with the name of religious wars would be entirely beside the mark. Such bloodshed as there was took place, not in defence of disputed points of doctrine, or of any abstract theological propositions whatever. From first to last, in some shape or other, it was all merely a question of loaves and fishes, for the considerations that provoked these armed ecclesiastical debates were generally of the earth earthy, and not infrequently sordidly so.

During Yoritomo's time, the priesthood throughout the Empire, while carefully conciliated and highly honoured, had been effectually restrained from all power of doing mischief, by a rare combination of judgement, tact, and firmness. After the death of Yoritomo, the same tradition was preserved in the Kwantō and where the Bakufu was strong. But in the Home Provinces, the Bakufu soon became the reverse of strong; and the Great Monasteries again got completely out of hand. By this date, of 1219 or 1220, they had become exceptionally turbulent. Miidera about this time once more got sacked and burned down by Hi-ei-zan; Kōfukuji had been several times on the warpath, “Divine Tree” (Shimboku) and all; while the clamorous and riotous monks of Hi-ei-zan had forced upon Toba II. the unfortunate necessity of manhandling them vigorously in front of his palace. They had come

down, sacred cars and what not, to protest about his showing too much favour to some of their rivals; and when they refused either to listen to reason, or to withdraw until the matter was properly looked into, the "West-face Warriors" were unslipped from the leash. In the scuffle that ensued, one of the bearers of a sacred car was most impiously and unceremoniously cut down; and thereupon his fellows, losing faith in the efficacy of their Ark of the Covenant to safeguard their very precious skins, abruptly threw it on the ground, and in spite of the handicap of their ecclesiastical habiliments, conclusively evinced their possession of great "sprinting" capacity. They, and the rest of the disorderly monkish rabble, were incontinently on their way out of Kyōto like so many express-couriers, and up the slopes of Hi-ei-zan like a flock of goats. The big gates of the great mountain monastery were at once slammed to, and all the powers of Heaven and Hell volubly invoked to avenge the astounding sacrilege.

The net result of the whole thing was that Toba II. made huge capital out of the incident. The ingloriously abandoned Ark of the Covenant was promptly returned with profound apologies and profuse expressions of regret; and when all these were rejected as insufficient, His ex-Majesty readily granted all the extra demands upon his patience and generosity. Later on, he went up the Holy Mountain, spent a night there *incognito*, and afterwards by various clever devices attached the whole might of this great sacerdotal fortress to his interests. United the various great Buddhist sects, with their enormously wealthy temples and monasteries, might very easily have made themselves supreme within the bounds of the four seas that ring the Empire of Japan around. In the Nara epoch (710-784), priestly ascendancy had been actually a dire menace, not only to the Ministers of the Crown, but to the throne itself. Kwammu, as has been stated, grappled with this pressing problem by removing the capital, and by favouring the rise of two new and powerful sects as a counterpoise to the great monasteries of Nara; and the rivalry between these had afforded another illustration of the virtue that is inherent in the trite old political maxim of *Divide et impera*. Now, for his own ulterior ends, it had become one of the immediate objects of Toba II. to bring all the great

monasteries to an amicable understanding with each other, so that their troops and other resources might be available for a great combined effort against a common foe. By ceaseless exertions and the exercise of a host of skilful devices, His ex-Majesty actually succeeded in his purpose; and when the brocade banner was flung to the breeze, almost every great shrine or fane in the Home Provinces sent its contingent to serve under it.

From February, or March, 1221, onwards Toba II. had been engaged in an unceasing round of religious ceremonies and observances; and in May strange rumours about the nature of some of the petitions he had been preferring to the Gods became current. As soon as Toba II., and his son, the Emperor Juntoku—(for the latter was privy to his father's designs)—were aware of this, they determined to take decisive action sooner than they had already intended. On May 16, Juntoku abdicated the throne in favour of his son, Kanenari, then scarcely three years of age. This step was taken without any consultation with Kamakura. Then, on June 4, all the military men in Kyōto were summoned to attend a great horse-archery festival Toba II. was to celebrate on that day. As many as 1,700 knights responded to the invitation,—all that were in Kyōto, in fact; and among them, the *Shugo* and all the other Bakufu officers then in the capital. The only absentee was Iga, Hōjō's brother-in-law and confidential agent, who had received timely warning from Saionji Kintsune of the real import of the apparently innocent gathering. That very day Saionji and his son were placed under arrest; and early on the morrow, Iga was attacked in his mansion, and buried under its blazing roof and rafters. On June 6, Hōjō Yoshitoki was stripped of his offices and declared an outlaw; and three days later, it was proclaimed that the East was in a state of insurrection, and all loyal subjects summoned to join in chastising the rebels.

On the night of that same 9th of June, 1221, an express dispatched by Saionji's steward arrived in Kamakura with news of events in Kyōto down to the morning of the sixth. Shortly afterwards, an Imperial emissary was arrested engaged in distributing copies of the Edict declaring Yoshitoki outlawed, while, about the same time, Miura Yoshimura called on Yoshitoki to hand over to him a letter he had just received

from his younger brother, Miura Taneyoshi, then in Kyōto, vehemently urging him to make an end of the rebel and traitor, the former *Shikken* Hōjō Yoshitoki! Since the extermination of the Wada family, eight years before, the Miura house had been the only one in the Kwantō that could be pitted against that of Hōjō in power and prestige. Luckily for Yoshitoki at this juncture, the Miura chieftain, who had much to gain by complying with Toba II.'s orders,—for Taneyoshi was merely the ex-Emperor's mouthpiece—and everything to risk by supporting a proscribed rebel, set the claims of an old and sincere friendship above those of a highly profitable loyalty to the throne. Here a tribute to both Miura brothers alike, as well as to Toba II.'s ability in the sphere of that statecraft which he plainly regarded as a minor accomplishment. The younger Miura (Taneyoshi) was a brave and gallant and simple-minded soldier, whom Toba II. had easily subjugated by his Sydney Smith-like ability of talking "runts" to such as were interested in nothing more than "runts." Taneyoshi was indeed an important capture, inasmuch as Toba II. counted upon being able to win over his elder brother, the head of the great Miura clan, through him. Had his ex-Majesty succeeded in doing so, the probabilities are that the Bakufu would have fallen.

On learning of how matters stood, the Lady Masa at once summoned five or six of the Kamakura leaders into her presence. Her words were brief, but stirring and to the point, and when she wound up by telling them that if any among them had thoughts of taking part with Kyōto, now was the time to say so clearly, they all professed their steadfast devotion with tears in their eyes. They were thereupon dismissed to hold a council of war. In this, opinion was all but unanimous in favour of shutting the Ashigara and Hakone barriers, standing on the defensive, and awaiting the course of events. Against this Ōe Hiromoto alone protested vehemently, and later on Miyoshi Yasunobu, who was not then present, urged a prompt and vigorous offensive; and it was the counsels of these sturdy old patriarchs that were approved of by Masako.

In a few days, the whole of the East and North of Japan was under arms. The main force of 50,000 was to advance by the Central Mountain route; an army of 40,000 was to come down through the Echizen passes from the Hokurikudo,

while 10,000 cavalry were to advance hotfoot along the Tōkaidō. The campaign was short, sharp, and decisive. It was on June 13 that Hōjō Yasutoki left Kamakura to assume command of the Tōkaidō Division; on July 6 he was in possession of the capital. The first encounter had been on the Mino-Owari frontier, whither an Imperialist force had been hastily thrown forward to hold the Tōkaidō column in check, while other bodies had been dispatched to deal with the Tōsandō and Hokurikudō armies. But Toba II.'s commanders were assailed so impetuously that they had been forced to fall back and concentrate for the defence of the capital. At the Uji stream, the Kyōto troops did make a gallant stand, and held the position for a long summer's day against all the assaults of the Easterners. But next morning, more Bakufu men arrived; and the Imperialists were then outflanked and driven back upon the capital in disorder. About the same time, Seta was captured by the main Kamakura force, which now came pouring on into the city. The Northern army did not make its appearance until some days later; before reaching the Echizen passes it had had to do some stiff fighting, for a considerable section of the population of the Hokurikudō had declared for the Imperialist cause.

Considering the seeming ease and astounding promptness with which the Bakufu stamped out what its retainers were wont to speak of as the "rebellion," the reader may well be puzzled with the assertion that Toba II. actually came within an ace of success in his project. But much may be urged in support of such a contention. In the first place, Toba II. was steadily gaining adherents day by day, when the leaking out of his plans constrained him to take sudden and premature action. In the second place, he had counted upon the support of the great Miura clan in Kamakura itself, and in this he was totally disappointed. But nothing of all this need have proved essentially fatal. What really wrecked the Imperialist cause were the counsels of Ōe Hiromoto and Miyoshi Yasunobu. If Kamakura had rested content with shutting the Hakone and Ashigara barriers, and standing on the defensive, one infallible result would have been that in the course of a few weeks, Toba II. would have found himself with the greater portion of the rest of the Empire at his back. A few insignificant reverses to the Bakufu arms might even

have led to the appearance of an Imperialist faction within the bounds of the Kwantō itself. And all this not for political or sentimental reasons. It was in the peculiar social and economic condition of the nation that Toba II. would have found his great opportunity.

During the great wars of the preceding generation it had been easily possible for strong and sturdy peasants to adopt the profession of arms; and hence, in spite of all the bloodshed and slaughter of that time, there had been a great accession to the numbers of the unproductive military class. In the thirty years of comparative peace that had followed, the ranks of this class had been still further swollen by mere natural increase. Soon, in spite of all the economy and simplicity of living insisted on by the sumptuary legislation of the Bakufu, the mere vulgar question of subsistence tended to become acute. As land was almost the only source of income, as properties were generally small,—Yoritomo speaks of an estate of from 250 to 500 acres as an exceptionally extensive holding—and as children were numerous,—as many as ten or a dozen in a family being not so very uncommon,—the question of who was to inherit the paternal homestead was one of supreme and vital importance. Some attention was indeed paid to the claims of primogeniture; but the situation was generally complicated by the custom of concubinage, and occasionally by the practice of adoption. Theoretically the decision of the matter rested with the parents; but as a matter of fact, as a Japanese author writes, the head-post to the father's grave had often been scarcely set up before his sons were at law about the family possessions. To relieve the courts from the incubus of having to deal with these succession worries, the Bakufu had ordered that each family, in the larger sense of the term, should have a General Head, with whom the decision of such internal squabbles should rest. But the situation was such that it could be relieved by no legislation which did not summarily enjoin a whole army of younger sons to exchange their swords for mattocks, and go back to rice-growing. The simple fact of the matter was that the loaves and fishes in most *Samurai* households could not possibly be made to go round. Hence it is not difficult to understand how the Japanese came by their proverb that "brotherhood is the beginning of estrangement." All through

the Empire were landless Bakufu vassals, forbidden by the traditions of their caste to engage in any money-earning industry, with absolutely nothing for their swords to do, and consequently often very little for themselves to eat. By such, any great civil commotion would infallibly be welcomed as a veritable godsend; while it lasted they would be sure of rations anyhow; and if they came out on the winning side there would be plenty of plums agoing in the shape of confiscated fiefs. Then, in addition to all this belly-pinched class of Bakufu vassals, there were not a few malcontents who had found the Kamakura law-courts too strict, and honest and impartial; and still others who had been disappointed in their aspirations to office, as well as those,—Jitō especially,—who had been stripped of office either for incompetence, or venality, or other malpractices, for the grey-beards on the Three Great Boards of Kamakura were terribly exacting in all their dealings with their subordinate agents. Then, outside the Bakufu vassals, there were military proprietors who cared just as much for the Bakufu as they did for the Court. As a matter of fact, not a few of these, especially in the West, while secretly sending their sons to fight under the Brocade Banner, remained on their lands at home, either maintaining a strictly non-committal attitude, or making great professions of devotion to Kamakura. Owing to imperious circumstances, mainly the near neighbourhood of Bakufu “dogs,”—otherwise spies—and what not, down to June 5, 1221, Toba II. had been constrained to confine his moling to the Home Provinces, and Kishū at the outside. On that and the following day, when he prematurely appeared in the open, above ground, the capital and vicinity were (to change the figure) at once vigorously and merrily ablaze in his favour. Suppose that the Ashigara and Hakone barriers had been shut, and that the Bakufu had supinely confined itself to the defensive, by July 6, when Hōjō Yasutoki was in possession of Kyōto, every province south of Echigo and Izu (inclusive) would have been as furiously aflame with professedly Imperialistic fervour as the capital itself was. So much Toba II. in all probability foresaw; so much Ōe Hiromoto did undoubtedly and unquestionably and unmistakably foresee. As a matter of fact, a considerable portion of the population of the Hokurikudō

did respond to the Imperial appeal; while one of Yoritomo's oldest and most trusted partisans, Kōno Michinobu (1156-1223), actually hoisted the Banner of Brocade against the Bakufu in Shikoku.

Yet another point there is that must not be overlooked. At this time the line of Yoritomo was extinct; and there was actually no Shōgun either in Kamakura or in Japan, for the baby Fujiwara Yoritsune had been taken to Kamakura merely as Shōgun *designate*; and in their innermost hearts many of the Kwantō warriors were profoundly dissatisfied with the fashion in which the succession to the position of the great and illustrious Yoritomo had been ordered. In truth, in 1221 the situation of the Bakufu was almost desperate; for besides being unpopular (mainly owing to its impartiality and honesty) in many quarters, it was certainly at that time, if not un-constitutional, at all events extra-constitutional. At this supreme crisis, one of the great geniuses in its organisation four decades before now proved its saviour. To a patriarch of seventy-three of the right sort, a few years more or less of the crepuscular existence that preludes the inevitable descent into the tomb are not of any very great or consuming consequence. But the survival of the best results of a laborious and beneficent exercise of his political or other genius, while in the full flush of his chastened and mature experience, is a vastly different and an infinitely more important matter. At this conjuncture Ōe Hiromoto's head was in all probability at stake; but that any consideration for his own safety ever entered into his calculations, I cannot, from what contemporary documents I have perused, believe for even a single moment. As for Miyoshi Yasunobu, then in his eighty-second year, the simple reason why he did not appear at that momentous council-of-war to support Ōe Hiromoto, is that he was then on his death-bed, for he passed away a few weeks afterwards! What doubtlessly weighed most with these two really grand old men was the conviction that a hungry esurient mob of effeminate, venal, pleasure-ridden, utterly good-for-nothing courtiers and Court nobles were worse than hopeless as administrators of the affairs of the Empire; and that the task of ruling Japan was work for *men*. Not the smallest of the services rendered to their country by Hiromoto and Yasunobu was the training of that wonderful

and admirable school of simple-living, hard-working, fearlessly just and honest officials which they left behind them, if not to perpetuate, at all events to prolong, their own splendid traditions of uprightness and efficiency.

Upon entering the capital, the Bakufu Commander-in-Chief, Hōjō Yasutoki (Yoshitoki's eldest son, then 38), was met by an official who announced that he was the bearer of an *Insen* (Rescript of an ex-Emperor). Yasutoki thereupon at once dismounted, and listened most respectfully, while one of his retainers read the document aloud. Its purport was to the effect that all this commotion had been caused by intriguing, self-seeking (Imperial) counsellors; as it was entirely against the will of his ex-Majesty (Juntoku) that Hōjō Yoshitoki had been put to the ban, the *Shikkō* was now reinstated in all the offices he had formerly held! In the hour of victory, Yasutoki was inclined to be merciful; and through his efforts some of the military men, such as Kōno Michinobu, were punished with nothing worse than banishment.

But it was not with Yasutoki that the fate of the vanquished rested. This was decided in Kamakura; and, mainly, it would appear, by Ōe Hiromoto. A fortnight later on, a Bakufu envoy entered Kyōto with dispatches and a paper of secret instructions for Yasutoki. Early in the following month Toba II. with a few attendants was relegated to the Island of Oki; a week later, Juntoku was banished to Sado; while two of his younger brothers, who had been made priests to conciliate the good-will of the warlike monks, were exiled to Tajima and Bizen respectively. Toba II.'s eldest son, the ex-Emperor Tsuchimikado, had studiously held aloof from his father's projects; the Bakufu had no grounds for ill-will towards him personally. But it was felt his presence in the capital might possibly become a disturbing influence; and so he was removed, first to Tosa, and later on to Awa, where a palace was built for him, and where he was treated with far less rigour than his father and brother. As for the infant Sovereign Kanenari, he was removed to a mansion in the Kujō quarter, where he died thirteen years afterwards. The Bakufu refused to recognise him as a Sovereign; in fact, it was not until 1870 that he received the name of Chukyō, and, as such, was entered in the list of Emperors. The vacant throne was now filled by the elevation of the ten-year-old son of Prince Mori-

sada (Toba II.'s elder brother,) who is known as the Emperor Horikawa II. (1221-1232); his father, who had become a priest in 1212, being honoured with the style of Dajō-Hō-ō and the name of Go-Takakura-in, although he had never occupied the Imperial seat.

The treatment thus accorded the Imperial family was harsh, indeed; but it was comparatively mild when compared to the stern measure now meted out to the Court nobles who had been implicated in the attempt to overthrow the Bakufu. Yasutoki had been secretly instructed to seize them and summarily execute them in the capital, together with four military chiefs whose guilt had been flagrant. As regards the latter, the mandate was promptly complied with; but Yasutoki dispatched the Court nobles to Kamakura under a strong guard. At various places on the route, they were, one after another, made away with, the last of them being drowned in the Hayakawa in Sagami. One or two of this doomed band escaped the extreme penalty owing to Masako's intercession. Later on, others who had not been so openly involved in the disturbance were banished to distant quarters of the Empire. In all probability, Ōe Hiromoto was not at all sorry to have such an excellent opportunity of settling accounts with what he must have considered a wasteful and pestilent brood of arrogant, pretentious, blue-blooded incompetents. It is true that the execution of their leaders need not have been any fatal blow to the Court nobles, for none of these leaders were men of any very transcendent ability. Yet, withal, Hiromoto contrived to hit his old *Kugé* foes very shrewdly on this occasion. Even down to this time not a few of the courtiers had been very rich; in various parts of the Empire they still held large tracts of landed property. Now the greater bulk of these *Kugé* manors got confiscated in common with those of the military proprietors who had espoused the Imperialist cause. Naturally this brought many of the aristocratic families of the capital to poverty, and sadly impaired the consideration in which they had been held.

As the result of these confiscations the Bakufu authorities found themselves enabled to relieve the dire pressure of economic distress among their vassals. As many as 3,000 additional manors had come into their hands. Certain of these were bestowed upon the fanes and shrines—Ise and Suwa

among the number,—that had remained steadfast to the cause of Kamakura and offered petitions on its behalf in its hour of peril. But these estates were mostly assigned as rewards to such as had rendered meritorious services in the recent struggle. It was nominally as Jitō that the grantees were placed in these Shō-en; but this new class of Jitō stood on a different footing from that already existing. The latter were simply administrative officers, removable for misconduct at any time; the new Jitō were not only administrative officers, but they also enjoyed what was virtually proprietary rights. And what was more, their position was hereditary, capable of being transmitted to daughters even in exceptional cases. As these manors lay to a great extent exactly in those quarters of the Empire where the influence of Kamakura had hitherto been weakest, it is easy to understand why these new Jitō were installed in their offices on such exceptionally favourable terms. In the case of any reverse to the fortunes of the Bakufu these functionaries would be the first to suffer; and so, by an adroit appeal to the all-important motive of self-interest, the Bakufu very easily riveted its grip upon sections of the Empire which otherwise might have given it great cause for apprehension and anxiety.*

This highly politic step constitutes a by no means inconsiderable factor among the many that go to explain the won-

* The following two clauses from the Hōjō Code of 1232 throw a good deal of light upon the situation:—

“16. Of the lands which were confiscated at the time of the military disturbance of Shōkyū (1219-1221).

“In the case of some whose tenements were confiscated in consequence of their having been reported to us as having taken part against us in the battle at the capital, it is now averred that they were innocent of such misdoing. Where the proof in support of this plea is full and clear, other lands will be assigned to the present grantees of the confiscated estates, which will be restored to the original holders. By the term present grantees is meant those of them who have performed meritorious services.

“In the next place, amongst those who took part against us in the battle at the capital were some who had received the bounty of the Kwantō (*i.e.* had received grants of land from the Shōgun). Their guilt was specially aggravated. Accordingly they were themselves put to death and their holdings were confiscated definitively. Of late years, however, it has come to our knowledge that some fellows of that class have, through force of circumstances, had the luck to escape punishment. Seeing that the time for severity has now gone by, in their case the utmost generosity will be exercised, and a slice only of their estates, amounting to one-fifth, is to be confiscated. However, as regards Sub-Controllers and village officials, unless they were vassals of the Shōgun's own house, it is to be understood that it is not now practicable to call them to account, even if it should come to be found

derful stability of the subsequent Hōjō administration during the ensuing century, and for years after it had forfeited all its claims to respect. These claims were simply that it could do that which Kyōto had utterly and completely failed in doing after having the fairest of chances for long centuries, *viz.* to manage the general affairs of the Japanese people with strict economy, rigid honesty, and efficiency; an ideal which Tenchi alone had realised, which Kwammu had done much to approach, and which with Sanjō II., during his all too brief reign and life, had been his dearest if unfulfilled aspiration. From these new Jitō were descended many of the Shomyō, or lesser feudal nobility, and even some of the great houses we find prominent in the Empire at the date of the arrival of the Portuguese, three centuries later. In connection with the distribution of these confiscated manors it is to be noted that the Hōjō themselves did not profit unduly. It is true that Yasutoki and his uncle, Tokifusa, were each awarded sixty new Shō-en in Ise; but the

out that they were guilty of siding with the capital. The case of these men was discussed in the Council last year and settled in this sense; consequently no different principle is applicable.

“Next as regards lands confiscated on the same occasion in respect of which suits may be brought by persons claiming to be owners. It was in consequence of the guilt of the then holders that those lands were confiscated, and were definitively assigned to those who rendered meritorious service. Although those who then held them were unworthy holders, there are many persons we hear who now petition that in accordance with the principle of heredity the lands may be allowed to revert to them by grant. But all the tenures that were confiscated at that time stand irreversibly disposed of. Is it possible for us to put aside the present holders and undertake to make inquiry into claims of a past age? Henceforth a stop must be put to disorderly expectations.

“17.—As regards the guilt of those who took part in the battle on the same occasion, a distinction is to be made between fathers and sons.

“As regards cases in which although the father took the side of the capital the son nevertheless took service with the Kwantō, and likewise those in which although the son took the side of the capital the father took service with the Kwantō, the question of reward or punishment has been decided already by the difference of treatment. Why should one generation be confounded with the other as regards guilt?

“As regards cases of this kind occurring amongst residents in the Western provinces, if one went to the capital, whether he were the father or the son, then the son or the father who remained at home in the province cannot be held blameless. Although he may not have accompanied his guilty kinsman he was his accomplice at heart. Nevertheless in cases where owing to their being separated by long distances or boundaries it was impossible for them to have had communication with one another or to be cognisant of the circumstances, they are not to be regarded as reciprocally involved in each other's guilt.”

onerous and extensive establishment they had presently to maintain in Kyōto made it necessary for them to have a certain amount of funds at their disposal. And, as a matter of fact, we soon hear of Tokifusa, at least, distributing his newly acquired property among Bakufu vassals whose merits in the contest had not been adequately rewarded. As for the *Shikken*, Hōjō Yoshitoki himself, he absolutely refused to benefit personally even to the extent of a single acre.

Hitherto Kyōto had been the weak spot in the Bakufu system. A *Shugo* had been installed there with the duty of repressing disorder in the Home Provinces; but the authority of the *Shugo* had been overshadowed by that of the ex-Emperor with his "West-face Warriors," with the *Kebiishi*, and other Imperial officers. Finally, in the great crisis of 1221 the *Shugo* had actually rallied to the Banner of Brocade. Plainly, something more than a *Shugo* was needed in the capital. Accordingly, Yoritomo's palace in the grounds of Taira Kiyomori's old mansion of the Rokuhara was now converted into administrative offices; and here Yasutoki and his uncle Tokifusa were installed as Kyōto *Tandai*. Three years later the work was found to be so onerous that it became necessary to divide it; and a new set of offices were erected in the south of the same grounds, and here one of the two *Tandai* took up his quarters. Hence the origin of the Two Rokuhara. The Rokuhara system was an almost complete replica of that of Kamakura. Under the *Tandai* were a Council of Government, a Headquarters Staff, and a High Court of Justice—all with an initiative of their own, but acting under instructions from Kamakura in gravely important matters. The *Tandai* were almost invariably members of the Hōjō family; and the office was regarded as a sort of training for the future *Shikken*. Certain of the duties of the position were not very dignified, for no honourable man can find much satisfaction to his soul in the dirty work of espionage, and the *Tandai* were responsible for a strict surveillance of the Sovereign and the Court, and all their doings.

In the light of subsequent events, it is easy to perceive that, by postponing his great effort for a matter of five years, Toba II. would almost infallibly have succeeded in overthrowing the Bakufu system, at least for a time. For the seven years following the death of Sanetomo in 1219, there was no

Shōgun in Kamakura; it was only in 1226 that Fujiwara Yoritune, then eight years of age, received his patent of investiture with that office. Although there had been no great commotion among the Bakufu vassals in consequence, yet the selection of a baby Court noble as the prospective occupant of the seat of the great Yoritomo had been nowhere received with enthusiasm, and had given rise to many secret murmurs. For such a mere prospective civilian figurehead, little more than out of his swaddling-clothes, few warriors would have cared to unsheath their blades. But as regards the Lady Masa, Yoritomo's widow, it was a vastly different matter. The Nun-Shōgun, as she had been called since the death of her son Sanetomo, was stern, and short, and sharp of speech; but when she did speak, her words were the winged words of the true leader of men to which the heart of every Deloraine in the Kwantō thrilled responsively. In the Council she at once summoned on hearing of Toba II.'s "revolt" (as her henchmen called it), her few straight-flung words brought tears of sympathy and devotion into the eyes of every one of her auditors. Without their grand "Nun-Shōgun" the Kwantō Bushi in 1221 would have had no rallying-point whatsoever. The Lady Masa, it must be frankly confessed by a writer who has a holy horror of petticoat ascendancy in politics (for in the majority of cases it has been banefully pernicious) must ever be reckoned as one of the very greatest glories of the Japanese nation. Now, Masako's long and distinguished career of beneficent activity came to a close in the summer of 1225; and for the next few months there was neither a "Nun-Shōgun," nor any kind of Shōgun, in Kamakura. If Toba II.'s blow had been reserved for such a season, it could scarcely have failed to prove fatal to the fortunes of the Bakufu.

Then, just about a month before the death of the Lady Masa, Ōe Hiromoto had passed away at the age of seventy-seven. If Toba II.'s early training had been in the hands of Ōe, and if Ōe had afterwards had that opportunity for the display of his genius which he found in Kamakura, it is highly probable that the historian would have had to add yet another name to the scanty list of Great Emperors. But at an early date Ōe had learned, to his grief and mortification, that either for himself, or for men like himself, there was no

place, and never could be any place, in the Councils of Kyōto. For an obscure man, outside the narrow ring of favoured blue-blooded courtiers, to raise himself to a position of commanding power and usefulness by the dint of nothing but hard, honest, unflinching, intelligent work was then, and had been for long, an utter impossibility. No doubt it was an intricate complex of many circumstances that led to the decay and ultimate ruin of the Imperial Court; but among these the baneful importance of this latter fact should never be overlooked.

Again, in 1224, the sudden death of the *Shikken*, Hōjō Yoshitoki had thrown the Kwantō into great perturbation. His second wife was a sister of that Iga who had been killed in Kyōto in 1221; and by her, he had a son Masamura, and a daughter who had been married to the Court noble Ichijō Saneimasa. The Igas now at once began to plot to have this noble made Shōgun, while Masamura was to become *Shikken*. The situation was saved by the Lady Masa. Attended by a single maidservant she proceeded under cover of darkness to the mansion of the great Miura chief, who she had discovered was implicated in the project, and with a few of those winged words she could launch so unerringly in times of crisis, she promptly restored his wavering loyalty. A few days later on, the bedridden and almost blind Ōe Hiromoto was consulted regarding the fate of the conspirators, who were mostly condemned to exile.

Hōjō Yasutoki, who had hurried down from Kyōto on receiving news of his father's death, had already assumed the office of *Shikken* before the conspiracy came to a head. The next year was free from disturbances; but Masako's death (in 1225) had hardly been announced when the new *Shikken* was called upon to deal with a whole series of plots, conspiracies, and actual risings in various parts of the Empire. The last of these was crushed in 1227. The fortunate thing for the Bakufu was that, with perhaps one exception, these conspiracies were merely local, with no very wide ramifications, and that when risings actually took place, there was no concerted action between the various bands of malcontents. With a Toba II. to furnish a rallying point for all the numerous elements of discontent and disorder the situation would have been menacing indeed.

CHAPTER XV.

THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU.

(1225-1260 A.D.)

DURING the last three-quarters of the thirteenth century the Empire of Japan enjoyed the benefit of an administration more economical, more honest, and more efficient than was known anywhere in contemporary Europe. And yet we are assured by one distinguished authority that the period of seventy-two years between 1214 and 1286 (under the Alexanders, II. and III.) was the golden age of Scottish history; and by another that "nowhere had better government been seen in Europe than that which Louis IX. carried on for the sixteen peaceful years which followed his first crusade (1254-1270)." Surely the reflection that mediæval Japan was able to produce not one single ruler, but a succession of rulers, the equals, if not the superiors, of the two great Scottish Kings, and of St. Louis himself, in ability, personal disinterestedness, and moral elevation of character, might well be expected to be something on which Japanese patriotism would dwell with pride. But the ways of Japanese patriotism are now and then wont to be fearful and wonderful and past finding out.* By it, until recent years, these great men,—among the truest patriots that have ever appeared in the Empire,—have been most ignominiously placed in the dock and arraigned at the bar of history as the most flagrant and deep-dyed criminals ever known in the political annals of Japan. Latterly, it is true, there has been a revulsion; and saner and juster judgements have been passed in certain quarters.

What has brought such a load of obloquy upon the memory of the Hōjōs was their treatment of the Emperors. In the first

* One of the greatest travesties of history I have ever met with is to be found in Dr. Murray's *Story of Japan*, pp. 153-157. Dr. Griffis's account in his *Mikado's Empire*, pp. 146-156, is almost equally misleading; but he amply redeems himself on p. 157, when he brings his own critical faculty into play.

third of the fourteenth century, their conduct in this respect is open to grave censure, as it was, indeed, in others besides; but during the period we are now dealing with, it is difficult to see in what the attitude of the Kamakura Regents towards the throne was at fault.

Just before the great tumult of 1221, the ex-Emperor, Toba II., was making a plaything of the Imperial Seat. This was no doubt in accordance with the wont of ex-Emperors; but it was none the less highly reprehensible. When the Bakufu was forced to deal with the situation, it was the son of Toba II.'s elder brother that was made Sovereign. Now, by the present Imperial Succession Law, this Prince's title was certainly superior to that of the deposed infant, Kanenari. Horikawa II., after a reign of ten years, abdicated in favour of his infant son, Shijō; and died two years later on. Neither during the times of Horikawa II., nor those of Shijō, was there any friction between Kamakura and Kyoto.

With the sudden and totally unexpected death of Shijō in February 1242 the line of Toba II.'s elder brother became extinct; and no Crown Prince had been designated. According to the present Imperial House Law, the succession would then naturally have devolved upon the second son of Toba II.'s eldest son, Tsuchimikado, for the latter's first-born had meanwhile entered the priesthood and so abandoned all claim to the throne. But a strong party in Kyōto wished to pass over this second son of Tsuchimikado's, and make the son of Juntoku (Tsuchimikado's younger brother) Sovereign. This latter was a grandson of Fujiwara Michiye, the father of the Shōgun Yoritsune; and besides his grandfather, the powerful Saionji Kintsune also supported his candidature. Both these great nobles had hitherto been on good terms with the Bakufu, whose support had greatly contributed to the influence they wielded. At this juncture they did not venture to proclaim a new Sovereign without consultation with Kamakura; but after sending off express couriers with news of Shijō's death, they presently sent others urgently requesting the Bakufu to sanction the elevation of Juntoku's son to the throne; and went on making all due preparations for the installation of their candidate. But Tsuchimikado's son, although hitherto living on straitened means in a private situation, also had his partisans and protectors, among whom

some were connected with the Hōjōs by marriage; and these also had hurried off couriers to lay the case before the Bakufu. The result was that ten days after the death of Shijō, during which time the throne had been vacant, Adachi and Nikaidō arrived as Bakufu commissioners in Kyōto, with a mandate to see to it that Tsuchimikado's, and not Juntoku's, son should be made Emperor! What undoubtedly weighed much with Hōjō Yasutoki in reaching this decision was the fact that the accession of Tadanari, Juntoku's son, would bring back Juntoku from Sado to the capital; and that the real sovereign power would fall into the hands of the banished ex-Emperor, who had a long-standing grudge against the Bakufu to settle. Juntoku possessed a considerable degree of ability of a certain kind; and the exercise of this might just possibly lead up to an issue similar to that which had to be faced in 1221. It is true that Juntoku died only eight months later on, in the same year; but in February, Yasutoki had no reason to believe that his ex-Majesty's end was so close at hand.

Later writers have asserted that Adachi, on the point of starting to fulfil his Kyōto mission, asked Hōjō Yasutoki what course was to be pursued in case he found that Juntoku's son had been proclaimed Sovereign before he reached the capital; and that Yasutoki replied that, in such an eventuality, the new Emperor must be deposed. But Yasutoki must have been morally sure that neither Fujiwara Michiye nor Saionji Kintsune would be likely to take any irrevocable step without his own sanction. It is to be observed here that this was *not a contest between Sovereign and subject*. The extinction of the line of Horikawa II., the failure to provide for any successor to the throne before the death of Shijō,—and the absence of any Imperial House Law automatically solving succession questions at such a conjuncture, made it necessary that the succession question on this occasion should be decided by mere subjects, for Fujiwara Michiye and Saionji Kintsune and their partisans were as much subjects as Yasutoki was. The very remarkable thing is, that here again once more, the decision of the Bakufu, if tried by the provisions of the present Imperial House Law, must be pronounced to have been perfectly correct.

Prince Kunihito, who now ascended the throne as Saga II. at the age of twenty-two, quickly made way for his

second son, Fukakusa II. (1246–1259), who in turn abdicated in favour of his younger brother, Kameyama (1259–1274); but it was by Saga II. that the real Imperial power was wielded down to the year of his death,—which was the same as that of Henry III. of England (1272). This Saga II. was a Sovereign of fair ability and of highly amiable and respectable qualities.* The friendship between him and his elder brother, the priest, was close, firm and enduring. From first to last his relations with the Bakufu, in the honesty of whose intentions his faith was at once profound and unwavering, were agreeable and harmonious. And yet, such is the irony of fate, it was this large-souled, fine-minded man,—perhaps, from a moral point of view, the very best of all the ex-Emperors,—that sowed the most prolific and the most baneful crop of Dragon's teeth that was ever scattered abroad by a Sovereign of Japan. As has been urged over and over again, the mere fact of being the first-born son of a reigning Sovereign did not in itself constitute any indefeasible or imprescriptible claim to the throne on the death or abdication of the Imperial father. Practically, since the institution of the *Insci* system, succession questions had in the majority of instances been decided by the fiat of the ex-Emperor; by the older ex-Emperor when there were as many as two, and by the oldest when there were as many as three. The ex-Emperor, Saga II., aspired to settle such questions for future ages in a peculiarly unfortunate fashion. In his will he directed that on the death or abdication of his seventh son Kameyama, the reigning Emperor, the new Sovereign should be of the stock of his second son, Fukakusa

* "Some account must be taken, indeed, of the Imperial Court's signal failures to inspire respect at that epoch. The Emperor Shijō amused himself by having the floors of the Palace salons waxed so that the ladies of the Court might fall when they walked on them. Finally he fell himself and died of the injuries received."—Captain Brinkley's *Japan*, Vol. II., p. 202. I find in two contemporary authorities that it was not wax but powdered soapstone (*Kosseki-no-fun*) that his youthful Majesty employed to upset the balance and the dignity of his tutors as well as of his nurses. For a grown man, such a thing would be brutal horseplay; a lad of eleven or twelve, as Shijō then was, should surely not be taken too seriously to task for such a prank,—just the sort of thing a high-spirited boy might be expected to do when he fancied he was coming in for more than his due share of "dry-nursing." As a matter of fact, between 1221 and the end of the century, the Court afforded much less occasion for scandal than it had done for long generations. One cause for this undoubtedly was that Court and courtiers alike had a wholesome dread of the surveillance of their conduct by what they considered the Puritanic *régime* of Kamakura.

II., the previous Emperor; and on the death or abdication of this new Sovereign, *his* successor was to be of the line of Kameyama, and so on thereafter, it being his intention that the two lines should henceforth alternate in the occupation of the throne for ever.

A very moderate degree of prescience should have been ample to discern that this agreement could not fail to be productive of trouble and strife sooner or later. As a matter of fact, before the century was out, Court and courtiers were divided into two bitterly hostile camps, at such serious variance with each other that the trenchant intervention of the Bakufu was provoked on more than one occasion. For example, the 92nd Emperor, Fushimi, after a reign of ten years, during which the real power was exercised by his father, Fukakusa II., abdicated in favour of *his own son* Fushimi II. This was a breach of Saga II.'s will; and so the head of the Kameyama line, Uda II., appealed to the Hōjō Regent (Sadatoki), and induced him to depose Fushimi II. and replace him by Uda II.'s own son (1301). The point to be attended to here is that what first brought the Bakufu into conflict with one of the two Court factions was the operation of that most unfortunate document, the will of Saga II.; and that during the eighty years following the great tumult of 1221 the relations between the Sovereigns in Kyōto and the Hōjōs in Kamakura had been thoroughly satisfactory, and often exceedingly amicable.

One point is specially worthy of attention. During the Tokugawa *régime* (1603–1868) the Imperial Court of Kyōto was but meagrely and slenderly provided for by the Yedo authorities, who assigned little more than some 120,000 *koku* of rice for the support of the Imperial Family and the 137 *Kuge* houses. For such exalted personages this was little better than penury; but between 1470 and 1550 the penury of the Court and courtiers had been of a still more grinding order, amounting as it did to a degree of absolute destitution which the arts of the most astute contemporary Caleb Balderstones found it hopeless to cope with. Now a comparison of the condition of the Imperial Court during the eighty years between 1470 and 1550 with the condition of that same Court during the eighty years between 1221 and 1301 is most instructive. It must be at once perceived that the comparison

amounts not only to a contrast, but to one of the most glaring of contrasts. For at no time for generations had the Imperial Family been so well off financially as it was between 1221 and 1301 at least.

By 1221 the *Insei* system had been in operation for a century and a half. Now, whatever merits might have to be imputed unto it for righteousness, economy could at no time, except for a few brief years under Sanjō II., be reckoned among them. Hitherto the *Insei* system had almost invariably been wastefully and criminally profuse in its expenditure,—and in order to procure the immense revenue needed for its support it time and again had had recourse to most undignified and most demoralising expedients, among which the open sale of offices and Court rank had not been one of the least blameworthy. Before 1221, in the times of Toba II., this special scandal had been as flagrantly pronounced as ever. After 1221 we meet with very little reference to it in contemporary records for at least two generations. One reason is that Kamakura exerted itself rigorously to repress, if not actually to suppress it. Another unmistakably is that the Court was now amply provided with means of support from legitimate sources. In his will (1272) Saga II. was able to deal with a vast amount of landed property, consisting of the 180 manors attached to the Abbey of Chōkōdō, and the revenues of wide domains in Harima and Owari. All this was henceforth to constitute the resources of ex-Emperors; the reigning Sovereign being supposed to be provided for by the Bakufu. At this date certain of the great Court nobles were also exceedingly wealthy, while not a few of them were even more than tolerably well off. They still held extensive *Shō-en*, administered by their own *Jitō* or stewards; and into these Bakufu officers found no entrance unless by virtue of a special commission which was issued only in rare and extreme cases, for instance, when it was proved that brigands and malefactors were being harboured there. In its own domains, and over its own vassals and officers the authority exercised by the Bakufu was absolute and final. With such functionaries as *Shugo* the Court could not interfere directly; in this matter the original regulations of the time of Yoritomo were now again strictly enforced. But outside all this, for any special or exceptional measure the Bakufu seems on the whole to

have been as careful to have its proceedings sanctioned by an Imperial Decree as Yoritomo had been.

From 1224 or 1225 onwards, the history of the Bakufu is largely that of the Hōjō *Shikken* or Regents. Of these from first to last there were nine; Yasutoki (1224-1242) being the third of the line. Of Yasutoki's two sons, one was assassinated at the age of sixteen, and the other died in 1230 (aged 28) twelve years before his father. From 1242 to 1246 the *Shikken* was Yasutoki's grandson Tsunetoki, and from 1246 to 1256 Tsunetoki's younger brother, Tokiyori, who really held the reins of administration down to his death in 1263. He had meanwhile been nominally succeeded by his young son Tokimune, who on his death in 1284 transmitted his office to his eldest son Sadatoki. In 1301 Sadatoki professedly retired; but he it was who truly directed the policy of the Bakufu during the nominal regency of his younger brother, Morotoki (1301-1311), who died about a month before him.

Upon the death of Sadatoki the decline of the Bakufu in moral no less than in material influence was portentously rapid. But four of these *Shikken*,—from the third to the sixth inclusive,—must be candidly admitted to have been great and able rulers, worthy of all respect. Possibly no other great family in Japan can boast of such an unbroken succession of men of lofty character and administrative ability as the house of Hōjō displayed. And to estimate the house of Hōjō by the line of *Shikken* alone, would be to do it something of an injustice. The Hōjō stock was a wonderfully prolific one; Yasutoki, for example, had seven brothers, several cousins, and at least a dozen nephews; and most of these, in common with later collateral members of the family, gave abundant evidence of the possession of high intellectual powers and an excellent capacity for hard and conscientious work, while their devotion to the wholesome traditions of the simple and strenuous life seems to have been unquestioned and unquestionable.

In one respect the early Hōjōs stand in open and glaring contrast to that blood-stained house of Minamoto which they had first supported, and then supplanted in the exercise of the governing authority. Down to 1272 not one Hōjō brother was done to death by another; and down to that date there are but few instances of a Hōjō meeting with

harsh or unjust or ungrateful treatment at the hands of a blood relation. The first Hōjō, Tokimasa, had been compelled to retire from public life by his own son and daughter and their counsellors (1205); but the penalty exacted from him for his mistaken policy, if not actual misdeeds, on this occasion, was neither unjust, nor harsh, nor excessive. In the plot against Yasutoki in 1224, his half-brother Masamura, whose name had been used by the conspirators, was not at all seriously compromised. At that date Masamura was a youth of no more than nineteen; and for long years before his death in 1273 he had been and continued to be one of the main supports of Yasutoki's grandsons and great-grandson in their exercise of the office of *Shikken*. The only really serious menace to the almost invariable harmony that prevailed among the Hōjōs was the episode of 1247, when the ex-Shōgun Fujiwara Yoritsune tried to induce Hōjō Mitsutoki to assassinate his nephew the new *Shikken*, Tokiyori, the proffered guerdon of the crime being investiture with the intended victim's office. Even on this occasion all that happened was that Mitsutoki was stripped of his offices, and relegated to the ancestral manors in Izu, there to enter upon an uninterrupted enjoyment of that dignified leisure which Cicero calls the haven of repose. Under a Minamoto *régime* even for an infinitely less flagrant offence, Mitsutoki's fate would have been less lenient by a good many degrees.

Then, behind the Hōjō Regents, was that most invaluable legacy bequeathed to them and the Empire by men like Ōe Hiromoto and Miyoshi Yasunobu; the mere outcasts of caste-ridden Kyōto, and the glories of Kamakura with its *carrière ouverte aux talents*.*

One thing to which Yasutoki and his counsellors devoted assiduous and unremitting attention was the administration of justice in the Bakufu domains. In Kamakura the first

* Possibly this has something to do with the origin of the legend of Aoto Fujitsuna. This Aoto, a simple peasant, while one day driving his ox through Kamakura and seeing some of the splendid new temples then being erected there, began to assail the administration for squandering the hard-won wealth of the people upon those lazy drones of priests, who had already far more than their share of the good things of life. His remarks were taken note of, and it was proposed to punish him for insulting the authorities. But on being brought into the presence of the *Shikken*, Hōjō Tokiyori, the latter was so struck with the farmer's spirit of honesty and sturdy independence that he appointed Aoto to office. Later on, Aoto was elevated

fifteen days of every month were given up to judicature, decisions being pronounced on the tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth days, after important and difficult cases had been discussed at the Council of Government. A bell was hung up at the gate of the Record Office; and, when a suitor struck it, his petition or complaint was at once attended to. To meet the peculiar circumstances and needs of a feudal society, the Bakufu had gradually to build up a special jurisprudence of its own; and after long and careful study of cases and precedents from the times of Yoritomo down to 1232, Yasutoki and Miyoshi Yasutsura, in that year, presented the draft of the famous Jōei Shikimoku to the Council of Government for discussion and approval.

Such a Code was indeed sorely needed. It was not because there were no codes or bodies of law in the Empire at the time. Truly it was quite the reverse. Since the beginning of the eighth century, a constant stream of laws and ordinances had been issuing, first from Nara, and then from Kyōto; and, for the last few preceding centuries, decrees and edicts had been pouring, not from one, but from at least three, and sometimes more, different sources in the latter capital. In numerous cases the edicts issued by the Imperial Chancery, the ex-Emperor's Chancellery, and the Kebiishi Board were in serious conflict with each other; and this, added to the fact that the accumulated mass of legislation of all sorts had swelled to such proportions that scarcely any one could be expected to master more than a fraction of it, imported such an element of difficulty and uncertainty into Japanese jurisprudence that the study of it had fallen into all but utter desuetude. Besides, in Kyōto the rewards for a profound knowledge of law had for long been insignificant compared with those accorded to such as could master the elementary principles of the facile art of pleasing the blue-blooded non-entities in authority. Hence it came to pass that by 1200 A.D. there was scarcely a single jurisconsult in Kyōto. Ōe

to the bench, where he distinguished himself as a model of uprightness and sagacity. "He was the terror of venal officials, injustice and bribery being known to him as if by sorcery; while every detected culprit was sure to be disgracefully cashiered." He was equally famous for the rigid simplicity and economy he practised and enforced. Unfortunately, no mention of Aoto Fujitsuna is to be found in the *Azuma Kagami*, nor does his name appear in any list of contemporary Bakufu officials.

Hiromoto, and Miyoshi Yasunobu, and their friends had removed to the Kwantō in disgust, carrying their knowledge of the Law of the Empire with them.

But in the Kwantō it would have been utterly impracticable to endeavour to enforce the Law of the Empire. The basis of that was still supposed to be the Code of Taihō. One prime object of that Code had been to guard against the danger of any development of a feudal system and the rise of any specially privileged military class. But when Ōe and Miyoshi went to Kamakura, they found that the organisation of society there was distinctly and pronouncedly feudal, and that it was the interests of the military class that had to be chiefly and primarily consulted and provided for in the administration of justice and in any legislation that they might contemplate. As this feudal system and this privileged military class had arisen only by the flagrant and systematic flouting of the Land-Provisions of the Code of Taihō, and as the whole economy of Japan rested upon an agricultural basis, it must have very quickly dawned upon the acute intelligence of Ōe and Miyoshi that in settling the disputes of the *Bushi* the judgements they delivered must generally be in accordance with something very different from the ordinary Imperial law. It was what had become the traditional customs of the district, and, perhaps, the House Laws of the Minamoto, that they had to take primarily and chiefly into account. The decisions rendered in accordance with these formed the basis of what was virtually a new system of jurisprudence; and the Code of Jōei (so named from the year-period, 1232), framed in consonance with the tenor of the recorded precedents of the previous fifty years, might be described as the Great Customary of the Kwantō.*

It is to be carefully noted that the Bakufu more than once emphatically declared that this "Customary" was intended for its own domains and its own vassals solely; and

* The first French Customary, that of Bearn, dates from about 1088. It was in 1170 that the Milanese lawyers, Girard and Obertus, published their two books of the law of fiefs. In France, under Charles VII., an ordinance was made for the formation of a general code of Customary law, by ascertaining for ever in a written collection those of each district; but the work was not completed till the reign of Charles IX. (1560-1574). This was what may be called the common law of the *pays coutumiers*, or northern division of France, and the rule of all their tribunals, unless where controlled by royal edicts.

that it made it plain to all that it had no intention of interfering with the internal administration of such fiefs and such districts as did not depend upon it. This, of course, meant the tracts still under the control of the Civilian Provincial Governors appointed by Kyōto, the manors of the Great Monasteries in the Home Provinces and elsewhere, and the estates held by the Court and the Court nobles, and even by military men who had continued to be independent of Kamakura. But in course of time, many of such proprietors, finding certain of the provisions of the Kwantō Customary highly suitable for the state of things on their estates, began gradually to enforce them there; and in a few generations it had supplanted the common law of the Empire over the greater part of its extent.

A compendium of fifty-one brief articles, whose contents may be mastered in an hour or so, can have no pretensions to be an exhaustive exposition of law. Neither is it a systematic one, for the various subjects are not dealt with in any strict logical sequence, while the sections were not even numbered, either when the Code was in force in Kamakura times, or when in use as a school-book in the Tokugawa age. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly interesting and instructive; all the more so, when we remember that it was the wont of the Kamakura Bakufu to see to it that its laws should be really and strictly enforced. One result of this is that the hints the Hōjō Code supplies us with about the social conditions of the time are exceedingly valuable, because trustworthy.* If one section (41) indicates that slavery was still an institution not unknown on the Bakufu domains, others furnish conclusive evidence that the free farmer there was in a better position than his descendant was under the Tokugawa *régime*. The cultivator was carefully guarded against undue rigour of process in exacting arrears of taxation from him; and on payment of his dues he was at entire liberty to remove elsewhere if he found the conditions unfair or unfavourable to him in the place of his abode (42). Another paragraph, while forbidding the sale of fiefs, sanctions the sale of their holdings by peasants in case of necessity. Under the Yedo Government,

* The whole Code has been admirably translated and commented on by John Carey Hall, Esq., *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XXXIV., Part I.

the right of migration and that of sale of his fields were alike denied to the farmer. What the exact social status of a village headman was,—whether *samurai* or commoner,—does not clearly appear; but village headmen, while held to a strict discharge of their duties, and severely punished for various malpractices, were safeguarded against all aggression or undue interference on the part of the Jitō.

The law of property was almost entirely synonymous with that of fiefs. These, if originally conferred for public services rendered by the grantee, could not be sold. On the death of the holder it was not necessarily the eldest son,—even though legitimate,—that succeeded. The only provision affecting the father's complete liberty of bequest or gift to his widow—(or concubine, in one article)—or children was that a *thoroughly deserving* eldest son whether of wife or concubine could claim one-fifth of the estate. Not only could women be dowered with, or inherit fiefs, and transmit a legal title to them to their own children, but a childless woman was even fully empowered to *adopt* an heir. Yoritomo had been the first to sanction this broad-minded and liberal principle; and although the language of section 18 of this Hōjō Code evinces that the Solons of Kamakura were beginning to be somewhat anxious about the possible risks of the “monstrous regiment of women” *—and this within seven years of the death of the great Lady Masa,—the truly lion-hearted Nun-Shōgun, the full equal in courage and ability of the best man Kamakura ever produced! Doubtless it was his appreciation of the sterling worth of his masterful, yet dutiful, spouse that induced Yoritomo to treat the best women of his time with such an extraordinary amount of confidence and respect.†

As the existence of the Kamakura Bakufu depended in no small measure upon the perpetuation and diffusion of the Yoritomo legend, the legists of 1232, while fully aware of the fact that neither Lady Masas nor Widow Oyamas were to be found in every second wayside hamlet, felt that it would be injudicious to attempt any curtailment of the

* It is needless to say that this phrase occurring in the title of Knox's book “The first Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment (*i.e.* ru'e) of Women” has been often misunderstood.

† We have seen him appointing the widow of one of his captains—Oyama—to the responsible office of Jitō “on account of her great merits.”

privileges accorded to women by the Great Lord of Kamakura; in the enjoyment of which they had been tacitly confirmed by a prescriptive term of nearly fifty years. In other respects, too, the women of the Kamakura *Bushi* class were in a more favoured position than were those of the Tokugawa *samurai*. In the Yedo period, a *samurai* husband wounded in his marital honour could take the law into his own hands, and put the offending spouse to death. In Kamakura an adulterer was stripped of half of his fief if he held one; and if he had none, he was banished. For an adulteress, the punishment was no severer, except that, if possessed of a fief, the whole of it was forfeited.

A good many sections of the Code deal with legal procedure, and the conduct and duties of magistrates,—the great objects being to make the administration of justice simple, prompt, and pure, while repressing everything in the shape of pettifogging or factious litigiousness. The penalties were neither cruel nor ferocious. Death for the worst offences,—among which theft is especially mentioned,—confiscation of fief and banishment,—these about exhaust the list. The only other punishment mentioned is that of branding on the face, inflicted on a commoner for the crime of forgery, a *Bushi's* punishment, in this case, being banishment, or simply confiscation of his fief, if possessed of one.

Bakufu vassals were strictly forbidden directly to solicit the Imperial Court for rank or office; they must be provided with a special recommendation from Kamakura. But once invested with Court rank, they might be promoted in grade without any further recommendation, while they were free to accept the position of *Kebiishi*, an office about which sufficient has already been said. Analogous restrictions were placed on the Kwantō clergy, who were to be summarily removed from their benefices if found appealing to Kyōto for promotion, the only exception being in favour of Zenshū priests. In their case, the erring brother guilty of such an offence got off comparatively lightly,—“an influential member of the same sect will be directed to administer a gentle admonition.”

The clergy within the Bakufu domains were to be kept strictly in hand; if they squandered the revenues of their incumbency and neglected the fabric and the established

services therein they were to be displaced. As regards the monasteries and priests outside the Bakufu domain, the case was entirely different; they were virtually independent, and Kamakura interfered there only when instructed to do so by Imperial Decree. What the position of the *Shugo* and the *Jitō* was has already been pretty fully set forth.

It is to be carefully noted that this "Code of Jōei" was only a fraction of the legislation of the Kamakura Bakufu. In Ogino's *Ancient Statute-Law of Japan* it occupies no more than 33 pages. During the subsequent century this rudimentary Kwantō Customary was amplified and modified by numerous enactments (some of them it is true of but trivial consequence)—which occupy as much as 204 pages of the work just alluded to.

Then, in 1336, a few years after the fall of Kamakura, the Kemmu-Shikimoku, of 17 sections, was drawn up by the former Councillors of the Bakufu,—Shōni, Akashi, Ōta, Fuse, in collaboration with the monks Zeen, Sen-e, and others. By 1430 some 208 articles had been added to this by the Ashikaga Shōguns or their Ministers.

But during the Kamakura Bakufu *régime*, it must not be supposed that the Kyōto legislative factories had suspended operations. During all that age they were extremely active. The great difference between Kyōto and Kamakura was simply this: Kamakura issued comparatively few laws, but these were rigorously enforced in the Bakufu domains. Kyōto issued many laws; and in most quarters they were more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

One of the most interesting things in connection with this Jōei Shikimoku is the "Solemn Oath" appended to the document:—

"Whereas a simple individual is liable to make mistakes through defect of judgement, even when the mind is unbiassed; and besides that, is led, out of prejudice or partiality, whilst intending to do right, to pronounce a wrong judgement; or again, in cases where there is no clue, considers that proof exists; or being cognisant of the facts and unwilling that another's shortcomings should be exposed refrains from pronouncing a judgement one way or the other; so that intention and fact are in disaccord and catastrophes afterwards ensue.

"Therefore: in general, at meetings of Council, whenever

questions of right or wrong are concerned there shall be no regard for ties of relationship, there shall be no giving-in to likes or dislikes, but in whatever direction reason pushes and as the inmost thought of the mind leads, without regard for companions or fear of powerful houses, we shall speak out. Matters of adjudication shall be clearly decided, and whilst not conflicting with justice the sentence shall be a statute of the whole Council in session. If a mistake is made in the matter, it shall be the error of the whole Council acting as one. Even when a decision given in a case is perfectly just it shall be a constitution of the whole Council in session. If a mistake is made and action taken without good grounds, it shall be the error of the whole Council acting as one. Henceforward, therefore, as towards litigants and their supporters we shall never say, 'Although I personally took the right view of the matter some or such a one amongst my colleagues of the Council dissented and so caused confusion, etc.' Should utterance be given to any such reports the solidarity of the Council would be gone, and we should incur the derision of men in after times.

"Furthermore, again, when suitors having no colour of right on their side fail to obtain a trial of their claim from the Court of the Council and then make an appeal to one of its members, if a writ of endorsement is granted by him it is tantamount to saying that all the rest of the members are wrong. Like as if one man shall we maintain judgement."

This Oath, subscribed by the *Shikken* and twelve others of the Council of State, indicates, among other things, the deep sense of the importance of unanimity, of a united front, of the individual sharing fully in the collective responsibility, that was cherished by the Bakufu Councillors. This was indeed one of the chief secrets of the wonderful stability and efficiency of the machine. It is but rarely that we meet with references to divided counsels in the history of the Kamakura authorities; but when they did make their appearance, the results were exceedingly serious. The instances of these under Yoriie and Sanetomo have been already dealt with. In the course of the half-century following 1221, there was no more than one great similar tragedy—in 1247.

The greatest family in Kamakura, after the Hōjōs, was the Miuras, as has already been said. The Miura stock was

even more prolific than that of the Hōjōs, while its landed possessions were much more extensive than those of the *Shikken* and his relatives. For long the two families had been on the most friendly terms. Meanwhile, however, the Adachis, of Dewa Fujiwara descent, had been rising in wealth and prestige; and an Adachi lady had become the mother of the fourth and fifth *Shikken*, Tsunetoki and Tokiyori. During the rule of Tsunetoki (1242-1246), the Adachis had waxed exceedingly powerful in the Councils of the Bakufu; and this excited the jealousy of the great Miura clan, and ultimately brought about an estrangement between Miuras and Hōjōs. The elder Miura chief, a son-in-law of Yasutoki's, finding his counsels no longer so frequently sought for as they had been, and often rejected when tendered, appears to have fallen into an attitude of lukewarm indifference to the interests of the administration, which presently came to be construed as intriguing and factious opposition. The other chief, his younger brother, Mitsumura, had for long been a personal attendant and friend of the young Shōgun, Fujiwara Yoritsune; and when Yoritsune was induced to resign, professedly on account of menacing portents in the heavens, in 1244, Mitsumura had been deeply grieved and chagrined. Now, in 1247, it was determined to remove the ex-Shōgun to Kyōto; and on his departure from Kamakura, Mitsumura, with tears in his eyes, assured him that he cherished the hope of yet being able to welcome him back there some day. Yoritsune had just been implicated in the plot to kill the new *Shikken*, Tokiyori, and replace him by his uncle Mitsutoki, who had no affinity with the Adachis. All this, with other circumstances deemed to be significant, combined to expose the Miuras to suspicion. Old Adachi Kagemori, Tokiyori's maternal grandfather, who had been living as a monk in Koyasan for nearly twenty years, suddenly hurried up to Kamakura to have long secret conferences with his grandson, the new *Shikken*, Tokiyori. The result was that the Miura mansion was, without any warning, invested by a strong body of troops, and fired. The two chiefs, Yasumura and Mitsumura, made good their escape to the Hokkedō, a huge temple in the neighbourhood; and there, with their clansmen who rapidly rallied to their summons, stood stubbornly on the defensive for some time. When

finally overborne by numbers they committed *harakiri*, as did more than 270 of their followers. Orders had meanwhile been issued for the slaughter of the Miuras in the various provinces; and in a few days this fine and great and powerful clan was virtually extirpated, and its immense landed possessions, amounting to many tens of thousands of acres of cultivated soil, were confiscated, and disposed of in various ways. Some of its manors were bestowed on meritorious Bakufu vassals, others were "contributed" to temples or shrines, while yet others were utilised to augment the Civil List of the Imperial Court.

With such drastic and heroic remedies for the malady of intrigue and self-seeking, it is not perhaps so very surprising that we should meet with such scant mention of divided counsels in the records of Kamakura. Besides, the secrecy of certain meetings of the Council of State was much better preserved than those of the British Cabinet. Tradition has it that when all-important questions were to be dealt with, the Councillors assembled in the *Takibi no Ma* ("Burning-fire room") in the Shōgunal palace. Here they deliberated without uttering a word, expressing themselves merely by tracing characters on the ashes of the fire lighted on the hearth. That Kyōto, with its rival Courts, its rival Chancelleries, and its intriguing functionaries, mostly all eager to trip each other up by any means, fair or foul, should have gone down before Kamakura with this wonderfully organised Bakufu machine, the embodiment not only of ability and power of work, but of discipline of the finest order, was almost a matter of course. Furthermore, the Bakufu was thoroughly in touch with the times; and Kyōto remained oblivious to the social changes that had passed and were passing over the face of the Empire at large. And not the least of all was, as the events of 1221 had shown, that Kyōto was impotent if a conflict of opinions or of interests had to be settled by the sharp and decisive arbitrament of the sword.

Here a few words about the special machinery employed by the Great Boards of Kamakura, and their duplicates in the Rokuhara, to enable them to keep in close touch with the whole wide-spreading extent of Bakufu domains. These domains, besides embracing practically the whole of the Kwantō, were to be found in almost every province of the Empire, from the

Straits of Tsuruga to the extreme south of Kyūshū. In some provinces they were less extensive than those belonging to owners exempt from Kamakura or Rokuhara jurisdiction; in Yamato especially, where the soil was mostly held by the Great Monasteries of Nara, the Bakufu foothold was so slender that it had no need for a *Shugo* there. In several other provinces, a map of, say, 1250 A.D. would show as many enclaves as could be found in Germany at any time. In most of the provinces, the Bakufu had a High Constable, or *Shugo*; and in those counties or districts where it had virtually superior proprietary, as well as administrative rights, a *Jitō*, or Land-Steward. These provincial *Shugo* and district *Jitō* (who in course of time were destined entirely to supplant the Provincial and District Governors of the old centralised civil government) were the local agents through which the Bakufu acted. Now, how were these agents held to the honest discharge of their duties, and restrained from all attempts at playing the part of local despots? In the first place, a well-founded plaint of aggression from any non-Bakufu proprietor, addressed to Kamakura or the Rokuhara through the Imperial Court, would almost infallibly lead to the reprimand or removal of the offending *Shugo* or *Jitō*. In the original contemporary records, I have come across not one, but scores of cases of this. But not only were neighbouring proprietors safeguarded from outrage at the hands of the local representatives of Kamakura; its own tax-paying subjects and thralls had their legitimate rights and interests carefully protected by the Bakufu during the greater portion of the thirteenth century at least. *Shugo* and *Jitō* alike had their administration subjected to a rigorous examination by envoys, both ordinary and extraordinary, dispatched on appointed circuits by the Great Central Boards. Of these envoys there were at least four categories; the *Jikkenshi* (Messengers to Examine the Truth), Special Commissioners expedited for the most serious reasons; the *Kenkenshi* (Examine-Look-Envoys), Commissioners to investigate special matters of less serious import; the *Junkenshi* (Go-round-Examine-Messengers), sent out annually at a fixed date to traverse a circuit, to take note of the economic and social condition of the people, to listen to complaints, and to compose disputes; and lastly the *Naikenshi*, sent out early every autumn to report on the actual yield of the rice harvest.

so as to enable the Central authorities to settle the amount and incidence of taxation justly and fairly and reasonably. In addition to these, each High Constable (*Shugo*) had a staff of Kenchū-shi whose duty it was to see to it that the land-survey in the Bakufu domains in his province was just and fair.*

All these officials were embraced under the generic term of the "Kamakura-Bakufu-Officers." These most hard-worked and meritorious public officials must be carefully distinguished from the Kamakura Banshū,—pampered minions of lower degree mentally and morally, whose only claim to distinction was that they had been selected to fill the dignified offices of lacqueys and superior flunkeys to the temporary figure-head of the Kamakura ship of State. The best known of these *Ban* were perhaps the oldest of them, the *Gakumonjo Ban*, organised in 1213, and the *Ō-Ban* (or Great Ban), dating from about 1225. The first of these two had to deal with the riding-school, archery, and the study of the old etiquette and usages of China and Japan; the second was of the nature of a guard for the person and palace of the titular Shōgun. The *Kinjū-Ban* (1223) had to select and supervise the employés in the Palace; the *Koshi-ban* was charged with the opening and closing of the shutters and gates at morning and evening tide respectively, the *Hisashi-Ban* were guardians of the Shōgunal pavilions or villas outside the Palace, while the *Monken-zanketsu-Ban* were, practically, Masters of Ceremony. The most notorious, if not the most famous, of all was the *Hayahiru-Ban*, whose personnel consisted of *petits maîtres* proficient in polite accomplishments,—the manufacture of verselets, vocal and instrumental music, dancing, hand-ball, and, above all, Japanese football, which has, or had, as much affinity with the rough-and-tumble of the Rugby or Association form of the game as chalk has with cheese.†

I have asserted that mere civilian grandees never exercised any authority in Kamakura. By this, political or administra-

* Certain Jitō also had a staff of Kenchūshi (Surveyors) to superintend.

† "Japanese football—derived originally from China—bore no resemblance to the rough-and-tumble contests of the Occident. It was simply the art of kicking a ball high and keeping it continuously off the ground. A certain Narimichi, whose official position corresponded to that of a Minister of State, gained undying fame by his skill in this amusement. After devoting a considerable part of seven thousand

tive authority is meant. From first to last,—from the death of Sanetomo, in 1219, down to the overthrow of the Hōjō, in 1333,—the six civilians successively invested with the Shōgunate were little more than puppets, as far as the real work of the Bakufu was concerned.

Of these six puppet Shōguns, the first two—father and son,—were Fujiwaras. About Fujiwara Yoritsune a good deal has already been said. Taken to Kamakura as Shōgun-designate in 1219 at the age of two, he received his patent of investiture only in 1226. Eighteen years later on, in 1244, when Yoritsune was in his twenty-seventh year, there was a succession of menacing omens and portents in the heavens; and to evade the threat of mysterious impending evil thus conveyed, Yoritsune was induced to resign his high office in favour of his son, Yoritsugu, then five years old. Removed to Kyōto in 1246, Yoritsune there became implicated in an abortive plot to overthrow the Hōjōs, six years later on. The chief outcome of the intrigue was that Yoritsugu, then thirteen, was stripped of his position. Shortly after, it was discovered that his grandfather, and Yoritsune's father, Fujiwara Michiye, who had just died at the age of 60, had been involved in a conspiracy to assassinate the ex-Emperor Saga II. Saga II. owed his position to Hōjō Yasutoki; and he had always been, and was, on the very best terms with Kamakura. It now became very easy for Kamakura to attain its long-cherished project,—a project in which it had been baulked by Toba II. in 1219,—of procuring an Imperial Prince to fill the office of Shōgun. And not only was an Imperial Prince now obtained to fill that office; the Imperial Prince, Munetaka (son of Saga II.), now obtained was the brother of the reigning Emperor, and a year his senior! At the same time, as he was then (1252) no more than ten years of age, even if he should ultimately prove to be possessed of a measure of ability and a will of his own, it would be long before he would be in any position to interfere with the *Shikken* and his projects. In

consecutive days to the practice of the art, rising even from his sick-bed for the purpose, he attained such lightness and deftness of foot that, while kicking the ball, he traversed the shoulders of a row of servitors, including a tonsured priest, and the men thus trodden on declared that they had felt nothing more than a hawk hopping along their backs, the priest saying that for his part it had seemed simply as though some one had put a hat on his bald pate. This is the historical record!"—Brinkley's *Japan*, Vol. I., pp. 1934.

course of time, this first Imperial Shōgun, at the instigation of His Reverence Ryōki and others, did make an effort to shake off the Hōjō tutelage upon attaining years of discretion (1266); but the outcome of the effort was that he was deposed, sent to Kyōto and confined in the Rokuhara there, and replaced in Kamakura by his own son, Prince Koreyasu, then little more than out of his swaddling-clothes. Koreyasu was the Bakufu figure-head for twenty-three years (1266–1289); then, just as he was beginning to evince a disposition to think and act for himself, he was suddenly relegated to Kyōto with as little ceremony as if he had been a bale of damaged goods or a “returned empty.” Prince Koreyasu was replaced by his cousin, Prince Hisa-akira, the son of the ex-Emperor, Fukakusa II., and the brother of the reigning Sovereign, Fushimi. At the time of his investiture, he was older than any of the other five civilian Fujiwaras or Imperial Princes hitherto selected to fill the position of head of the military class. But even so, Prince Hisa-akira was only in his fifteenth year. For nearly a score of years he managed to continue to be the nominal head of the house of Minamoto; and then one fine morning in 1308, he was forced to make way for his own son, Prince Morikuni. The latter lived to see the overthrow of the Hōjō Regents in 1333. He then resigned the office of Shōgun, became a monk, and died before the year was out, at the age of thirty-two.

Such in brief was the tame and impotent record of all these blue-blooded civilian Shōguns as statesmen and administrators. But politics, law, and administration constitute only a part of the regulative machinery by which any nation or society is governed. The sanctions of religion and the moral sentiments of the age must also always be taken into account. And in many cases, the dictates of ceremonial and of fashion are even more imperious and better obeyed than either the law of the land, the thunders of the Church, or the promptings of the conscience. Such for long ages had been the case at the Court of Kyōto; and with the advent of the civilian Kyōto Shōguns in Kamakura, these stern and rugged traditions of a wholesome simplicity of life, which Yoritomo had strenuously fostered, and which the Hōjōs, to their eternal honour, did so much to maintain as an ideal, presently found themselves confronted with standards of a vastly different kind.

The blue-blooded Kyōto Shōguns did not come to Kamakura alone and unattended. Several of them had actually to be nursed, and all of them educated, while on reaching man's estate they had all to be kept amused, for otherwise their exile to the wilds of the not inhospitable, but uncouth and uncourtly, Kwantō would have been insupportable. Accordingly in the Court of every successive Shōgun there was a strong Kyōto element, selected from among the more needy masters and exponents of the arts and accomplishments that were held in highest esteem in the gay and effeminate capital. Such people would not readily go down to the Kwantō for nothing; their emoluments had to be very substantial indeed. To these in the Shōgunal Palace were added Kwantō Instructors of his Highness in Equitation, Archery, Swordsmanship, and all the arts of the warrior. But these latter generally found their offices little better than mere sinecures; and yet their emoluments were such as had been seldom bestowed for the most daring and gallant services on the battlefield. And from 1221 onwards, for long years, those were emphatically the "piping times of peace"; and under the strong and firm rule of the Hōjō all opportunities for distinction on the battlefield seemed to have vanished, if not for ever, at all events for generations. Now the Kwantō *Bushi* were rapidly increasing in numbers, and in spite of all the tracts of new land that were being reclaimed and brought under cultivation, the economic problem among them was becoming more and more pressing. Hence lucrative appointments in the Shōgun's household gradually came to be eagerly coveted; and as these appointments only went to such as had some proficiency in the polite accomplishments so much valued in Kyōto, many of the young warriors began to devote their best efforts to acquiring the arts and graces of the fine and fashionable gentleman. This led to a rage for finer clothes, and for elaborate banquets, while presently the *samurai* began to vie with each other in the beauty and grandeur of their dwellings. The result was that the *Bushi* had to borrow money; and by the end of the century the number of mortgaged estates in the Kwantō was enormous. Even under Yasutoki (1224-1242) these evils had begun to make their appearance, and to cause that sagacious ruler serious disquietude, while his grandson Tokiyori (1246-1263) tried to grapple with them in a series

of sumptuary regulations. In 1252, 1253, 1254 (and later on in 1281 and 1330) the prices of commodities were fixed, for extravagant and wasteful living in certain circles had driven them up tremendously. In 1261, Bakufu vassals were forbidden to build houses at a cost incompatible with their rank and fortune. In the same year an order was issued prohibiting persons visiting the Kwantō on official business from dressing expensively and above their station in life. In 1256 the Bakufu retainers were severely censured for their crying and scandalous neglect of the traditional military arts of the Kwantō, and the assiduous practice of the old sports and exercises was again made compulsory.

It is undoubted that the social influence,—direct and indirect—of the Shōgun's Court was at no time inconsiderable, and that it became very great in the three or four decades preceding the overthrow of the Hōjō rule. In fact, in the complex of factors that led to the downfall of the Bakufu, the ultimate ascendancy of Kyōto social standards in Kamakura must probably be regarded as the most important.

In the previous chapters incidental references have been made to ecclesiastical affairs when they have been entangled with political developments. Here a few paragraphs must be devoted to a somewhat minuter view of the contemporary fortunes of Buddhism. At the same time, the exigencies of space forbid anything beyond the merest outlines of the general religious situation.

Down to nearly the end of the twelfth century, the six old sects of Nara, the Shingon, with its headquarters on Koyasan and in the temple of Tōji to the south of Kyōto, and the Tendai, with its great monastery of Enryakuji, on Hi-ei-zan, and its offshoot and rival Miidera on Biwa strand below, remained in possession of the field. At, or somewhat subsequent to, that date, these eight sects had altogether some 11,000 fanes scattered over the length and breadth of the Empire. To-day, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the six old Nara sects combined have no more than 66 temples, the Tendai about 4,600, and the Shingon a little under 13,000. In other words, the eight old sects have now 17,388 places of religious worship, and no more than 4,700,000 adherents,—something considerably under ten per cent. of the total population of these islands. At the beginning of this twentieth century

there are about 72,000 Buddhist temples in Japan, and perhaps 29,000,000 or 30,000,000 Buddhists. Of these as many as 53,000 fanes with 24,000,000 adherents belong to four great new sects whose first appearance was synchronous with that of the Dominican and Franciscan Friars in Europe. Now, in connection with these new sects, two points are to be especially noted. In the first place, their founders had all without exception been some time or other connected with the great Tendai Monastery of En-ryakuji on Mount Hi-ei; and secondly it was either in the Kwantō itself, or within the Bakufu domains, that three of these prophets, if not of a new religion, at all events of a new method of securing one's bliss in a present or future state of existence, found their earliest adherents, and the most fruitful field of their activity.

The Tendai system was exceedingly comprehensive in its doctrines and teachings; and this comprehensiveness, while at first ensuring for it a speedy and wide-spreading success, naturally made it the parent of so many schisms. "It tried to reconcile contradictory systems, and sooner or later the contradictories were bound to come to the light and to separate." The earliest of these schismatic offshoots of the Tendai system was the Jōdo (Pure Land) sect established by Genkū, now generally known as Hōnen Shōnin. Born in Mimasaka about 1133, he entered Hi-ei-zan at the age of fifteen in 1148. His progress in scholarship was extraordinarily rapid; but by these times scholarship had become a very subordinate interest among the proud, worldly-minded turbulent priests of the great monastery. Accordingly, after four years there, Genkū withdrew to the solitude of the neighbouring valley of Kurodani, and during his twenty-five years' stay here read through the whole Buddhistic canon. These were stirring and troublous time in the capital; and then, later on, came the terrible disasters of 1182 and subsequent years. How these affected many minds appears from Chōmei's record of the Hō-jō-ki; people seemed to be living in a hideous nightmare of despair. Truly the first fifteen centuries of the splendour of Buddhism appeared to have yielded to those prophesied five hundred years of degradation and misery,—“the Latter Days of the Law, when iniquity should abound and the love of many should wax cold.” During this lamentable period, it was taught, “the gate of self-exertion which stands at the end

of the Holy Path should be closed, but the gate opened by the exertion of another should be opened wide, and men should be saved by their faith in Amida."

The characteristics of the special doctrine now inculcated by Genkū have thus been summarised: "It is salvation by faith, but it is a faith ritualistically expressed. The virtue that saves comes not from the imitation of and conformity to the person and character of the Saviour Amida, but from the blind trust in his efforts and the ceaseless repetition of pious formulæ. It does not therefore necessitate any conversion or change of heart. It is really a religion of despair rather than of hope. It says to the believer:—The world is so very evil that you cannot possibly reach to Buddhahood here. Your best plan therefore is to give up all such hope, and simply set your mind upon being born in Amida's Paradise after death; and if you once get admission into that land your ultimate salvation is secure."*

That this gloomy creed of self-abandonment should have won large numbers of adherents in the capital and in the Court is not at all surprising; for the miserable social and political conditions of the time, and an almost uninterrupted succession of natural calamities,—earthquakes, typhoons, fires, floods, droughts, famine, and pestilence,—had made the general outlook upon life there profoundly pessimistic. The new cult simply gave articulate and emotional expression to what most people felt and thought. The Emperors Shirakawa II. and Takakura had both suffered much, and that these should have been found among Genkū's disciples is not strange. But Toba II., a man of a far robuster type, also followed in their footsteps in this matter. However, in 1207, Toba II. and his ghostly mentor came into collision, and Genkū had to spend three years in exile in Sanuki. According to some accounts, one of Toba II.'s female favourites had been induced by Genkū to abandon the world, and his Majesty resented this deeply.

On the other hand, for long years, indeed for generations, the Jōdoshū made no headway in the Kwantō. There, first

* Rev. A. Lloyd, *Developments of Japanese Buddhism*.—*T.A.S.J.*, Vol. XXII, Part 3. This excellent paper, and others by the same learned writer in subsequent volumes of the *T.A.S.J.* are worthy of careful perusal by such as wish to become minutely conversant with the fortunes of Buddhism in Japan. Dr. Bunyū Nanjō's *Short History of Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects* will also be found useful,

under Yoritomo, and then under the Hōjō-Regents, peace and order were maintained; there life was simple, strenuous, and hopeful; in fact the outlook on the world was just as optimistic in Kamakura as it was the reverse in Kyōto. Plainly a creed of hopeless despair had but small prospects of general acceptance in such a social and moral atmosphere. Yet what purported to be a form of the Jōdo cult,—in fact it called itself the True Jōdo,—became very popular in the Bakufu domains before the middle of the thirteenth century.

Hino Arinori, of Fujiwara stock, had sent his son to Hi-ei-zan to be educated for the priesthood. In 1202, at the age of twenty-nine, this priest attached himself to Genkū, whose favourite disciple he became. On Genkū's death in 1212 the subsequent policy of the sect did not commend itself to Shinran's mind as a true development of his master's teachings. Much discussion and dissension arose about this; and the Hi-ei-zan monks profited by the disorder to get Shinran exiled to Hitachi. Here, about 1224, he began to preach the doctrines of the Jōdo Shinshū, or "True Sect of Jōdo."

The modifications introduced into or superimposed upon the original Jōdo doctrines and practices by Shinran were so important as virtually to constitute another and a new cult. As regarded the great question of the method of attaining ultimate salvation, Genkū had taught that if we call the mercy of Amida to remembrance, then Amida will meet us *at the hour of death*, and conduct us to Paradise. Shinran insisted that the coming of Amida is *present and immediate*, that the believer receives, even in this life, the assurance of his salvation. The original Jōdo did not forbid supplications to the other Buddhas; but Shinran forbade all worship to any but Amida. Genkū's followers might offer petitions for temporary blessings; Shinran insisted that prayer should only be offered for what concerns man's ultimate salvation. The older sects insisted upon the performance of many acts of religion and devotion as necessary, and the Jōdo had retained this as advisable; Shinran would have none of this—faith in Amida, "the way of easy acts," was alone amply sufficient. Shinran also prohibited all resort to spells, incantations, and exorcism,—a step which appears to have specially brought upon him the wrath of the monks of Hi-ei-zan, for it struck a severe blow to what was one great and perennial

source of priestly revenue. Furthermore, to quote Mr. Lloyd, "if faith in Amida and his vow is the sole necessary for that *present* salvation which is to land the believer in Paradise at his death, it is clear that to trouble the mind of the believer with metaphysical subtleties and high speculations which form so important a part in the teachings of other sects, such as, for instance, the Tendai and Shingon, is a very needless work. Once in Paradise, and the whole of the speculative and metaphysical system of the Truth will come spontaneously to the mind without any teaching at all. The Shinshū therefore, at any rate in its earlier and more popular presentments, divests itself of all metaphysics. It knows nothing of a Philosophy of Religion: faith in Amida is all in all."

Now, put all this in its proper historical setting, and the genius of Shinran will begin to become apparent. He was sent down to the Kwantō in 1224, three years after the great commotion of Shōkyū (1221) had made it plain to all that it was really Kamakura and not Kyōto that gave the law to the Empire. And among the 100,000 Bakufu vassals that had been thrown against Kyōto in that year, it was notorious that not five in a hundred could make anything, whether sense or nonsense, out of Toba II.'s Decree scattered broadcast among them. To trouble these people with wire-drawn metaphysical subtleties would have been just as injudicious as to commend a creed of despair and self-abandonment to a brood of lusty, sturdy dare-devils who had the best of all reasons for regarding the present world as very good,—for their overwhelming success in the fortnight's war of 1221 had just brought them manors and glory in plenty.

And meanwhile, yet another new sect had established itself in the Kwantō, where it had actually captured the Hōjō Regents themselves. The Zenshū, whose chief aim was to inspire its followers directly with the "*heart mark*" of Buddha by "device and diligent practice," and not to teach its doctrines by words or letters as did other sects, was indeed a formidable rival in the latitude and atmosphere of Kamakura, where contentment with the present "vile" world was general, where trust in one's own right arm and one's own best endeavours prevailed, where the schoolmaster had never "been abroad" to any marked extent, where all great issues were decided not by sentimentality but by real honest fundamental

sentiment and an appeal to rustic yet robust common-sense, and where the cobwebs of priestly metaphysics would have been as hateful to the male head of the household as the real cobwebs of the spider were to his strong-minded garment-weaving spouse and her bevy of buxom, cherry-cheeked, merry maid-servants. With the Zenshū already largely in possession of the religious field among the Bakufu vassals, the Jōdo in its original form could never hope to root itself in the soil of the Kwantō. The Zen believer had to acknowledge—(1) that “the ‘way’ he had been taught was perfect, and there was consequently no need to prove it; (2) that religion is liberty, and that there is therefore no hope of forcing the reason to accept what the will refuses; and (3) that the whole body of the law is not far removed from this place, and that consequently we do not need the feet of asceticism to help us to reach it.” The believer had to prepare for his meditation by moderate eating and drinking, for while satiety is an obstacle to high thinking, so is also the weakness resulting from too rigorous a fast. He is further to expel from his mind, as far as possible, all thoughts of a worldly nature, so as to leave himself absolutely unfettered for the work before him. The Zen doctors protested against the Tendai and Jōdo view that Buddhahood can be attained to only by the strict observance of the commandments. Here also, to meet the Zenshū with some hopes of success, Shinran modified the original Jōdo doctrine. According to the “True Jōdo,” the thankful remembrance of the mercies of Amida summed up the law. Whoever kept that mercy ever before him would, without fail, keep all the commandments. Shinran’s confining all worship to a single Buddha—Amida—was also a highly politic stroke,—for the ideal *samurai* was taught that it was a shame for him to serve more than a single lord.

But Shinran’s most daring innovation was in connection with the discipline and organisation of the priesthood. “If faith is the sole means of salvation it follows that there is no need for the candidate for salvation to become a priest, leave his home, renounce matrimony, and live by rule. The layman’s, and even the laywoman’s, chance of salvation is quite as good as the priest’s. The object therefore for which the priesthood exists is changed. It is no longer, as it was in Shaka’s conception, a body of men striving after perfection,

but a body of men living to teach others,—the corporate depositary of the Faith and Worship of the Church. The Shinshū sect therefore allows its priests to marry, to dress like laymen, and even when necessary to eat meat. In this sect priestly marriage is encouraged in every way; the family is considered the best sphere in which to lead the religious family life, and the incumbency not only of the ordinary temples, but even of their bishoprics and primacies, is hereditary in certain families.”

Thanks to the genius of Shinran, the “True Jōdo” achieved a great and rapid success in the Kwantō, where the prospects of the original Jōdo would have been utterly hopeless. Takata, in Shimotsuke, was the seat of the first great Shinshū monastery, and this continued to be the headquarters of one branch of the sect from 1226 down to 1465, when these were transferred to Isshinden, not far from Tsu in Ise. In the early days, Kibé in Ōmi was the chief Shinshū fane in the neighbourhood of Kyōto. Before the end of the fifteenth century, the Shinshū priesthood had developed into a great feudal power, ruling the whole province of Kaga and wide domains in many other quarters of the Empire.

The fourth, and last, of the new sects was not only founded in the Kwantō, but founded there by a Kwantō man. Nichiren, the son of a Kyōto exile, was born at Kominato in Awa in 1222, and after passing some time in a Shingon monastery there, was sent up to Hi-ei-zan for a fuller course of study. Like other earnest students before him, he was profoundly dissatisfied with the conditions prevailing, and the doctrines taught, in the great Tendai monastery; and he went back to the Kwantō in indignation and disgust. “Returning to his little temple of Kiyosumidera, before an audience of people whom he had known from his youth, he preached the sermon which has generally been considered as the foundation of his sect. Commencing with the new formula, ‘Namu myō hō renga kyō’ (‘Hail to the Scripture of the Lotus of Good Law’), he preached on the shortcomings of all the existing sects and pointed out that in the Hokke-Kyō alone was to be found the true and highest teaching of Sakyamuni. This sermon caused a great commotion, and Nichiren was forced to escape for his life from his indignant auditors.” In Kamakura he began street-preaching,—a practice hitherto virtually

unknown in Japan,—resorting to the drum and similar Salvation Army devices to enable him to assemble audiences. One great feature in Japanese Buddhism had been a spirit of toleration for differences of opinion. Shinran had infringed this so far as to forbid worship to any one save Amida. But Nichiren went much farther than this; he alone preached the true doctrine; all others were false, and because false, deadly and damnable. “He regarded the influence of Buddhism in its relation, not only to individual adherents, but to the State as a corporate whole: and it was this connection of his new principles with the idea of nationality that formed one of his most prominent characteristics.” In his *Risshō-an-koku Ron* he lays down the axiom that the prosperity or decline of a State depends entirely upon the truth or perversion of its religion; and says boldly that both the rulers and the ruled were at that time wandering in error. He insists upon the substitution of truth for falsehood as a *sine quâ non* for the peace and prosperity of the country, and launches defiance at the authority of the Government, because of its failure to suppress all the “heretical” sects then in existence, the Zenshū among them. As Hōjō Tokiyori was at once a devout adherent of the Zen sect and numbered some of its priests among his closest friends and confidants, it is not surprising that he evinced but little inclination to fall in with the views of this rabidly intolerant street-preacher. At last Nichiren was banished to Ito in Izu as a disturber of the public peace (1261). On his return he resumed his propaganda; and in 1272, after narrowly escaping the death penalty, he was again banished to Sado for about two years. The rest of his life,—eight years or so,—was spent in comparative quiet at his new monastery of Minobu in Kōshū. About some undoubtedly beneficent effects of his activity something will be said in the following chapter. “To this day, the Nichiren sect maintains the characteristics of its founder. It is pugnacious, defiant, proud, as he was.”

However, from first to last, it was the priests of the Zen sect who continued to command the respect and reverence of the highest classes of society in Kamakura and the Kwantō in the fullest measure. This statement may at first occasion some surprise; for the *Bushi* were above all things men of action, while *Zen* is simply the Japanese form of the Sanskrit

Dhyana, which means "Meditation," and the three divisions of the Zenshū—the Rinzai (1175), the Sōtō (1223), and the Ōbaku (1650),—are known as the "Contemplative Sects." Now, as Mr. Lloyd points out, in these "Contemplative Sects" there is a great deal that savours of the original teachings of the Founder, and a very great deal that is eminently Hindoo, for neither Japan nor China could of themselves have produced a method so utterly unpractical as that of arriving at the Truth by pure contemplation. But it must never for a moment be forgotten that the peculiar genius of Japan is analogous to that of the Normans. It originates little, but it seizes upon the original ideas of other peoples, or nations, or races, and not so much adopts them, as adapts them to suit the peculiar, and not infrequently the mere temporary, exigencies of the social and political fabric of the Empire. Now, it was a peculiar tenet of the newly introduced, or rather newly re-introduced Zen sect, that "Knowledge can be transmitted from heart to heart without the intervention of words. In its early form, as introduced to Japan by the *Rinzai* sub-sect (1175), the Zen system differed but little, if at all, from the form of contemplation practised in India and China. It was purely contemplative, and the teaching of the Faith was handed down directly from heart to heart without much need being felt for the use of religious books, or manuals of doctrines." Now in the Kamakura of 1203 A.D. how many of even the upper classes could read ?

"Thanks to Saint Bothan, son of mine,
Save Gawain, ne'er could pen a line!"

Thousands of Yoritomo's most doughty vassals cherished old Bell-the-Cat's lordly scorn and contempt for effeminate literary accomplishments to the full. Then just recall the fashion in which discussions on the most grave and weighty matters of State policy were wont to be conducted by the chosen and most trusted Bakufu Councillors in the *Taki-bi-no-ma*, with nothing more than a pair of "fire chopsticks" tracing transitory and evanishing Chinese characters upon the miniature Sahara of ashes in the big *hibachi* or "fire-basin."

But above all things it was the robust and stern virility of the Zen doctrines and practices that made the fortunes of this new sect among the warriors of the Kwantō. This may

indeed seem something of a paradox to Western readers, for the Zen was a meditative sect; and the occupants of the great military camp of Kamakura were supposed to be men of action entirely. There we find great chiefs, possessed of wide domains and with hundreds of vassals at their beck and call, sleeping on a verandah, with their guards beside the middle gate and their servants on the stable-floor; an arrangement typical of preparedness for any emergency. Surely a fierce brood of ever-ready fighters like this could have found but few charms in contemplation. It would have been inconsistent with their instincts, and subversive of their training and discipline, to have their "native hue of resolution sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." But the Zen doctrine and practice of abstraction were supposed to render the devotee superior to all his surroundings, and to educate a heart and inculcate a spirit that defied fate. "The mood it produced seemed to him an ideal temper for displays of military valour and sublime fortitude; the austere discipline it prescribed for developing that mood appealed to the conception of a soldier's practice." His ultimate salvation had to be worked out for himself by the Zen believer; not by easy and vicarious trust in another.* In this special respect the Zenshū stood in direct antithesis to the "True Jōdo." Both Zenshū and True Jōdo were at one in rejecting spells, incantations, lengthy prayers, and elaborate ritual. It was this special peculiarity that brought upon both sects the bitter hostility of the Kyōto monks, who were scandalised, not so much by the heresy, as by its economic results.

The Zenshū had originally been introduced into Japan early in the ninth century, by a Chinese priest who obtained the patronage of the Emperor Saga, and of his Tachibana Empress, who founded the temple of Danrinji. But at that date it obtained no permanent foothold in the Empire. After one visit to China in 1168, and another in 1187, Eisai, originally a monk of Hi-ei-zan, built a Zen temple at Hakata from whence he transferred himself to Kyōto in 1202. Three years later the capital was devastated by a terrible typhoon; and

* To appreciate one reason at least why the Zen made such headway among the military class, the reader should refer to Mr. Yamashita's excellent paper on "The Influence of Shinto and Buddhism in Japan" in the *Transactions of the Japan Society*, Vol. IV., pt. 4, pp. 264-269.

the Kyōto monks persuaded the ex-Emperor Toba II. that this was the punishment of Heaven for tolerating the promulgation of heretical doctrines. Eisai was thereupon driven from Kyōto, and withdrew to Kamakura, where his new cult at once met with ready acceptance, the great Hōjō family, among others, becoming zealous adherents of the Zenshū.

Japanese historians dwell on the fact that with the rise of the new sects there was a great revival of priestly activity in making and repairing roads, in bridging streams, and improving ferry services. As in Europe in the Middle Ages, and, indeed, in certain European countries down to the eighteenth century, all these were regarded as most commendable works of public charity. And so they were no doubt; but that they were entirely disinterested may well be open to question. The priests have always had a high appreciation of picturesque scenery and the beauties of nature, and have been wont to rear their monasteries on the most pleasant and romantic sites, often far removed from the busy haunts of men. It was their business, of course, to attract worshippers to their fanes, for temple finance was always a matter of prime importance to the ecclesiastical mind. In these days hotels were unknown in Japan; and devotees from afar were generally lodged in the priests' quarters, or some of the out-buildings of the monastery. Plainly in the interests of revenue, it was sound economy to facilitate communications between the secluded mountain fane and the centres of population. Besides, all the expenses of driving the road and bridging the stream need not necessarily come from the sacerdotal coffers; many workers would cheerfully labour without any wage on an undertaking which, they were assured, would benefit them not only in this life, but in that which was to come.

Among the many material enterprises originated by the priests in the Kwantō in this age, the great Buddhas of Kamakura must not be overlooked. The earlier of these, a wooden statue, 80 feet in height, erected in 1238, was blown down by a typhoon, and no longer exists. But the great bronze Buddha still sits upon his pedestal here calmly looking out upon the centuries as they go by, and placidly watching the successive generations of stooping-shouldered peasants being gathered to their fathers.

Tradition has it that when celebrating the dedication of the restored temple of the Dai Butsu in Nara, Yoritomo resolved to have a similar image in Kamakura. Be this as it may, it is plain from hints in the *Azuma Kagami* that the collection of funds and materials for this enterprise went on for long, voluntary contributions being supplemented by fines for certain kinds of offences inflicted by the Bakufu law courts. It was not until 1252 that the work of casting the great image was begun by a certain Ōno Gorōemon.

A few words remain to be devoted to the subject of the Hōjōs' attitude towards religion. That they were sincere and devout believers in Buddhism, and that their religion was a religion of the rational moral conscience exercising a deep and abiding salutary influence upon their conduct cannot admit of any doubt. In a measure they were Reformers. While the legitimate interests of religion and of *religieux* were carefully protected and fostered in the Bakufu domains, sacerdotal abuses were sternly checked and repressed there. One result of this was that earnest ecclesiastics from other sections of the Empire showed a willing readiness to place themselves, their services, and their advice at the disposal of the Regents. One of Yasutoki's cherished friends was that Kōben (or Myō-e) of Takao-zan in Yamashiro, who boldly declared that "if Buddhism were such a religion as it is represented to be by the present generation of monks, it would be the worst in the world"; and from Kōben, who was a Zen priest, Yasutoki got many valuable hints.

One of the very highest European authorities on ancient Japanese history maintains that "the emotional basis of religion is gratitude, love, and hope, rather than fear. If life is worth living—and what sane man doubts it?—there are far more frequent occasions for the former than for the latter." Now, this last statement is emphatically untrue of Kyōto between, say, 1180 and 1232 A.D., if the contemporary records are to go for anything better than the mere figments of ultra-imaginative pessimists. Again, the same learned authority remarks, later on, in the same work:* "The true reason for making offerings, whether to Gods or to the dead, is to be sought elsewhere. Men feel impelled to do something to

* *Shinto* (the Way of the Gods), by W. G. Aston, C.M.G., D.C.L., p. 210.

show their gratitude for the great benefits which they are daily receiving, and to conciliate the future favours of the powers from whom they proceed." Again, in dealing with the *ohonihe* (or Great Food Offering of First-fruits), Dr. Aston tells us it is "gratitude rather than fear which animates the Japanese." However, on page 285 of the same excellent work, after a capital translation of the ritual prayer in the harvest-praying service, Dr. Aston is constrained to admit that "this *norito* contains paragraphs—possibly later accretions—which have nothing to do with the harvest. In some of the petitions the *do ut des* principle is very thinly disguised." But indeed there is often no disguise about the matter at all. Witness the following blunt avowal in an essay by a Japanese student of some two- or three-and-twenty years of age—a man of a good deal more than average ability, too:—

"It is impossible to demand to shiver with cold in the midsummer day as well as in winter. It is also unreasonable request to demand that he must not take a bit of beef in his whole life, since he did not take even a bit when he was suffering from disease. The danger is past and God is forgotten. *It is quite proper to forget God when the danger is past. One who says that he does not forget God, though the danger is past, is a liar.*"

In the history of Buddhism in Japan at least it is abundantly clear the gratitude which Dr. Aston would have us believe to be one of the three emotional bases of religion has often been of that species of the feeling which consists in a very lively sense of favours to come. It was the great smallpox epidemic of 735-737 that made the fortunes of the continental religion in this Empire; and in subsequent ages seasons of the direst national calamity and disaster continued to be the richest of godsendings to the priests. It was mainly in such seasons—when people were starving, or dying in tens of thousands of pestilence—that the monks in the great Kyōto and Nara monasteries fared most sumptuously; for it was in times like these that believers were most lavish in their gifts and benefactions. At such crises in the fortunes of the Empire and of the Japanese people, the mailed men of God could safely count upon being allowed to carry their armed outrage and insolence to the utmost extremes without much risk of interference by the constituted civil powers. For example, the

years between 1226 and 1231 are filled with bewildering records of mutual temple-burning and internecine sacerdotal strife in Yamato and the environs of Kyōto. At last, about 1230 or 1231, the civil authorities had perforce to interfere, and in the latter year they were actually on the point of taking strong and rigorous measures against these most unclerically-minded of clerics. But just at this point a series of unfruitful years culminated in a season of famine, almost as keen in its pinch as that of 1181-2; and this was, as was almost always unfailingly the case, followed by a terrible death-dealing pestilence, nearly as fatal as that of half-a-century before. Thereupon, proceedings against the monks were stopped; their services as "devil-dodgers" had to be secured at all costs.

Five years later on these turbulent Reverences did receive a sharp and much-needed lesson for once. In 1235, the monks of Nara got into a dispute with the priests of Iwashimidzu about the boundaries of some of their manors; and it was only Rokuhara troops that kept the dreaded *Shimboku* out of Kyōto. Ten months later, the Nara *bonzes*, failing to get satisfaction from the Emperor, actually began to throw up fortifications and to prepare for open war. The Court thereupon appealed to the Bakufu; and Hōjō Yasutoki took very prompt and drastic measures. A strong force blockaded the monks; their manors were confiscated, and a *Shugo* placed in Yamato. The result was that they had to beg for terms; and thereupon their estates were restored and the *Shugo* withdrawn. It was only when specially requested by the Court to do so that the Bakufu ventured to interfere with the Kyōto and Nara monasteries. As a matter of fact, Hi-ei-zan was at least once burned by Miidera, and Miidera several times burned and sacked by Hi-ei-zan in the latter half of the thirteenth century; while scarce a decade of that half-century passed without serious armed strife between some or other of the great fanes and shrines in and around the capital. And that too at a time when elsewhere throughout the Empire the strong hand of the Kamakura regents had little difficulty in preserving the public peace. In this thirteenth century there cannot be the least doubt that it was by terrorising the nation, from the Emperor or ex-Emperor down to the scavenger, that the Kyōto and Nara priests of the old sects maintained their ascendancy.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE MONGOL INVASIONS AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES.

IN the first half of the ninth century we found the "three Learned Emperors" so deeply impressed with the culture and magnificence of the Court of Hsian that they wasted no inconsiderable portion of their resources in paying it the sincerest form of flattery,—imitation to wit. Before that century was out, however, the Middle Kingdom had so far fallen from its high estate in Japanese estimation, that on the representation of Sugawara Michizane it was determined to send no more embassies to the Chinese capital. In thus cutting herself off from all diplomatic relations with China, it is not probable that Japan lost very much, for during the ensuing centuries the state of China was on the whole deplorable.

In 907 the great T'ang dynasty fell; and before 960, there had been as many as five dynasties and no fewer than thirteen Sovereigns in the Middle Kingdom, while not a few of the great satrapies became virtually independent States. Under the succeeding Sung dynasty, which ruled the whole Empire from 960 to 1120, and on the south of the Yang-tse-kiang down to 1280, great things were indeed done in Literature, Philosophy, and Art; but even so, the unhappy country was scarcely ever at peace. From first to last it was engaged in a desperate struggle with three distinct hordes of northern barbarians,—the second of which established a dynasty in Northern China and the third of which actually overran and held the whole of the Empire.

Two of these hordes were Tartars; the third was the Mongols. Of the Tartars, it was the Khitans who first came upon the scene. At the accession of the first Sung Sovereign, these held Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula, and for the next half-century hostilities between them and China were almost incessant. Shortly after the opening of the eleventh century, the Chinese Emperor agreed to pay them an annual tribute if they would abstain from their incursions; and this,

later on, was increased to 200,000 taels of silver and a great quantity of silken piece goods. Even then, the unrest continued; and, at the beginning of the next century, the Emperor invited another horde of Tartars, the Kin or Golden, to expel the Khitans from Liao-tung. As is generally the wont in such cases, the remedy turned out to be infinitely worse than the disease. The invitation was promptly accepted, and the service effectually rendered; but once possessed of the Khitan country, the Kins insisted on holding it themselves, and China found herself face to face with a new power, far stronger and more restless and aggressive than the one that had originally harassed and harried her northern marches. In no long space of time the Kins overran the provinces of Chih-li, Shen-si, Shan-si, and Honan; and by 1160 they had advanced their frontiers to the line of the Yang-tse. In the seat of their conquests they established a dynasty of their own, which lasted from 1115 down to 1234, and counted as many as fourteen Sovereigns. This "Golden" Tartar Dynasty was finally overthrown by a horde that had originally been vassals, or dependants, of its own,—the Mongols.* These also established a Chinese dynasty of their own, which in most books is given as lasting from 1280 to 1368. But, in truth, it was of considerably greater duration; for even half-a-century before 1280 the major portion of Northern China had been in Mongol hands, while it was in 1264 that the Mongol capital was transferred from Central Asia to Peking (Cambaluc).

The cessation of the interchange of diplomatic courtesies between the Sovereigns of Japan and China did not mean that the Japanese people were cut off from all culture-contact with the continent. Those who became the great lights in the Buddhist Church in Japan in the eighth and ninth centuries had spent long years in study in China; and this tradition, although sometimes interrupted, was never entirely abandoned; and the great monasteries of China were still from time to time frequented by Japanese monks. Again, the harbours of Japan, and especially of Kyūshū, were occasionally visited by Chinese merchantmen, whose cargoes found eager purchasers. We read of certain of these being conveyed to Kyōto, and of the

* Readers who have not done so are strongly advised to peruse Gibbon's chapter on the "Mongols and the Ottoman Turks," Douglas's article on the "Mongols" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and Yule's *Marco Polo*.

competition to secure their items being so keen as to lead to scenes of disorder somewhat akin to riot. On more than one occasion we find the Court issuing rescripts and making regulations dealing with such contingencies. Then, there are one or two authentic notices of Chinese traders settling in Japan as naturalised subjects. Taira Kiyomori's efforts to improve the harbour of Hyōgo were mainly in the interest of that Chinese trade he was so eager to promote; he even went so far as to receive the foreign merchants as honoured guests in his great Fukuwara mansion. It will be remembered that Kiyomori's son, Shigemori, when stricken with mortal illness declined to avail himself of the services of a distinguished Chinese physician then in Japan, on sentimentally patriotic grounds.

It was the harbours of Chikuzen that were most frequented by Chinese vessels; for generations the Great Shrine of Munakata had kept itself and its auxiliary six-and-seventy buildings in repair with timber from the wrecks cast upon the Chikuzen coast. The practice was to confiscate such wrecks and their cargoes, until Hōjō Yasutoki put a stop to it. Another port much frequented by the Chinese was Bōnotsu in Southern Satsuma. When Amano Tōkage was sent down by Yoritomo as Chinzei Bugyō to Kyūshū, he imposed customs duties upon all foreign vessels; but when he endeavoured to exact them in Bonotsu Haven, the great house of Konoye,* who held wide manors in Satsuma and Hyūga, successfully insisted that the Bōnotsu customs were their property.

At this date, Japan lagged far behind China in shipbuilding and maritime enterprise; but that Japanese vessels did occasionally reach China is undoubted. The route was along the Korean coast, and the shores of the Gulf of Pechili. Such as reached Eastern China seem to have been mostly derelicts, or

* The Konoye were one of the five branches into which the main Fujiwara stock had parted about this time. The other four were the Takatsukasa, the Ichijō, the Nijō, and the Kujō. These five families, known as the *Go-Sekke*, were supposed to have the prerogative of supplying Empresses and *Kwampaku*. But this regulation, said to have been established in Hōjō Sadatoki's time, was not strictly observed, for shortly after that date we find many of the Empresses coming from the house of Saionji. This also was a Fujiwara house,—one of the nine Seikwa *Kugē* families whose members could aspire to the positions of Chancellor or Minister of the Left, or Minister of the Right, but not to those of Sesshō or Kwampaku.

vessels blown out of their course,* for such Japanese craft as were built at this time were intended for inland navigation and hugging the coast, not for standing boldly out across the high seas. The great "Queen Bee Ship" in the Taira fleet at Dan-no-ura was regarded as something of a wonder; for that vessel was Chinese rigged. Sanetomo in 1215 conceived the project of going to China in person; and for nearly a year he had a Chinaman at Kamakura superintending the construction of a great ship for the intended voyage. The vessel, however, proved a failure, and was left to rot where she lay, and the voyage was never undertaken. It was about this date that bills of exchange began to be used in Kamakura for inter-provincial trade; and this device, known in China for long, was probably suggested to the Bakufu Councillors by Sanetomo's guest, the unsuccessful shipwright. Shortly before this the tea-plant had been reintroduced into Japan. It had been first brought to the country in 805 by Dengyō Daishi, who had had tea-seed planted at Uji, although some authorities maintain that the priest Eishū had grown the plant in the grounds of his monastery in Ōmi some time before. But its culture never became general; and by the time when Eisai returned from China in 1191 bringing tea-seed with him, tea had become utterly unknown in Japan. Eisai planted his seed partly in Chikuzen, partly at Togano in the neighbourhood of Kyōto. At first people regarded the leaf as poison, and would have nothing to do with it until Eisai was fortunate enough to be called in to prescribe for the young Shōgun Sanetomo, who had drunk too much *saké* the night before. A few cups of tea served to clear the Shōgun's head; and from that day it began to be held in the highest estimation. For more than a century the fine leaf was so highly prized, that a tiny jar of it used to be bestowed on warriors as a reward for uncommon exploits; and the fortunate recipients assembled

* It may be noted that the Chinese were more considerate to shipwrecked strangers than the Japanese were before the days of Hōjō Yasutoki. "In 1190 some Japanese were blown over to Taichow. The Emperor ordered that their cargo should be looked after and allowed to pass free; that a junk should be bought, and that all their property should then be returned to them; and that they should be supplied in addition with a compassionate allowance of rice at nominal rates. In 1200, some of them arrived in Chên-Kiang, and in 1202, at Ningpo. Imperial orders were given in both cases for them to be supplied with money and rice and sent home with the first favourable wind." Ma Twan-lin's *Account of Japan*,

their friends and relations to partake of the precious gift. Here, perhaps, we have the tea ceremonial in embryo.

For centuries past Japan has been famous for the produce of her kilns, no less than for her tea. But down to 1230 Japanese pottery continued to be of the crudest and most commonplace description. But "simultaneously with the import of the (tea) leaf some of the vessels employed in infusing it were brought to Japan, and from these it became apparent that the Chinese potter under the Sung dynasty had completely distanced both Korea and Japan in technical processes, while at the same time a new need was felt by the Japanese for utensils of improved quality. Accordingly Katō Shirozaemon, a potter who had already acquired some reputation, determined to make the voyage to China, and in 1223 accomplished his object in company with a priest, Dōen. After an absence of six years, Katō returned and settled at Seto, in the province of Owari, where he commenced the manufacture of a ware which to this day is regarded with the utmost esteem by his countrymen. . . . The chief productions were tea-jars of various sizes and shapes, which, having been from the very first treasured up with greatest care by their fortunate possessors, still exist in considerable numbers, and are still highly valued by amateurs of the *Cha-no-Yu* (Tea Ceremonial). So great a reputation did this Tōshiro-yaki, as it was commonly called, enjoy, and such prestige did its appearance give to the potters of Owari, that everything which preceded it was forgotten, and the name *Seto-mono* (i.e. ware of Seto) thenceforth became the generic term for all ceramic manufactures in Japan, just as 'China' in Europe."*

Ordinary men are governed as much by ceremonial and fashion as by the precepts of religion or the decrees of the Government and the laws of the land. As has been repeatedly set forth, the claims of mere ceremonial and etiquette in Japan have been at most times insistent, and absurdly onerous. So much Hideyoshi, whom Froez at an early date pronounced to be "tortuous and cunning past all measure of belief," appreciated fully; and hence his unceasing efforts to raise the

* See Capt. F. Brinkley's *Japan*, Vol. VIII., p. 13-14. For the "Tea Ceremonial," see same work Vol. II., p. 246-275. Vols. VII. and VIII. and the part of Vol. II. alluded to, show Captain Brinkley at his very best, and his very best is truly excellent,

“Tea Ceremonial” to the dignity of a veritable cult, as a means of taming the ferocity and curbing the spirit of many who were inclined to question his authority. But for the reintroduction into Japan of the tea-plant by his Reverence Eisai in 1191, and for Katō Shirōzaemon’s sojourn in China between 1223 and 1229, *Cha-no-Ÿu* as an instrument of government would never have been at the disposal of the preternaturally acute and *rusé* peasant-ruler, Hideyoshi.

At this date, also, Japan was largely dependent upon China for her medium of exchange. A succinct account of the old Japanese mint has already been given. It had finally stopped operations in 958; and so naturally by this time there was a sad dearth of native coin in the Empire. And as the Hōjōs endeavoured to collect as much of their taxes as they could in money, coin became a greater necessity than it might otherwise have been. It was with the aid of the influx of Chinese coins, mainly of the Sung dynasty, that the Kamakura Regents were able to carry out some of their fiscal reforms. The craze for China and Chinese institutions had long been a thing of the past; the Japanese Court highly resented the traditional attitude of the Sovereigns of the Middle Kingdom towards surrounding nations, and on more than one occasion left dispatches from the Chinese Court unanswered, on the ground that their tone and phraseology were unsatisfactory. But withal, as should abundantly appear from what has just been set forth, the obligations of Japan to China for the development of her social culture were by no means yet at an end.

The state of things in the Korean Peninsula had meanwhile undergone a great change. The small northern State of Bokkai, with which Japan long maintained a friendly intercourse, had disappeared, as that dire old foe of Japan the Kingdom of Silla had done, in 935. Silla had been swallowed up in the new Kingdom of Kōryu, which originating in the north in 918, soon extended its sway over the whole of the Korean Peninsula and far over the Yalu into Manchuria. On several occasions Kōryu Sovereigns attempted to establish diplomatic relations with the Japanese Court; but as the language of their dispatches was nearly always considered to be lacking in courtesy and respect, the overtures were almost invariably coldly received. Still there were no actual hostilities between

the two nations, although Kōryu pirates occasionally harried Tsushima, and gave trouble to the Kyūshū authorities. Now, at last, in 1227, things began to look serious. Three or four years before this, bands of Japanese had begun to ravage the Korean coast, where they committed great depredations; and in 1227, a Kōryu envoy, named Pak In, appeared in Kyōto with demands for redress. The Japanese Court was in great anxiety, for a war with Kōryu would be a very serious thing. The matter was entrusted to the Bakufu for settlement; and Hōjō Yasutoki, on investigating the circumstances, found that Kōryu had well-grounded reasons for complaint. He forthwith gave orders for the arrest and execution of the corsairs; and the affair was promptly settled. It is not at all unlikely that these Japanese corsairs had been driven to sea-roving as the result of the numerous confiscations of 1221, and that Yasutoki was not at all sorry at finding a good excuse for dealing drastically with former opponents who would be only too glad to snatch at any opportunity of giving trouble to the Bakufu.

What perhaps greatly facilitated the amicable settlement of this difficulty was the fact that at this date Kōryu had so much to occupy her attention elsewhere that she was really in no condition to enter upon an armed contest with the Island Empire. Although the Khitans had been temporarily overthrown by the Kins, their power had been by no means irretrievably broken; and by the opening of the thirteenth century they had again become formidable in the Liao-tung and Southern Manchuria. However, just about this time the Mongols, who had generally acknowledged the supremacy of Jenghiz Khan in 1206, appeared in the Liaō-tung; and the Khitans, finding it hopeless to withstand them, poured across the Yalu into the Korean Peninsula, with a view of carving out a new State there for themselves. After a series of fierce struggles Kōryu succeeded in crushing the invaders; but it was only with Mongol help that she was able to do so. Then quarrels broke out between her and her allies; and in 1231 and 1238 huge Mongol armies crossed the Yalu, and in the latter years swept the Peninsula from end to end and from sea to sea. The Kōryu Sovereign took refuge in the island of Kang-Wha, where he had to spend the remaining twenty years of his reign, defying all the attempts of the invaders to get

him out of it, for the Mongols were no sailors and were completely helpless on the blue water. In 1259, the year of the old Kōryu King's death, Kublai Khan became Emperor; and in 1264 established his capital at Peking. By this time Kōryu had acknowledged the Mongol suzerainty, and in 1265 the seed was sown that led to the Mongol attacks upon Japan.

A Kōryu citizen, Cho I, found his way to Peking, and there having gained the ear of the Emperor, told him that the Mongol power ought to secure the vassalage of Japan. Kublai thereupon appointed two ambassadors to Japan, ordering them to proceed by way of Kōryu, and to take a Kōryu envoy along with them as well. The Kōryu King named two officers to accompany the Mongols; but on putting to sea, the mission was driven back by a tempest, and the Kōryu King thereupon sent the two Mongols back to Peking. The simple fact of the matter was that the Kōryu Sovereign, although the reverse of a great statesman or ruler, had enough common-sense to perceive that he had absolutely nothing to gain, and probably a great deal to lose if Kublai Khan persisted in his project of "securing the vassalage of Japan." For ages the proud-stomached islanders had shown themselves abnormally sensitive about their national dignity, to say nothing of their national independence; that they would ever acknowledge the suzerainty of the semi-barbarous Mongols without a most resolute and determined struggle was simply incredible. Kōryu, at most times not unwilling to be regarded as a satellite of the great and enlightened Middle Kingdom, had itself only submitted to the Mongol domination after having been hopelessly beaten to her knees and subjected to a long succession of horrors and miseries absolutely unparalleled in the history of the unhappy Peninsula. She was now completely exhausted, poverty-stricken and famine-smitten; and whenever any faint signs of a recovery manifested themselves, hopes were quickly blasted by the rapacity of the Mongol officers and the exactions of the Peking Court. In a Mongol assault upon Japan, Kōryu would infallibly have to bear the brunt of the struggle. As has been said, the Mongols were no sailors; and so Kōryu would certainly be called upon to supply the naval armament and the transports and to contribute a military contingent. Kōryu certainly did not desire any quarrel with Japan, nor did Japan wish any war with Kōryu at this time. It is

true that Japanese pirates kept harrying the Korean coasts; but Kōryu had the best of reasons for knowing that these freebooters were in no way encouraged by the Japanese Government. Some half-dozen years before, the Bakufu had again willingly exerted itself to give Kōryu the redress she demanded for the depredations of certain Japanese subjects, had punished the wrong-doers, and had made restitution of their booty.

In 1268 Kublai's envoy, accompanied by a Kōryu suite, at last made good the passage of the Straits and appeared in Dazaifu, where he handed over the original dispatch of 1266 to Shōni, the Bakufu representative there, who at once forwarded it to Kamakura by relays of express couriers. The Bakufu Councillors found its contents to be of such portentous moment that they did not venture to deal with it on their own initiative. It was promptly transmitted to Kyōto, for consideration by the Imperial Court.

The tenor of this fateful missive was as follows:—

“ (We) by the Grace and decree of Heaven,

“ *Emperor* of Great Mongolia,

“ Present a letter to

“ The *King* of Japan.

“ We have pondered (over the fact) that from ancient time even the princes of *small States* have striven to cultivate friendly intercourse with those of adjoining territories.

“ To how much greater an extent have Our ancestors, who have received the Middle Empire by the inscrutable decrees of Heaven, become known in numerous far-off foreign lands, all of whom have revered their power and majesty!

“ When We first ascended Our throne, many innocent people in Kōryu were suffering from (the effects of) continuous war. Thereupon we put an end to the fighting, restored their territories, and liberated the captives both old and young. Both the prince of Kōryu and his people, feeling grateful towards Us, have visited Our country, and *while the relation between Us and them is that of Lord and vassal*, its nature is as felicitous as that of parent and child, and of this, no doubt, you, O King, are well aware.

“ Kōryu is situated on the eastern border of Our dominions, Nihon is near to it, and ever since communication was opened with Kōryu intercourse has, from time to time, been carried on with China also.

“ Since the commencement of Our reign not a single messenger of peace and friendship has appeared, and as We fear that your country is not fully acquainted with these facts, We have specially sent a messenger bearing a letter to inform you, O *King*, of Our sentiments.

“We beg that hereafter you, O *King*, will establish friendly relations with us so that the sages may make the four seas (the World) their home.

“Is it reasonable to refuse intercourse with each other? *It will lead to war*, and who is there who likes such a state of things!

“Think of this, O *King*!

“8th month of the 3rd year of Shigen.”

When we consider the arrogant phraseology in which Chinese dispatches were usually couched, the tone of this special communication may at first blush appear comparatively mild and inoffensive. But as a matter of fact it must have been extremely galling to Japanese national pride. In the first place, while Kublai arrogated to himself the title of Emperor, he addresses the Sovereign of Japan as a mere King, thus placing him on a footing with the nominal ruler of Kōryū, who was an acknowledged Mongol vassal. Then, in the event of a failure to respond to the overture, there was something more than a merely veiled threat of coercion. And the Kamakura authorities at least, must have been fully alive to the hideous travesty of history contained in the third paragraph of the missive.

Kublai's dispatch threw the Court and the capital into the greatest perturbation. Kyōto was then in the midst of preparations for a great *fête* to celebrate Saga II.'s fiftieth birthday. The preparations were at once abandoned, and Court and courtiers did nothing but hold councils as to how this dire emergency was to be faced. An answer was finally drafted, and sent on to Kamakura for transmission to the envoy. But the Bakufu Councillors were made of sterner stuff; and they decided not to hand the reply to the ambassador, but to dismiss him after a five or six months' stay without so much as an acknowledgement of the receipt of the dispatch he had brought.

For some time previous to this the Japanese people had been living in a highly-wrought state of nervous tension and excitement. From 1260 onwards there had been a rapid and unceasing succession of comets, meteors, and other dire and menacing portents in the heavens, all interpreted as foreboding impending national calamity and disaster. What greatly intensified the apprehension and terror with which these supposed harbingers of ruin were regarded was the fact

that the nation was then in the throes of the last and greatest of the famous religious revivals of the thirteenth century. It was in 1254 that Nichiren had begun to preach his new, and what he insisted was the only true, creed: and since that date Kamakura and the east of Japan had been in a constant state of ferment and turmoil. Exile, as a disturber of the public peace, had only served to intensify the influence of this, the first and the greatest of all Japanese street-preachers. There cannot be the slightest doubt that both by voice and by pen this great and remarkable man profoundly affected his contemporaries and the spirit of the age. Into any exhaustive discussion of his peculiar position or of his doctrines it is impossible to enter here. But what is especially to the point in the present connection is this:—In the first place he addressed himself not merely to the individual, but also to the *national* conscience. And then in calling the people to repentance for their sins, he foretold that the wrath of Heaven would speedily be visited upon them either in the form of the curse of civil war, or in the shape of the scourge of *foreign invasion!* In this he may merely have been drawing the bow at a venture. But it is much more probable that his commanding order of intellect enabled him to read the signs of the times aright.

As to what was happening over-sea in China and Korea, it is perfectly plain that the Japanese were well apprised. In these days we hear a great deal about the “Yellow Peril.” In the thirteenth century Europe, it is true, was really exposed to such a menace in the form of the Mongols. But so was China, so was Korea, and so was Japan.* China and Korea

* “Before the invasion of Tchingis, China was divided into two empires or dynasties of the North and South; and the difference of origin and interest was smoothed by a general conformity of laws, language, and national manners. The Northern [or Kin] empire, which had been dismembered by Tchingis, was finally subdued seven years after his death (A.D. 1234). The Southern [or Sung] empire survived about forty-five years longer, and the perfect conquest was reserved for the arms of Khubilai (A.D. 1279). The boundless ambition of Khubilai aspired to the conquest of Japan; his fleets were twice shipwrecked; and the lives of 100,000 Mongols and Chinese were sacrificed in the fruitless expedition (A.D. 1274). But the circumjacent kingdoms, Korea, Tonkin, Cochin-China, Pegu, Bengal, and Thibet, were reduced in different degrees of tribute and obedience by the effort or terror of his arms.”—*Student's Gibbon*, Vol. II., p. 273.

“The Tartars spread from Livonia to the Black Sea, and both Moscow and Kiev (A.D. 1240), the modern and the ancient capitals were reduced to ashes,—a temporary ruin, less fatal than the deep,

had either been or were being overwhelmed; and with the maritime resources of these two countries and the skill and experience of their sailors at the complete disposal of the Mongols, a much less acute and penetrating mind than that of Nichiren might readily presage that Japan's immemorial record of a happy immunity from serious foreign aggression was nearing its close. Be this as it may, and whatever may have been the exact truth of the matter, it is incontestable that the vehement, turbulent Nichiren,—a strange compound of old Hebrew prophet, Dominican friar, and John Knox,—rendered his countrymen the highest and most essential of services. What above all things at this time was necessary was an intense feeling of nationality. The genuine religion of Gautama, whose central idea was the impermanency of all things and the vanity of human wishes, was essentially quietist

and perhaps indelible, mark which a servitude of 200 years has imprinted on the character of the Russians. From the permanent conquest of the Russians they made a deadly, though transient, inroad into the heart of Poland, and as far as the borders of Germany. The cities of Lublin and Cracow were obliterated; they approached the shores of the Baltic; and in the battle of Liegnitz they defeated the dukes of Silesia, the Polish Palatines, and the great Master of the Teutonic order, and filled nine sacks with the right ears of the slain (1241). From Liegnitz, the extreme point of their western march, they turned aside to the invasion of Hungary (see correction in footnote); the King, Bela IV., assembled the military force of his counts and bishops; but the whole country north of the Danube was lost in a day and depopulated in a summer; and the ruins of the cities and churches were overspread with the bones of the natives, who expiated the sins of their Asiatic ancestors. Of all the cities and fortresses of Hungary, three alone survived the Tartar invasion, and the unfortunate Bela hid his head among the islands of the Adriatic.

“Since the invasion of the Arabs in the eighth century Europe had never been exposed to a similar calamity; and if the disciples of Mahomet would have oppressed her religions and liberty, it might be apprehended that the shepherds of Scythia would extinguish her cities, her arts, and all the institutions of civil society. The Emperor Frederic II. called upon the Kings of France and England and the princes of Germany to arm their vassals in the just and rational crusade. The Tartars themselves were awed by the fame and valour of the Franks; the town of Neustadt in Austria was bravely defended against them by fifty knights and twenty cross-bows; and they raised the siege on the appearance of a German army. After wasting the adjacent kingdoms of Servia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria, Batu was recalled from the Danube to the Volga by the death of Ogotai (1241 A.D.)”—*Ibidem*, p. 275.

The justification for the citation of these passages is that, in spite of errors of detail necessarily occasioned by the imperfect materials at his command, Gibbon has presented us with the best bird's-eye view ever given of the general course of the Mongol Conquests. It is hard to discover what single service these rapacious and aggressive bandits rendered either to the progress of civilisation or the cause of humanity.

and unaggressive, and was ill-fitted to foster any such feeling. But in breaking with the traditional Buddhism of the past at many points, and in many ways, Nichiren introduced into religion a more robust and a most pronouncedly aggressive spirit. He was the first great religious leader in Japan who persecuted such as differed from him in points of doctrine; and he endeavoured to make his a *national* cult. Nichiren's preaching undoubtedly did much to stimulate the spirit of nationality at a time when a crisis was impending which could only be met by the Japanese people standing shoulder to shoulder, and thinking and acting as if animated by one single soul. That there was such a thing as a spirit of nationality, or rather of race, in Japan before Nichiren began his crusade is quite true. But it was derived, not from Buddhism, which was essentially cosmopolitan, but from the traditions in the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*, and from the old Shintō cult. And for long, the fortunes of Shintō had been cast upon evil days.

Another great boon, for which Japan had to thank her lucky stars at this time, was the work of the great Yoritomo, and his highly capable successors, the much-abused Hōjō Regents. Before Yoritomo's date, to the average *Bushi* the immediate fortunes of his own sept or clan or feudal chief were of vastly greater consequence than those of the nation at large. If the Mongol Armada had appeared on the coasts of Kyūshū just a century earlier, when the Empire was racked and riven by the deadly internecine strife between Taira and Minamoto, the very existence of Japan as a nation would have been in the direst jeopardy. Ten years later, when the *Bushi* had been subjected to the autocratic control of a single master mind, a patriotic Japanese bard might with the utmost truth and justice have bettered the proud vaunt of the gallant Bastard in King John:—

“This Nippon never did, nor ever shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
Even when it first did help to wound itself.
Now that *this Empire is at one again*,
Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them; naught shall make us rue,
If Nippon to itself do rest but true.”

And since the days of Yoritomo, Nippon had in the main remained true to herself. Since 1189 there had been only one great civil commotion in the Empire, and most fortunately

that was most speedily allayed in a manner that made for the best interests of the nation. Had Toba II. been successful in his struggle with Kamakura in 1221, the rule of the august descendants of the Sun-Goddess over an independent State might very readily have come to an end a single cycle later on. In spite of all his great talents and natural abilities, Toba II. was no statesman; as soon as he had found leisure and adequate resources for indulging in his whims and hobbies, ecclesiastical architecture, poetising, football, horse-racing, wrestling, and, in plain and most uncourtly language, philandering and wantonly dallying with *shirabyōshi*, the prototype of the modern *geisha*, he would have consigned the dour and hard work of governance to incompetent favourites,—appointees of Lady Kane and the other great dames who were waxing rich by their traffic in official positions. With such soft-fibred gentry in control of the ship of State, the condition of the Empire would have speedily become more wretched than it had been even in the middle of the tenth century. Dissension, confusion, and anarchy would have been the almost infallible results long before 1281. And with these rife in the land, even the small Mongol expedition of 40,000 men of 1274 might very well have succeeded in establishing a permanent footing in Kyūshū.

As it was, we find that in 1268 Kyōto was prepared to enter into parley with Kublai Khan. If the Bakufu had gone down before Toba II. in 1221, it is not at all improbable that Kublai might very well have succeeded in securing at least the nominal vassalage of Japan. But with the *Bushi* united, and bending to one single strong will, the little Island Empire of the East could well and safely afford to present as resolute a front to the terrible and unconquerable Mongols as the fifty knights and twenty cross-bows of Neustadt had done in Austria seven-and-twenty years before. When the youthful Hōjō Tokimune appealed in thrilling words to the *Bushi*, calling upon them to sink all petty, private differences, and to rally in defence of the national independence, he must have been assured that his appeal would fall upon no deaf ears for the very best of reasons. In the first place, during the Kamakura age there was such a thing as a national sentiment in Japan; and in the second, for long years the Kamakura Bakufu had been wont to have its instructions and orders to

the *Bushi* implicitly obeyed. Even that perfervid and ultra-Imperialist historian of Japan, Rai Sanyō, is constrained to admit that "The repulse of the Mongol barbarians by Hōjō Tokimune, and his preserving the dominions of our Son of Heaven were sufficient to atone for the crimes of his ancestors." By "the crimes of his ancestors," Rai Sanyō evidently refers to the action of Tokimune's grandfather, Yasutoki, and his great-grandfather Yoshitoki in the great crisis of 1221. But it needs no very profound exercise of intelligence to perceive that if Hōjō Yoshitoki had quietly submitted in 1221, it would have been impossible for his descendant Tokimune, or perhaps for anyone else, to save the national independence of Japan sixty years later on.

It seems hopeless to recover the exact details of the next few years. That most invaluable Bakufu Chronicle, the *Azuma Kagami*, closes with the year 1266; and such contemporary Japanese records as we possess are exceedingly imperfect and unsatisfactory. In them we meet with no reference to certain important incidents which are recorded in the Great Korean History, the Tong-guk T'ong-gam, and in contemporary Chinese records. Yet the outlines of the course of events may be traced. Between 1268 and 1273 as many as five Chinese or Kōryū missions appeared in Japan, none of which got beyond Dazaifu. To the second of these the Kyōto Court had drafted a reply, but the Bakufu did not choose to forward it to the envoys. Some authorities allege that this reply was actually delivered to the third mission without the intervention of the Bakufu; but this appears to be very doubtful. In 1269 two natives of Tsushima, called Tōjirō and Yajirō, were captured by a Kōryū vessel, and were sent on to Peking. Here they were kindly treated by Kublai, who showed them all the magnificence of his palace and his capital, reviewed his troops before them, and then set them at liberty, charging them to inform their countrymen of all they had seen, and to counsel them to submit. A year later these men and several others accompanied a subsequent Mongol mission to Dazaifu back to the Chinese capital, as Japanese envoys, but about this the contemporary Japanese records are silent. What is possible is that they were dispatched by the Bakufu agent in Kyūshū (Shōni), ostensibly as envoys, but in reality as spies. The Chinese authorities allege that in the *pour-parlers* they entered

into, they protested against the occupation of Kinchow in Kōryu by the Mongols, and that the latter replied that the "occupation was only temporary in view of operations against Quelpart." On this island of Quelpart the semi-independent kingdom of Tamna still survived; and here the remnants of the Kōryu troops that had mutinied shortly before had taken refuge, and erected a great stronghold from which they were harrying the neighbouring districts. A Mongol commissioner had in consequence been installed in the Kōryu capital to deal with the prevalent disorder; and in 1272 Quelpart was actually reduced and garrisoned by Mongol and Kōryu soldiers.

Immediately upon the failure of his first mission to Japan Kublai sent word to the Kōryu monarch to begin building 1,000 vessels and collecting troops (40,000) and supplies for an invasion of the island realm. The King made answer that it was impossible for him to do so; but Kublai was resolute, and dispatched a commissioner to see that his orders were carried out, and to have the straits surveyed. Next year Kublai had rice-fields laid out at Pong-san, to raise supplies for the projected expedition, and instructed the Kōryu King to furnish 6,000 ploughs and oxen and seed-grain. The King again protested his inability to do so, "but as the Emperor insisted he sent throughout the country and by force or persuasion obtained a fraction of the number demanded. The Emperor aided by sending 10,000 pieces of silk. The Kōryu army had dwindled to such a point that butchers and slaves were enrolled in the lists." What made the position of the King exceedingly difficult was the presence of certain renegade subjects at Kublai's Court, who did everything they could to bring their Sovereign under the Emperor's suspicion. About this time a horde of Japanese sea-rovers had established themselves on the Kōryu coast, and the people, in fear of their lives, received them hospitably and gave them whatever they asked for. One of these Kōryu renegades informed Kublai of this with embellishments of his own, and insinuated that Kōryu was making friends with Japan, with a view to an invasion of China!

In 1273, 5,000 Mongols appeared in Kōryu as the advance-guard of the force being levied for the invasion of Japan. But the pinch of famine was then so sharp in Kōryu that Kublai had to forward supplies from China for the support of his

troops, and had perforce to await the new rice-harvest before sending on the main body. Meanwhile he had kept on sending envoys to Japan; the last of whom had insisted on delivering his dispatches to the Emperor, or Shōgun, in person. However, he had been at last induced to allow a copy of these dispatches to be transmitted to Kamakura; but he intimated that if a prompt answer was not forthcoming his master would at once appeal to the sword. As soon as ever the copy of the dispatch and the accompanying verbal message were communicated to Tokimune, he at once sent down orders to Dazaifu for the prompt deportation of the envoy and his suite. On learning of this, Kublai at last sent on the main body of the expeditionary force to join the 5,000 men already at the port of embarkation. In spite of all his missions to Japan, Kublai must have acquired but little real knowledge of the Island Empire and the sturdy and indomitable spirit of its inhabitants. Man for man, the Japanese *Bushi* were fully the equals of the very best Mongol troops in courage and endurance. In Japan at this time there must have been, at a very conservative estimate, at least 400,000 men who could be counted upon to fight to the death in defence of hearth and home and the national independence. And to reduce these 400,000 to slavery and subjection, Kublai fondly imagined that 25,000 of his Mongols would be sufficient! It is true that these were to be reinforced by 15,000 Kōryū troops, in addition to the 8,000 Kōryū sailors who manned the 900 craft that were to carry the fighting men over to the Japanese coast. But by this time Kōryū had been brought so low that she had been forced to eke out her military rosters with slaves and butchers! And butchering inoffensive, unresisting kine and sheep was one thing; and slaughtering Japanese *Samurai* another and a vastly different affair!

At last, in November 1274, the first Mongol Armada directed against Japan put to sea. Its first effort was the reduction of the island of Tsushima. Here a grandson of the Taira Admiral, Tomomori, who had commanded and perished in the great sea-fight of Dan-no-ura (1185), was at the head of affairs. In history this grandson is known as Sō Sukekuni, for his father Tomomune, appointed ruler of Tsushima as a reward for his services in restoring order there in 1245, had assumed that family name of Sō which the gallantry of his

descendants in maintaining this island outpost in the sea-way to Japan was destined to render so illustrious. With but 200 hastily mustered retainers Sō Sukekuni made a most gallant and intrepid stand against the overpowering force of the invaders; but as a mere matter of course he was overborne and lost his life. Nine days later (November 13) the island of Iki was attacked. Here also the Warden was of Taira descent, and here also the little garrison sold their lives right dearly. It goes without saying that both islands experienced to the full the atrocious barbarities that invariably attended a Mongol victory. From Iki the invaders stood over to Hakosaki Gulf, some miles behind which lay Dazaifu, the administrative capital of Kyūshū. Here they arrived on November 18, and on the following day they landed at Hakata, and seized Imatsu, Sahara, Momomichi, Akasaka, and other places.

On the very day in which the hostile Armada entered Hakozaki Haven, a Dazaifu courier had arrived at the Rokuhara with intelligence of the disaster in Tsushima; and ten days later (November 27) yet another came in, announcing the sad fate of Iki. As soon as these dispatches reached Kamakura, Hōjō Tokimune at once sent instructions to the Shugo in the Sanyōdō, Sanindō, and Kyūshū, to get every landholder, whether a Bakufu vassal or not, under arms. Those who acted properly were to be rewarded; those who failed to respond to the summons were to be put to the sword. At the same time troops were to be hurried down from the Kwantō. But before these orders reached Kyūshū, there was not a single living Mongol left upon the soil of Japan.

On the very day on which they landed (November 20) the invaders were vigorously attacked by the levies of Shōni, Ōtomo, Shimadzu, Kikuchi, Matsuura, and other Kyūshū chieftains. But the Japanese soon found themselves at a disadvantage in several respects. In the first place in tactics; for it was not the wont of the islanders to fight as units of any *Bushi's* tactical formation, but as individuals. "It was the *Bushi's* habit to proclaim his names and titles in the presence of the enemy, sometimes adding from his own record or his father's any details that might tend to dispirit his foes. Then some one advancing to cross weapons with him, would perform the same ceremony of self-introduction, and if either found anything to upbraid in the other's antecedents or family

129

130


131

132

K Ō R Y U

MAP

Illustrating Mongol Invasion



35

35

34

34

33

33

129

130

131

132

GOTŌ

TSUSHIMA

IKI

GENKAI

NAGATO

CHIKUZEN

BUZEN

INLAND SEA

SHIKOKU

HIZEN

CHIKUGO

BUNGO

HIGO

history, he did not fail to make loud reference to it, such a device being counted efficacious as a means of disturbing the hearer's *sang-froid*. The duellists could reckon on finishing their fights undisturbed, but the victor frequently had to endure the combined assault of a number of the vanquished's comrades or retainers. Of course a skilled swordsman did not necessarily seek a single combat; he was ready to ride into the thick of the foe without discrimination, and a group of common soldiers never hesitated to make a united attack upon a mounted officer when they found him disengaged. But the general feature of a battle was individual contests, and when the fighting ceased, each *Bushi* proceeded to the tent of the commander-in-chief and submitted for inspection the heads of those he had killed."* In addition to this it must be remembered that at that time no Japanese officer had ever commanded in a general engagement, or even seen a general or any other kind of serious action fought. On the other hand, among the invaders, the Mongols at least had been fighting during the greater part of their lives; and in their long contest with the Chinese, in which there was a great deal of siege warfare, they had been constrained to supplement their own original tactics by the adoption of more scientific formations, and the employment of the best artillery of the time.

By "artillery" cannon are not necessarily meant; in fact the "Fire-Pao" sometimes used by them would appear to have been of the nature of rockets. But even the "Fire-Pao" played a comparatively insignificant part in Mongol warfare. It was the great slings and the great cross-bows that were really formidable.† With these the Mongols were now well equipped, and their discharges inflicted terrible damage upon the Japanese long before their own missiles could be of any service. So much can be readily understood; but what is really surprising is to learn that even the Japanese bow was

* Capt. Brinkley's *Japan*, Vol. II. p. 162-3. This is excellently put; but the subsequent pages appear to contain several serious errors of detail.

† For what the various kinds of trebuchet could effect see Yule's *Marco Polo*, Vol. II. pp. 143-150, and Oman's *Art of War in the Middle Ages*, p. 543. *seq.* "The trebuchets generally discharged stones; but not unfrequently they were used to throw pots or barrels of combustible material, destined to set fire to the brattices or roofs of towers, or to start a conflagration in the town which they were employed to bombard."

now completely outranged by the Tartar weapon!* The latter, we are told, sent short shafts a full 240 or 250 yards. But at the Battle of Dan-no-ura (1185) we hear of Japanese long and heavy bolts being sped that distance with deadly effect. It is true that these came from Kwantō bows, which were the strongest and longest and heaviest in Japan, and that now, on the Japanese side, it was not Kwantō bows but Kyūshū bows that were in question. But indications are not lacking that even Kwantō archery was no longer what it had been during the great civil wars three generations before. We more than once find Tokiyori, the fifth Hōjō Regent, censuring the *Bushi* for remissness in attention to military arts and especially to perfecting themselves in the use of the bow. In 1262, when Tokimune, Tokiyori's son, was a boy of eleven, at an exhibition of archery in Kamakura, the young Shōgun expressed a wish to see some *ogasakake* or shooting at a small hat target. In Yoritomo's time this was common enough; but now all the *Samurai* were so diffident of their skill that not a single one of them ventured to come forward. At last Tokiyori ordered his son to try what he could do; and the first shaft loosed by the boy got home in the centre of the mark. Fifty years before, there would have been scores of eager competitors.†

In all these points, fighting in well-ordered formation, the possession of the best artillery of the age, of which the Japanese had absolutely none, and of bows—(shooting poisoned arrows according to some authorities)—which outranged those of the Kyūshū men, the Mongols were vastly superior. Besides, as cavalry and mounted archers the Mongols were simply superb; and that a certain proportion of the invaders were not only mounted, but capitally mounted,

* "You must know that the practice of Tartars going to battle is to take each a bow and 60 arrows. Of these 30 are light with small sharp points, for long shots and following up an enemy, whilst the other 30 are heavy, with large broad heads which they shoot at close quarters, and with which they inflict great gashes on face and arms, and cut the enemy's bowstrings and commit great havoc. This everyone is ordered to attend to. And when they have shot away their arrows they take to their swords and maces and lances, which also they ply stoutly."—*Marco Polo*, Bk. IV. Chap. 2.

† The Shōgun rewarded Tokimune richly; but on going home, Tokiyori gravely warned the boy about the danger of accepting valuable presents. The strict yet kindly fashion in which the Hōjōs reared their sons can never be too much commended. When this grand tradition was departed from in the early fourteenth century, the fall of the great house of Hōjō was at once swift and disastrous.

seems very plain. In one thing, and in one thing alone, but that the most cardinal of all things, the islanders were not one whit inferior to the staunchest of the invaders. In sheer courage and gallantry the best Japanese *Bushi* had then and has now few equals and no superior. In spite of all their disadvantages the Japanese here and there did manage to get within striking reach of their foes; and although few of these heroes survived, they worked terrible havoc in the Mongol and Kōryu ranks. Late in the afternoon the islanders drew back behind the protection of the primitive fortifications of Mizuki, raised for Tenchi Tennō by Korean engineers six centuries before. Here the Kyūshū men could have undoubtedly hung on till the levies from Shikoku, and the west of the main island, and the Rokuhara and Kamakura troops arrived, when the Mongols in spite of all their death-dealing artillery would have infallibly been overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers.

But the Mongol stomach for fighting had already, all unknown to the Japanese, been fed full to repletion. Before night closed in the experienced Kōryu pilots had discerned signs of an approaching tempest; and the safety of the Kōryu fleet was their first and most important consideration. The Kōryu contingent of 15,000 men, with mere slaves and butchers among them, had been especially man-handled by the Japanese that day; for the Japanese had a contempt for the Kōryu soldiery, who had over and over again been worsted by Mongols on their own soil. Besides, it had been comparatively easy for the Japanese levies to get into close combat with the Kōryu men; and when it had become a mere question of man to man and sword against sword, the Kōryu "butchers" had gone down as easily as the placid-faced patient oxen had been wont to go down before their axes in the Song-do slaughter-yards. What the exact train of events on this most fateful evening and night of November 19, 1274, in and on the shores of Hakosaki Haven were can possibly never be rescued from the obscurity of such imperfect and inadequate contemporary records as have survived. However, after laboriously wading through all accessible contemporary documents—whether Japanese, Korean, or Chinese—that seem to bear on the matter, I have been brought (of course subject to correction) to the following conclusions:—

Although the Mongols had inflicted terrible losses on the

islanders, and had beaten them off, still there had been no rout. The Japanese now entrenched behind the Mizuki dyke were still vastly superior to the Mongols in numbers; and reinforcements might reach them at any moment. They knew the ground thoroughly, as the Mongols did not; and if the invaders encamped on the battle-field, a night attack was a good deal more than a mere possibility. In such a night engagement the invaders could reap no advantage from their artillery or the greater range of their bows; it would all be close-quarter sword work, and even fighting in orderly tactical formations would be impossible. In fine, in a night engagement, the primitive Japanese tactics would have been terribly effective, for the Mongols would infallibly have had to meet their foes at close quarters and in individual sword contests. And what these island fanatics could accomplish with their heavy, two-handed razor-edged blades the Mongols had just experienced with lively disgust. In fact, although the Japanese loss had been far greater than that of the expeditionary force, the Mongol casualties on that day had been such as few Mongol armies of 25,000 men had sustained in a contest of eight hours during all the years they had fought in China. Plainly, the risk of a night attack could not be faced with prudence; especially so when experienced seamen declared that there were clear indications that a tornado was brewing. The best course was to re-embark and pass the night on board the vessels of the fleet.

So orders for a general re-embarkation were issued; and to cover that operation the great shrine of Hakoziaki was fired, and several of the villages fringing the strand were set ablaze. Soon the Japanese behind the Mizuki embankment saw the evening sky ruddy with the lurid glow of wildly leaping and rapidly spreading flames, announcing the ruin of the altars of their gods, and of their own hearths and homes. However, the conflagration cannot have lasted long, for it must have been drowned out by the terrible deluge of rain accompanying the tornado which presently burst with devastating fury. All through the darkness of the night the Japanese cowered shelterless behind the Mizuki dyke; and when morning at last dawned they saw the last vessels of the invaders' fleet running out through the mouth of Hakoziaki Bay. One ship with about a hundred men on board ran aground on Shiga

spit, which forms the northern horn of the Haven; and these unfortunates were promptly captured, carried to Mizuki, and there put to the sword. Many of the Kōryū vessels foundered on the open sea; and when the remnants of the expedition rendezvoused at Hap harbour, it was found that its operations, so far, had cost it the lives of 13,200 men. Doubtless a large proportion of these perished by shipwreck; but it is undoubted that the Mongol casualties on Hakōzaki strand had been exceedingly heavy. The resistance the invaders there met with had been so determined, that the leaders of the expedition must have had their eyes fully opened to the fact that the idea of conquering the islands of Japan with a force of but 40,000 men was ludicrously absurd.

Yet Kublai was very loath to take any such view of the matter; for his generals, by way of explaining away their ill success, appear to have attributed the disastrous result of the expedition to the accident of the fury of the elements. It is but natural that they should have made the most of their having successfully beaten off the Japanese assault and compelled the islanders to retire behind the Mizuki wall in the actual fighting. At all events, the Emperor evidently believed that the Japanese had got such a lesson that they would now be somewhat readier to respond to his diplomatic advances than they had hitherto shown themselves to be. Accordingly, yet another mission was dispatched; this time actually to summon the Sovereign of Japan to repair to Peking in order to do obeisance, as the Kōryū King had done! On this occasion the envoys landed in Nagato, whence they were sent to Dazaifu. Hence in June 1275 four of the mission were sent on to Kamakura without being allowed to enter Kyōto on the way: and a little later the Bakufu ordered yet another of the envoys to be brought up. Three or four months afterwards these were all executed outside the city of Kamakura, and their heads exposed on the public pillories.

Meanwhile Hōjō Sanemasa, the first Kyūshū Tandai, had been sent down to Dazaifu to put the island in a thorough state of defence; while the office of the Nagato Keigoban, which was soon to become the Nagato Tandai, was also organised. Kyūshū and Nagato would be the likeliest immediate objectives of any invading armament; but other points were also provided for. The Mongols next time might make

some eastern Kōryū harbour their base, and crossing the Sea of Japan might attempt to assail Kyōto from the north. Accordingly the levies of the Hokurikudō were specially charged with the watch and ward of Tsuruga Haven. The invaders might also make their way up the Inland Sea; and so Harima was put under arms. Of course it was hopeless for any Japanese naval force to try to cope with the enemy on the high seas; but along the coasts and in inland waters, the small Japanese war junks might very well be expected to prove of great service. Accordingly we find a very strict maritime conscription of capable helmsmen and able seamen enforced at this date. At the same time everything possible was done to lighten the fiscal burdens of the people, and to economise the national resources.

All this, of course, was highly admirable. But there is another side to the shield. The notion that all Japanese are and have been at all times superhumanly or supernaturally patriotic, ready to sink every idea of self-interest at the national call, can easily be shown to be mistaken. The Japanese are pretty much the same as the other sinful sons of man; there have been and still are good and bad, brave men and cowards, self-seekers and true patriots among them, just as there have been and are among Britishers and Americans and all their "even Christians." There are Bakufu dispatches still in existence charging Ōtomo, Shimadzu, and Shōni to see to it that the landed proprietors who had failed to rise in defence of the national liberties in November 1274 should be suitably dealt with! On the other hand, we find that not a few of those who had responded to the call had been actuated by the hope of glory and reward as much as by anything else, for we find some of the most prominent chiefs proceeding to Kamakura for the express purpose of pressing their claims to "recompense" there. In Japan, at all times, there have always been a few choice spirits who have looked upon the practice and exercise of virtue as its own sufficient and exceeding great reward. But in Dai Nippon, as in other countries, these spirits have rarely been in a majority; they have merely been the "little leaven" that has now and then succeeded in "leavening the whole lump."

The behaviour of certain of the Court nobles in these years of great national stress was not specially praiseworthy.

Their weak and temporising attitude towards the haughty and imperious Kublai has already been adverted to. On this great question alone they seem to have been unanimous, for mutual jealousy, faction, and intrigue were by no means silenced by the impending menace of foreign invasion. To modern Western readers one standing and chronic cause for contention may very well appear to have been a very trivial one. But the *Kugé* of the time was just as proud of his literary and polite accomplishments as the *Bushi* was of his courage and skill in arms. Sufficient reference has already been made to the ludicrously absurd importance assigned to ability in turning out Japanese "poems" of thirty-one syllables at the Nara, and more especially the Kyōto, Court. Any great and renowned master in this craft—of course, always provided that he belonged to the privileged blue-blooded aristocratic ring—could set, if not the whole decalogue, at all events its seventh commandment, at defiance with full assurance of impunity. Before a deftly-turned *Tanka*, the tradition was that female coyness, if not chastity, was bound to yield as readily as the walls of Jericho fell flat before the blasts of the priestly trumpets and the shouts of the Israelitish people, while even the highest Ministers were apt to set infinitely more store by a reputation as an arbiter of taste in the world of *belles-lettres* and polite accomplishments than by renown as a great and successful administrator of the affairs of the nation. In the great Imperial poetical contests, which were held periodically, as many as 1,000 or 1,500 candidates for distinction occasionally appeared. In 951 a special "Poetry Bureau" had been established, for the management of these poetical tournaments; and the practice had become to deposit the finer pieces then presented in the archives of this institution. From time to time, by Imperial command, anthologies from these were selected and published. Subsequent to the publication of the *Manyōshū*, down to 1205, eight of these official collections had been issued. In 1223 and 1250, 1267, and 1280, further new volumes were compiled. Now, the question as to who was to have the supreme distinction of selecting and editing the pieces for the latter two, and especially for the last of these new anthologies of Japanese verse had been, and was, a burning one among the Court nobles of Kyōto. It is true that when the storm of Mongol

invasion actually burst, the *Kugé* were fain to drop their miserable internal squabbles for the nonce, and to devote all their time and energies to praying to the gods, and to religious ceremonies and functions. But during the years while the tempest was plainly brewing they continued culpably heedless of everything except their own petty interests and differences.

If certain of the *Kugés* were bad, the greatest and wealthiest of the monasteries were worse. As a plain matter of fact, it was in seasons of dire national calamity that the priesthood had invariably found its greatest advantage; and this supreme menace of foreign invasion was destined to be a veritable mine of wealth and influence to it. In 1264 the Miidera monks had burned and sacked the temples of Hi-ei-zan; and two months later the holy rabble of Hi-ei-zan had done as much for Miidera; while in the same year the priests of Nara, "Divine Tree" and all, had poured into the capital and had kept it in a state of seething disorder for days. And all this for the most worldly and grossly material, if not for the very slightest, of reasons. In the Kwantō the priesthood, while greatly honoured and respected, was confined to a pretty strict discharge of its own special and appropriate functions by the Hōjōs and their councillors. But even there, of late years there had been serious religious disturbances. But these must be placed on an entirely different footing from those of the armed debates of Hi-ei-zan, Miidera, and the Nara temples. The Kwantō religious disturbances had been the outcome of an honest difference of opinion merely; for there is nothing to show that either Nichiren or his Zenshū opponents were insincere in their beliefs, or were wantonly endeavouring to derive worldly fame or to amass filthy lucre from the propagation of their cult and creed. In truth, the religious ferment in the Kwantō was really a great national gain. The services rendered by Nichiren have already been discussed. But his Zenshū adversaries, who had exercised a great and healthy and quickening influence over the Kama-kura *Bushi* for more than two generations, had an exceedingly meritorious record,—vastly different from that of the Kyōto and Nara priests. All the Hōjōs had been, or were, devout and fervent adherents of this robust sect; and often had some of its abbots as their most trusted and trusty councillors. What was perhaps especially fortunate at this time was that

some of these were Chinamen, who had a hearty dislike for the Mongol conquerors of their native land. Dōryū (1214–1278) had been in Kamakura for the last thirty-one years of his life; and the year following Dōryū's death, Sogen arrived from Southern China (1279), and at once received the full confidence of Hōjō Tokimune. Thus the young Regent was fully informed about the course of events on the continent and about the certainty of another Mongol attempt on Japan.

Although the five years' leaguer of Saianfu had come to an end in 1273, it was not till 1279 that the complete overthrow of the Sung in Fukhien and Kwangtung was effected. During all this time vast Mongol armies were needed in Southern China. And meanwhile Kublai continued to be seriously threatened by the vast power of his relative Kaidu from Turkestan. All this had a good deal to do with the postponement of a second and stronger expedition against the Island Empire. Again, the Mongols had no fleet of their own. It is true that on the Yellow River Kublai had as many as 15,000 craft; but they were small. "Each of these vessels, taking one with another, will require 20 mariners, and will carry 15 horses with the men belonging to them, and their provisions, arms, and equipments."* Plainly, such boats were unserviceable for an over-sea expedition. As for Kōryu, she was utterly exhausted; and Kublai had to acknowledge that much when his vassal, the Kōryu King, protested in 1275 that it was entirely impossible for him to equip another fleet. But by 1279 things in the peninsula had mended somewhat; and in that year the King was summoned to Peking to discuss the project of another armament against Japan. The result was that His Majesty returned to superintend the construction of a new Kōryu fleet of 1,000 vessels, to levy crews for them, and also a subsidiary land force of 20,700 men, while later on a Mongol army 50,000 strong was marched overland to the point of embarkation.

But all this was only a part of Kublai's preparations. With the complete overthrow of the Sung he had become master of the great maritime resources of Southern China. How formidable these really were will readily appear by a reference to Yule's *Marco Polo*, Bk. III., Ch. 1: "Each of their great

* *Marco Polo*, Bk. II., Ch. 64.

ships requires at least 200 mariners; some of them 300." An immense Armada of the great ships was meanwhile being mustered in Zayton Harbour (Chinchew) in Fukhien, opposite Formosa; and on these a force given at 100,000 men embarked. This fleet was to sail up the coast, and form a junction with the Kōryu armament, somewhere between Quelpart and Kyūshū.

Meanwhile, Kublai made still one more effort to attain his end by diplomacy. In the summer of 1280 yet another Mongol mission arrived at Hakata, where its members were detained while their dispatches were sent on and submitted to the Court and the Bakufu. These dispatches announced the complete overthrow of the Sung and summoned Japan to enter into friendly intercourse with the Mongol (Yuen) dynasty. All the notice that the Bakufu took of this was to send down prompt orders to Hakata for the immediate execution of the venturesome envoys. Nothing remained for Kublai now but to push on his preparations for the conquest of Japan apace.

By the spring of the following year, the Kōryu fleet was thoroughly equipped and manned; but the Zayton armament was not yet fully ready to put to sea. However, the Northerners did not wait for its arrival; but at once stood over from Masampo to Tsushima. On this occasion the little island by no means fell such an easy prey to the invader as it had done seven years before. According to the Korean accounts, the Mongols at first obtained a success over the Japanese here; but when the latter were reinforced, the allies were beaten off with considerable losses. "The allied forces then went into camp, where 3,000 Mongols died of fever. General Hong was very anxious to retreat, but General Kim said, 'We started out with three months' rations, and we have as yet been out but one month. We cannot go back now. When the 100,000 contingent arrives, we will attack the Japanese again.'"

At last the approach of the van of the great Southern Armada was announced, and the Kōryu expedition thereupon put to sea again, and sailed out to meet it off the island of Iki. Iki was attacked by the Northerners on June 10; and after reducing it, they made for various parts of the Chikuzen coast between Munakata and Hakosaki Haven, in which they

seized the islets of Genkai and Noko and the spit of Shiga, on which last position the Japanese would appear to have kept up a series of most desperate and determined assaults. It was on June 23 that the Northerners effected their landing. What exactly took place between that date and the great tornado of August 14-15, fifty-two days later on, it is impossible to say, for contemporary accounts of the actual military operations are meagre and confusing.

During these days the Southern Armada evidently kept on arriving in successive squadrons. That these various squadrons formed units of two great divisions appears very probable. Two Admirals-in-Chief held command; according to some accounts their dissension was a factor that greatly contributed to the ultimate failure of the expedition; according to others, the Admiral of the leading division became ill, and returned, and when the Admiral of the rear division did arrive he found matters in a precarious, if not actually desperate, condition. Be that as it may, Hirado was evidently seized by one or other of the Southern squadrons; and a huge force of Chinese troops was disembarked at various points in Northern Hizen. The object of this is pretty plain. Here the Japanese had raised no specially strong defences; while the whole circuit of Hakozaki Haven, from Imatsu right round the bay, had been strongly fortified by forced labour since 1275. Behind their stone ramparts there, the islanders hung on doggedly and tenaciously in spite of all the fire of the trebuchets and similar artillery mounted on the Mongol fleet. From Northern Hizen an invading force might turn the strong Japanese works fringing Hakozaki Bay, provided it overbore the resistance of the Japanese levies thrown forward to bar its advance. One great difficulty here is the total absence of dates. When these troops landed, and how long the Kyūshū men held them in check, we simply do not know. But two points are sufficiently clear, and these are, first, that these Southerners were effectually held in check till the great tornado burst; and secondly that it was these Southerners who furnished by far the greater portion of the victims who were shortly afterwards immolated to expiate the overweening ambition of Kublai, and the patriotic resentment of Japan. And these hapless Southerners were mostly pure Chinese, who until a few years—in the case of some of

them, indeed, a few months—before had been fighting the Mongols to the death! Naturally, their hearts could never have been in the task of this Japanese expedition at all. It is highly probable that their enthusiasm in the Mongol cause was no more intense than that of the Polish regiments was for Russia in the war of 1904-5. That they were of much less fighting value than the 46,000 or 47,000 Mongols on board the Kōryū fleet in Hakozaki Haven scarcely admits of dispute. What is at all events clear is that down to August 14 they did not succeed in turning the Japanese position from Imatsu northwards. The main Japanese defence was undoubtedly at Hakata, and behind the long stone wall fringing Hakozaki Haven. But it must not be overlooked that this was only a mere section of a long curve, extending at least from Munakata into Northern Hizen which had not only to be held, but to be held effectually. That the invaders actually succeeded in breaking through this long defensive line during the fifty-two days before the great tornado does not appear. On the other hand the Japanese losses, whether in repelling attacks or delivering assaults—more especially on Shiga spit—were undoubtedly heavy.

Meanwhile, to the great surprise of the Mongols, the Japanese had actually begun to assume the offensive on the water. That they had been assiduous in equipping strong flotillas for operations on the coast and in the Inland Sea has been already stated;* and this "mosquito" fleet presently began to give a very good account of itself. Some of its units were splendidly handled by such daring and intrepid captains as the brothers Ōgano, and the two Kōnos, Michiari and Michitoki. The latter fell early in the struggle, but Kōno Michiari kept on worrying the invaders till the end. Michiari came of a race of capable and gallant sea-captains; it was to the skill and seamanship of his grandfather Kōno Michinobu that Yoshi-

* "Pictorial scrolls painted by Tosa artists of the era show some of these boats dashing seaward on their reckless errand, and append the names of the soldiers seated in them, as well as the issue of each venture. In no case can more than ten fighting men be counted in one boat."—Captain Brinkléy's *Japan* Vol. II., p. 167. Now, anyone who has seen samples of modern Japanese war pictures, where the imagination is allowed to run riot, will readily understand that these old pictorial scrolls cannot be accepted as conclusive evidence either as to the size or the complement of the Japanese vessels. It is hard to understand why they should have been less formidable than those that fought at Dan-no-ura, nearly a century before.

tsune owed no small part of his success in the extraordinarily brilliant Yashima-Dan-no-ura campaign of 1185. These four captains all distinguished themselves by their more or less successful efforts in cutting out and firing isolated Mongol ships; and finally compelled sections of the invading fleet to draw up alongside of each other, lash themselves together with cables, and lay planks from one deck to another so as to receive prompt reinforcements to deal with Japanese boarding parties.

Meantime the islanders not only hung on to their entrenchments successfully, but actually kept on fiercely assailing the Mongol camp on Shiga spit. At last, according to some accounts, the Mongols, finding they could make no headway at Hakozaki, weighed and retired to the island of Taka in Northern Hizen.* But this statement must be taken with caution; it is probable that it was the Southerners who really occupied Takashima.

The Southern Armada is said to have numbered as many as 3,500 vessels. Seeing that a Kōryū fleet of 1,000 ships was sufficient for the transport of 20,700 Koreans and 50,000 Mongols, a portion of whom must have been cavalry, and that 100,000 men was the extreme strength of the Zayton armament, and that the Zayton ships were then by far the largest afloat anywhere, it is difficult to understand why as many as 3,500 craft should have been necessary to bring up the Southern Chinese. But a reference to *Marco Polo*, Bk. III., Chap. 1, may help to elucidate matters somewhat. "Every great ship has certain large barks or tenders attached to it, carrying 50 or 60 mariners apiece. Each ship has two or three of these barks, but one is bigger than the others. There are also some ten small boats for the service of each great ship. . . . And the large tenders have their boats in like manner." Thus, although there may very well have been as many as 3,500 craft employed in work on the Japanese coast, the "great ships" of the Armada need not have numbered more than 300 or 400.

Whatever may have been the actual vicissitudes of the

* This Takashima (Hawk Island), to the N.E. of Hiradō, is always confused by foreign writers with Takashima (High Island) in Nagasaki Harbour. It was while staying on Hawk Island (together with Froez) that Fernandez compiled the first Japanese-Portuguese Dictionary.

seven weeks' fighting before the great tornado of August 14-15, it is plain that the invaders had so far won no great strategic advantage and made but little headway in breaking down the stubborn Japanese defence. Then on August 15 all hopes of a successful issue to the expedition had to be abandoned by such of the invaders as survived the terrible catastrophe of that eventful day. Here, again, as regards exact details we must be content to remain more or less hopelessly in the dark. As regards the awful hurricane that then burst, some accounts say it blew from the north, others from the north-west, and yet others from the west. All agree that its direction was inshore; and from all of them we can infer that it was the Southerners who were the chief victims of its fury. The Kōryū contingent proper, we are told, got back with a loss of 8,000 men (forty per cent.); and there is no special reason why the Northern Mongols on the Kōryū vessels should have suffered more severely. The Korean accounts have been thus epitomised. "A storm arose from the west, and all the vessels made for the entrance of the harbour together. The tide was running in very strong and the ships were carried along irresistibly in its grip. As they converged to a focus at the mouth of the harbour a terrible catastrophe occurred. The vessels were jammed together in the offing, and the bodies of men and broken timbers of the vessels were heaped together in a solid mass so that a person could walk across from one point of land to another on the mass of wreckage. The wrecked vessels carried the 100,000 men from Kiang-nam (*i.e.* South of the Yang-tse Kiang.)" The "harbour" here probably means Imari Gulf in Northern Hizen, the entrance to which is protected by Takashima.

A certain number of the Chinese established themselves on this island; and here they were presently assailed by Shōni Kagesuke, who either put them to the sword or took them prisoners. Some accounts say that 3,000 prisoners were taken to Hakata, and all massacred there except three who were spared for the purpose of carrying an account of the fate of the expedition back to China. The large force of Southerners landed at various points in Hizen, to turn the left flank of the Japanese at Hakozaki, presently also fell a prey to the islanders. According to the Chinese annals 10,000 or 12,000 of these were made slaves.

Great and thorough as had been the failure of this second attempt on Japan, Kublai was not at all disposed to let the matter rest there; and he at once began to concert measures for a third great armament. But the Mongols began to murmur. The strength and efficiency of Mongol hosts lay principally in their cavalry; and in these over-sea expeditions the Mongol cavalry had been really and truly confined to the rôle of "horse-marines"! And the Mongol horsemen were thoroughly tired of that sort of service. On the advice of a certain Korean, Kublai then resolved to send none but Koreans and Southern Chinese; and forwarded instructions to the Kōryu King to begin to muster men and supplies. But Kōryu was exhausted, and Kublai's Ministers protested strongly against the project, so it had to be postponed, and when Nayan's great revolt occurred in 1286 Kublai's attention was fully engaged with affairs at home for the nonce.

The appearance of the great Armada ought not to have taken the Japanese people by surprise, for as early as March 1280 Tokimune had issued a proclamation stating in the clearest language that the Mongols would certainly attack the Empire again in the May of the following year (1281). Yet, when belated intelligence of the fall of Tsushima reached Kyōto, the consternation of the Court and the citizens was extreme; and the panic soon spread to the populace of the surrounding provinces. One cause of this was a baseless rumour that the invaders had landed in Nagato, had overborne all resistance, and were advancing hot-foot upon the capital. But the chief cause was sheer, crass, unreasoning superstition; scaremongers were busy seeing baneful signs and omens in the heavens and elsewhere—even in their rice-pots. During the war of 1904-5, all this was impossible in Japan; mainly because the purely secular schoolmaster had been abroad in the land for more than a generation before that great struggle. But in 1281 such popular education as there was, was entirely and completely in sacerdotal hands; and to the more unworthy members,—whether in intelligence or moral spirit,—of a special caste that has always common and corporate interests of its own to serve, the great foe has always been not superstition, but science and reasoned and reasonable knowledge. In short, it was to the interests of the priests to exert themselves not to allay, but to intensify the panic and commotion. One result

of all this was that all work and business were suspended, and the transportation of rice and other supplies to the army in Kyūshū temporarily interrupted, while even the capital itself began to suffer from the dearth of supplies in its two great markets. As has been already said, the trustworthy Kwantō records close with 1266. Such contemporary chronicles as we have were mainly compiled in Kyōto. If these devoted a tithe of the attention they have given to religious functions and ceremonies and observances to the real, practical, stressful, gallant hand-to-hand work meanwhile being transacted on the Chikuzen and Hizen sea-board, how truly grateful we should be! But of the heroes who were doing the real work; of the men who were "withal keeping (the equivalent for) their powder dry," we hear very little indeed from these most courtly and ghostly-minded of "Dryasdusts." It is abundantly plain that the whole nation, from the ex-Emperors downwards, passed most of the time during the great crisis on its knees before the gods imploring them for the overthrow of the invader. "Throughout the length and breadth of the land could be heard the tapping and roll of temple drums, the tinkling of sacred bells, the rustle of the sleeves of vestal dancers, and the litanies of priests; while in thousands of temples the wood fire used in the *goma* rite was kept burning, and the smoke of incense ascended perpetually."

All these ghostly services had to be paid for, of course; and, as it at once became a generally accepted article of faith that the great tornado had been expressly sent in gracious answer to their orisons, the priests promptly maintained that their merits in saving the national independence had been even greater than those of the warriors who had fought with merely carnal weapons. And to judge from the measure of recompense awarded to the ecclesiastics and to the soldiers respectively, it is tolerably clear that this claim was admitted by Court and Bakufu alike. "The danger is past, and the god is forgotten." But, according to the general view, the danger was by no means past. Twenty years later, in 1300 or 1301, the appearance of a mysterious fleet of 200 sail off Koshikijima in Satsuma threw the Empire into great consternation; and the priests in many temples were then instructed to conduct services for the overthrow of the invader. And during these intermediate years there had been a continued series of

alarms. During most of the time the Kyūshū troops, or certain portions of them, had been kept under arms, while early in the last decade of the thirteenth century the excitement seems to have been almost as great as it had been in 1274 or 1281. The Bakufu had then ascertained that by Kublai's orders preparations were actually being made in Korea for another Japanese expedition. Kublai died in 1294; and his successor Timur at once ordered these preparations to be abandoned. He also sent priests as envoys to Japan, for when the mission of 1284 had been massacred, the priest accompanying it had alone been spared. One of these priests, at first confined in prison in Izu, was ultimately naturalised as a Japanese, and obtained very high Church preferment, first in Kamakura and afterwards in Kyōto. It was in 1299 that this Ichi-nei arrived in Japan; but even he could not disarm the suspicion of the islanders for a long time. Down to the end of the first decade of the fourteenth century at least, the Kyūshū men were kept harassed by Bakufu injunctions to keep on the alert and be fully prepared to deal with foreign invasion.

The ablest of modern Japanese historians has said not only wittily, but wisely and with perfect truth, that the "Great Wind" of August 14-15, 1281, did a good deal more than wreck and ruin the Mongol Armada merely. Before two generations had passed, it had become abundantly clear that it had really shaken the fabric of Hōjō greatness very rudely indeed. The important question of rewarding meritorious services in repelling the invaders had to be faced; and this was truly a difficult problem to deal with. For the last few centuries Japanese wars had all been civil wars; and in these the confiscated possessions of the vanquished had provided ample recompense for the victors. But the repulse of the Mongols had not put a single extra yard of soil at the disposal of the Bakufu; and as it had been under the strain of keeping the military forces of the nation in general, and of Kyūshū in particular, on a war footing for long years, its resources had been greatly exhausted. The claims of the *religieux* whose prayers had been so efficacious, and whose orisons were still necessary, were first dealt with, and, all things considered, treated with great liberality. Temple domains that had been forfeited were in many cases restored; mortgaged temple estates were relieved from their burdens, and grants of addi-

tional lands made. In not a few cases this bore hardly on military men who had become possessed of former temple lands sometimes fairly and justly enough, for at this time the commissioners were very rigorous in their land-survey and in their inspection and interpretation of title-deeds and mortgages. When the monasteries and shrines were finally settled with, it was found that there was little left for the military men, some of whom had meanwhile been despoiled of their holdings, or part of them, for the benefit of the Church.

A *Tandai* had been installed in Kyūshū in 1275; and now the administration of the great southern island was assimilated to that of the Rokuhara, the three *Shugo*, Shōni, Ōtomo, and Shimadzu, being appointed assessors. For years they had to struggle with the reward question to very little purpose. Presently we find Kamakura again refusing to entertain claims or petitions or suits for recompense there, and referring them all back to Kyūshū; and finally, near the end of the century, declaring the whole question to be closed. All this caused profound dissatisfaction with the Bakufu in many quarters in Kyūshū; where, meanwhile, the local landowners were harassed with the burden of keeping the coast defences in repair, and their vassals frequently under arms at Hakata and other points remote from their own estates. Nor was this all. The conduct of the Hōjō *Tandai* and his favourites was the reverse of satisfactory in some respects, especially in the administration of law. Besides, they began to abuse their position in order to amass manors and other kinds of wealth. Hōjō Tokimune had died at the age of 34 in 1284; and with his death the Bakufu entered upon its downward course. Some of the Hōjōs in Nagato, in Shikoku, in Harima, and in Echigo presently began to give rise to complaints similar to those made by the Kyūshū gentry, although it is fair to say that there were still many upright and able administrators among these. For the best part of a generation after 1281, the nation continued to be haunted with the dread possibility of another Mongol invasion; and the sense of the absolute need of concord and unity to meet such a contingency probably did much to constrain the military class to bear hardships and occasional injustices with an unusual degree of patience.

The seventh Hōjō Regent, Sadatoki, was a boy of fourteen when he succeeded his father Tokimune, in 1284. The true his-

tory of Sadatoki and his times can perhaps never be written; such contemporary records as remain are fragmentary and silent on points of vital interest to the modern historian, while most subsequent accounts can be shown to be so inaccurate in other sections of the narrative where original authorities are available for checking them that we cannot place any great confidence in their assertions. This is all the more to be regretted inasmuch as the period from 1284 to 1311 is an important one.

However, in the midst of much that is obscure, two points are tolerably clear. In the first place the Bakufu machine was no longer the wonderful efficient instrument of administration it had been in the days of Ōe Hiromoto and Miyoshi Yasunobu. And in the second, the Hōjōs were no longer the happy and united house they once had been. Even in 1272, one of the Rokuhara *Tandai* and several of his relatives and partisans in Kamakura had been executed for plotting against Tokimune and the Bakufu. Now, just after the death of Tokimune in 1284, the Southern Rokuhara *Tandai*, Tokikuni, was suddenly recalled, exiled to Hitachi, and soon after put to death there. And before the death of Sadatoki in 1311, there had been several fatal internecine brawls between certain of his Hōjō relations, occasioned by the competition for power and place.

Again, among the Bakufu councillors, some of whom were now mere nonentities, were certain who were playing for their own hands. In 1285 the most influential men in Kamakura were Adachi Yasumori and Taira Yoritsuna. The former was Sadatoki's maternal grandfather; the latter was his *Shitsuji* or *Naikwanryo*, which may be translated either as First Minister or Major Domo of the Regent. The rivalry between these two was intense. Just at this time, Adachi's son Mune-kage adopted the family name of Minamoto instead of Fujiwara, which his house had hitherto borne. His grandfather had been a relative of Yoritomo; and Taira Yoritsuna now insinuated that the Adachis were aiming at nothing less than the Shōgunate. The accusation was listened to; and the result was the all but complete extirpation of the Adachi clan. Eight years later Taira Yoritsuna's own fate overtook him. His own eldest son accused him of aiming at the regency; and, together with his second son and over forty retainers,

Yoritsuna was made away with. Three years later, there was yet another similar tragedy in Kamakura, the victim on this occasion being Yoshimi, a descendant of Yoritomo's brother Noriyori. Although the direct line of Yoritomo had long been extinct, the name of the Minamoto septs was legion; and many of them were beginning to chafe at having to bend to the will of the Hōjōs, who had originally been mere Minamoto vassals.

Down to 1293, Sadatoki remained under the tutelage of his first Minister Taira Yoritsuna. During the ensuing eight years (1293-1301) he seems to have taken the work of his office seriously. It is probable that he was a man of clear head and strong will, and that he really set great store upon having the administration honestly and efficiently conducted. But on the other hand details were irksome to him; to "toil terribly" in the fashion of Yasutoki and Tokiyori was to him merely a counsel of perfection, unless indeed in connection with questions of cardinal importance. Accordingly a brief eight years of the strenuous life proved more than ample for him; and in 1301, at the early age of one-and-thirty, he shaved his head and "entered religion." His cousin (and later on son-in-law) Morotoki, a young man of twenty-six, then became nominal *Shikken*, and he is usually counted as the eighth of the Hōjō Regents (1301-1311). But as a matter of fact, Moritoki died a few months before Sadatoki; and during his regency some of his relatives were from time to time associated with him in his office, while Sadatoki continued to be consulted on all important issues.

In 1303, two years after Sadatoki had become a priest, his eldest son Takatoki was born to him by the daughter of a younger brother of that Adachi Yasumori who had perished in 1285. Meanwhile the confidence of Sadatoki had been won by Nagasaki Enki, a nephew of Taira Yoritsuna; and before his death in 1311 Sadatoki entrusted these two men with the care of Takatoki, it being understood that the boy was to become *Shikken* on reaching years of discretion. During the next five years as many as four Hōjō relatives were at one time or another titular Regents; but the real power was in the hands of Takatoki's guardians, and more particularly in those of Nagasaki Enki. Then when Takatoki was made Regent in 1316 at the age of thirteen, this unscrupulous, avari-

cious, and utterly corrupt lay-bonze became virtually supreme in Kamakura. By this cunning old man Takatoki's education was not so much neglected as conducted in a manner that could not possibly have been worse, for the prime object plainly was not to fit, but utterly to unfit the youth for the discharge of the onerous duties of his office and position. At the same time there was no great need for Nagasaki to cudgel his priestly brains to devise means for attaining his object, for that could easily be compassed by the commonplace and hackneyed device of ambitious Japanese underlings, who find their own account in unduly magnifying their master. He could most plausibly insist that the lineal Head of the great House of Hōjō that had saved the national existence of the Empire thirty years before, and which had regulated the succession to the Imperial seat for nearly a century, should be treated in a manner consonant with his dignity. Now, since 1219 there had been a succession of Kyōto civilian Shōguns in Kamakura, all of them without exception being mere gilded figure-heads and political ineffectualities. But they had all unknown to themselves contrived to do much to prepare the way for the fall of the Hōjōs, for thanks to them and their attendants Kyōto standards of judging things had become dominant in the Kwantō. Sadatoki's way of living had been almost as magnificent as that of his nominal lord; and hence when Nagasaki insisted that Takatoki should be reared like a young Shōgun, there were no murmurers.

The Bakufu now proceeded gaily and rapidly along that downward course on which it had entered a generation before. The tendency of things presently became so obvious that in 1318 we find the Emperor Hanazono passing some very caustic remarks upon the shortcomings of the Kwantō administration; and the Court nobles openly congratulating themselves upon the approaching end of their long eclipse by upstart military swaggerers. The chief hope of the Court party lay in the possibility of serious dissensions among the military men themselves. During the last twenty or thirty years the Hōjō and their officers in Kyūshū had given serious offence to non-Bakufu vassals like the Kimotsuki of Ōsumi and others; and many non-Bakufu vassals in other parts of the Empire had had only too good cause to complain of aggression and spoliation by Hōjō chicanery.

But even among the Bakufu vassals proper, there was a rapidly gathering and spreading sense of discontent. In the last two decades of the thirteenth century many had fallen into such straits that they could neither pay their taxes nor discharge their other obligations to the authorities. The general excuse for this was that they had been hopelessly impoverished by the burdens of national defence. Such indeed might have been the case in Kyūshū and the West; but in the Kwantō at least the great cause was simply the extravagance occasioned by the "fast" and fashionable life of Kamakura. To enable them to ruffle it there, needy *Samurai* mortgaged their holdings to wealthy neighbours, to Kamakura merchants and money-lenders and even to farmers who had saved money. As the interest ranged from sixty to ninety-six per cent., the whole income of the estate often went to the mortgagee; and foreclosure suits were incessant. After a great deal of patchwork legislation, in which laws were now and then revoked after a few weeks' trial, the Bakufu finally had resort to the desperate expedient of a *Tokusei* in 1297. By this so-called Act of Benevolent Government, suits for the recovery of interest were forbidden, mortgages cancelled, and the future sale or mortgage of *Samurai* holdings interdicted. There were certain saving provisions in the enactment; but as its general effect was to strike at the root of all credit, it soon proved economically and socially disastrous. It mortally offended the capitalists, among whom there were *Samurai*; and it made the raising of money more difficult to needy borrowers. In a short time the poorer *Samurai* were more deeply involved in debt than ever; for extant legal documents conclusively show that subterfuges for evading the law were readily devised. The only hope of relief for this huge and ever-swelling mass of *Samurai* penury and indebtedness lay *in being on the victorious side in a great civil war, when there would be confiscated manors to dispose of.*

In the endeavour to alleviate the economic distress of its vassals, the Bakufu, between 1284 and 1297, had stultified itself by the issue of many temporising regulations, which being often at serious conflict with each other had introduced a fatal element of uncertainty into the exact state of the law. A similar flaw is only too apparent in its legislation in connection with several other matters. Most Japanese historical

text-books allude to the great crop of law-suits that sprang up in the years following the repulse of the Mongols. The chief reason is not far to seek; it lay in the incompetence of the Kamakura legislators. In the early days of the Bakufu, judgements were often written on a single sheet of paper and they rarely extended beyond a compass of five or six pages. Now they often cover scores of sheets; and, with their auxiliary documents and what not, occasionally assume the proportions of respectable volumes! Presently we hear of suits having been instituted, and petitions filed, years before they were decided or dealt with. And even when judgement was finally given, it was sometimes found to be no real decision at all. It was "ambiguous"; and left the litigants exactly where they were before the suit was instituted, in every respect except that they were both so much the poorer by the amount of the bribes they had surreptitiously forwarded to the judge. It was the result of one of many cases of this description that precipitated the impending fall of the Hōjō and the Kamakura Bakufu.

The Andō family, descended from Abe Yoritoki, was settled at Tsugaru, and for the last hundred years an Andō had been Yezo Kwanryō; in other words, Bakufu Lieutenant to deal with the Ainu in what is now the Hokkaidō. About 1319 or 1320 a succession dispute broke out in the Andō family; and both parties appealed to Kamakura. There Nagasaki Takasuke had succeeded his father, Nagasaki Enki, in power, and in ascendancy over his friend and playmate, Hōjō Takatoki. One great article of Takasuke's creed was to "take his good thing wherever he found it"; and accordingly he most impartially and large-heartedly accepted the kind offerings of all parties to this Andō family succession dispute. In due course of time, after a decent and proper volume of water had been allowed to run under the bridges, a decision was at last "handed down" to these rustic litigants. The respective merits of the cases, as measured by the value of their "thank-offerings," were so nearly equal that the only possible judgement was an "ambiguous" one. Thereupon the disputants proceeded to settle the matter by force of arms; and at last the Bakufu had to dispatch a considerable force to restore order in Mutsu, where Andō Gorō was getting the upper hand. This chieftain thereupon summoned a large body of

Ainu auxiliaries from Yezo, and with these and his own clansmen he effectually held the Hōjō army in check. The Bakufu tried to keep all this as quiet as possible; but the news leaked out, and produced a profound impression, especially in Kyōto. The Court nobles were jubilant; for the episode served to reassure them that in their anticipation of the speedy fall of the Bakufu the thought was something more than the mere child of the wish. Certain of them soon began to plot; but it was not till 1324 that the Hōjōs got to know of this. In that year it was discovered one Hino brother had actually been in Kamakura on a secret mission tampering with the discontented element there; and that another had been engaged in similar work in the Home Provinces and Kyōto, where two Minamoto captains from Mino, Toki, and Tajimi had been won over. These latter had to commit suicide; and one of the Hinos was banished to Sado, the Emperor's intercession proving sufficient to secure the release of the other.

The elements for an explosion which might blow the Hōjōs, if not the Bakufu, to the moon, had been accumulating for long; and it was rapidly becoming a mere question of applying the match. As it was the Emperor Daigo II. who fired the mine, it now becomes necessary for us to direct our attention to the antecedent course of events in Kyōto.

	Birth.	Accession.	Abdication.	Death.
Fukakusa II.	1243	1247	1259	1304
Kameyama	1249	1259	1274	1305
Uda II.	1267	1274	1287	1324
Fushimi	1265	1287	1298	1317
Fushimi II.	1288	1298	1301	1336
Nijo II.	1285	1302		1308
Hanazono	1297	1308	1318	1348
Daigo II.	1287	1319		1338

It will be observed that the five sovereigns between Kameyama and Daigo II. were mere boys at their accession, the only exception being Nijō II., who was seventeen. As a matter of fact not one of these was allowed to administer the Empire while titular Sovereign, the direction of affairs being in the hands of one or other of the ex-Emperors. Furthermore, it will be noted that at one time, from 1298 to 1304, there were actually no fewer than five of these ex-Emperors alive! It was between these that disputes arose,—not between the Emperors, who were little better than pawns in the game, the nominal occupation of the throne by the son or grandson enabling the father or grandfather to exercise the Imperial authority. Then there was frequent discord over the management and disposal of the estates designated by Saga II.'s will for the support of the ex-Emperor. Moreover, the fortunes of the Court nobles depended greatly upon their being attached to the service of the line in power; and so the *Kuge* became split into two great antagonistic factions—and sometimes more—which kept up a bitter warfare of intrigue against each other. How the bitterness of their relations was still further intensified by literary squabbles has already been alluded to.

If it had been the custom for the Sovereign to remain in occupation of the throne for the term of his natural life after his accession, occasions for disputes would have been minimised. But abdication at an early age was the invariable practice; and Saga II.'s will had said nothing as to the length of the tenure of the Imperial dignity by future Emperors. Another fatal defect was that nothing about primogeniture was said in that most unlucky document; and hence even in one and the same line we meet with the appearance of rival candidates and their supporters! Two centuries before such a state of things would infallibly have occasioned a great succession war, and very possibly a whole series of such contests. Even now, although these perennial disputes were always temporarily composed without the effusion of blood, it

was by the power of the sword that they were really settled, for in the last resort it was the Bakufu that pronounced judgement. The intervention of Kamakura was being continually solicited by one or other of the rival lines or their partisans; generally of course by the line that for the time being was subsisting on the scanty fare of expectation. Of course it is only too plain that Bakufu officials of the stamp of the Nagasakis must have been greatly delighted with such a situation, and have blessed the gods for inspiring Saga II. with such a happy idea as that "will" of his.

Naturally enough both lines endeavoured to profit as much by, and suffer as little as possible from, the effect of the provisions of Saga II.'s well-meant and most affectionate legacy of mischief to his favourite sons and to the Empire at large. Evasions, or attempts at evasion, of the purport of the "will" were only to be expected. The first occurred in 1274 when Kameyama abdicated in favour of his own son, Uda II., instead of that of one of his nephews, the sons of his elder brother and predecessor, Fukakusa II. As has been said, Fukakusa's turn came in 1287, when his own son Fushimi became Emperor; and in 1298 he made an effort to pay off his brother Kameyama in his own coin, by getting the Imperial succession transferred to a grandson of his own instead of to a grandson of Kameyama.* Against this the Kameyama, or junior line, protested strongly, and after several appeals to Kamakura got the Bakufu to depose Fushimi II. in 1301, and install Nijō II., a grandson of Kameyama's, on the throne.

Exact details of the matter are obscure and conflicting; but it seems that it was at this time that Hōjō Sadatoki decided that the tenure of the throne was to extend to ten years, unless previously determined by the death of the occupant.

Nijō II. died in 1308, and he was duly succeeded by a re-

* Kameyama, as a mere *paterfamilias*, must have been sadly put to it by the problem of how to make ends meet. In 1305 "he died at the age of fifty-seven. . . . At the age of fourteen he had already become a father; after his abdication (1274), he had children every year, even after shaving his head (1290)!" Some accounts allege that he had been compelled to take the tonsure because of his complicity in the attempt of a certain Asawara Tameyori, his son, and a few followers to assassinate the Emperor Fushimi during the night of April 19, 1290. Finding the Emperor had escaped, Asawara sat down on the Imperial couch and committed *hara-kiri* there. There was another attempt to assassinate an Emperor in his bed-room in 1444.

representative of the Fukakusa II. or senior branch, in the person of Hanazono, who abdicated at the end of the ten years term. The new Sovereign, Daigo II., of the Kameyama, or Junior branch, was the brother of Nijō II.; and was the first Emperor for long who had really attained to manhood before his accession. At that date, 1318, he was thirty-one years of age. Yet, even so, he was not permitted to direct affairs in person at first; for the first four years of his reign it was his father Uda II. who ruled. At this point there was another irregularity. A Crown Prince was designated; and this Crown Prince, who should have been taken from the Senior line, was a son of Nijō II., and consequently a nephew of Daigo II. This Crown Prince, Kuninaga, died in 1326, and Daigo II. wished to have him replaced by his own son, Prince Takanaga, which would have been a still more glaring infraction of Saga II.'s "will." Now a year or two before this the Hino plot against the Hōjōs had been discovered and dealt with; and Daigo II. had been suspected of complicity in that intrigue, and had found it advisable to disavow all knowledge of it and to protest his good-will towards Kamakura. But the Bakufu remained suspicious; and now in 1326 it refused to fall in with Daigo II.'s views, and had Kazuhito, a son of Fushimi II. of the Elder line, nominated Heir Prince.*

This decision of the Bakufu was strictly correct, if regard was to be had to the terms of Saga II.'s will. But Daigo II. knew something of the history of the Imperial line and of the Empire over which his ancestors had not merely reigned, but ruled till times not so very remote! Besides, one of the three counsellors who commanded his deepest confidence was the very first and greatest living authority on the history of Japan. This was one of the three later "Fusa" (Nochi no Sambō), as Yoshida Sadafusa, Madenokōji Nobufusa, and Kitabatake Chikafusa were called. The last of these, Kitabatake, is really one of the great characters in the history of his country, for

* When Fukakusa II. abdicated in 1259, he retired to the Ji-myō-in Temple (or Palace) in Kyōto; and this became the chief residence of those of his line,—which is consequently known as the Ji-myō-in-tō. Later on, the Daikaku-ji at Saga was occupied by Kameyama (1276), and his son Uda II. (1288); and theirs—the junior line—appears as the Daikakuji-tō in Japanese histories. For the sake of simplicity, we shall use the terms Senior and Junior; the line of Kameyama, to which Daigo II. and all the "Southern" Emperors belonged being not the Senior, but the Junior one.

he played a leading part in the annals of his own time, where he was illustrious on the battle-field as well as at the council-board; while his writings were destined to exercise a profound influence upon the political thought and theory of Japan at various times and especially in the nineteenth century. Kitabatake had evidently not forgotten the words of Shōtoku Taishi: "In a country there are not two lords; the people have not two masters. The Sovereign is the master of the people of the whole country. The officials to whom he gives charge are all his vassals. How can they, as well as the Government, presume to levy taxes on the people?" The actual conditions at that time were a negation of any such political philosophy. No doubt many causes had been at work to bring about the decay of the power and prestige of the Sovereign; but one of the greatest and most immediate had been the will of Saga II. That unfortunate and fatal document must henceforth be set aside at all hazards; and the succession to the throne confined to a single line. To surrender it to the Senior line, as would have to be done in 1328 or 1329, would be to surrender it to a boy, for the Prince-Imperial would be no more than fifteen years at that time and the *Insei* system would have to be reverted to again. The only thing was for Daigo II. to endeavour to cling to power as long as life lasted, or at all events as long as he could; and meanwhile to concert measures for the overthrow of the Hōjōs and the domination of the military caste. The prospects of doing so seemed neither desperate nor even remote, for meanwhile it became plainer and plainer that the Kamakura Bakufu was engaged in digging its own grave.

In the Kwantō things were indeed going from bad to worse with startling rapidity. In 1326 Hōjō Takatoki, then twenty-three years of age, became ill and "entered religion." He transferred the Regency to his own younger brother Yasuie, and to Kanazawa Sadaaki; but they threw up their offices in a few weeks, since they found that Nagasaki Takasuke, who was the real governing power, would consult them in nothing. Thereupon Akabashi Moritoki and Hōjō Koresada were made joint *Shikken*, but Nagasaki's influence continued supreme, for his ascendancy over Takatoki was complete.

Meanwhile Takatoki's conduct was getting more and more deplorable. Monk as he had become, he still had between

thirty and forty concubines; and what time was not devoted to these was mainly given up to music and dancing and dog-fights. Takatoki summoned *dengaku* players in crowds from all parts of the country, placed them under the care of his officers, and made them entertain guests with their performances. After any brilliant performance, the spectators headed by Takatoki himself often took off their robes and threw them to the actors, and sometimes the hall was filled with piles of garments. These were later redeemed by money-presents; and huge sums were squandered in this way. Nor were Takatoki's kennels less expensive. He had a mania for dog-fights; and certain regular days of the month were fixed for these encounters. Daimyō who wished to curry favour would send up presents of a score of the largest and fiercest hounds they could collect. These animals were fed on fish and birds and decked with collars of gold and silver; and when the champion in a fight was led through the streets people were expected to doff their head-gear and even to kneel down in reverence! And Takatoki's "state" withal was that of an Emperor; and his attitude towards even great Bakufu vassals was haughty as that of a Sovereign to his subjects. Latterly he seems to have resented Nagasaki's ascendancy over him; at the end of 1330 he commissioned one of Nagasaki's own relatives to kill him. Nagasaki quickly got to know of this, and Takatoki then threw all the blame upon his tool, who was sent into exile, as were the whole of his followers.

News of this dissension must have been welcome in Kyōto, where the Bakufu just a few months before had seemed to be on the point of unearthing the great Imperialistic plot. As it was, three priests had been arrested on suspicion and conveyed to Kamakura; while the Hino brother released in 1325 was now taken down to the Kwantō and killed, and orders sent to Homma, the Governor of Sado, to execute the Hino imprisoned there. Later writers have alleged that it was the Elder line or their partisans that set the Bakufu to work on this occasion; but in support of this contention there is no satisfactory contemporary evidence. That the Jimyō-in party should be eager to have their turn, now that Daigo II.'s term of ten years had more than passed, was only natural; and that Nagasaki would not be offended at being approached by them in a *suitable* manner is only too plain. But that is all

that can be said; and what is certain is that of the arch-conspirators, like Kitabatake, Kamakura had no suspicion whatsoever.

Now just at this time (1330-1) a great pestilence broke out, and the priests were very busy. An Emperor who had showed such a solicitude for his poorer subjects in the famine of 1321 as Daigo II. had done might reasonably be expected to pay frequent visits to the great monasteries to stimulate the monks to exert themselves to appease the wrath of Heaven, and obtain relief from this great national scourge. Hence his visits to Nara and to Hi-ei-zan might have seemed to be not so much harmless as highly praiseworthy. Now, after the miscarriage of 1326, two of Daigo II.'s sons had been sent to Hi-ei-san,—and in 1329 the elder of these became Abbot of the huge and warlike monastery. This in plain language meant that Daigo II. had now a large if but imperfectly disciplined and not very efficient military force at his disposal in the immediate vicinity of the capital. He had a similar one in Nara, while he appears to have come to an understanding with the monks of Kōya-san, which put the services of many of their parishioners, whether clients or “protectors,” at his service. Around and especially behind this great Shingon mountain fane lay tracts of wild country where many of the inhabitants had never accepted the Minamoto or Hōjō domination as anything better than an unfortunate necessity. In Iga, Ise, and Kumano were many descendants of Kiyomori's clansmen now living in abject poverty, but still mindful of the fact that theirs had once been the most powerful house in the Empire. Then there were others whose ancestors had suffered in the great proscriptions of 1221. And besides these there was quite a number of smaller gentry, some of them holding considerable manors, who were not Bakufu vassals, and who had no favours to expect from Kamakura. The most important of these was Kusunoki Masashige, a descendant of Tachibana Moroe; and Kusunoki was quite prepared to take all the risks and responsibilities of leadership in his district when the Banner of Brocade should be unfurled.

In September 1331 it was learned that the Bakufu had decided to effect the transfer of the throne to the Prince-Imperial, who, it will be remembered, belonged to the Senior line. Thereupon Daigo II., taking with him the Imperial Seal,

escaped by night and took refuge in the Temple of Mount Kasagi (on the borders of Yamato and Yamashiro), which had been fortified and was presently garrisoned. The Bakufu troops, fancying the Emperor was in Hi-ei-zan, attacked the great monastery; but the Prince Abbot and his brother made good their escape, the latter joining his father in Mount Kasagi, while the former proceeded to join Kusunoki, who had meanwhile fortified himself in the almost impregnable Castle of Akasaka in Kawachi, some twenty miles or so to the south. This latter proved a very hard nut to crack, indeed; for several weeks it held out most gallantly against a huge investing force—75,000 strong, according to the *Taihei-ki*—and when the Kamakura men at last did carry it by a great effort, they found that both Kusunoki and the Prince Abbot had previously succeeded in stealing through their lines.

Kasagi meanwhile had fallen some time before this, and Daigo II. was now a prisoner in the Rokuhara, while all who had accompanied him were also in the hands of the Bakufu. In April next year, 1332, the deposed Sovereign was banished to the island of Oki, and two of his sons exiled to Tōsa and Sanuki respectively. The last of these presently eluded his warders, and soon became a storm-centre in Shikoku, while Daigo II. made good his escape from Oki almost exactly a year after he had been sent there. And meanwhile during this time many things had happened.

The Prince Abbot, who now assumed the lay-name of Morinaga, was wonderfully successful in his appeal to the population behind Kōya-san, and it presently needed a large Bakufu force to disperse his following in Yoshino. Even so, he himself remained at large; and so was still dangerous. But this was not the worst of it. In June 1332 Kusunoki had actually become strong enough to attempt to capture Kyōto by a *coup de main*. He was repulsed, indeed; but the net effect of the bold venture was to bring new adherents to his standard, and to embolden other secret sympathisers with the Imperialistic cause to declare themselves openly. For example, in August of the same year Akamatsu Enshin began the contest in his native province of Harima. In the same month Kusunoki established himself in the Castle of Chihaya on Mount Kongō, while one of his lieutenants re-occupied the old position of Akasaka. Akasaka again fell in March 1333, but before Chi-

haya the huge beleaguering force met with nothing but disaster upon disaster and Chihaya remained un-reduced till the end. Its gallant and determined defence was of inestimable service to the Imperialistic cause for many reasons. The concentration of 100,000 men,—(this is an exaggerated number no doubt),—stripped the outlying provinces of Bakufu troops, and so encouraged Imperialistic partisans to show their hand there. In Iyo, two chiefs had risen; Kikuchi attacked the Hōjō Tandai in Kyūshū, and although he failed and fell he produced a great moral effect upon his more powerful neighbours, who began to see what was possible. Then in far distant Mutsu, at the other end of the Empire, Yuki had risen. But this was not all. Akamatsu had meanwhile reduced Harima, and advanced into Settsu; and learning that most of the Rokuhara troops were before Chihaya he made a sudden dash upon the capital. After fierce fighting he was driven out of it, as were the monks of Hi-ei-zan a little later; but episodes like these served to indicate that Kamakura was no longer what it had been a century before.

Then just at this time (April or May 1333), Daigo II. escaped from Oki in a fishing-boat and landed in Hōki; and the whole of the west of the main island was at once ablaze. A former Hōjō partisan, Nawa Nagatoshi, received the Emperor in his castle of Funanoe Sen, and beat off the Sasaki sent to reduce it and recapture the Sovereign. The Nagato Tandai had been trying to put down the "revolt" in Iyo, with but scant success; and he was now recalled by intelligence of an attack from Iwami upon his own province of Nagato. Meanwhile nearly the whole of the rest of the San'yōdō and Sanindō declared for the Emperor; and a strong force was soon thrown against the capital from Tamba. But warned by Akamatsu's attempt, the Bakufu commanders had massed large bodies of troops in Kyōto; and the Tamba expedition met with a serious check. Thus in the course of a few weeks there had been no fewer than three Imperialistic assaults upon the capital, and they had all miscarried. Yet in a few more weeks Daigo II. was destined to be in secure possession of Kyōto; and that too almost without striking another blow.

The two chief commanders of the Bakufu armies lately dispatched from Kamakura to hold Kyōto, had been Nagoshi

Takaie and Ashikaga Takauji. The former had just fallen in battle against Akamatsu; and so Ashikaga Takauji had been left in supreme and undivided command. Now Nagoshi was a Hōjō, but Ashikaga was not. His family had occasionally intermarried with the Hōjōs; and his own wife was a sister of Akabashi Moritoki, the acting *Shikken*. But he himself was of pure Seiwa-Genji, or warlike Minamoto stock; although he came of a somewhat junior branch of it. But enough has been said to indicate that while the claims of primogeniture were not entirely ignored in Japan, they were frequently overridden by other considerations. The line of Yoritomo had long been extinct; that of his father Yoshitomo only survived in the Yoshimi family, descendants of Noriyori, one chief of which had been executed in 1296. Of collateral branches of the stock, there were Tada, Ōta, Toki, Yamana Satomi, Nitta, Hosokawa, all senior to that of the Ashikaga; but at this time all these were comparatively insignificant except the Nitta. Both Nitta and Ashikaga were descended from that son of Yoshiie's, Yoshikuni, who had been banished to Shimotsuke in 1150, for the then terrible offence of being disrespectful to a Fujiwara. When Yoritomo rose, in 1180, the Ashikaga chieftain, who was his own brother-in-law, joined him at once; but the Nittas at first were hostile, and, although there was no actual fighting, their ultimate adhesion was a sullen and ungraceful one, for it was prompted not by affection but by fear. Hence among the Minamoto clansmen at large who cherished the hope of again seeing a great chieftain of their own in Yoritomo's seat, the Ashikaga, although junior to the Nitta, stood highest in prestige; all the more so as they held broader acres and had for long been figures of mark in Kamakura society, in which the Nittas rarely mingled. At this date (1333) Ashikaga Takauji, just become the head of the house by the death of his father Sadauji, was twenty-eight years of age, while his brother, Tadayoshi, was two years younger. Both were highly accomplished in letters as well as in arms; and both were exceedingly popular among their fellow warriors in the Kwantō, by whom they were generally regarded as the most promising officers in the service of the Bakufu.

Shortly after the beginning of June 1333, Ashikaga Takauji left the capital at the head of a strong expedition directed against Daigo II. in Hōki. His progress was slow, and a few

days later he had got no further than Shinomura, in Tamba just a little beyond the Yamashiro border. Here suddenly, on June 10, he changed his flag, carried all his troops over to the Imperialist side; and then wheeled round upon Kyōto. The Hōjōs in the Rokuhara fought with courage; but at last, seeing that prospects of relief were hopeless, they stole out of Kyōto by night, taking with them the titular sovereign Kōgon and the two ex-Emperors, meaning to make a dash for Kamakura. At Bamba they were either intercepted or overtaken; and here the two Tandai and over 400 of their followers fell, while the three Imperial personages were captured and reconducted to Kyōto. In the successful attack on the Rokuhara, Akamatsu Enshin's men had borne the brunt of the struggle.

This most unexpected development was undoubtedly a terrible blow to the fortunes of the Hōjōs; but it need not have proved immediately fatal, provided the Kwantō stood staunchly by them. But the Kwantō itself was by this time in open and armed revolt. In the previous chapter some allusion was made to the elements of discontent and disaffection that had been gathering there for long. And if possible to strain the situation still further, the maintenance of the huge forces operating against Chihaya and elsewhere in the Home Provinces had made increased taxation a necessity, and the exactions of the revenue officers had brought the patience of their victims to an end. Furthermore a Hōjō victory in this struggle could bring no adequate rewards to the ordinary officers and soldiers. The Imperialists, with the exception of certain of their faction of the Court nobles, and a few "bonnet-lairds," were nearly all landless men of broken fortunes, with little beyond their heads to lose. Such "rewards" as would be available would surely be appropriated by the Hōjōs themselves, who were already the greatest landholders in the Empire. On the other hand, if the Hōjōs were overthrown, there would be abundance of confiscated manors to dispose of. Even before the news of Takauji's defection arrived this reasoning seems to have been common in the Kwantō.

Within ten days from the date of that defection the Kwantō was in a blaze of insurrection. On or about June 20, Nitta Yoshisada raised his flag in the Imperialist cause

on his estates in Kōzuke, and within a week his few hundred followers had swelled to a great army. Kamakura at once put every man it could under arms; and if some accounts are to be believed, as many as 100,000 troops were mustered. Portions of these were thrown northward into Musashi, and here one great action was fought on the banks of the Tamagawa, and many smaller engagements elsewhere. The hopeless feature in the case was that the Kamakura men kept deserting to the enemy in large bodies; while at the same time the "rebel" host was being swelled by large forces (under Yuki) from Mutsu, and by the accession of *Samurai* of the Bōshū peninsula as well as of Musashi and Shimōsa. By July 1 the Kamakura hosts had been driven back behind what is now the Tōkaidō railway line; and during the next three or four days there was the fiercest of fighting around and in Kamakura itself. The city fell on July 4 or 5, just a fortnight after Nitta had raised his standard. On this occasion, Takatoki and nearly three hundred of his kinsmen and followers committed *harakiri*. But Takatoki's son Tokiyuki escaped, as did several other of the "doomed" clan; while Kamakura, which had been given to the flames, presently rose from its ashes to become the capital of the Kwantō under a new system.

Meanwhile Takauji had been in communication with the three Kyūshū *Shugo*, Shōni, Ōtomo, and Shimadzu, and they turned against the Tandai, Hōjō Hidetoki, and easily accomplished what Kikuchi had attempted in vain a few months before. About the same time the Nagato Tandai begged for his life; and he is said to have been the only Hōjō among the great provincial officers who was spared. The commanders of the huge force that had been vainly investing Kusunoki in Chihaya for months were equally unfortunate. When news came of the fall of the Rokuhara, they abandoned the leaguer of Chihaya and retired to Nara, where they remained not knowing what course to take, whether to return to Kamakura or not. If they could have trusted their men they would have tried to recapture the capital; but all the probabilities were that most of the force, instead of assailing Takauji, would go over to him without so much as striking a blow. Presently it was learned there was no longer any Kamakura to fall back upon; so it was no wonder that the leaders surrendered themselves as prisoners of war to Takauji's emissaries when they

appeared in their camp. Later on fifteen of the chief officers of this Hōjō army were taken to Amida-ga-mine at the dead of night and beheaded there.

If we confine our view to the mere surface of things the fall of the Hōjōs may very well strike us as having been so portentously sudden as to be almost cataclysmic. In April 1332 Daigo II. was an exile in Oki, while his Ministers had either been executed or at least stripped of their positions and estates. The Hōjō had installed an Emperor of their own in Kyōto; and according to the will of Saga II. the title of this Sovereign* was not only perfectly legitimate but absolutely unimpeachable. A strong faction of Court nobles supported, and gladly took office under him. From the Straits of Tsugaru to Satsuma, the whole Empire seemed to be lying peacefully and resigned in the "loof" of the Hōjō hand. Fifteen months later Kamakura was little better than a mass of smouldering ashes, the Hōjō chiefs had mostly "passed to the Yellow Streams," while such of them as had not become disembodied spirits were sharing the lairs of the wild beasts in the forests and mountain fastnesses.

* Kōgon (1331-1333).

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ATTEMPT TO RESTORE THE OLD
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

FOR the first three months after his escape from his island prison Daigo II. remained in Hōki, where his Court was presently thronged by many of the section of Court nobles attached to his cause. Early in July he left Hōki, and passing through Mimasaka, journeyed up along the coast of the Inland Sea by easy stages and reached Kyōto on the 20th of the month.

Kōgon Tennō was not deposed; the theory was that he had never reigned. But he was now accorded the same treatment as Toba II.'s brother, Prince Morisada, and made Dajō-Tennō. Thus there were again three ex-Emperors,—all of the Senior line. They retired to the Jimyō-in, Daigo II. assigning them the Chōkōdō estates and the other property designated for their support by the will of Saga II., retaining however the provincial taxes of Harima as a civil list for himself. So far all this did not seriously depart from the spirit of the famous will. But the nomination of one of Daigo's own sons as Crown Prince certainly did so. Here again it is plain that the claims of primogeniture were of comparatively little consequence, for some half-dozen elder half-brothers were passed over in favour of the Emperor's son by his favourite consort, the Fujiwara Lady Renshi, who had accompanied him to Oki, and who had exercised a considerable influence over him for the past fourteen years. According to the gossip of the *Taihei-ki* the Empress's ascendancy over Daigo II. had by this time become complete; it was upon her good-will or enmity that advancement at Court and in the official world mainly depended. Accordingly she has been held largely responsible for the disastrous failure of the restored government to grapple with the problems by which it was presently confronted. But in this connection two remarks must be made. In the first place, the *Taihei-ki* is no history; it is mostly a romance. The publication of contemporary official and other records

enables us to test certain of its most assured assertions; and these turn out to be so glaringly false that it becomes almost hopeless to repose any confidence in the narrative when unsupported by other accounts or evidence. Then in the second place, even if there had been no Empress in the case at all, the attitude of the Court towards the great social and political problems of the times was such that a successful solution of them from that quarter was not to be expected.

The chief idea that now occupied the minds of the Court nobles was delightfully simple. It was that the day of the *Buké* was completely over; and that the *Kugé* had come by their own again. Things were to revert to the conditions of the year-period of *Engi*,—or in other words of the early half of the tenth century. “Back to *Engi*!” That was a formula easy to remember and to repeat; and it provided a full solution for all the problems of the day, and a complete cure for the accumulated social and political maladies of four hundred years. Now what the state of Japan was under the rule of Fujiwara Tadahira—he of the Cuckoo fan—has already been set forth. Then Kyōto was everything; the rest of the Empire was of no consequence except in as far as its resources ministered to the needs of the luxurious world of civilian rank and fashion in the magnificent capital. In those days most of the great mansions of the Fujiwara nobles had their *Samurai-dokoro*, or “waiting-upon place,” a humble apartment for the accommodation of the military men who had the honour of protecting the house from thieves. Great captains were often to be found occupying these apartments, and acting as modern police constables specially hired by wealthy people as night-watchmen. Now the upstart descendants of these humble private police inspectors and constables owned the greater part of the soil of the Empire, for which they paid no taxes to Kyōto, while the civilian authorities dared not set foot in their manors. Not only had the *Buké* become an *imperium in imperio* with a great capital of their own, with a system of jurisprudence of their own, with a highly efficient and far-reaching system of administration of their own, but in the highest of issues they frequently laid down the law to Kyōto. For more than a century the proudest *Kugé* had been constrained to go cap in hand to Kamakura on the most important occasions, while even in

Kyōto itself the real masters for the last century or more had not been the Court or the courtiers, but the two military commandants in the Rokuhara. Now there had been a clean sweep of Kamakura, the Rokuhara, Shōgun, *Shikken*, Bakufu, and all! Therefore "Back to *Engi!*" with Kyōto once more the sole and single centre of the universe; with the *Kugé* once again the lords of the earth, and with the *Buké* in their proper places of obsequious servitors and humble family watch-dogs! Of course this delicious programme could only be carried out by stripping the *bushi* of their manors, or at all events subjecting them to very heavy fiscal liabilities. The revolution just effected was mainly the work of military men; and the notion that these should have drawn sword for the express purpose of reducing themselves to a position of indigence and dependence for the benefit of a class they heartily despised as effeminate incompetents was too ludicrous for words.

That Daigo II. personally cherished these childish illusions and delusions, and fancied that the hands of the clock of Time could be thus easily and arbitrarily thrust back a matter of four centuries of vigorous national life, does not appear. Apart from his remark that he intended to establish a precedent *for future ages*,—the indications are that he did not; and that his purpose was merely to bring *Buké* and *Kugé* alike under direct control of the Crown on a fair and equable footing. That indeed was a serious problem, requiring time and thought for a lasting solution. Meanwhile, now that the Bakufu had fallen, the Kyōto administration was the only one in existence. As Daigo II. intended to rule as well as to reign, no Kwampaku was appointed. Neither was any Chancellor of the Empire,—but apart from this the Dajō-kwan was re-organised on the model of the ninth century, with Ministers of the Left and of the Right, Naidaijin, Dainagon, Chūnagon, and Sangi, while the old Eight Boards were recalled to life and their Chiefs entrusted with onerous duties. The Head of the revived Board of War was the Emperor's eldest son, the former Abbot of Hi-ei-zan, now known as Prince Morinaga, who had raised the Kii Peninsula and Yoshino against the Hōjōs and whom the priests were clamouring to have back again as their abbot. As a glance at the *Kugyō Bunin* (1333) will show, the Cabinet was almost entirely composed of Court nobles; the chief and almost the only excep-

tion being Ashikaga Takauji, who held the very subordinate office of a *Sangi*. That is to say, while his opinion might be asked for, he had no actual vote or voice in the decision of any question.

However, behind all the open and orthodox administrative machinery, Daigo II. had an unofficial and private cabinet-council of his own,—the three “Fusas,” and one or two others. And behind this again stood the Empress, while several of the secondary consorts and concubines were not entirely destitute of influence in what were considered small matters. Now, although the recorded “gossip” of the time can easily be shown to be at fault in many particulars, it seems here to point in the right direction in one important matter at least. Daigo II. was perhaps not as great a slave to the pleasures and blandishments of the *harem* as his grandfather, Kameyama, the founder and ancestor of the Junior line, had been; but the plain and regrettable fact is that he spent time and effort in the *harem* which a truly patriotic sovereign would have devoted to the interests of the nation he was supposed to govern. He trusted far too much to his favourite consort, the Lady Renshi, whose great aim from first to last had been to secure the Imperial succession to a son of her own, an effort in which she was successful on two occasions. This brought her into collision with Prince Morinaga, who had been born eleven years before her connection with the Emperor began in 1319. Morinaga’s appointment as Abbot of Hi-ei-zan seemed to have disposed of him as a candidate for the succession; but he had since allowed his locks to grow again, and had re-entered active public life. This step had been taken without consulting Hi-ei-zan; and the monks were making great trouble over it. The Prince had shown himself a gallant, if somewhat unfortunate soldier; and many *samurai* cherished the hope of seeing him made Shōgun. These *samurai* were mostly non-Kamakura men. The favourite of the latter for the office was Ashikaga Takauji. The story is that the Prince began to plot to have Takauji put out of the way, but without any success. It seems that the Lady Renshi and Takauji had quickly perceived that they might prove of great mutual assistance to each other, and that in many things they were now acting in concert.

One of the first great questions to be faced by the restored

government was the settlement of the provinces. Here the general policy was either entirely to suppress, or to curtail as much as possible, the powers of the *Shugo* and to make the Governor supreme in everything. Here be it noted once more that the Governors had never been appointed by the Bakufu; from first to last they had been Imperial officers; and, furthermore, in theory they were civil, and not military, functionaries. However, at this time, for many obvious reasons, many of the military leaders prominent in the revolution were now invested with Governorships. Ashikaga Takauji was entrusted with the administration of Musashi, Hitachi, and Shimōsa; his brother Tadayoshi with that of Tōtōmi; Kusunoki Masashige with Settsu and Kawachi, and Nawa Nagatoshi with two Sanindō provinces. It is to be observed that the provinces were not given as fiefs; on the contrary *the appointment of these Governors was a negation of the feudal system*. Some three centuries later when Hideyoshi or Iyeyasu assigned a "province" to one of their vassals it was a vastly different matter. The grant was for no fixed term of four years; it was often not only for life but actually hereditary. Then the grantee had the power of legislation, of administering justice, or imposing what taxes he pleased, and doing with them what he pleased; he had both proprietary and administrative rights. In fact he was absolute master within the bounds of his domains. The chief, and sometimes the only, obligation under which he lay was that of furnishing a military contingent at his own cost. In those days the gift of a province was really a substantial reward. But a mere provincial *governorship* was in itself no very weighty recompense after all. It was merely for a term of four years; and it conferred no proprietary rights beyond the use of the land attached to the official residence during these four years. It was certainly not the matter of the award of governorships that provoked the bitter heart-burnings and quarrels that ensued. It was the distribution of *manors* that proved the burning question of the time.

At the date of its fall, the great Hōjō family with its six or eight septs held wide private domains in almost every quarter of Japan. These had just been all confiscated, as had been those of most of the Kamakura *samurai* who had fought on the losing side. Not a few military men had remained in

a non-committal attitude throughout the struggle, and their landless neighbours who had rallied to the Imperialist cause saw their opportunity in this. Hence the comedy of witnessing the prudent stay-at-homes claiming rewards for having refused to support the Hōjōs, while their needy acquaintances were clamouring for their summary expropriation. As all these questions were to be decided in the capital, Kyōto presently began to be thronged with a rustic army of claimants and counter-claimants.

The tribunals to deal with all this had been originally composed of Court officials alone; and the various attempts that had been made to re-organise the Kyōto law-courts towards the end of the thirteenth century had shown that the Court nobles were incompetent as men of affairs. The *Taihei-ki* asserts that now after the lapse of several months some twenty odd rewards had been determined, and some others after having been determined and announced had been recalled. Although authentic contemporary documents conclusively prove that this assertion must be added to the mass of glaring inaccuracies in the *Taihei-ki*, yet it is true that the original commission was very inefficient and dilatory. It gave place to a new board of four sections, each dealing with a section of the Empire; and on two of these Kusunoki and Nara found seats, while the name of yet one other military member appears. Even so, things moved too slowly; and the number of bureau was increased to eight, each dealing with a circuit. Now we not only meet with many military men among the commissioners; but besides some temple-officials we find former Bakufu councillors occupying prominent places! This is a very significant fact, indeed; it indicates that the hope of carrying on a successful government of purely *Kugé* personnel was beginning to wane.

Long before this, however, it had become plain that in many parts of the country the decisions of Kyōto were not to be passively accepted. The surviving Hōjōs, and their vassals just stripped of their lands, began to form into organised bands, and the guerilla warfare they were prosecuting threatened to develop into something more serious. It was true the disturbances were sporadic; but it was no less true that at one time they were serious in localities so far apart from each other as Mutsu, the Home Provinces,

and Kyūshū. In the last-named, where an attempt had been made to re-establish the old Dazaifu system of three centuries before, they were so formidable that Takauji successfully insisted that it was inexpedient to abolish the office of *Shugo* there; the result being that his three fast friends Shōni, Ōtomo, and Shimadzu were reinstated in their functions, the only modification being that Higo was withdrawn from Ōtomo's control and its administration entrusted to Kikuchi, who was appointed Governor,—not *Shugo*.

But although so far there had as yet been no great outbreak there, it was the Kwantō that constituted the gravest problem. Nitta had been made *Shugo* of Kōzuke; and, as has been said, Takauji had been appointed Governor of Musashi, Hitachi, and Shimōsa,—combining with his governorships the office of *Shugo* as well, according to some accounts. But what about Kamakura itself? It was certainly no part of the policy of the Court nobles to re-establish the Shōgunate there; but the very few intelligent minds among them presently began to perceive the futility of the “Back to *Engi*” shibboleth, and to recognise that there was such a thing as “The Spirit of the Age,” and that this was a very formidable thing indeed. By the *Kugé* with no armed force to rely on, it could never be openly flouted with impunity; at best it could only be manipulated deftly and adroitly. The *Buké* would insist on having a Shōgun as their own head; that soon became abundantly plain. The only thing to be done was to make the Shōgun as weak as it was possible to do. *Divide et Impera*. Accordingly the whole of Northern Japan, which had been a Kamakura appanage since Yoritomo's time, was now divorced from the Kwantō and put under a civilian Kyōto Governor of its own. The new administrator of Mutsu was a Court noble of the mature age of sixteen years! Yet the strange thing is that a better choice could not have been possibly made, for this Kitabatake Akiie proved himself, before he fell on the battlefield four years later on (1337), to be one of the prodigies of Japanese history.*

* Here it ought to be said that Akiie's father, Kitabatake Chikafusa, had, on the death of Prince Yonaga, with whose education he had been entrusted, taken the tonsure and retired from public life just before the outbreak of 1331. This undoubtedly saved the great arch-plotter from detection. During his three or four years of retirement, he seems to have been principally occupied with the education of

Almost immediately a great migration of Kamakura *bushi* into Mutsu began, where they appear to have got very liberal inducements to settle themselves permanently. At the same time, about the end of 1333, or the beginning of 1334, Daigo II.'s tenth son, Prince Narinaga, then nine years of age, was sent down to the Kwantō, not as Shōgun, but as Kōzuke-taishu or Imperial Governor of Kōzuke, while Nitta shortly after went up to Kyōto with 7,000 men, and was thereupon, as it would appear (for the records are conflicting), appointed Governor of Harima, the province whose taxes had been specially appropriated for the support of the Court. A significant fact was that Prince Narinaga was entrusted to the charge of Takauji's brother Tadayoshi, who was now nominated Governor of Sagami. As the Governorship of this province and of Musashi had always been held by the Hōjō Regents, it seemed as if the Shōgunate was about to be re-established with Ashikagas as *Shikken*. And shortly after the young Prince was invested with the Shōgunate, and installed in Kamakura with a brilliant Court. But there was no intention of restoring the Bakufu system with its complete control over the military class. That class generally was to be brought under the direct rule of Kyōto; the re-establishment of the Shōgunate was only in form, and was merely a makeshift to put the Kwantō in good humour.

In the capital, the *Mushadokoro* had been re-established, and Nitta appointed its chief. This was to be the real centre of Imperial control over the *bushi*. But it soon became apparent that the *bushi* were not to be controlled by any such machinery. By 1335 Kyōto was simply swarming with crowds of armed men, mostly brought hither by captains and landowners who had come up to push their claims for "rewards" or to defend their titles, or to profit in some way or other in the mad scramble for manors then going on. According to the *Taihei-ki*, estates had been lavishly granted to worthless intriguers, and by the time it came to rewarding the meritorious officers there was not in the sixty odd provinces of Japan as much unappropriated land left as would suffice to "stick a carpenter's awl into." Of course this is merely a

his three distinguished sons. Lucky indeed were these boys to have such a preceptor! They were reared, not as Court nobles, but as plain men who would have to make an honourable living by the honest discharge of practical work-a-day duties.

rhetorical way of saying that the action of the commissioners had occasioned profound general dissatisfaction. It is not strange then to find that armed claimants began to take the law into their own hands, as the only means of rectifying its deficiencies and the partiality and other shortcomings of its administrators. Kyōto presently assumed the aspect of a captured city in the hands of a victorious enemy; and instead of finding that their Golden Age had returned, the Court nobles discovered that the sword and the mailed fist had never been so powerful in the streets of the capital as they were now. It was even dangerous for them to venture out-of-doors; especially after nightfall. And all this, too, after they had held Court functions in the fashion and in the robes of the *Engi* period, and had legislated as to what shape of hat the military men were to wear!

In the provinces things were almost equally ominous. The Jitō often defied the Governors; would neither give up their lands, nor submit to taxation, and the special impost levied on them and proprietors generally for the construction of a new palace could rarely be exacted. Boundary disputes were now and then fought out with arms almost under the very eyes of the Imperial representatives; while possession was coming to be regarded not as nine points of the law, but the whole *corpus juris*. In the general unrest aggressions upon the country manors of the Court nobles, which would have been promptly repressed in Bakufu times, became not infrequent. The Age of the *Kugé* indeed! And then among the *Kugé* themselves the old factions began to appear, and one great noble was executed and several banished for intriguing to restore the Elder line to the throne. Naturally enough in this state of things the expropriated saw their opportunity, in seizing which they could moreover count upon the support of many of the disappointed. Only lately, Hōjō revolts had had to be put down in Nagato and Iyo; now Shinano, whither Takatoki's son Tokiyuki had escaped, was in a ferment. This proved to be really a very serious matter indeed, for in the autumn of 1335 the insurgents not only captured Kamakura, but chased Ashikaga Tadayoshi and the young Shōgun over Hakone and along the sea-board as far as Mikawa.*

* It was at this time that Prince Morinaga was murdered. He had been exiled to Kamakura; and Tadayoshi caused him to be killed before evacuating the city.

During all this time Ashikaga Takauji had remained in Kyōto. He now requested to be sent to deal with the Hōjō revolt and to recover Kamakura. The commission was given and promptly and efficiently executed ; but Takauji, instead of returning to Kyōto thereupon, stayed on in Kamakura, a circumstance which excited suspicion against him and gave his rivals at Court an opportunity they had been eagerly looking for. As a matter of fact Takauji's conduct was peculiar in several respects. He reared a mansion for himself on the site of what had been the Shōgunal Palace; he interfered in the affairs of Hitachi and Mutsu, which were outside the scope of his commission, and he undoubtedly bestowed manors as rewards upon some of his officers for their services in the campaign; a proceeding which was a contravention of the recently established rule that henceforth all questions of recompense for military merit should be decided in Kyōto alone. But the tongue of slander was also at work; a former retainer of Prince Morinaga's who had gone down to Kamakura as a member of a mission sent there being pointed to as the chief author of the false or exaggerated reports, one of which was that Ashikaga was to place, or had placed a *Shugo* of his own in Kōzuke, of which Nitta was Vice-Governor, according to some documents, *Shugo* according to others. Lately the two great Minamoto chiefs had been on bad terms; and the inevitable open breach between them was now assured. The steps presently taken by Nitta led to Takauji's making his brother Tadayoshi send out circular letters to the Ashikaga supporters to assemble for the purpose of punishing Nitta. Many of these documents, which were scattered all over the country, even to Kyūshū, still survive.

The Court, after much discussion, at last took action early in November 1335, when the Emperor's second son Prince Takanaga, then 24 years of age, was appointed "Shōgun to Subdue the East." The real commander, however, was Nitta Yoshisada. The first battle or series of battles took place in Mikawa, where Nitta drove Kō Moroyasu, the Kamakura commander, out of the province, and, following up vigorously, broke the "rebels" in Suruga. Thereupon the Easterners entrenched themselves on the west slopes of the Hakone mountains; and when the Imperialists endeavoured to turn this position by seizing the Ashigara Pass, they were met by a

strong force which had just arrived from Kamakura under Takauji himself; and just about this time Ōtomo Sadanori, who was serving under Nitta with a considerable Kyūshū contingent, went over to the enemy. The result was that the Imperialists met with a bloody and disastrous repulse; and the whole region then rose for the Ashikaga cause.

Presently huge masses of Kamakura troops were directed against Kyōto. Here Nitta was joined by Kusunoki and Nawa, while the monks of Hi-ei-zan also donned their war-harness. On February 14 the opposing forces came into touch, and for eleven days all round the east and south of the capital the fighting was fierce, desperate and incessant.

Meanwhile the whole of Japan was in commotion, and in addition to strong bodies of hostile partisans afoot in every circuit of the Empire, two great armies were hurrying up to Kyōto to reinforce their respective parties there. Akamatsu Enshin of Harima, who had fought so vigorously for Daigo II. in 1333, being a priest was not eligible for a civil appointment; and so had not been made a Provincial Governor, and had received but a single manor as a reward. Whether he was discontented with this is not clear; but it is clear that he and Takauji had been on the best of terms ever since the latter had gone over to the Imperialists. Akamatsu had now rallied the troops of Harima and other Sanyōdō districts to the support of his friend; and pushing up rapidly seized Yamazaki, and repeated his former exploit of penetrating into the capital. This settled the direction of the seething, surging eleven days' turmoil of strife; and the Imperialists had to abandon Kyōto perforce.

Hi-ei-zan however stood fast; and Daigo II. was sheltered there. The first attempt to carry the mountain fortress failed; and just at this time the Loyalists were strongly reinforced.

The seventeen-year-old Governor of Mutsu, Kitabatake Akiie, had been made Chinjufu Shōgun at the beginning of the troubles; and mustering a formidable army he had advanced upon Kamakura from the north. But learning on his march of the rout of Hakone, he left Kamakura (now in charge of Shiba Takatsune) alone; and hurried westward towards the capital by forced marches. His unexpected arrival there now served to place an entirely new complexion on the situation. Thanks mainly to this new force, and to the singularly

able dispositions of Kusunoki, the Imperialists not only raised the siege of Hi-ei-zan, but in their turn drove the Easterners out of Kyōto, Takauji having to make his escape by the Tamba road, from which he soon diverged and made for Hyōgo. Just as he was rallying his beaten forces there he was furiously assailed by Kusunoki and Nitta and had to make for Tomo in Bingo.

It was only his previous shrewdness and foresight that enabled Takauji to extricate himself from this disaster. During the two years he had been influential in Kyōto he had always exerted himself to befriend the *Shugo*, and to save the office from being suppressed where possible. The three Kyūshū *Shugo*, Shōni, Ōtomo, and Shimadzu, were exceedingly grateful to him for his highly successful services on their behalf; and we have seen Ōtomo's son, Sadanori, carrying over his command to the Ashikagas in the crisis of the battle of Hakone. All three had been ready to respond to Tadayoshi's circular summons. But the Kyōto Court had managed to give them more than enough to do at their own doors by summoning all the gentry of Kyūshū to rise in support of the throne. In Chikugo the Haradas and Akidzukis, in Higo the Kikuchis and Asos, in Hyūga the Kimotsukis and Itōs responded at once, for all these and other local Daimyō were impatient of being interfered with and domineered over by neighbours of their own class and rank, merely because they happened to hold a *Shugo's* commission. Here it must again be insisted upon that a *Shugo* did not at this date *own* the provinces "given" to him. He usually was in his own right a land-owner; sometimes indeed by this date a very great land-owner with manors covering some square miles of territory. But some of his neighbours often owned broader acres. A *Shugo quâ Shugo* was something like the contemporary English Sheriff, or the Lord-Lieutenant of, say, 1550 A.D.,—neither of whom "owned" the country which was the sphere of their administrative duties.

Takauji could not any longer be regarded as a mere rebel, for he had obtained a commission from the ex-Emperor Kōgen while in occupation of the capital. From Tomo he dispatched his officers to raise troops in Shikoku and in the west of the main island in virtue of this commission, while he and his brother hurried down to Kyūshū. There things were going

none too well for their cause; the Imperialists had actually captured Dazaifu and killed Shōni, the *Shugo*. The two brothers soon retrieved the situation however; in a hard-fought and desperate battle at Tatarahama near Hakata they utterly routed the Loyalists, with the result that the waverers in the north-west of the island and even in Higo had to rally to their standard.

In about a month (May 1336) the brothers were again strong enough to essay another attempt on the capital. Even when beaten out of it their rout had been by no means so complete as it had seemed to be. Many of their troops surrendered indeed; but their adhesion proved to be of merely temporary advantage to the Imperialists. By the end of June, bands of Ashikaga partisans had overrun Kawachi and Izumi, while a strong force of them was operating not unpromisingly in Tamba. Furthermore, the redoubtable Akamatsu threw himself into Shirohata keep, in Harima, and Shiba Ujiyori into Mitsuishi citadel, in Bizen, and these places of arms were held most desperately, tenaciously and successfully. Still they were ultimately both hard pressed; and urgent couriers that had managed to make their way through the beleaguering lines warned the Ashikaga brothers that they must advance promptly to the relief. The latter meanwhile had crossed the straits to Chōfu in Nagato, and there completed their arrangements for the great effort. More than one contemporary record supplies evidence that they studied Yoshitsune's Yashima-Dan-no-ura campaign very closely; and hence, no doubt, the great exertions they made to equip an Inland Sea fleet. In this effort they were eminently successful; on the night before the (second) battle of Hyōgo (July 3-4, 1336) the whole expanse of water between Awaji Isle and the Akashi-Suma strand,—even on to the present Kōbe—seemed to be ablaze, for the lights and signal-fires on 5,000 craft of all kinds,—war-junks, transports, dispatch-boats, and what not,—went a long way towards turning night into day. Naturally this immense naval force did much to make the Ashikaga brothers masters of the immediate strategic and tactical situation; at all events until they advanced inland from what is now the city of Ōsaka. On the same night (July 3-4), the centre of a huge land force encamped on the ground where Doi Sanehira had lain before the attack on the Taira host at

Ichi-no-tani a century and a half before, while the van stretched far on towards Hyōgo. There along the Minatogawa, and occupying Kiyomori's "island," were bivouacked something less than 20,000 Imperialists under Nitta and Kusunoki. Nitta was there because he knew no better; Kusunoki was there under imperative instructions from the Court and sorely against his will, for he knew perfectly well what was bound to happen, if they persisted in clinging to a position which could only prove a veritable death-trap.

After the first battle of Hyōgo the Imperialist commanders had withdrawn to Kyōto to give their men a fortnight's rest there. Of such a rest they stood badly in need,—for instance, many of Nitta's troops who had fought at Hakone had not been able to doff their armour on more than three occasions in the course of as many months. Shortly afterwards Kitabatake Akiyie was sent back to Mutsu, first to quell disorders there and then to advance on Kamakura, and Nitta was commissioned to deal with the Ashikaga partisans in the West. Nitta is blamed for dallying in Kyōto with the Kōtō no Naishi,* the most beautiful woman of her time; but a simple examination of the dates suggests that this is merely another instance of *Taihei-ki* embroidery. At the same time Nitta failed disastrously; for the truth is that he was merely a dour, determined, hard-hitting fighter, good at the head of a charge or a forlorn hope or even perhaps in command of a division, but incompetent to plan and direct operations on a grand scale. A strategist he was emphatically not. In Shikoku parties were evenly balanced; and a small expedition would have enabled Nitta to decide the fate of the island easily. As it was, 500 Shikoku war-junks and other craft with 5,000 *samurai* on board joined the Ashikaga brothers on their way up from Tomo. Of the importance of obtaining and holding command of the sea-way Nitta never dreamed. He had had to fall back from one position to another; and, as Kusunoki insisted, the only thing that now remained to be done was to get away from the sea, all the more so as the Ashikaga forces on Izumi on the one hand and Tamba on the other might meanwhile close in on the line of retreat to the capital.

* The Kōtō no Naishi was the superintendent of the whole female *personnel* in the service of the Court,

On July 4, great masses of Ashikaga troops disembarked where Kōbe now stands; and the Imperialists were at once effectually hemmed in. Kusunoki, covered with wounds, committed the happy dispatch, while Nitta managed to cut his way through the enemy and escape to Nishinomiya and thence to Kyōto. Although many of the Imperialist officers knew that the situation was hopeless, all fought gallantly enough; but in spite of this, the army as an effective force was practically annihilated; and Kyōto was uncovered. All that remained to defend it were the monks of Hi-ei-zan and the levies of Nawa and the *Kugé* general, Rokujō Tadaaki, for, as has been said, young Kitabatake had departed for Mutsu with his command.

The Ashikagas were soon in the capital, whence Daigo II. had fled to take refuge in Hi-ei-zan. The great monastery held out stubbornly and the siege had to be converted into a blockade. In some of the sallies and attempts to relieve it, Nawa and Rokujō fell, and when the Ashikagas were on the point of completing their investing lines, Nitta, taking with him the Crown Prince and a younger brother, made a successful dash for Kanzaki Castle on Tsuruga Bay, while Kitabatake Chikafusa escaped to Ise with the former priest, Prince Munenaga. By November Hi-ei-zan could hold out no longer on account of famine; and Daigo II. then proposed terms of peace.

Meanwhile, two months before, Kōgon Tennō's younger brother, then fourteen years, had been set up as a rival Emperor,—(Kōmyō Tennō),—and to this new Sovereign two of Daigo II.'s Ministers, acting on his behalf, surrendered the Sacred Sword and Seal on November 12, 1336. But it afterwards turned out that these were not the genuine emblems; they were merely duplicates fabricated for the occasion.

During the next month or two Daigo II.'s partisans were active on his behalf in Kawachi, in spite of his professed abdication. But the really formidable man was the old Kitabatake, still no more than forty-three, however, who soon made himself master of the three provinces of Iga, Ise, and Shima, and presently opened up secret communication with his master. Suddenly on January 23, 1337, Daigo II., taking with him the *real* sacred emblems of Imperial authority, escaped from Kyōto, and was welcomed by Kitabatake to Yoshino,

where a palace was constructed and a Court organised. For the next six-and-fifty years the unhappy country was to be racked and riven by bitter armed strife between two rival Sovereigns and their respective supporters.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE GREAT SUCCESSION WARS.

(1337-1392.)

AT the date of Daigo II.'s escape to Yoshino the Empire was in a state of comparative tranquillity. Nitta Yoshisada was still holding out for the deposed sovereign in the castle of Kanzaki on Tsuruga Bay, and Kitabatake Akiye was making strong headway in Mutsu. Elsewhere, however, organised resistance to the Ashikaga cause, except in the mountainous peninsula between the head of the Inland Sea and the Bay of Owari, had ceased to be formidable. But Daigo II.'s flight from Kyōto changed the aspect of affairs completely. Within a hundred days of that event civil war was raging furiously in almost every corner of the Empire.


The Southern Court lost no time in appointing its own local officials and in dispatching emissaries commissioned to raise troops and punish the "rebels" in every direction. As has been said, Daigo II. had many sons, and the services of all these were now utilised to the full. They were individually committed to the charge of able soldiers, and sent out as nominal commanders to Kyūshū, to Shikoku, to the Hokurikudō, to Tōtōmi, to Mutsu, and elsewhere, to stimulate loyal subjects to rally to their father's cause. The first event of any consequence in this fifty-six years' strife was the fall of Kanzaki keep in April 1338, when one of Nitta's sons and one of the Imperial Princes committed suicide, while the other was taken prisoner. Nitta himself contrived to make good his escape over the mountain passes into Central Echizen, whither he was presently followed by Shiba Takatsune, who had reduced Kanzaki; and for the next fifteen months the province was the scene of various encounters between these two leaders. The fall of Nitta in a skirmish in September 1338 practically decided the issue in Echizen for the time being, his brother Wakiya Yoshisuke abandoning the contest there and retiring to the South in the following year, after some abortive operations against Takatsune.

Meanwhile the Southern Court had sustained a more serious loss in the person of the brilliant young Kitabatake Akiye, the Governor of Mutsu. By the end of 1337 he had not only beaten down all opposition in his own province, but was in a position to undertake operations beyond its limits. His first exploit was the capture of Kamakura (January 1338) and the reduction of some of the surrounding provinces. His stay in Kamakura was of the briefest; in the following month he was *en route* for Yoshino at the head of a strong army. The prime object of the Southern Court at this time was the capture of Kyōto, and it had endeavoured to bring up troops from every quarter of the Empire to effect this purpose. But everywhere the country was so evenly divided in sentiment that the local partisans of the South found more than ample employment in their own districts, and the Mutsu army was the only considerable force from the provinces that appeared. It routed the Ashikaga commanders at Awa-no-hara in Mino, at Yawata, and at Nara, while the appearance of Kitabatake Akiye's younger brother Akinobu on Otoko-yama threw Kyōto into a panic. This latter force was dislodged, however, while the situation was relieved by the victory of that capable leader Kō Moronao at Abeno, in Settsu, over Kitabatake Akiye, who fell in the action at the age of twenty-one. Two months later (August 1338) Daigo II. died; and under his son and successor Murakami II., a boy of twelve, the struggle in the Home Provinces languished for a decade or so. It was hopeless for the Southerners to attempt to capture Kyōto unless strongly reinforced from the outlying circuits; and until the Ashikaga partisans in some one or other or several of these circuits were reduced, no reinforcements could be looked for.

In these outlying circuits it is small wonder to find that all was turmoil and confusion. Which was the legitimate sovereign was a question on which the Court nobles themselves were pretty evenly divided, for we find from a glance at the *Kugyō Bunin* that at no time had the Senior line with its seat in Kyōto the least difficulty in filling its ministerial and other important posts with high-born Fujiwaras. Such being the case among the Court nobles themselves, it is not strange that the military men in the provinces should have been perplexed by the problem. As a rule they adopted that view of the situation which was most in accordance with their own immediate material interests.

The accompanying map, which is such as appears in most Japanese historical atlases, will convey a rough general idea of the situation. Only it is to be noted that in several circuits the situation was constantly changing; and--what is more important still--many extensive tracts which are coloured North or South exclusively, were by no manner of means undivided in their allegiance. Take the case of the three southern provinces of Kyūshū in the years following the flight to Yoshino. In the map, Satsuma is represented as being held by Shimadzu for the Northern Court. But in the very district in which Shimadzu had his headquarters, Aso, the *Shugo* of the Southern Court also had his! Of the thirteen cantons into which the province was then divided, Shimadzu's authority was absolute and undivided in no more than one. Aso's partisans were supreme in as many as three; while the gentry in the remaining nine were pretty equally distributed between the opposing camps. Shimadzu was *Shugo* of Ōsumi also; but the greater part of Ōsumi was held by Kimotsuki (the hereditary foe of the Shimadzu), a partisan of the Southern Court. In Hyūga the situation was, if possible, still more complicated. Here the Northerners had a *Shugo* (Hatakeyama) and the control of two out of five districts, one of these being held by the Itō family. But this house of Itō was divided, and one branch of it strongly supported the Southern Court in Miyazaki district. South of this, Morokata district was hotly contested, not by two, but by three parties, for while Kimotsuki opposed the *Shugo*, a remnant of the Hōjō party made head for itself not unsuccessfully. Later on, this Hōjō chieftain, Nagoshi, espoused the Southern cause,—as did Tokiyuki, the surviving head of the house. But many of the Hōjō faction fought for the Northerners, even against their own neighbouring kith and kin.

This state of affairs was by no means confined to the south of the Empire; it was general. What really was going on was a whole series of private wars,—the combatants acting professedly in the name of one or other of the rival Emperors to legalise their aggressions upon their neighbours, and passing from one side to the other in a fashion utterly bewildering to the historian. In short, these six-and-forty years might not inaptly be characterised as the Great Age of Turncoats, for the great houses that remained constant to the fortunes



MAP
Showing Gokinai and Neighbouring Provinces

MAP SHOWING RIVALRY BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH COURTS

Provinces in Capital letters
Other geographical names in Roman characters
Generals in Italics
Provinces adhering to South coloured yellow
" " " North " blue
" " " neither " red



of the Southern Dynasty from first to last might almost be counted upon the fingers of one hand. In this respect, the Nittas and their related sept, the Kitabatakes and the Kikuchis, have an unblemished and unimpeachable record. That of the Kusunoki's is marred by the twelve years' defection of Masanori (1368-1381); although the Wada branch of the family remained unshaken in its allegiance at that time. On the Northern or Ashikaga side the record is not a whit more satisfactory. Disappointed hopes in the matter of promotion and rewards for services rendered, jealousy of fellow-commanders, quarrels with fellow-officers, and numerous causes of a less serious and even of a trivial nature over and over again drove Northern partisans into the Southern camp,—sometimes, however, for a very brief space of time! There were undoubtedly some men who fought stoutly and disinterestedly on behalf of what they honestly believed the legitimate cause, on both sides; but they were certainly in a minority. Many military septs fought merely to extend their domains; others wished nothing better than to be left in peaceable enjoyment of the lands they held. But in most provinces they were harried by the recruiting agents and tax-collectors of both Courts,—and passive neutrality was out of the question. Espousing one or other side was imperative; and should this turn out to be the losing one, it meant the confiscation of the domains of the sept. Accordingly, to safeguard themselves against any such contingency many families like the Itōs in Hyūga, and the Utsunomiya in Shimotsuke, arranged that different branches of the house should declare for opposing causes and carry on a friendly family warfare of their own. One party would erect a fort or a stockade in a strategic position and provision themselves to maintain it; the other would raise a similar structure in the immediate neighbourhood. In the encounters between the two garrisons sword-wounds were exceedingly rare, although there were occasional "accidents" in the exchange of arrows. The party whose provisions first gave out would retire. Thus when the recruiting agents appeared, the opposing chiefs could urge that they were too closely pressed at home to be able to spare any men for distant expeditions; while in the case of an ultimate decisive triumph of either the Southern Court or the Ashikaga cause, the con-

fiscated lands of the vanquished faction of the sept would pass not to a stranger but to friends and relatives.

In most of the provinces each Court had its own *Shugo* or Governor, or other official representative, and the lieges were constantly worried by antagonistic edicts from the Southern Court and the Northern Court, and instructions from the Shōgun, the delegate of the latter. From this two natural results followed. In the first place, respect for central authority went on waning, and threatened to disappear, and in the next every sept strong enough to do so endeavoured to establish an *imperium in imperio* on its own behalf. Great houses, like that of Kikuchi in Higo, now began to regulate their affairs by a machinery similar to that which the great *Kugé* families had employed in their halcyon days of prosperity. Four or five of the leading members or vassals formed a standing council, which decided not only all important internal questions, such as succession to the chieftainship, and the guardianship of the chief if a minor, but the general internal policy of the fief as a whole. Most matters that would have been referred to the Bakufu in Kamakura days, were now settled at the Daimyō's own council-board. As has been repeatedly asserted, fiefs in Yoritomo's time were generally small in extent; now they began to assume considerably wider dimensions. Weaker septs in the neighbourhood, while not abandoning their position of direct vassalage to the Shōgun, found it advantageous to "commend" themselves to their more powerful neighbours, so far at least as to have their external policy dictated for them by the neighbouring great Daimyō's council-board, at which the heads of the most influential among them now and then found a seat. This was an important step in the development of the feudal system in Japan. Another was the abolition of female fiefs, and the succession of women to real estate, and a curtailment of the inheritances not so much of younger sons as of all sons except the one selected as lord of the clan.

In Yoritomo's time the *Shugo* was not a hereditary office; in fact, the *Azuma Kagami* shows that the *Shugo* were then shifted about in most cases with greater frequency than the Provincial Governors appointed by Kyōto were. But under the Hōjō, in some cases, the office did practically become hereditary in some families; notably in the case of the three

Kyūshū Shugo,—Ōtomo, Shimadzu, and Shōni. Now at this time few if any of the former Kamakura *Shugo* rallied to the Southern standard; they nearly all espoused the Ashikaga cause, while many of the old-established non-official military families in their jurisdiction took the Southern side, actuated by jealousy of the *Shugo* as much as by any other feeling perhaps. Thus in their own interests it became the policy of the Ashikagas to strengthen the hands of the *Shugo* as much as they could, and under them the office did become virtually hereditary in most cases. And not only that, but a single *Shugo* was occasionally entrusted with the administration not merely of one, but of several provinces. Now it must never for a moment be forgotten that at this time a *Shugo's* position was two-fold. In the first place he was like other chiefs in his province, a territorial magnate with broad acres and numerous vassals of his own. This was in his own right. But in addition to that he was the Shōgun's salaried officer, paid from taxes levied in the province. Now these *Shugo* in their capacity of territorial magnates began, like their neighbours, to organise councils for the conduct of the affairs of the family, and for the settlement of the general external policy of the clan; while, *quâ* great Daimyō, they forced their weaker neighbours to commend themselves to them. It is not strange then to find that the most powerful of the Japanese "Kings" of whom the early missionaries speak in their letters were descendants of Ashikaga *Shugo*, whose double position had given them a great advantage over their fellow land-owners in the struggle for territorial aggrandisement and independent authority which accompanied the total breakdown of all central authority—whether Imperial or Shōgunal—in the Empire. Some of the great feudal houses of sixteenth-century Japan had been founded by Provincial Governors, it is true. But such houses were few and far between,—Kitabatake in Ise and Anenokoji in Hida being the most considerable, for by 1542 the fortunes of the erstwhile great family of Kikuchi in Higo had fallen on evil days. Of old the Provincial Governor had been a civil office purely and simply; but these Kitabatakes and Kikuchis had all been among the finest and most determined fighting men in Japan.

As indicated in the accompanying map, the Southerners held the provinces of Idzumi, Kawachi, Yamato, Iga, Ise, and

Shima, the greater portion of Kishū to the south, and a small portion of Ōmi to the north. Of course, the position of the frontier line fluctuated considerably from time to time; but on several occasions at various points it was within less than twenty miles of Kyōto. Within it were the great temples of Nara and Kōyasan, and the great Shintō sanctuary of Ise. The province of Settsu through which ran the maritime communication with Kyōto was for most of the time in the hands of the Northerners. But it was the great cock-pit of the war; the neighbourhood of what is now the city of Ōsaka being the scene of scores of bloody encounters. Settsu afforded the best base for operating against the Southern domains; and on the other hand the possession of it was a factor of prime importance in the great problem of provisioning a city of many hundred thousand inhabitants, as Kyōto then was. On many occasions Southern successes in the open country reduced the Northern capital to a state of temporary starvation and drove commodities up to famine prices.

Balked in their endeavours to seize the harbours of Settsu and hold them permanently, the Southerners established a new naval base of their own. This was at the picturesque haven of Shingū on the east coast of Kishū, where a little village at the head of the inlet soon assumed the aspect of a populous and bustling mart. Here squadrons were fitted out to maintain communication with Shikoku and to dominate the Inland Sea, and above all to carry troops to and from Southern Kyūshū, where the Southerners from the first contrived to hold their own, and presently began to wear down opposition and to carry their victorious arms into the centre and ultimately the north of the island. On the east they had established themselves in Tōtōmi, but their hold on that province was brief. In the Kwantō, Kamakura had been promptly recovered by the Ashikaga officers; and in several parts of the Eight Provinces the Southern cause had its local supporters. To reinforce these a strong expedition was dispatched from Shingū harbour; but it met with premature disaster in a typhoon, and of the leaders (old) Kitabatake Chikufusa was the only one who succeeded in reaching Yedo Bay. Landing there, he established himself in the keep of Oda in Hitachi, and for the next four or five years he gave the Ashikaga officers so much to do

in the Kwantō, that they could spare but few troops for service in the West. At last things turned against Kitabatake, who was cooped up in Seki Castle. He managed to escape from it just before its fall in 1343, and, making his way to the Southern Court, reassumed the general direction of affairs, continuing to hold it down to the time of his death in 1354. While in the Kwantō, he had found time to compose the two works which were destined to make him a very considerable political force in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Japan. The first of these works, the *Shokugenshō*, or "Brief Account of the Origin of Offices," was actually used as a text-book in Japanese schools until very recent times. But it is his *Jintōshōtōki* ("History of the True Succession of the Divine Monarchs") that is Kitabatake's principal work.

Inasmuch as this pamphlet was evidently intended as a counterblast to the Ashikaga *Kemmu Shikimoku*, it is advisable, before dealing with it, to turn our attention to what Takauji and his party had meanwhile been doing. Although it was not until 1338 that Ashikaga Takauji received his patent of investiture as Shōgun from the Northern Court, he had been virtually acting as Shōgun ever since his recapture of Kamakura in the autumn of 1335. One aim of his was to follow the precedents of Yoritomo in all things as far as possible; and so it was his original intention to make Kamakura the seat of his authority. But the political situation imperiously demanded his presence in Kyōto. Accordingly he installed his son Yoshiakira, then eight years of age (of course, under the guardianship of a *Shitsuji* Minister) as Kwantō-Kwanryō, and re-established the old Kamakura administrative machinery with certain necessary or advisable modifications. He himself established the Bakufu at Muromachi in Kyōto, which thus became the seat of the Shōgunal power, and remained so for more than two centuries. The Muromachi Bakufu at first was an almost exact replica of that of the thirteenth-century Kamakura. The chief difference arose from the fact that as Takauji was Shōgun not merely in name but in reality, there was no place for a Regent; and so instead of a *Shikken* and one *Shitsuji*, two *Shitsuji* (Ministers) were placed at the head of affairs in Kyōto, acting of course under Takauji's order. The first two *Shitsuji* were Kō

Moronao and Uyesugi Tomosada, the latter a relative of Takauji by marriage, Tomosada's cousin, Noriaki, being about the same time appointed *Shitsuji* for Kamakura. Takauji's brother Tadayoshi, was made Chief of the General Staff, while several Kamakura *literati*,—descendants of Ōe, Nakahara, Miyoshi, and others—were brought up to fill positions on the various Boards, the services of some of the ablest priests of the time being also enlisted in the work of drafting laws and regulations and in similar duties. One of their earliest tasks had been the compilation of the *Kemmu-Shikimoku* (Code of Kemmu), which was drawn up and published not long after the battle of the Minato-gawa and while Daigo II. was invested in Hi-ei-zan.

However, even in the very limited sense in which the *Jōei-Shikimoku* might be called a Code, a Code the *Kemmu Shikimoku* emphatically is not,* for in the whole of its seventeen articles there is scarcely a single specific legal provision in the strict sense of the term. Economy must be universally practised; Drinking parties and wanton frolics must be suppressed; Crimes of violence and outrage must be quelled; The practice of entering the private dwellings of the people and making inquisitions into their affairs must be given up,—such are its first four injunctions, while Articles 5 and 6 merely deal with the ownership of vacant plots and the rebuilding of houses and fire-proof “godowns” in the devastated sections of the capital. The following paragraphs provide that (7) Men of special ability for government work should be chosen for the office of *Shugo*; (8) A stop must be put to the practice of influential nobles and women of all sorts and Buddhist ecclesiastics making their interested recommendations (to the Sovereign); (9) Persons holding public posts must be liable to reprimand for negligence and idleness; (10) Bribery must be firmly put down; (11) Presents made from all quarters to those attached to the Palace whether of the Inside or Outside services must be sent back; and (12) Those who are to be in personal attendance on the rulers must be selected for that duty. Ceremonial etiquette to be the predominant principle; Men noted for probity and adherence to high principle to be rewarded by more than ordinary dis-

* See the excellent paper on the *Kemmu Shikimoku* by J. C. Hall, Esq., in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan.

tion; The petitions and complaints of the poor and lowly to be heard and redress granted; The petitions of Temples and Shrines to be dealt with on their merits; Certain fixed days to be appointed for the rendering of decisions and the issue of government orders,—these complete the provisions of this so-called “Feudal Code.”

All this is so simple and harmless that the idea of the necessity of any counterblast to such a document might well appear to be ludicrous. But the articles as a whole had a preamble and a conclusion, and each of them was accompanied by a brief and pithy commentary. There the tone of thought was mainly Chinese; and the Chinese virtue theory (to which reference has been made in an early chapter) with *its logical consequences* was by implication admitted by the writer. Now, any admission of the logical consequences of this Chinese virtue theory might be disastrous to the pure native Japanese theory of the Sovereign ruling indefeasibly by virtue of Divine descent from the Sun-Goddess.

In view of this, passages like the following in Kitabatake's chief work become highly significant: “Great Yamato is a divine country. It is only our land whose foundations were first laid by the divine ancestor. It alone has been transmitted by the Sun-Goddess to a long line of her descendants. There is nothing of this kind in foreign countries. Therefore it is called the divine land. . . . It is only our country, which from the time when the heaven and earth were first unfolded has preserved the succession to the throne intact in one single family. Even when, as sometimes naturally happened, it descended to a lateral branch, it was held according to just principles. This shows that the oath of the gods (to preserve the succession) is ever renewed in a way which distinguishes Japan from all other countries. . . . It is the duty of every man born on the Imperial soil to yield devoted loyalty to his Sovereign, even to the sacrifice of his own life. Let no one suppose for a moment that there is any credit due to him for doing so. Nevertheless in order to stimulate the zeal of those who come after, and in loving memory of the dead, it is the business of the ruler to grant rewards in such cases (to the children). Those who are in an inferior position should not enter into rivalry with them. Still more should those who have done no specially meritorious service

abstain from inordinate ambitions. . . . I have already touched on the principles of statesmanship. They are based on justice and mercy, in the dispensing of which firm action is requisite. Such is the clear instruction vouchsafed to us by Tenshōdaijin (the Sun Goddess).”

Of course it is true that the prime object of Kitabatake's pamphlet was not so much to counter the doctrine of the *Kemmu-Shikimoku* as to prove the legitimacy of the Southern line whose cause he had so devotedly espoused. But the fact remains that the influence of the *Jintōshōtōki* upon the practical politics of the age was insignificant. Not that there was no reading public in those times; for among the *Kugé* for some generations there had been a great revival, not of productive literary activity,—except perhaps in Japanese “poetry,”—but of scholarship, while the Court of the Imperial Shōguns in Kamakura had made learning fashionable in the Kwantō. Great military chiefs now often kept a priest attached to them, not merely as ghostly counsellor, but as tutor and instructor in the lore of China. A list of some thirty or forty names of captains and chieftains enjoying a considerable reputation for scholarship could easily be compiled. But Kitabatake's arguments were not of the kind that appealed most strongly to them; for the chief convincing argument at this time was,—self-interest. Otherwise how can we explain the astounding and bewildering frequency and seeming levity with which sides were changed by many, if not by most, during the course of this long and dreary civil war? It was not till 1649 that the *Jintōshōtōki* was printed. Then indeed it began to exercise a great and steadily growing influence upon the political thought of the nation. The compilers of the *Dai Nihon Shi*, the great standard History of Japan, were profoundly affected by it, as were also Motoori and the other leaders in the Revival of Shintō movement in the following century. And the book was in the hands of many of the “patriots,” whose watchwords were “Reverence the Emperor: Expel the Barbarians” in the troublous times following the appearance of Perry's squadron of “Black Ships” in Yedo Bay.

On his return to Yoshino Kitabatake set vigorously to work to organise an efficient administration and to prepare for a decisive movement on Kyōto. In this he was ably seconded

by the Court noble Shijō Takasuke, who might not so very inaptly be characterised as the Carnot of the Southern Court. By the middle of 1347—(plague was then raging in Kyōto, by the way)—the Southerners were again in a position to assume the offensive. The commander was Masatsura, son of Kusunoki Masashige, who had lately assumed the chieftainship of the clan. Down to February 1348 his record was one of unbroken triumph; he not only threatened to master the estuary of the Yodo River, and so cut Kyōto off from all communication with the sea, but from his base at Tō-jō he seriously menaced the capital, where his emissaries or partisans were raising great conflagrations night after night. The unhappy city was thus at once the victim of plague, fire, and famine. This compelled the Ashikaga to make a great effort; and a force of 60,000 men was mustered, and thrown against the Southerners in two columns. While one marched to relieve the situation in Settsu, the other, under Kō Moronao, advanced upon Masatsurā's base at Tōjō. This latter army was far stronger than Masatsura's; and in the great battle of Shijō-nawate in Kawachi that gallant and able young officer met with his first disaster. It was also his last, for he fell while leading a desperate charge. His army was completely routed, and many of his troops surrendered to the Northerners. These now pressed forward into Yamato, burning and plundering right and left. Yoshino with its palace was captured and fired; while many of the oldest and richest fanes in the province went up in flames. This brought the priestly mercenaries with their Sacred Tree and other similar paraphernalia into the field,—and the onward swoop of the victors received a temporary check. Then just at this point Kō Moronao to the surprise of all suddenly wheeled round and returned to Kyōto (February 1348).

The Southerners very soon rallied, and bringing up fresh levies from Kumano promptly repelled the invasion from Settsu, and drove back the Northerners to the neighbourhood of what is now the city of Ōsaka. Here the Bakufu commander, Kō Moroyasu (Moronao's brother), could do little more than cling on to the line of the Yodo. Meanwhile the great storm which had long been brewing in the Ashikaga camp was on the point of bursting. As has been said, Kō Moronao had been made *Shitsuji* in Kyōto, his brother Moro-

fuyu *Shitsuji* in Kamakura, while another brother Moroyasu held high military command. Kō Moronao, by far the ablest of the trio, had undoubtedly great talents both as an administrator and as a commander; and Takauji, fully appreciating the fact, gradually came to entrust him with difficult commissions outside the sphere of his proper duties. This gave offence to many, and especially to Moronao's fellow-officer Uyesugi Shigeyoshi, and to Ashikaga Tadayoshi. From all accounts it appears that Moronao's demeanour was the reverse of conciliatory; although he aspired to play the part of a Hōjō *Shikken*, his character was in many respects the very reverse of that of Yasutoki or Tokiyori. In his great mansion in Kyōto he kept almost regal state; in fact his extravagance and his haughtiness were equally marked. Time and again several of the Daimyō had endeavoured to bring about his fall; but all their efforts had hitherto miscarried. Just at the time he suddenly wheeled round upon Kyōto in February 1348, there was a formidable intrigue afoot against him, for in it both Tadayoshi and Uyesugi Shigeyoshi were involved. Takauji had left a bastard son behind him in Kamakura as a priest; and this son now came up to Kyōto. His father refused to meet him; and thereupon Tadayoshi received the youth in his mansion, and ultimately adopted him. Tadafuyu, as he was henceforth called, turned out to be a singularly able man, and the conspirators, determined to make him a counterpoise to Moronao, obtained a commission for him as Tandai of the West of the Main Island, which would place a vast military force at his disposal. Meanwhile Moronao had been able to gather all the threads of the plot into his hand; and he was strong enough to procure the banishment of Uyesugi to Echigo, where he was presently assassinated, and the revocation of Tadafuyu's commission, while Tadayoshi was compelled to shave his head and retire from public life. All this intensified the profound dissatisfaction of the many military chiefs hostile to Moronao.

Tadafuyu promptly crossed the straits into Kyūshū, where the situation was very peculiar. The Southerners had not indeed conquered the whole of Satsuma and Ōsumi, but they had so far gained the upper hand there that they could entrust the local gentry with the task of reducing Shimadzu, and remove their headquarters into Higo. Here the balance of

power was held by the house of Aso. It had espoused the Southern cause from the first; but the chieftain of one of its two branches had, as he considered, not been adequately rewarded for the distinguished services he had rendered; and instead of fighting he was now negotiating the best terms he could with both parties. If action be the real criterion of belief, this Aso had not the slightest faith in the Kitabatake's theory of the duty of sacrificing life itself for the Sovereign without hope or expectation of reward, for in his demands he was worse than a Dugald Dalgetty,—in short he seems to have been a veritable son of a horse-leech. However Prince Yasunaga, the Imperial Commander-in-Chief, had been able to satisfy him for the time being; and the Southerners were presently able to begin operations in Chikugo. Here in the north of the island, Isshiki, the Ashikaga Tandai had been in command for some years; and among others he had contrived to offend the *Shugo*, Shōni. Now on Tadafuyu's appearance in Kyūshū, Shōni and a great mass of the local gentry attached themselves to him. Thereupon a deadly intestine struggle broke out in the Ashikaga camp; and the island was presently contested, not by two, but by three parties. Shortly afterwards Takauji started from Kyōto to settle things in Kyūshū. Then all of a sudden Tadayoshi disappeared from the capital, and no one knew where he had gone, till certain intelligence arrived that he was at the head of a rapidly increasing force in Kawachi and about to march on Kyōto. After making futile overtures to the Southern Court Tadayoshi braced himself for a decisive struggle with the Kō family. Desperate fighting in and around Kyōto ensued, as the result of which the Kōs had to retire to Harima to form a junction with Takauji, who had thus to abandon his southern expedition. Again Tadayoshi's party triumphed; and peace was patched up at Hyōgo, it being arranged that the Kōs should resign their offices and enter the priesthood. On their way up to the capital they were waylaid near Nishinomiya by a squadron of Uyesugi Akiyoshi's horse, sent to avenge the murder of his father, and Moronao and Moroyasu and some half-dozen of their kinsmen were made away with. A little later Kō Morofuyu, the Kamakura *Shitsuji*, met his doom.

Some time before starting on his southern expedition, Takauji had brought his eldest son, Yoshiakira, up from

Kamakura to take Tadayoshi's place in Kyōto, and had sent his fourth son Mochiuji (ten years of age) down to Kamakura as Kwantō Kwanryō, with Uyesugi Noriaki and Kō Morofuyu as his *Shitsuji*. As Uyesugi had gone over to Tadayoshi, and Morofuyu had been killed, Takauji's position in Kamakura was the reverse of secure.

Although Takauji and Tadayoshi had been nominally reconciled, their distrust of each other was so great that Tadayoshi presently deemed it advisable to retire from Kyōto to Tsuruga. His military following was very strong, and his appearance in the neighbourhood of Kyōto caused much anxiety in the city. In the meantime Takauji had secretly entered into communication with the Southern Court, and many of his followers were intensely chagrined to learn that he had actually made his peace with Murakami II. and arranged for the abdication of the Northern Emperor, Sukō. Thereupon several of the most influential captains followed Tadayoshi in his flight to Kamakura.

Now for the second time Takauji found himself confronted with the task of recovering Kamakura. It proved to be easier than he expected, for after a great battle near Okitsu, in which, as in the battle of Hakone, the defection of the opposing vanguard at the beginning of the action practically decided the day, Takauji's march was unopposed. When he reached Kamakura he found that his brother was no more; the general belief of the time was that Tadayoshi had taken poison to save himself from falling into the hands of the victor.

On this occasion Takauji stayed two years (1352–1353) in the Kwantō; and during this time the alarms and excursions in Northern and Eastern Japan were continuous and incessant. What the exact causes of many of them were is a good deal more than I can say; a good deal more perhaps than any one will ever be able to say. But in the midst of the weltering confusion a few facts are plain. One is that Takauji was again assailed by his old foes the Nittas, who actually captured and held Kamakura for a brief space in 1352; and another is that Takauji's adherence to the Southern cause was of very brief duration, for in a few months we again find him using the Northern calendar. In the Kwantō alone during these two years more battles were fought,—some of them of considerable magnitude—than during the thirty years between 1455 and 1485 in England!

Meanwhile envoys from the Southern Court had appeared in Kyōto and received the sacred emblems (that is, the fabricated set) from Sukō Tennō; and later on Kusunoki Masanori and Kitabatake Akiyoshi's troops occupied Kyōto for about two months. Takauji's son, Yoshiakira, retired into Ōmi, there to await the course of events. He soon either became dissatisfied with the situation, or his hand was forced by his followers whose fortunes had suffered, or seemed likely to suffer, by his father's surrender. Strong masses of Ashikaga partisans presently assembled round the north of the capital and the mountain slopes became ruddy with their camp fires at night. On the plea that the terms of the convention were being violated they at last burst upon the city, and swept the Southerners out of it. In the meantime all the three ex-Emperors of the Northern line had been conveyed to Kanafu, far within the Southern lines, and the attempts made to enable them to effect their escape miscarried. Yoshiakira was thus reduced to the expedient of setting up an Emperor who could neither receive the succession from a predecessor nor be invested with the sacred emblems; and for these reasons Kōgon II. (1352-1371), Sukō's younger brother, was in a very doubtful and exceptional position. A proposal was made that his mother should conduct the administration as ex-Empress—(Kōgon II. was only fifteen)—but this was rejected as something unheard of. A compromise was arrived at; the young Sovereign's mother being entrusted with the administration of the Chōkōdō domains, from which the ex-Emperors still derived their revenues.

The fighting around and to the south of Kyōto on this occasion had been fierce and desperate, and in some of the actions Yamana Tokiuji, the *Shūgo* of Hōkai and Inaba, had especially distinguished himself. The Yamanas, it should be explained, were Minamotos, a senior branch of the same stock as the Ashikagas. Tokiuji now claimed as a reward that his son should be invested with some lands in Wakasa he had been promised by Takauji. The request was refused; and thereupon the Yamanas in high dudgeon returned to their provinces, entered into pourparlers with the Southern Court and raised troops for an assault upon Kyōto. About the same time, Tadafuyu's position in Kyūshū and the West of the Main Island had become precarious; and soon after he made

up his mind to throw in his lot with the Southerners, by whom he was at once made *Sōtsuibushi*, or Commander-in-Chief. In July 1353 the capital was captured, and Yoshiakira carried off the Emperor (Kōgon II.) first to Hi-ei-zan and then to Mino, while all the Court nobles who had assisted at Kōgon II.'s coronation or taken office under him were degraded and otherwise punished. However the failure of the Southern Court to provide the Yamana troops with the promised supplies disgusted their leaders, who soon withdrew to their own country. In the meantime the Ashikagas had been mustering men; and they presently were strong enough to re-occupy the capital and make preparations for carrying the war into the enemy's territory again. Then, early in 1355, the Ashikagas were again hunted from the capital for another two months; and then again another series of furious engagements to the south of the city followed upon their return. And so the weary, weary struggle went on.

Just about this time the Southern cause sustained a serious loss in the death of Shijō Takasuke, who fell in action in 1352, and old Kitabatake, who died in 1354. It was mainly owing to the personal ascendancy of the latter that the Southern Court had been kept united and free from faction. Not long after his decease, faction did begin to make its appearance, and the Southern Court presently ceased to be the formidable power it had been in his days. Since the fall of Nitta Yoshisada in 1338, it was really between Kitabatake Chikafusa and Ashikaga Takauji that the struggle had lain.

Takauji himself died some four years later on, in June 1358. His memory has been blackened and blasted by ultra-loyalist historians, and for two centuries it has been the target of obloquy and perfervid patriotic invective. Lately in certain quarters a reaction has set in, and he has actually been characterised as "one of Japan's greatest and noblest men." I greatly regret that I cannot bring myself to participate in any such estimate of him. That he had many fine personal qualities is indeed perfectly true; brave in the field of battle, patient and tenacious in the face of disaster; generous, liberal, not vindictive, and highly accomplished as accomplishments then went. But all that is far from making him a great man. Just weigh him in the same balance with Yoritomo. When Takauji began his political career he was in command of a strong

and well-equipped army which made him the virtual master of the situation; at his death a quarter of a century later on, the flames of civil war were raging furiously in almost every corner of the Empire, the fuel being in a large measure supplied by vassals of his own—such as the Yamana and the Momonoi—whom he lacked the capacity to control. And these twenty-five years from first to last had been years of fierce and fell internecine strife, of factions, of desertions, and in many parts of Japan of absolutely chaotic confusion. Yoritomo entered upon his struggle with the Taira at the head of a band of no more than 300 desperate men; and yet in less than ten years his control over the military class from Mutsu to Satsuma was complete, absolute, and unquestioned; and the peace and order that reigned within the “four seas” was such as Japan rarely knew. Then the new Shōgunate, that wonderful administrative engine the Kamakura Bakufu, the new military capital of Kamakura itself, are eloquent testimony to Yoritomo’s originality. On the other hand what did Takauji originate? Absolutely nothing,—except perhaps a new line of Shōguns, who, with one or two exceptions perhaps, were remarkable for nothing so much as for lack of fibre and gross incapacity. To the all important matter of the administration of law and justice, Yoritomo paid the closest personal attention; either to this or to the working of his administrative machinery in general Takauji paid scarcely any personal attention at all. Much—far too much—was entrusted to the Kō family, especially to Moronao, whose name became synonymous with all that was haughty and all that was arbitrary. Under Yoritomo the Kōs would unquestionably have been kept in their proper places and restrained from all misuse or abuse of their undoubted abilities. Under Yoritomo the laws were strictly enforced; in Kyōto almost from the very first the very excellent though commonplace provisions of the *Kemmu Shikimoku* were merely so much dead-letter. Take the first article of that “Code” which enjoins the universal practise of economy for example. “Under the designation of ‘smart’ there prevails,”—so runs the commentary to it—“a love of eccentricity or originality, figured brocades and embroidered silks, of elaborately mounted swords, and a hunting after fashions, and of everything calculated to strike the eye. The age may almost be said to have

become demented. Those who are rich become more and more filled with pride; and the less wealthy are ashamed of not being able to keep up with them. Nothing could be more injurious to the cause of good manners. This must be strictly kept within bounds." Now, by the very man chiefly responsible for the enforcement of this regulation, Kō Moronao, the article was wantonly flouted in the most open and ostentatious manner. In the pomp and luxury of his own establishment he was the Cardinal Wolsey of the age. Nor was Takauji himself much better in this respect. The tone of his household was that of the most extravagant of the greatest Court nobles; the state he maintained was almost imperial. The death of an Ashikaga female infant sufficed to bring all public business to a temporary stand-still. Simplicity and economy! About their traditions the Ashikaga line of Shōguns knew nothing. We hear of Yoritomo drawing his sword and cutting off the too ample skirts of a certain Vice-Governor of Chikuzen who had appeared in a costume which contravened a Kamakura sumptuary regulation. For Takauji or any of his line to have administered any such an object-lesson to a vassal would have been a glaring case of Satan reproving sin. And until Hosokawa Yoriyuki's time (1368-1379) most of the injunctions of the *Kemmu Shikimoku* were regarded as being more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Possessed of no great measure of originality, Takauji can hardly be described as great, whether as an organiser, an administrator, or as a law-giver. Nor was either he or his brother Tadayoshi a great captain in the sense that Yoshitsune was. The best achievement of the two brothers was perhaps the campaign which led up to the battle of the Minato-gawa in 1336. But there the opposing Commander-in-Chief, Nitta Yoshisada, was anything but a genius in strategy; if Kusunoki Masashige had been in his place, that campaign might have ended very differently. Takauji may indeed have been the greatest man of his time; but that is not saying very much, for the middle of the fourteenth century in Japan was the golden age, not merely of turncoats, but of mediocrities.

The troublous decade (1358-1368) of the second Ashikaga Shōgun's rule may be briefly dismissed. Yoshiakira's want of resolution and his readiness to be ruled by the advice of the counsellor who held his ear for the moment involved him in

frequent troubles with his great vassals, several of whom revolted and went over to the Southerners. In 1362 one of these, Hosokawa Kiyouji, disappointed in his expectations of reward, drove the Shōgun from the capital, and then returned to his native province of Awa intending to reduce Shikoku on behalf of the South. Kiyouji however was soon overpowered by his cousin, the famous Yoriyuki. In this same year of 1362 the redoubtable Yamanas, who had meanwhile over-run the five provinces of Mimasaka, Bitchū, Bizen, Inaba, and Tamba, abandoned the Southern cause, and after a ten years' defection made their peace with Yoshiakira. An evidence of the straits in which they had placed him is to be seen in the fact that the administration of these five provinces was now entrusted to the elder Yamana. Certain foreign writers speak of these provinces being given to him in fief. This is nonsense; he was merely made *Shugo*, as which of course he was entitled to retain a certain proportion of the taxes as official revenue. Then followed troubles with the Shibas and certain other great vassals. In 1366 and 1367 Yoshiakira endeavoured to arrange terms of accommodation between the rival Courts and to reunite Japan under a single Sovereign, but the negotiations ended in smoke.

The one satisfactory section of the Empire at this time was the Kwantō, where Takauji's fourth son Motouji held the office of Kwanryō. In 1358 his officers settled matters effectually with that disturbing factor the Nittas, by seizing their chief, Yoshioki, and drowning him in the Tamagawa; and henceforth Motouji was truly master of the eight Eastern Provinces. His vassals then strongly urged him to march to Kyōto and dispossess Yoshiakira of the Shōgunate, who was known to be jealous of him. But Motouji stoutly refused to do so, and sent a strong force under his *Shitsuji*, Hatakeyama Kunikiyo, to aid Yoshiakira in his campaign against Yoshino. A series of considerable victories followed; but Hatakeyama's conduct brought him into collision with his brother officers, and he abandoned the Ashikaga cause and tried to form a party of his own. On returning to the East he was attacked and vanquished by Motouji, who thereupon recalled his former *Shitsuji*, Uyesugi Noriaki, who had been in exile since the death of Tadayoshi in 1352. At, or shortly after this time, Kai and Izu, and, later on, Mutsu, were put under Kamakura

jurisdiction; and their peaceful and orderly condition formed a marked contrast to the general state of the rest of the Empire. On the whole this Motouji, who died at the early age of twenty-eight in 1367, was perhaps the best and ablest of the Ashikagas.

Meanwhile, except in Kyūshū, whither, by the way, the remnants of the Nittas had betaken themselves in considerable force, the fortunes of the Southern cause were decidedly on the downward grade. Had Kitabatake Chikafusa survived ten or twelve years longer the probabilities are that the Ashikaga Shōgunate would have fallen. But on Kitabatake's death in 1354 there was no one capable of filling his place. Nor was this the worst of it. Where the three Northern ex-Emperors had been conveyed far within the Southern lines in 1352, they had been followed by a huge influx of Court nobles from Kyōto. Now these, instead of proving an element of additional strength, had turned out to be a great source of weakness and discord. The Emperor Murakami II. had expressed an intention to abdicate; and immediately these worthies split into two hostile camps each supporting the claims of a different son of his to the succession, and expended all their strength not in opposing the Northerners, but in internal squabbles. The Emperor did not abdicate; but the cabals went on notwithstanding; and when he died in 1368—the same year as Yoshiakira—the discord was really serious. This disgusted many of the military men and took all the heart for the cause out of them; and early in 1369 the chief of the hitherto loyal Kusunoki, Masanori, abandoned it as hopeless, and went over to the Northerners. Chōkei had become Emperor and his brother Crown Prince; but even on the abdication of the former and the accession of the latter as Kameyama II. in 1372, the faction in the Southern camp was by no means at an end. It was only the natural strength of the mountain fastness of the Kii peninsula that enabled the Southerners to maintain a precarious existence.

But in Kyūshū, by 1371, they had triumphed unquestionably, and the Ashikaga had either been beaten to their knees or driven from the island. However with the appointment of the highly capable Imagawa Sadayo as Tandai things began to change there also; and although it took him more than a decade to re-establish the Ashikaga supremacy and to restore order in Kyūshū, he at last succeeded in doing so.

On the death of Yoshiakira, in 1368, the Ashikaga administration had greatly gained in efficiency and vigour. This was indirectly the result of Motouji's counsel, who discerning the great abilities and sterling character of Hosokawa Yoriyuki had advised Yoshiakira to entrust the fortunes of his ten-year-old son, Yoshimitsu, to his charge. Of Yoriyuki it suffices to say that he was fully the peer of the very best of the Hōjōs; and that in addition he was thoroughly devoted to the very best interests of the youthful Shōgun. Yoshimitsu was most carefully brought up; everything was done to develop his intelligence, to build up his character, and to fit him for the proper discharge of the duties of the great office and illustrious position for which he was destined. And it is greatly to Yoshimitsu's credit that he never forgot the immense debt of gratitude he owed to the guardian of his early years. Now under Yoriyuki, for the first time, the *Kemmu Shikimoku* ceased to be nothing more than empty phraseology, setting forth the pious aspirations of a few belated Puritans mocked by being called upon to legislate for a fourteenth-century Japanese Vanity Fair in arms. The spirit of its clauses was now strictly, sternly, and impartially enforced. Naturally enough this brought Yoriyuki into serious collision not only with individuals but with classes; especially with the priests, on some of whom his hand fell heavily. Truculent *Shugo*, incompetent officials, venal parasites, intriguing Court nobles and high-born dames were all presently loud in the expression of their grievances against him. At last in 1379 he set fire to his mansion in Kyōto and retired to his own acres in Shikoku in disgust.

Twelve years later, however, Yoriyuki's services were again in request. A member of the Yamana family had reduced the provinces of Kishū and Idzumi in the Shōgun's name, but showed no inclination to surrender them to his suzerain. Meanwhile the Yamana power had been steadily growing in the West of the Main Island, and the family now had the administration of no fewer than eleven of the sixty-six provinces of the Empire. The Shōgun, naturally enough, felt this to be a serious menace to his power; and now that Kyūshū had been thoroughly reduced and pacified, and that the Southern Court was merely existing on sufferance, he recalled Yoriyuki and determined to curb the Yamanas. Just at this

time the Yamana chief Mitsuyuki seized some domains belonging to the ex-Emperor in Idzumo, one of the provinces he not owned but administered. Thereupon Yoshimitsu mobilised a force to punish him; but on January 24, 1392, Mitsuyuki suddenly threw himself at the head of a vast force upon Kyōto. After desperate fighting he was repulsed; and in less than a month he was hopelessly overwhelmed and had to submit, and retire from the headship of the family, which was now stripped of the office of *Shugo* in nine provinces.

Shortly afterwards Hatakeyama Motokuni and Ōuchi Yoshihiro captured the castle of Chihaya, and, although Kusunoki Masakatsu made good his escape, nearly all his followers surrendered. The situation of the Southern Court was now becoming desperate; and when Yoshimitsu opened up negotiations with it through Ōuchi Yoshihiro, a definite settlement was presently arranged. The exact particulars cannot be definitely ascertained. What is certain is that a deputation of six Southern Court nobles appeared in Kyōto (1392), and handed over the sacred emblems to a commission of twenty-one Northern *Kugé*; that the Northern Emperor, Komatsu II., was then acknowledged sole and undisputed Sovereign of the Empire, and that Kameyama II. became Dajō Tennō, and presently took up his residence at Saga near the capital. The (Southern) ex-Emperor was guaranteed in the possession of all his manors in Yoshino and elsewhere, while the Southern *Kugé* were also assigned estates for their support.

The chief doubtful point is whether it was stipulated that the Imperial succession should thenceforth be regulated by the provisions of Saga II.'s will. The commonly-accepted view is that it was so covenanted; and certain subsequent events lend support to this contention. The military men who had supported the Southern cause till the end did not make their appearance in the capital; they withdrew into various retreats to await the day when an Emperor of the Junior line should again be on the throne. If Saga II.'s will was still authoritative that day should have come in 1412, when Komatsu II. abdicated. But he was succeeded not by a Prince of the Southern line, but by his own son Shōkō (1412-1428). This Sovereign was greatly addicted to the study and practice of magic arts, in which it was believed that proficiency could not be attained without the strict observance of continence, and he

died without children. This contingency should have provided a fair opening for the Junior line, but Hanazono II. (1428-1464) who was now raised to the throne was a grandson of the third Northern Emperor Sukō. In 1413 or 1414, Kitabatake Mitsumasa had risen on behalf of a Prince of the Junior branch, and now he and Kusunoki Mitsumasa made another abortive effort in the same cause. The last and perhaps the most sensational attempt of the partisans of the Southern line was made in 1443. On the night of October 16 in that year, a band of determined men under Kusunoki Jirō and the Court noble Hino Arimitsu suddenly assailed the Palace from two directions, all but succeeded in killing or capturing the Emperor, and actually got possession of the regalia. They were soon driven out, however, and in their flight to Hi-ei-zan, where one body of them entrenched themselves, the Mirror and the Sword were dropped and recovered by the pursuers. The other body made good their escape to the wilds of Odaigahara, carrying with them the Seal; and it was not until a year later that it found its way back to Kyōto, when the "rebels" had been overpowered and extirpated. Naturally enough immense importance was placed upon the possession of the sacred emblems; and the fact that from 1338 to 1352 the Northern Emperors held only a fabricated set of them, and from 1352 to 1392 no sacred emblems at all, has caused orthodox Japanese historians to omit them from the list of Sovereigns.

One natural result of this wasting and interminable succession war was greatly to weaken the reverence and respect in which the Emperor and his Court had been held. Kō Moronao is accused of having told his followers to "take the estates of the Emperor if they wanted estates. A living Emperor is a mere waster of the world's substance, and a burden upon the people. He is not a necessity, but if we must have him a wooden effigy will do equally well." The truth of this specific charge I have so far been unable to verify; but what is certain is that the behaviour of some of the *Bushi* towards the ex-Emperor in the streets of Kyōto was so outrageously insolent that Tadayoshi had the offenders decapitated (1342), and that military men did endeavour to seize the Imperial estates is plain from the incident that gave rise to the war between the Shōgun and the Yamana chieftain in 1392.

Under the Kamakura *régime* the Imperial law courts had been by no manner of means superseded throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. The territorial extent and the territorial limitations of the Bakufu jurisdiction have already been fully, and it is to be hoped clearly, dealt with. In Kyōto especially nearly all ecclesiastical disputes about manors and what not, and all civilian cases had been decided not by Kamakura but by Imperial tribunals. Under the Ashikagas this ceased to be so; the tendency was to draw all legal business into the Muromachi Courts. In the words of a contemporary chronicler: "Ministers of State, who from generation to generation had received the nation's homage, had to bow their heads to petty officials appointed by the Shōgun, who was now the depositary of power. The Five Great Families began to curry favour with these low-born officials. They studied the provincial dialects and gestures because their own language and fashions were ridiculed by the *Samurai* whom they met in the streets. They even copied the costumes of the rustic warriors. But it was impossible for them to hide their old selves completely. They lost their traditional customs, and did not gain those of the provinces, so that, in the end, they were like men who had wandered from their way in town and country alike: they were neither *Samurai* nor Court Nobles."

The loss of their traditional customs by the *Kugé*, however, was of much less consequence than the loss of their patrimonial acres. As has been stated over and over again, their revenues came from manors in the provinces, which were exempt from the control of the Bakufu or the attention of its taxation officials. But the stress of maintaining his armies in the field had constrained Takauji to procure an Imperial rescript authorising his officers to collect half the annual taxes of all civilian and ecclesiastical estates, the whole of which had hitherto been paid to the proprietors. Nor was this the worst of it. Military men began to encroach on the boundaries of such estates; and not unfrequently even to evict the bailiffs and to seize the manors of the civilians in their entirety. Naturally when the partisans of one or other of the rival Courts triumphed in their localities they promptly confiscated all the lands belonging to those on the losing side there. Then from 1347 onwards Kyōto was frequently in a

virtual state of blockade; and as the *Kugé* could then get no supplies from their properties in the provinces, they were often on the brink of starvation. This drove great numbers of them to betake themselves to their manors in the vain hope of being able to save something from the wreck with which their fortunes were threatened, and Kyōto for the time being became a solitude, we are told.

If the Muromachi Bakufu gained at the expense of the Imperial law courts in the capital, it rapidly got shorn of its influence in the provinces. Formerly all succession disputes in, and boundary disputes between, military families in the country had been settled by the Kamakura tribunals. These were now, in default of being composed by the clan councillors, generally decided by an appeal to the sword. Sometimes for months at a time the Muromachi law courts were closed on account of the war, and to carry local cases there would often have been a sheer bootless waste of time and money. And besides these tribunals had often an unsavoury reputation for bribery. The hold of Takauji over his great vassals was comparatively loose; that of Yoshiakira notoriously so. Their support had to be bought by gifts of manors, and with investiture as *Shugo* sometimes over two or three or more provinces. To scan their administration too closely would in many cases simply drive them over into the opposing camp. Hence the net result was that the Imperial Court lost all control not only over the provinces but over the capital itself; that the Shōguns usurped the last shred of central authority possessed by the Emperors; while the Muromachi Bakufu was impotent to control the military class in the various circuits of the Empire as the Kamakura Boards had done. The process of decentralisation had undoubtedly set in strongly.

And what, it may be asked in conclusion, was the general effect of this Japanese analogue of the Wars of the Roses upon the fortunes of the common people? In England the struggle between York and Lancaster fell but lightly on the farmers, the labourers, and the artisans, who seem to have generally gone on their way prosperously, while the nobles and gentry with their mercenary troops were massacring each other. In fourteenth-century Japan things were very different; then perhaps the lot of the peaceful toilers and fillers of the soil was quite as miserable as that of the French peasant during

the contemporary Hundred Years' War. In many provinces each Court had its partisans, its *Shugo*, its taxation and other officials, and the hapless peasant was often so harried by requisitions first by one side and then by the other that he was reduced not to the verge of, but to actual, starvation. Then his house was frequently burned over his head, and his crops either trampled down and destroyed or cut down and carried off. The result was that the able-bodied absconded and took to brigandage and piracy. Once possessed of arms it was not difficult to find service with some chieftain in need of fighting-men. We actually find the Southern Court utilising the services of pirate bands in operations against some of the enemy's maritime fortresses on the Higō sea-board. Then on several occasions we read of promising campaigns having to be abandoned on account of the hopeless break-down of the commissariat. In sheer defence, the great houses ultimately found themselves compelled to accord their peasants and serfs better treatment; and thus perhaps the position of the labourer was better in 1392 than it had been half-a-century before.

Seemingly the only industry that flourished in the Empire in these years was that of the armourer and the sword-smith, swords in fact constituting the chief in the limited list of items of export in the renewed trade with China.

CHAPTER XX.

ASHIKAGA FEUDALISM.

AT the death of Hosokawa Yoriyuki shortly after the overthrow of the Yamanas in 1392, Yoshimitsu found himself in the possession of power and authority such as no Ashikaga Shōgun had ever wielded before. The long succession war was now at an end, and a single Emperor once more reigned in Japan. Inasmuch as this Sovereign owed his position to Yoshimitsu, and inasmuch as all the Court nobles, especially those who had betaken themselves to Yoshino—were more or less dependent upon his bounty, the Shōgun was now all-powerful at Court. Furthermore his hold over his great vassals had become firm and strict, for any revolt against him was now a rebellion which could not be legalised by the simple expedient of taking service with a rival Emperor. Moreover the Muromachi Bakufu machine suddenly brought to a high state of efficiency, presently succeeded in making itself respected in most parts of the Empire. Kamakura under a Kwanryō of Ashikaga stock was responsible for the administration of Kai and Izu in addition to the Eight Provinces of the Kwantō. One Tandai was at the head of affairs in Kyūshū, while another had charge of Ōshū, which was again withdrawn from the jurisdiction of Kamakura.


In the previous chapter the constitution of the central Muromachi administration has been already outlined. It only remains to say that in 1367 Shiba Yoshimasa, who had been *Shitsuji* since 1362, was made *Kwanryō*, and that thenceforth the Shōgun's first Minister was known by that title. This, in most respects, was the *Shikken* of Kamakura under a new name; only the office of Kwanryō was not hereditary in a single family as that of the *Shikken* had been in the house of the Hōjō. After Shibas, Hosokawas held the post; and in 1398 a member of the house of Hatakeyama occupied it for the first time. Ultimately a tradition established itself that the Kwanryō might come from any of these three houses, and that he *must* come from one of them.

This appointment of Hatakeyama to the post gave rise to serious troubles in the following year. He and Ōuchi Yoshihiro were on notoriously bad terms, and Ōuchi was by no means inclined to bend to his will or to take orders from him. The Ōuchi family was descended from the Korean Prince, Rinsei, who settled in Japan in 611; and in 1180 its chieftain, then settled in Suwō, was admitted into the military class. In the early half of the great succession war the Ōuchis had fought on the Southern side; but in 1364 the then head of the clan passed over to the Ashikagas, and was rewarded with the office of *Shugo* in Nagato and Iwami, where the Southern partisans were still strong. His son, Yoshihiro, had done good service in Kyūshū against the Kikuchis, and in the overthrow of the Yamanas he had played a prominent part in 1392, while in the same year he had shown great diplomatic tact and skill in successfully arranging the terms of accommodation between the rival Courts which brought the exhausting civil war to a close. As the reward of these distinguished services he was ultimately invested with the administration of the six provinces of Nagato, Suwō, Aki, Buzen, Kii, and Idzumi, and was in a fair way to become as powerful as the Yamanas had been. Accordingly he was in no mood to allow himself to be overshadowed by the new Kwanryō, Hatakeyama, his personal foe. Besides he conceived he had other grievances against Yoshimitsu himself; and his first determination to effect the removal of the Minister presently developed into a design to substitute Mitsukane, the third Ashikaga Kwanryō of Kamakura, for Yoshimitsu. The latter was too prompt, however; before Kwantō troops could arrive Ōuchi was invested in Sakai by Hatakeyama Motokuni and Shiba Yoshishige, and the rebellion ended with his fall in battle there (1399). Although there were some troubles in Kyūshū, in Shinano, in the Kwantō (where the Oyama clan was extirpated), and in Mutsu, (where the Dates had to be dealt with,) this revolt of Ōuchi's was the only serious commotion Yoshimitsu had to face in his later years.

Under his four immediate successors, the peace of the central portion of the Empire remained comparatively undisturbed, for although all four, except perhaps Yoshinori (1428-1441), were anything but strong and able rulers, the Muro-machi Bakufu machine continued to run well and smoothly

on the whole. At the same time, such halcyon days of peace as the Empire had enjoyed between 1221 and 1274 under the firm but beneficent rule of the Hōjō's were no longer known.* Even in the Home Provinces and in Central Japan there were

* At this point it may be convenient to append the following genealogical charts:—



	Birth.	Nomination.	Abdication.	Death.
1. Takauji	1305	1338		1358
2. Yoshiakira	1330	1358	1367	1368
3. Yoshimitsu	1358	1367	1395	1408
4. Yoshimochi	1386	1395	1423	1428
5. Yoshikazu	1407	1423		1425
6. Yoshinori	1394	1428		1441
7. Yoshikatsu	1433	1441		1443
8. Yoshimasa	1435	1443	1474	1490
9. Yoshihisa	1465	1474		1489
10. Yoshitane (1)	1465	1490	1493	
11. Yoshizumi	1478	1493	1508	1511
Yoshitane (2)		1508	1521	1522
12. Yoshiharu	1510	1521	1545	1550
13. Yoshiteru	1535	1545		1565
14. Yoshihide	1565	1568		1568
15. Yoshiaki	1537	1568	1573	1597

It will be observed that no fewer than eleven of these Ashikaga Shōguns were minors at the date of their nomination to the office. On the death of his son (5) Yoshikazu in 1423, (4) Yoshimochi reassumed the reins of administration and held them down to his death in 1428.

KAMAKURA BRANCH.		Birth.	Death.
1. Motouji		1340	1367
2. Ujimitsu		1357	1398
3. Mitsukane		1376	1409
4. Mochiuji		1398	1439
a. Shigeuji		1434	1497
b. Masauji			1531
c. Takamoto			
d. Haruuji			1560
e. Ycshiuji			

The descent here is from father to son in every case. The first four had their seat in Kamakura and ruled the whole of the Kwantō, together with Kai and Izu. The others residing at Koga in Shimōsa

sporadic risings of the partisans of the Southern line. More than once the Kwantō was the scene of sanguinary strife, while Kyūshū for one reason or another was generally in a state of turmoil and confusion. And meanwhile the Ashikagas in Kyōto, in spite of all their seeming prosperity, were surely paving the way for the undoing of their house.

The third Shōgun Yoshimitsu is a baffling character to read. It was undoubtedly to Hosokawa Yoriyuki that he mainly owed his success, for, as has been said, it was Yoriyuki who was responsible for the efficient organisation or re-organisation of the administrative machinery as well as for the training and education of the young Shōgun. However, on reaching manhood, while retaining a sincere affection and respect for Yoriyuki, Yoshimitsu broke with the traditions of Yoriyuki in several essential respects. From the day that Yoriyuki fired his Kyōto mansion, and retired to his estates, frugality and simplicity ceased to be the watchwords of the Ashikaga administration, and that régime of unbridled and wasteful extravagance set in which was soon destined to make the Ashikaga peace a greater scourge to the people at large than the long succession war had been.

The first article of the *Kemmu Shikimoku* had been directed against *Basara*, or the luxuries of fashion; the comment winding up with the assertion that "this must be strictly kept within bounds." Under Yoshimitsu this "Basara" was practically elevated to the position of a divinity, and easily became the best and most devoutly worshipped of all the eight million gods of the land. The Shōgun was continually making progresses to various parts of the Empire, once to worship at Itsukushima, once to view Fuji-san, and frequently to fanes and shrines within a few days' journey of the capital. On these occasions the magnificence of his retinue reminds the European student of the accounts of the Field of the Cloth of Gold he read in his schoolboy days, just as the description of

had a more or less precarious hold over the provinces of Shimotsuke, Shimōsa, Kadzusa, and Awa only.

Down to 1439 the Ashikaga Lord of Kamakura continued to bear the title of Kwantō Kwanryō, while his first Minister, usually the head of the Uyesugi house, was known as the *Shitsuji*. In 1439, on the expulsion of the Ashikagas from Kamakura to Koga, their chief became known as Goshō or Kubō, the title of Kwanryō being then either bestowed upon or assumed by the Uyesugi *Shitsuji*, who remained in possession of Kamakura.

Yoshimitsu's *Kinkakuji* (Golden Pavilion) recalls Nero's famous Golden House. Besides the *Kinkakuji*, which cost a fabulous sum, the Shōgun erected or repaired many temples, and was as faithfully imitated in his building enterprises as in his other extravagances by his great vassals and wealthy subjects; and indeed by some who were not wealthy. And for the next half-century this mad craze continued. A somewhat later writer gives the following account of the capital in the first half of the fifteenth century:—

“The finest edifices were of course the Imperial Palaces. Their roofs seemed to pierce the sky and their balconies to touch the clouds. A lofty hall revealed itself at every fifth step and another at every tenth. In the park, weeping willows, plum-trees, peach-trees and pines were cleverly planted so as to enhance the charm of the artificial hills. Rocks shaped like whales, sleeping tigers, dragons or phoenixes, were placed around the lake where mandarin ducks looked at their own images in the clear water. Beautiful women wearing perfumed garments of exquisite colours played heavenly music. As for the ‘Flower Palace’ of the Shōgun, it cost six hundred thousand pieces of gold (about a million pounds sterling). The tiles of its roof were like jewels or precious metals. It defies description. In the Takakura Palace resided the mother of the Shōgun, and his wife. A single door cost as much as twenty thousand pieces of gold (£32,000). In the eastern part of the city stood the Karasu-maru Palace built by Yoshimasa during his youth. It was scarcely less magnificent. Then there was the Fujiwara Palace of Sanjō, where the mother of the late Shōgun was born. All the resources of human intellect had been employed to adorn it. At Hino and Hirohashi were mansions out of which the mother of the present Shōgun came. They were full of jewels and precious objects. (The writer then enumerates the palaces of twenty-seven noble families.) Even men that made medicine and fortune-telling their profession and petty officials like secretaries had stately residences. There were some 200 of such buildings, constructed entirely of white pine and having four-post gates (*i.e.* gates with flank entrances for persons of inferior rank). Then there were a hundred provincial nobles, great and small, each of whom

had a stately residence, so that there were altogether from 6,000 to 7,000 houses of a fine type in the capital.”*

In contradistinction to Yoritomo, who cared little for high Court rank or office himself, and who left instructions that his descendants should be very chary of accepting such until their career was obviously nearing its end, Yoshimitsu had a most insatiate appetite for titles and rank and honours. Although the Ashikaga was a comparatively junior branch of the Minamotos he constituted himself or got himself constituted Uji-Chōja, or Head of the great warlike clan at large, while about the same date he declared the Presidency of the two Colleges of Junwa, and Sōgaku, at that time held by Kuga, who was descended from the Emperor Kwammu, to be hereditary in the line of the Shōguns. And henceforth no one of non-Minamoto stock was to be eligible for the office of Shōgun.

All this, of course, might in itself be allowed to pass without comment. But Yoshimitsu sought and obtained the First Degree of Court rank, had himself declared equal with the Three Palaces, and invested with the Chancellorship of the Empire,—and much more of a similar nature. Since Taira Kiyomori’s time, no military man had held the Chancellorship; and for that reason perhaps Yoshimitsu has often been compared to Kiyomori. But in truth the methods of the two men were radically different in most respects. Yoshimitsu sought no matrimonial connections with the Imperial House, and he had nothing of Kiyomori’s swaggering truculence. In many points he recalls Fujiwara Michinaga,—although Michinaga owed his influence mainly to his position of “maternal relative.” Yoshimitsu’s attitude towards the Sovereign was courteous and friendly; so friendly indeed that their two households seemed to be one and the same. As *Shitsuji*, or High Steward in the establishment of the ex-Emperor who professedly conducted the administration, the Shōgun was supreme even in the ordering of the internal and domestic affairs of the Court, which by the way was amply provided with means to support its dignity.

Towards his great vassals also Yoshimitsu was exceedingly affable, often attending feasts and functions in their mansions, and returning their hospitality on a lavish scale. So successful was this course of conduct in preserving the peace of the

* Quoted by Captain Brinkley in his *Japan*, Vol. II., pp. 55-56.

Empire, that one cannot help the suspicion that it was adopted as much from well-pondered policy as from natural inclination. The age was essentially a luxury-loving one; devoted to gaiety, to ostentatious display, to extravagance and magnificence. Hosokawa Yoriyuki's severe Puritanism had brought him into serious conflict with many influential interests, which Yoshimitsu afterwards exerted himself to conciliate. In short after the death of Yoriyuki in 1392, Yoshimitsu's policy in many respects was a forerunner of that of Louis XIV. of France. By drawing all the wealth and men of mark in the Empire to Kyōto, and inveigling the great Barons into a profuse and lavish way of living there, he insidiously sapped at once their moral fibre and their material resources, and so placed the provinces more and more at the mercy of the capital, and of the central administration. In the Hyōjōshū or Great Council, sixteen of the twenty-four seats were occupied by great feudal chiefs, each of whom administered one or more provinces,—generally by means of a deputy or deputies. That concord among these powerful and by nature often turbulent chieftains was on the whole so well maintained speaks eloquently on behalf of Yoshimitsu's ability and social tact.

The priesthood was still a mighty power in the land; and Yoshimitsu made great and successful exertions to earn the good-will of the monks. The older great monasteries, such as Hi-ei-zan, Kōfukuji, and Kōyasan, had indeed decayed in wealth and influence; and the Zenshū was now on the whole the most flourishing sect. In Kamakura their five great fanes were known as the *Go-zan* (Five Temples); and later on five of their chief seats in the metropolis or its vicinity were placed on a similar status, the only difference being that these five were made subordinate to a sixth, the Nanzenji. Yoshimitsu conferred special favours upon these, and furthermore directed that each province should have its own great Zen monastery. The Zen Abbot, Soseki, as confidential counsellor to Takauji and Yoshiakira had been a great political power in his time, and Manzai now occupied a similar position, while yet other Zen ecclesiastics were later on exceedingly influential as *kuromaku*. Their usual work was to draft the public and official documents of the time; but in addition to this it is unquestionable that the opinions they expressed were of great weight in deciding certain administrative questions of high importance.

As has been recorded, Takauji had appropriated half the taxes of all non-military estates for the support of his troops, and this regulation still held good in the case of all manors owned by civilians. But those held by temples and shrines were now relieved from that burden, while many religious houses received additional gifts of valuable landed property. Many monasteries were also repaired by a levy of the tax known as *Dansen*, which was imposed to meet special exigencies of the most miscellaneous character, while certain of them were endowed with the proceeds of custom-duties and transit-dues levied at barriers which were now erected all over the country. For instance, the Kōfukuji of Nara henceforth had a right to the customs of the port of Hyōgo. The priests were not slow to erect barriers of their own on many roads and levy taxes on all traffic there; but this practice, as well as their possession of weapons of war, was forbidden. On the whole Yoshimitsu remained on very friendly terms with the religious, who were flattered by the high consideration and reverence he exhibited towards them, and by his devotion to the study of the Sutras. In 1395, he nominally retired from active life and entered the priesthood; but as a matter of fact he continued to direct the administration down to his death in 1408.

Under Yoshimitsu the foreign relations and policy of Japan again became matters of importance. He was exceedingly anxious to establish commercial relations with China, for the profits from the Chinese trade were enormous and Yoshimitsu's extravagance made a fresh source of revenue a vital necessity to him. Besides, he was greatly swayed by his Zen counsellors; and as the prestige of the Zen priests was greatly owing to the traditional prosecution of their studies in China, they were naturally eager to promote intercourse between Japan and the Middle Kingdom. In Takauji's time the management of the Chinese trade had been almost entirely entrusted to them; and now that the gateway of Kyūshū was again in Ashikaga hands they strongly urged a resumption of commercial intercourse with the Middle Kingdom. The chief obstacle, they knew, lay in the inveterate persistence of the Chinese Sovereigns in affecting to treat all neighbouring States as vassal kingdoms. But just as Henry IV. deemed the possession of Paris "well worth a mass," Yoshimitsu sadly in

need of money considered that the immense profits of a lucrative foreign trade were no inadequate compensation for humouring Chinese vanity for the time being. Japanese pirates had been and were, worrying the whole Korean and Chinese sea-board, and when Chinese envoys appeared in order to remonstrate, the Shōgun at once issued orders to the Kyūshū *Shugo* to deal drastically with all the sea-rovers they could lay hands on. The efforts of these officers by no means put an end to the evil, but they served to show that the Japanese Government was sincere in its professions; and Yoshimitsu was presently furnished with permits for the dispatch of a certain number of merchant vessels yearly. In the diplomatic intercourse which followed Yoshimitsu is undoubtedly addressed as "King of Japan" by the Ming Emperor, and in his reply the Shōgun not only makes use of the Chinese calendar, but he also speaks of himself as a vassal. Furthermore he proceeded to meet Chinese envoys at Hyōgo; and escorting them to his Kinkakuji Palace, welcomed them there in a manner which led them to believe that they were dealing with a tributary to their master. These incidents have excited the hot indignation of successive generations of Japanese patriots.

The old State of Kōryū came to an end in 1392, and the ancestor of the present line of Korean Sovereigns ascended the throne of what was henceforth known as the Kingdom of Chōsen. Before the year was out envoys arrived in Kyōto; and Yoshimitsu at once embraced the opportunity of entering into friendly diplomatic and commercial relations with the new Peninsular dynasty.

Yoshimochi, Yoshimitsu's son and successor (1408-1428), deviated from his father's policy in two particulars. His relations with the Imperial Household were less intimate; in fact he treated it with a neglect that amounted to something like disrespect; and he showed no eagerness to maintain the intercourse with China. He was fortunate in his Zenshū counsellors; especially so in the person of Mansai; and his social relations with his great vassals in the Hyōjōshū assured him of their support. As a matter of fact he troubled himself very little about administrative details personally; his life appears to have been spent in an interminable round of feasting and banqueting with some of the Daimyō and the

Court nobles. His repeated failure to appear at Court functions was often owing to the circumstance that at the time he was sleeping off the effects of the debauch of the previous day. In modern times the Japanese are certainly a temperate people; but at this date the drunkenness that prevailed was worse than a scandal. Falstaff would have been thoroughly in his element in contemporary Kyōto. In 1423 Yoshimochi entered the priesthood, and resigned office in favour of his son Yoshikazu, then sixteen years old. But in two years this young hopeful literally drank himself to death! As Yoshikazu had been Yoshimochi's only son, a grave succession question arose on the death of the latter in 1428. All his six brothers except Yoshitsugu, whom he had caused to be killed in 1418, had taken the tonsure; and so the way to the Kyōto Shōgunate appeared to be open for the Ashikaga Lord of Kamakura, the ambitious third Kwantō-Kwanryō, Mochiuji. But one of Yoshimochi's priestly brothers was selected as his successor. Yoshinori, as this sixth Ashikaga Shōgun was thenceforth called, was then thirty-four years of age; and during his rule (from 1428 to 1441) he showed a considerable measure of vigour and determination. In the matter of intercourse with China he returned to the traditions of his father Yoshimitsu. As usual the Chinese were loud in their complaints about the ravages of Japanese pirates, whose numbers and audacity had notoriously increased since the death of Yoshimitsu in 1408. This was, no doubt, partly the result of recent developments in Kyūshū. There had been a serious succession dispute in the Shimadzu family in Satsuma, a border warfare between Shimadzu and the Itōs in Hyūga, a long and bloody contest between the two powerful houses of Aso and Kikuchi in Higo, and a triangular duel for the possession of the north of the island between Shōni, Ōtomo, and Ōuchi, which latter house was now rapidly recovering from the disasters that had overtaken it in 1399. Shōni had been driven from his domains, and compelled to take refuge in Tsushima, while at one time the Bakufu Tandai had also been forced to abandon his office and retire to Kyōto. One outcome of all this was that many Kyūshū *Samurai* were stripped of all their property and reduced to beggary; and these men of broken fortunes generally betook themselves to sea-roving. In many Japanese historical manuals we meet with mention of the reappearance of a

Mongol fleet at Tsushima, and a Japanese victory there in which 2,700 heads were taken (1420). A glance at Korean records suffices to show that the Mongols had nothing to do with the affair; it was a Korean punitive expedition fitted out to make reprisals for a great piratical raid in the previous spring that then came into collision with the Japanese. However the matter went no further; and from about 1436 Sō, the Daimyō of Tsushima, was allowed to send 50 merchant vessels every year with cargoes of Japanese goods to be exchanged for Chinese and Korean produce, while he also received a permit for the establishment of a Japanese settlement of not more than sixty houses at each of the ports of Fusan, Ché-pho, and Yöm-pho.

During the first four decades of the fifteenth century the Kwantō was much less disturbed than Kyūshū, but still it was not altogether without its commotions. There the great house was that of Uyesugi, which was divided into the three branches of Inukake, Yamanouchi, and (later on) Oigayatsu, so named from their respective seats in the neighbourhood of Kamakura. A Uyesugi chieftain was also *Shugo* of Echigo, and so was under the jurisdiction of the Kyōto Bakufu, in the Great Council of which he occupied a seat. About 1415 Uyesugi Ujinori of the Inukake branch was Ashikaga Mochiuji's *Shitsuji*; but for some obscure reasons he was stripped of his office in 1416. He thereupon determined to replace Mochiuji by his brother Mochinaka. When Ujinori seized Kamakura the young Kwanryō fled first to Izu, and then to Suruga. Hence he was escorted to Kyōto by Imagawa, the *Shugo* of the province; and the Kyōtō Shōgun Yoshimochi thereupon ordered the Kwantō Daimyō to crush Ujinori and restore the fugitive Kwanryō. Meanwhile another Uyesugi, Norimoto of the Yamanouchi branch, had marched upon Kamakura at the head of Echigo levies; and as Ujinori had been abandoned by most of his partisans, this Echigo army had an easy triumph. Mochinaka, Ujinori and forty of their followers then committed *harakiri*, while in Kyōto Yoshimochi's own brother Yoshitsugu, who was found to be implicated in the affair, was put to death in 1418.

Uyesugi Norimoto was succeeded in the office of *Shitsuji* by his son, the famous Norizane, in 1419. In 1428 this Norizane did not encourage his master Mochiuji in his preten-

sions to the Kyōto Shōgunate; and accordingly he became an object of dislike and hatred to the latter, who several times endeavoured to compass the death of his all-powerful Minister. In 1437 Mochiuji, who always spoke slightly of Yoshinori as the Priest Shōgun, formed a plot for his overthrow, and as a first step attempted to arrest Norizane. Norizane however escaped to Kōdzuke, and there mustered his vassals and at the same time dispatched urgent messengers to Kyōto for support. The result was that Mochiuji went down before the overwhelming force thrown against him and was driven to commit *harakiri*, as were also his uncle Mitsusada and his eldest son Yoshihisa (1439). His three youngest sons escaped to Nikkō; and in the following year Yūki, the Lord of Koga in Shimōsa, received them in his castle and espoused their cause. He was soon invested and reduced by the Uyesugi; and two of his three protégés were captured in their flight and put to death at the respective ages of thirteen and eleven, only the youngest, a child of five, escaping. Henceforth there was no Ashikaga Lord of Kamakura; and until 1449 the Uyesugi exercised the office of Kwanryō without dispute.

At this conjuncture the Shōgun Yoshinori had acted with great promptness and resolution, qualities he had already displayed on several occasions. In 1435 he had made very short work of the monks of Hi-ei-zan when their Reverences once more essayed to disturb the peace of the capital; and since then they had been praying for his death. Certain abuses in the Court, in the households of the Imperial Princes and among the Court nobles had been repressed not over gently; and the Shōgun had succeeded in making many enemies in these circles. But these were impotent to do him harm; it was only when he made an effort to curb certain of his great military vassals that he became threatened with real danger. He had caused the chiefs of the Toki and Isshiki clans to be executed; and in 1441 he formed the project of breaking the power of the great Akamatsu family by partitioning its extensive domains of Bizen, Harima, Mimasaka, and some cantons of Inaba and Tajima. The Akamatsu chieftain on learning of this held his peace, and invited the Shōgun to a banquet to be held in his Kyōto mansion on July 16, 1441. When the carouse was at its height, two of Akamatsu's retainers set loose all the horses in the stables and drove them

out into the courtyard, where they bit and kicked each other and created a great uproar. In the midst of this, all the doors were suddenly shut; and another retainer jumped up and seized the Shōgun by the hands. As he was struggling to free himself, another vassal came behind him and cut off his head at a blow. With this grisly trophy Akamatsu made his escape to his castle of Shirahata in Harima, where he was presently invested by Hosokawas, Takedas and Yamanas all eager for a share in his domains. He and several of his leading vassals committed suicide, and the power of the clan was broken for the time being.

Yoshinori was succeeded by his eldest son Yoshikatsu, who died in his tenth year in 1443, and was then followed by his brother Yoshimasa, two years his junior. Of course this child, who received his patent as Shōgun in 1447, cannot reasonably be held responsible for the maladministration of the next ten or twelve years. But the fact remains that the very worst that the Empire had to suffer during the minority of this eighth Ashikaga Shōgun, Yoshimasa, was the merest trifle to the miseries that had to be endured under his personal rule.

And yet the period from 1443 to 1454 was the reverse of a quiet or happy one. Kyūshū as usual was in a state of turmoil. In Yoshinori's time the Tandai had been hunted out of the island, and Yoshinori, unable to find any commander willing or competent to undertake the duties of the office, had been compelled to content himself with sanctioning Ōuchi's operations against Ōtomo and Shōni. Now, in 1441, neither Ōtomo nor Shōni nor Kikuchi nor Chiba had moved, when ordered to join in the attack upon Akamatsu to avenge the murder of the Shōgun Yoshinori; and by the Bakufu this was regarded as a dire offence. Ōuchi was thereupon commissioned to resume operations against them. This time, the Ōuchis were highly successful; Shōni was again driven to take refuge in Tsushima; Ōtomo's capital of Funai was captured, and the north of the island practically reduced. One result of this was a marked increase of the corsair bands, who now had an opportunity of doing Ōuchi serious damage at sea, for he had lately been entrusted with the apportionment of the Chinese permits for 200 Japanese merchantmen to make an annual voyage to Ningpo. What with its victories in Kyūshū, and with the resources being amassed in the over-sea trade, the

house of Ōuchi was now rapidly recovering from the great disaster that had overtaken it in 1399. The Yamanas, by whose fall the Ōuchis had so greatly profited in 1392, had now also all but regained their former strength. As the reward of their distinguished services in the campaign against Akamatsu in 1441 they had been entrusted with the administration of his provinces of Harima, Hizen, and Mimasaka, and this with their own provinces of Tajima, Inaba, and Hōki made them exceedingly formidable, all the more so as they were within easy striking distance of Kyōto, where the central administration was daily becoming weaker.

The nemesis of Yoshimitsu's extravagance and magnificence was now overtaking his descendants. The fall of the Hōjōs had been mainly occasioned by economic and social abuses, and history was now repeating itself in the case of the Ashikaga, whose fiscal and financial administration was perhaps the very worst that Japan has ever seen.

From first to last under the feudal system the chief source of revenue was the land-tax. At no time perhaps has the rate of this been uniform over the whole of this Empire; it has generally varied not so much in different provinces, as in different fiefs, and often on neighbouring manors. Even at the present day it is far from uniform in Japan, for while in some circuits the survey is accurate and exact, in others it is not so. So to state what the true rate is or has been at any time is always a matter of great difficulty. But from an examination of many documents so much is clear. Under the Kamakura Bakufu before the Mongol invasions the levy was generally comparatively light; in Tokugawa times it was considerably heavier, and under the Ashikagas it was still more onerous. Yoshimitsu had ordered a general survey of the Empire; but about the result of this details are lacking. What we do have is a return or perhaps an estimate of merely the rice-lands under cultivation about the middle of the fifteenth century. As the *tan* of those days measured 1,440 square yards against the 1,200 square yards of that of the present time, the 946,606 *chō* of 1450 would be equal to 1,037,920 *chō* of the twentieth century, when the total extent is a little under 3,000,000 *chō*, or some 7,500,000 acres. Besides this there was, of course, a considerable superficies under other crops; but of the exact extent of that we know nothing.

It is no doubt surprising to find so much of the soil under cultivation after the long and devastating civil war, and at a time when the Empire was still in a state of turmoil in many quarters. But, as in France, the recovery of prosperity after the ravages of war has always been rapid in Japan. The explanation is that the actual destruction of capital has never been very great. Stock-farming was almost unknown; agricultural implements were of the simplest and most inexpensive nature; the farmer needed no clothing at all in summer and not much in winter; his household furniture consisted of little more than a rice-pot, a few bowls, and some sets of chopsticks. When his house was burned over his head it was no irreparable loss, for it was nothing but a flimsy hut that could be run up again in a few days. In the fighting around Sakai in 1399, we are told that more than 10,000 farmers' houses were reduced to ashes. This on the face of it looks a great calamity for the poor peasants; but the probability is that it did not interfere with their work in the fields for more than a day or two. What the farmer dreaded was not so much war, as famine, plague, and above all the tax-gatherer, who in Ashikaga times exacted in one guise or another something like 70 per cent of the produce of his fields. As a certain quantity of the manure necessary to raise a crop had generally to be bought, not much, if indeed anything at all, could have remained in the cultivator's hands.

In seasons of famine the misery of the farmers was unspeakable. Such of them as had the strength left to do so would crawl into the gay capital in the vain hope of finding something to keep soul and body together there. In the great dearth of 1421-2, Yoshimochi did indeed issue orders to his officers to adopt some sadly inadequate relief measures; but in 1454 the famine-stricken peasants were simply left to perish in the streets, and a daily average of 700 or 800 corpses had to be taken up and disposed of. The females of the family were then consigned to the brothels, while the boys were often sold to the priests, who shaved their eyebrows, powdered their faces, dressed them in female garb and put them to the vilest of uses, for since the days of Yoshimitsu, who had set an evil example in this as in so many other matters, the practice of pæderasty had become very common, especially in the mo-

nasteries, although it was by no means confined to them.* And in the midst of all this misery the Shōguns usually deigned to evince no tokens of compassion for the stricken multitude. While the people were dying by the road-sides Yoshimochi made a progress to Nara whose magnificence almost equalled those of his father; and in 1454 Yoshimasa abated not a bit in the indulgence of his most dissolute and extravagant whims. And in 1461, when in the course of two months as many as 80,000 people perished of plague and famine in Kyōto alone, he went on with his fantastic building projects, until the receipt of a satirical poem from the Emperor put him to the blush. Even then, all he did was to request certain of the metropolitan temples to distribute some miserable doles, the administration making no further effort to grapple with the awful crisis. For all the world, the Shōgun and his minions in this terrible year might well have been of the breed of the Gods of the Choric Song in Tennyson's "Lotos-Eaters." In the great famine of 1231-2 Hōjō Yasutoki wore nothing but old clothes, and reduced the number of his meals—always of the plainest fare—to two a day, thus setting an excellent example to his officers, who were not slow to imitate him, while at the same time both he and they laboured strenuously from morn to eve devising and superintending measures of effective relief.

The *Impôt foncier* in course of time came to constitute only a fraction of the liabilities of the tax-payer—house tax, door tax, cart tax, rice-shop tax, taxes on pawn-shops, on saké and on saké-warehouses, of which there were 327 in the capital alone, and on fire-proof "godowns," were imposed and levied with increasing stringency. The saké-warehouse tax, for example, under Yoshimitsu had been exacted only four times a year; later on it was levied once a month and under Yoshimasa several times a month. But perhaps the worst impost of all was the *Dansen*, an extraordinary tax imposed at first perhaps once in six or seven years to meet such contingencies as the expenses of a coronation, or the rebuilding of the palace. But latterly it had come to be raised several times a year, on the most frivolous of pretences; sometimes indeed on no pre-

* Xavier found the practice prevalent a hundred years later, especially among the Zen priests, who, wrote Fernandez, "tendo publicamente muitos meninos com os quales cometiao sus maldades."

tence at all. Outraging as it did every single one of Adam Smith's four maxims of equality, certainty, convenience, and economy, it was really nothing more or less than a sponge to absorb what the revenue officers might so far have left in the possession of the producer.

In their own provinces and districts the *Shugo* and the *Jitō* were not slow to imitate the fiscal vagaries of the central administration; and in addition to this they went on establishing barriers on the highways and on the waterways, where heavy tolls were exacted from all passengers and merchandise passing through them. The *Shugo* and the *Daimyō* were in urgent need of money to enable them to keep afloat in the maelstrom whirl of the fashionable life of the capital, where they had to give elaborate banquets and other entertainments in their palatial residences, to present the *Shōgun* with costly gifts, and latterly to bribe the minions who had come to have the disposal of patronage and the plums of office. But some of the great provincial Lords were beginning to use their money for other purposes; for instance in 1454 we read that the Yamana chieftain caused great anxiety to his neighbours and in *Kyōto*, by taking "landless men without any occupation" into his service. In a few years this practice was destined to become not unusual if not general; and it was this that really dealt the death-blow to slavery if not serfdom in Japan. There being no such things as bankruptcy courts in those days, an insolvent debtor often had to become the practical slave of his creditor. Now with an opening for service under a great feudal chief, able-bodied debtors who could handle sword or bow could afford to laugh at creditors and law-courts alike.

It is tolerably plain that all the fabulous magnificence and grandeur of the capital at this time were reared upon the oppression and degradation of the people at large. For centuries the common folk, the base-born *semmin*, had been wonderfully patient and submissive, and apart from absconding and taking to brigandage they had made but few practical protests against the iniquitous treatment they were subjected to. Now at last, however, the worm began to turn. From 1447 onward there was a series of well-organised and concerted popular *émeutes*, the fellows of Wat Tyler's rebellion in England, and of the *Jacquerie* in France. *Kyōto* was generally

their centre; but they spread all through the Home Provinces, —(much damage being done in Nara especially)—on to Harima on the one hand and to Ōmi on the other. The demand of these mobs was for a *Tokusei* (Benevolent (Act of) Government), which was just the equivalent of the old Roman *novæ tabulæ*, or a summary cancellation of all indebtedness. This *Tokusei* was no new thing; we have already met with one so early as towards the end of the seventh century; and since that time, in seasons of great national distress, and even on such occasions as the death of a Sovereign, they had been proclaimed in a modified form. The theory was that they were in civil, what an amnesty was in criminal, law. Already under the Ashikagas there had been *Tokusei* on several occasions, but not of the sweeping nature now demanded by the rioters, while the Muromachi Bakufu had made important modifications in the old usury laws. As the result of the great riots (1447, 1451, 1457 and 1461) the authorities yielded so far as to declare debts to be liquidated by the payment of one-tenth of the principal, obligations to shrines and temples being excepted. Thereupon some of the religious houses were fired and pillaged. In Kyōto itself it was the “godowns” and the pawn-brokers’ shops that were the chief objects of attack, for the mob was intent on destroying all bonds and mortgages and such-like legal documents. But as a matter of fact a very considerable portion of the city was burnt and countless houses entered and pillaged. Certain of the Daimyō were called upon to restore order; but in 1461 it took them several weeks to do so. And the cure was almost as bad as the disease, for many of their retainers being heavily in debt, now took the opportunity of firing the money-lender’s house or breaking into his strong room and repossessing themselves of the acknowledgements they had given him. Yoshimasa yielded to the demand of the mob greatly because it suited his own purposes to do so. He himself was deeply in debt at most times; and his frequent proclamations of *Tokusei* subsequently were dictated as much by the wish to evade his own financial obligations as by any other consideration. Naturally the result of these *Tokusei* was untold disaster to industry and commerce, for apart from rendering any system of credit impossible, they together with the *Dansen* made the merchant and the manufacturer abandon all hope

of acquiring a competency and the capitalist all expectation of accumulating wealth.

Meanwhile a course of events was in train destined to thrust all economic and industrial problems into the background, to reduce most of the capital to a heap of ashes, and to make its ruins the battle-ground of two great hosts for more than a decade. Here in dealing with the incidents that led up to the Great War of Ōnin (1467–1477) exigencies of space compel me to compress into a few paragraphs what can only be properly elucidated in a series of chapters.*

In the previous chapter something was said about the fashion in which succession disputes in the great feudal families were wont to be decided during the Great Civil War. After the conclusion of peace in 1392 Yoshimitsu made a tolerably successful effort to have such questions settled by the Bakufu, and not by an appeal to arms. But on his death, in the outlying portions of the Empire at least, such matters were almost invariably determined by the sub-feudatories of the house in which they arose,—sometimes without fighting, but often after a trial of strength on the battlefield. Now in Yoshimasa's time these succession disputes became exceedingly common; and in the cases where the Shōgun was appealed to his intervention generally served to do nothing but aggravate the situation. Yoshimasa was possessed of no independent judgement of his own; he was almost entirely under the influence of his consort Tomi Ko and other Court ladies, and of favourites like Ise Sadachika. And the most unfortunate part of the business was that he was always inclined to adopt the views of the latest counsellor who had chanced to get his ear, the result being that since the time of Temmu Tennō the Empire had never perhaps witnessed such an exhibition of *Chōrei Bokai*,† incompetence and confusion.

I shall pass over dissensions like those in the Shinano house of Ogasawara, and in that of the Togashi,—(which had furnished Kaga with Governors or *Shugo* for four centuries),—without comment, inasmuch as the disturbances they

* Readers who may care to make an exhaustive study of this period should be warned to use Japanese biographical dictionaries with circumspection. I have found many of the details given in some of them to be at once inaccurate and confusing.

† Revising in the evening the edict issued in the morning.

gave rise to were local merely. But those in the great houses of Shiba and Hatakeyama developed into national questions and precipitated a terrible civil war.

There were two branches of the Shiba family, one settled in Echizen, the other in Mutsu. The latter had split up into the sept of Ōzaki and that of Mogami, which played a prominent part in the north-east of Japan in the early Tokugawa age. But it was the Echizen branch that was the great Shiba house in Ashikaga times. The first Kwanryō had been a Shiba; and besides holding this great office he had been *Shugo* of the six provinces of Echizen, Etchū, Noto, Shinano, Sado, and Wakasa. About 1450 we find the Shiba chieftain Yoshitake invested with the administration of Echizen, Owari, and Tōtōmi. These provinces were not contiguous; and so in two of them at least Yoshitake had to be represented by a *Shugodai* or Deputy Shugo. Now the position of these Deputy Shugo was very different from that of the old Vice-Governors. The latter had not been appointed by their immediate superior the Governor; but by the central authorities. The Vice-Governor was no vassal of the Governor's, but his fellow officer. The Deputy Shugo, on the other hand, was not only the mere nominee of the *Shugo*, but was actually his vassal. Furthermore the office of Deputy Shugo tended to become hereditary in the family of the holder of the office, and these great vassals in the provinces they administered often became more influential than their lords. At this time the chief great vassals of the Shiba were the Oda in Owari, and the Asakura and Kai in Echizen, the last being the most powerful of all. In fact the Kai chieftain was at this time to the Shibas, what the Mayor of the Palace was to the Merovingians.

Shiba Yoshitake, being childless, had adopted the adopted son of an uncle of his; and on Yoshitake's death in 1452 the Shiba family made this adopted son, Yoshitoshi, his successor. Kai was not satisfied with this, and Yoshitoshi was not minded to brook his vassal's interference. Sometime later on Yoshitoshi was put in command of 10,000 troops for service in the Kwantō; but after starting from Kyōto, he suddenly wheeled off to the north and invested Kai in Tsuruga by land and sea. Kai had only 800 men in his castle; but taking advantage of a great typhoon he found these quite numerous enough to rout his beleaguers. The Shōgun could not over-

look this episode; and the ultimate result was the extirpation of the Kais on the one hand, and the flight of Yoshitoshi to Suwō on the other, a new head for the house of Shiba being provided in the person of Yoshikaō, the son of Shibukawa Yoshino, who was nominated by the great vassals. Yoshimasa's assent to this was obtained through his favourite, Ise Sadachika, to whom the retainers had made suitable presents. This was in 1459, and some time afterwards Ise Sadachika married the sister of the fugitive Yoshitoshi's wife. This lady at last prevailed upon her husband to espouse Yoshitoshi's cause; and in 1466, Yoshitoshi was recalled to Kyōto, and the Shōgun then decided that he was the rightful head of the house of Shiba. Meanwhile the man in possession,—Yoshikado—had married a daughter of the great Yamana Sōzen, and Yoshikado now invoked the support of his formidable father-in-law, who at once mustered a strong army and marched upon Kyōto. This greatly frightened the vacillating Shōgun; and Yoshikado was now not only recognised as *the* Shiba, but actually invested (1467) with the office of Kwanryō, Yoshitoshi having to flee for his life!

Synchronous with the succession-dispute in the Shiba family had been a similar one in the house of Hatakeyama. The chief difference was that whereas among the Shibas the complications occurred after the death of the childless chief Yoshitake, those in the Hatakeyama family arose while the Kwanryō, Mochikuni, was still alive. Here, too, the struggle was really between the great vassals of the clan. Mochikuni wished to make his son Yoshinari his successor. Now this would throw the power into the hands of a certain Suya, who had been appointed Yoshinari's guardian, a contingency which the hitherto all-powerful vassals Jimbo and Yūsa could not view with equanimity. Accordingly they declared that Yoshinari, being the son of a concubine, was not the rightful heir, and armed in support of the claims of Mochikuni's nephew, Masanaga. Mochikuni then appealed to the Shōgun, who authorised him to put Masanaga to death. The latter thereupon took refuge in the mansion of Yamana Sōzen, with whom Mochikuni had been on notoriously bad terms, ever since Mochikuni had endeavoured to re-establish the house of Akamatsu in Harima, which province had come into Yamana's possession in 1441. In 1451 a Yamana vassal had been killed

by one of Mochikuni's followers. Thereupon Yamana challenged Mochikuni to single combat; and when the affair was patched up by the surrender of the offender to Yamana, Yamana had cut him to pieces with his own hand.

Yamana now espoused Hatakeyama Masanaga's cause with great vigour. One night in September 1454 he invested Mochikuni's mansion and fired it over his head. Mochikuni took refuge in one of the big temples, while his son Yoshinari fled to Kawachi. Thereupon Masanaga went and paid his respects to the Shōgun, who cancelled the warrant for his arrest and execution, and declared him head of the Hatakeyama house, Mochikuni having just then died (1455). Next year Yoshinari appeared at the head of a strong body of Kawachi troops to attack Masanaga, but the Shōgun succeeded in patching up a peace between them, and the house of Hatakeyama was then divided into two branches.

For some years Yoshinari was greatly favoured by the Shōgun; but in 1460 all the trees presented by him to adorn the grounds of one of the Shōgun's new buildings withered,—a very serious omen,—while Yoshinari was also accused of infringing the lately issued ordinances against the taking of animal life. This was sufficient to bring Yoshinari into ill odour with the capricious and superstitious Shōgun and to restore Masanaga to high favour. Yoshinari had fled to the south, and Masanaga was commissioned to pursue and kill him. In Kawachi, Yoshino, and Kōyasan, a war between them went on for some six or seven years (1460-1467). In the course of the struggle Yoshinari with vastly inferior forces established such a reputation as a skilful and capable captain that Yamana Sōzen, now knitting a great party together, entered into an alliance with him and threw his former protégé Masanaga overboard. Masanaga had been made Kwanryō in 1464; he had now (1467) to give way to Yamana's nominee Shiba Yoshikado, and muster troops to defend his life.

The great faction that Yamana was now banding together was really directed against his own son-in-law Hosokawa Katsumoto. This Hosokawa was perhaps the ablest and most remarkable man of his time. Noted for his refinement and culture, in the Europe of his day he would undoubtedly have made his mark among the great Humanists of the age. In many directions his erudition was sound and solid, especially

in medicine, of which he was an ardent student. As an administrator he was exceedingly capable; and if not in statesmanship, at all events in the devious ways of statecraft, he had no equal in contemporary Japan. Born in 1430, he became Kwanryō in 1445 at the age of fifteen; and with a break of three years (1449-1452) he held this important post down to 1464. In the exercise of the office, although not so great as Yoriyuki had been, he was no failure; but it was in the administration of his own wide domains that he made his lasting reputation. At a word from him 60,000 retainers of his own would take the field at any moment, while he could always rely upon the fidelity of collateral Hosokawas, who could muster 21,000 more. From first to last he kept his great vassals in strict order; it was not until a score of years after his demise that the family of Hosokawa began to be scourged with the curse that had smitten the fellow-Kwanryō houses of Shiba and Hatakeyama.

Originally Hosokawa's relations with his turbulent father-in-law, Yamana Sōzen, had been exceedingly friendly. When the Red Monk,—(as the latter was nick-named from his flame-coloured countenance),—had fired Hatakeyama Mochikuni's mansion over his head, the Shōgun Yoshimasa in his exasperation declared him an outlaw, and was on the point of issuing orders to have him put to the sword. However Hosokawa, who had from the first associated himself with his father-in-law in espousing the cause of Hatakeyama Masanaga, succeeded in mitigating Yoshimasa's wrath, and the Red Monk was merely punished by relegation to his own provinces.

Shortly after, one of Hosokawa's relatives then in the capital revived the project of restoring the Akamatsu family to its former possessions; and with the Shōgun's approval, he induced the former Akamatsu retainers in Harima to rise against the Yamanas. At once the Red Monk took the field at the head of 20,000 men. Pouring into Harima, his troops swept everything before them; and then pushing on to the capital, entered it with drums beating and war conches blowing. This effectually over-awed the Shōgun; and Harima had to be left in Yamana's hands.

Three years later (1458) certain escheated manors in Kaga, Ise, Izumo, and Bizen were bestowed upon the Akamatsu chief; and the Red Monk discerning, as he fancied, the hand

of his son-in-law the Kwanryō in this, came to the conclusion that ultimately a struggle between them was inevitable. For the next few years he devoted all his energies to making friends with the great Daimyō; and by 1466 he deemed himself ready for the contest. True, against the 81,000 Hosokawa vassals he could muster no more than 41,000 retainers of his own; but his alliances with Isshiki (5,000), Toki (8,000), Rokkaku (5,000), Shiba Yoshikado (10,000), and the Hatakeyamas,—Yoshinari (7,000) and Yoshitō (3,000),—put 38,000 more men at his disposal, while he could count upon the active sympathy of at least 10,000 besides. This would give him a grand total of some 90,000 troops. At last all that was wanted was a plausible pretext for a rupture. This, however, Hosokawa was in no haste to supply, for he was aware that the Red Monk was just as much his superior in the field, as he was the Red Monk's at the council-board.

Meanwhile the situation in the Shōgun's court had become peculiar. Yoshimasa had got tired of office, and wished to resign it soon. But although he was now thirty years of age, he so far had had no son. Accordingly he begged his younger brother, Yoshimi, who had entered the priesthood and become an Abbot, to return to secular life with a view to succeeding him. At first Yoshimi would not listen to the proposal; but on Yoshimasa undertaking to make any son that might be born to him become a priest, Yoshimi at last yielded to his entreaties (1464). Thereupon Hosokawa resigned the office of Kwanryō to his friend and protégé Hatakeyama Masanaga, and assumed the stewardship of the household which Yoshimi now established. Then in the following year the Shōgun's consort Tomi Ko at last presented him with the son who was afterwards known as Yoshihisa. Although Yoshimasa was ready to abide by his agreement, the Lady Tomi was not inclined to see her offspring deprived of the succession. Accordingly she secretly opened up communications with the Red Monk, and obtained a promise from him to support her when the proper season arrived.

Now at this date Yoshimasa was greatly under the sway of Ise Sadachika, who was very justly regarded by Hosokawa as a banefully corrupting and disturbing influence in the administration. Sadachika had given mortal offence to the Red Monk in the Shiba affair; and when the Red Monk success-

fully exerted himself to get Sadachika degraded and banished, Hosokawa purposely kept very quiet. He had however been very unobtrusively bringing up his own troops to Kyōto, and forming compacts with other chieftains which presently swelled his forces to 160,000 fighting men—not all in the capital, of course. Even when adherents of the Red Monk (February 1467) assailed and routed the ex-Kwanryō Hatakeyama Masanaga in his retreat in the outskirts of the capital, Hosokawa made no movement, although he stood pledged to support Masanaga. The reason was that the Shōgun had sent Yoshimi to both camps to warn the leaders that the first to strike a blow would be proclaimed a rebel.

For some months the armies lay watching each other, Hosokawa's lines being to the east and north of the Bakufu offices in Muromachi, and the Red Monk's to the west and south. The troops filled all the great mansions of their Lords, and occupied the temples and all buildings of strategic importance, while barricades and other defences were thrown up at weak spots in the lines where attacks might be expected. Again in May, Yoshimi acting upon instructions from Yoshimasa visited both leaders and repeated his previous warning, and for a few days the barricades disappeared. But neither of the chiefs felt that he could afford to withdraw his forces from Kyōto; if he did so and his opponent remained, he would infallibly be declared a rebel by Yoshimasa as soon as he was left exposed to pressure from one side only. As weeks passed the strain became unbearable; and at last, on July 7, 1467, the collision came, when some of the subordinate captains began to contest the possession of a mansion that lay between the outposts of the rival hosts. In this special affair Hosokawa's men had the best of it, but in the general fighting which at once ensued they made no great headway. Still their numerical superiority promised them an ultimate triumph, and for the rest of the summer the Red Monk was very anxious about the result.

Then, in September, Ōuchi Masahiro with 20,000 men from Yamaguchi, and Kōno with 2,000 from Iyo, fought their way up to Kyōto, and joined Yamana. This substantial reinforcement entirely altered the aspect of affairs. The Red Monk now assumed the offensive, and in the great battles of September 29, when the Imperial Palace was taken, and of October 30, when

the Sōkokuji was captured, his followers won decided successes. Both edifices were fired and burned to the ground; in the first contest 50,000 Yamana troops came into action, and after the second, we are told, the streets for miles were heaped with "several tens of thousands of corpses."

The year 1467 expired with the military situation in the capital entirely in favour of the Yamanas; and in 1468 they continued to have the best of it on the whole. On the Japanese New Year's day, when almost everything in that drunken age was supposed to be incapable of taking care of itself, Hosokawa ordered a general assault, mainly with the object of recovering the site of the Sōkokuji. The result was tremendous slaughter and a disastrous repulse. Then ensued a lull in active operations, but on April 28 there was another serious engagement, in which as usual the Red Monk was victorious. Hosokawa was now thrust into a narrow nook behind the Bakufu offices, which he had the greatest difficulty in maintaining. And yet although thus handsomely beaten in Kyōto, it was Hosokawa who was the real victor in the strife.

It was Hosokawa's gifts as a statesman, or, if you like, his statecraft that saved him. He had been careful not to move till he was assured in his own mind that the Shōgun would formally commission him to chastise the Red Monk. This was no easy matter to compass; for Yoshimasa was then personally well-disposed towards Yamana, while his consort, the Lady Tomi, backed by a strong faction in her husband's Court, exerted herself strongly on behalf of her secret confederate. Hosokawa, however, was able to secure the banishment of twelve of the faction opposed to him some time after he got his commission and so provided against the chance of having it revoked. He furthermore made sure of the Emperor and the ex-Emperor by inducing them to remove to the Bakufu offices, where quarters were provided for their reception. Hosokawa's position was thoroughly legalised, while the Red Monk was technically a public enemy; and this circumstance in course of time began to weigh seriously with certain of the Yamana confederates, some of whom came over to the Hosokawa camp, while others quietly slipped off home. Yet these desertions were not so numerous as to affect the general result. But meanwhile Hosokawa had taken still more effective measures to cause a serious shrinkage in the numbers opposed to him in

and around Kyōto. Emissaries of his were presently at work in the provinces of his antagonists, inciting their vassals to revolt, or their neighbours to attack them, and matters ultimately became so threatening in Ōuchi's domains that that formidable chieftain was at last constrained to hasten home to defend his own ancestral possessions, while the Red Monk himself had to detach contingents to help to make head against local adversaries. In other directions this device of Hosokawa's was equally successful, and he was strong in the fact that his previous excellent administration of his own broad domains, and the firm hold he had upon the fidelity of his sub-feudatories, made it hopeless for his adversaries to attempt to retaliate upon him in kind.

By this time the struggle between Hosokawa and Yamana had assumed the appearance of a succession war between members of the Shōgunal house itself. On September 24, 1467, Ashikaga Yoshimi, feeling his position insecure, had fled from Kyōto; and for the last year or so he had been living in Ise under the protection of Kitabatake, the Governor of the Province. After repeated requests to return to the capital, he at last did so in October 1468, attended by an escort of 2,500 men. Meanwhile the favourite, Ise Sadachika, had returned to the Shōgun's Court and was again as influential as before, while Hino Katsuakira, the Lady Tomi's close confederate, was also in possession of Yoshimasa's ear. Yoshimi demanded the removal of these two intriguers; and upon the demand being refused he went into Hosokawa's camp. There to his profound astonishment he was advised to re-enter the priesthood. He thereupon again escaped and took refuge on Hi-ei-zan; whence on December 17 he was escorted into the Yamana camp, the Red Monk now declaring that the object he was fighting for was the assertion of Yoshimi's just rights! Ten days later the Shōgun obtained a decree from the Court stripping Yoshimi of all his offices and putting him to the ban; and early in 1469 Yoshimasa's four-year-old son Yoshihisa was formally declared heir to the Shōgunate. This was a new shuffling of the cards with a vengeance! The Red Monk, the Lady Tomi's secret confederate, was now fighting for nothing but the assertion of the just rights of the Lady Tomi's most detested enemy.*

* It is interesting to remember that it was just at this time that Warwick went over to the Lancastrians in England.

Two years later there was perhaps a still more startling development. So long as the Sovereign remained in Hosokawa's hands, the Red Monk must remain, technically at least, a rebel. At last so many supporters had fallen away on that account that Yamana resorted to the desperate expedient of reviving the claims of the Southern line. In 1470 a pretender calling himself Prince Hidaka, and claiming to be a descendant of Daigo II., raised his flag in Kii; but in January 1471 his career was brought to an end by Hatakeyama Masanaga. Then, in September 1471, a Prince of the Southern line was actually brought into the Yamana camp, and treated as Emperor, the Red Monk now professing to be fighting in support of the legitimate Imperial line! This did not please Yoshimi; and in course of time, but when or how is not known, this Imperial Prince vanished from the Yamana camp and from history alike.

Kyōto had long before this been reduced to little better than a heap of ruins; and the hostile armies had mostly retired to strategic positions around it, where their efforts were mainly directed to cutting off the enemy's supplies. In these operations there were scores, perhaps hundreds, of skirmishes; but nothing in the shape of a general, much less of a decisive, action. The struggle was now really being fought out in the provinces, where the rewards of victory were much more substantial than they were in the capital. For instance, the Shiba captain, Asakura, who had hitherto fought most gallantly on Shiba Yoshikado's behalf, was seduced by the promise of his master's province of Echizen, about 1471 or 1472. At once proceeding there, he speedily reduced his fellow vassals, the Kai and the Ninomiya; and established a new great feudal house of his own. This perhaps was one of the most conspicuous of many instances.

In Kyōto, where the contest had long before developed into a stalemate on a chessboard of blackened ruins, almost every one was getting tired or disgusted with the situation. The dearest wish of the two great opposing chiefs themselves for some time past had been for peace. But when they did endeavour to compose their differences they found that the war they had raised was a veritable Frankenstein whose vagaries they were powerless to control and who had them both at his mercy. Certain of their most influential confederates would have

128

130

132

134

136

138

140

38

FEUDAL MAP OF JAPAN

during Ōnin and Bunkai (1467-1487)

Provinces in capital letters

Daimyō in italics

In Kwantō:-

Provinces coloured reddish-yellow belong to Ashikaga of Koga.

" " yellow " " Uyesugi of Yamanouchi.

" " purple " " Uyesugi of Ōgi-gu-yatsu.

In Kwantai:-

Provinces coloured red belong to Hosokawa.

" " green " " Yamaana.

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132


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136

138

140

142



GENERAL MAP OF INDIA

Showing the extent of the British Empire in India, and the position of the various States and Territories under its protection.

The British Empire in India is divided into the following Provinces and Territories:

- Bombay
- Bengal
- Madras
- United Provinces
- Assam
- Central Provinces
- Madhya Pradesh
- North-West Frontier Province
- Baluchistan
- Coastal States
- Princely States

The map also shows the position of the various States and Territories under the protection of the British Empire.



nothing to do with proposals of peace. Among these Akamatsu Masanori was the most important. During the war his partisans had at last recovered the old family provinces of Harima, Bizen, and Mimasaka from the Yamanas; and on reaching any accommodation with Hosokawa, the very first thing the Red Monk would do would be to hurry home and fall upon Akamatsu with every man he could muster. Accordingly the negotiations came to nothing. So weary of the whole thing and so chagrined was Hosokawa that he threatened to enter the priesthood and retire from the world. The Red Monk, being a priest already, vowed that he would commit the happy dispatch.

However, release from the worries of their own raising was nearer at hand than they expected, for the Red Monk died on May 16, 1473, and Hosokawa on June 6 of the same year. Yet the wasting war continued to drag its weary length along until the winter of 1477. The position of the Yamana (or Yoshimi) faction had grown less and less secure owing to the fact that they were "rebels," and that the Shōgun stripped their leaders of their offices of *Shugo*, and, as in the case of Asakura in Echizen, assigned their provinces to subordinates who were expected to reduce them, or otherwise undermine their influence in their native seats. The consequence was that some surrendered, while others withdrew to retrieve their fortunes at home. At last Ōuchi Masahiro arranged terms of accommodation for himself; and on the night of December 17, 1477, the sky around Kyōto was ruddy with the glare of the blazing cantonments the Yamana men were abandoning. On the morrow it was found that they had vanished; and the long and disastrous struggle around Kyōto was at an end.

But elsewhere the war was by no means over. The Yamana leaders had actually arranged to resume operations in the capital as soon as they had settled things in their own provinces. But there things were not to be settled in a month or even in a year; and meanwhile Yoshimi, who had withdrawn with Toki into Mino, made peace with his brother the Shōgun, and consequently there was no further pretext for the Yamana men to attack the capital.

But this simply meant that the war was now wholly transferred to the provinces; for the subordinate chiefs in the opposing camps had made no truce with each other. For example

the old struggle in Yamato, Kii, and Kawachi between the Hatakeyamas, Masanaga, and Yoshinari was resumed, and ended only with the death of both of them in 1493. As for the great house of Shiba it found itself threatened with ruin. In Echizen it had been replaced by its former vassal, Asakura; in Owari, its great retainers the Odas had seized most of the province, while the raids of Imagawa, the Lord of Suruga, upon Tōtōmi had left the Shibas but slender foothold there. It was not indeed until 1572 that the family disappeared from history; but during the last century of its existence it was nothing but a mere shadow of its former self. As regards the Yamanas, they had lost a good deal more than half their domains. In fact the only great chiefs who emerged from the struggle with, if not bettered, at least unimpaired fortunes were Akamatsu, Hosokawa, and Ōuchi.

Meanwhile the Empire at large had been seething with armed strife and disorder, a good deal of which had no connection with the great War of Ōnin at all. In the very winter that saw the end of this struggle, a twenty-four years' civil war in the Kwantō was brought to a temporary conclusion.

In the general doom of Ashikaga Mochiuji (1439) and his family (1440) only his five-year-old son, Shigeuji, had escaped. For the next ten years Kamakura remained in the hands of the Uyesugis; but in 1449 this Ashikaga Shigeuji was appointed Kwantō Kwanryō, with Uyesugi Noritada as his *Shitsuji*. Now this Noritada was the son of the man who had been responsible for the death of Shigeuji's father and brothers, and Shigeuji's mind kept brooding on thoughts of revenge. Besides this, Noritada sent reports of Shigeuji's conduct to Kyōto, where he was beginning to be distrusted; and this fact served to intensify Shigeuji's hatred. In 1454 Shigeuji sent Yūki and Satomi, his confederates, to invest Noritada's mansion and put him out of the way. The murder of their chief at once drove all the Uyesugis to arms; Shigeuji was hunted from Kamakura, and Noritada's son Fusaaki was then made Kwanryō. After five years' fighting Fusaaki asked the Kyōto Shōgun to send down his brother Ashikaga Masatomo as Kwantō Kwanryō. But Shigeuji, who had established himself at Koga in Shimōsa, received the support of the great families of Chiba, Yūki, Oyama, Utsunomiya, Nasu, Satomi, Satake, and Oda; and although Masatomo was backed by the Uyesugis and the men of Kai and Izu,

he never was able to install himself in Kamakura and had to rest content with establishing his court at Horikoshi in Izu. The war between the rival Kwantō Kwanryōs of Koga and Horikoshi went on until 1478, when the Shōgun Yoshimasa induced Shigeuji to abandon the contest and return to Kyōto.

Echigo, being a Uyesugi province, was deeply involved in these Kwantō disturbances. Kaga, which had been partitioned between the two branches of the Togashi family, and in which the two rival branches of the Monto (or True Jōdo) Sect had acquired many manors, had been convulsed since 1474 by a struggle between one branch of the Togashi house, allied with one branch of the Monto Sect, against the other Togashi sept, supported by the other Monto faction. Shinano, Suruga, and Mikawa each had local contests of their own. Kyūshū was almost in as evil a plight. At the southern end of the island, the Shimadzu and the Itō families were at war; in Higo the Sagaras were slaughtering the Nawas, and the Kikuchis were fighting out a succession quarrel among themselves, while in the north the Ōtomos and Shōni, who had again come back from Tsushima, were raiding Ōuchi's domains.

And yet all this was merely the prologue to the piece, for it is the period between 1490 and 1600 that is known in Japanese history as the *Sengoku Jidai*, or "Epoch of the Warring Country"!

Before the outbreak of the War of Ōnin in 1467 the control of the central administration over the provinces had already become feeble. One result of that cataclysm was to destroy it utterly. Imperial Decrees and Instructions from the Shōgun had come to be alike disregarded with impunity, and it was presently recognised that it was futile to issue them. The peasant, the craftsman, the trader, and the traveller were still taxed as before; but, outside of Kyōto and the single province of Yamashiro, scarcely a cent of all this revenue was now paid into the coffers of the Shōgun. This meant that the great military families had made themselves independent. In the following century we find the early missionaries speaking of mere local chiefs as "Kings,"—the "King" of Bungo, the "King" of Satsuma, the "King" of Hirado, of Arima, and Ōmura, and so on. As a matter of fact, although technically at fault, the worthy Jesuit Fathers were practically correct in their terminology, for within his domains even the pettiest of these poten-

tates was possessed of virtual regal powers. It is true that they did not coin money; for no money was coined in Japan at that date, nor had been coined in it for centuries, the country being almost entirely dependent upon China for supplies of a metallic medium of circulation. But, while imposing what taxes they themselves chose upon their subjects, they paid no tax, not even "feudal aids," to any superior. They exercised not merely "original" but unlimited judicature within their domains; while the laws enforced there were all of their own making. And they declared war and made peace without invoking any one's permission; and when they did by any chance profess to be acting in a Shōgun's name it was merely to serve special temporary purposes of their own. Then on their own sole initiative they bestowed lands or revenues upon their retainers, who had to render military service in return; and the greatest of these vassals had their sub-feudatories, who had to take the field with their personal following when occasion arose. In short, we are at last face to face with a fully developed Feudal System.

In Kamakura days we had to deal with manors, rarely exceeding 500 acres of good rice-land in extent. Besides, at that epoch, only a proportion of these manors were held by military service. A large, perhaps an equal, number were held by civilians,—Imperial Princes, great Court nobles, and the like. Besides these the wide estates of temples and shrines were ordinarily exempt from the attentions of the Kamakura Shugo and Jitō, while a certain portion of the soil of the country was not manorial property at all, and paid its dues directly to the Civilian Governor or his staff appointed by the Imperial Court. The manorial system still lingers on; but the manors now become integral portions of great fiefs. The military leaders now seize every acre of ground they can lay hold on. The Imperial Household domains, the estates of the Imperial Princes and of the Court nobles, are all "swallowed up," to use the expressive Japanese phrase, while everywhere save in a few quarters where he lingers on as an anachronistic curiosity, the civilian Provincial Governor vanishes, there being not a rood of ground left for him to govern, or a single sheaf of rice to collect as a tax. The only non-military manors that survive are those of the Shrines and Temples, for the warrior class had generally a salutary dread of the wrath of the gods, and a superstitious rē-

verence for the three sacred things, Buddha, the Law, and the Priesthood. Even these ecclesiastical manors assume, or rather resume, a warlike appearance; and we shall presently find the Monto Chief Priest figuring as a great military potentate in possession of the whole province of Kaga, and with many estates and numerous throngs of mailed vassals in other quarters of the Empire.

One great immediate cause of the breakdown of the Ashikaga Shōgunate was the incapacity of Yoshimasa as a ruler. The work of administration was as distasteful to him as it had been to Yoritomo's son Yoriie in Kamakura; but whereas Yoriie had been a robust and strong-thewed roysterer, Yoshimasa's sensuality was of the soft and passively self-indulgent kind. Intellectually torpid he was not, but he possessed little or nothing of his grandfather Yoshimitsu's faculty of concentrating his attention upon objects that demanded any considerable mental strain. From first to last he was an aesthete and a dilettante. From the single fact that art, and especially pictorial art, was one of his chief interests, and that he patronised artists in a princely way, he has been called a Japanese Medici. But this is doing a serious wrong to the great rulers of Florence, for of their vigorous and robust qualities, their power of work, their many-sided ability Yoshimasa had nothing. He had all Yoshimitsu's craze for pomp and magnificence, and more,—and although the financial position of the State was now as desperate as it had been sound in Yoshimitsu's time, Yoshimasa would persist in aping his grandfather's extravagances. Immediately after the War of Ōnin he set to work to immortalise himself by the erection of the Ginkakuji (Silver Pavilion) as a fellow or rival to the Kinkakuji, while he was also responsible for other structures, all magnificent, but all unnecessary or worse at the time. In his Ginkakuji, he gave his "Cha-no-yu" parties, his "Incense-Comparing" parties, his "Poem-Comparing" parties,—refined frivolities innocent enough as mere pastimes perhaps, but not so innocent when they became the main interest of the man responsible for the administration of a great Empire, which was proceeding swiftly along the downward path to disintegration, if not actually to ruin. And harmless too, perhaps, compared with the drinking bouts and foul debauchery in which His Highness habitually indulged. In the midst of one of the greatest battles in 1467,

Yoshimasa had held high revel in his Palace. Like Nero he evidently enjoyed the spectacle of "the earth being mixed with fire" in his lifetime.*

There were something like forty Court dames all struggling for a share of the Shōgun's favour, and many of these became rich thanks to the presents they received from the Lords who made them their medium of approaching His Highness with their requests for office or other petitions. But the usual avenue to his ear was through Ise Sadachika or Hino, the younger brother of the Lady Tomi. The itching of Hino's palm was constant and unappeasable,—and at a time when the other Court nobles had sunk into such abject destitution that many of them could not appear at the rare Court functions still held because their robes had been sold or pawned, Hino continued to amass fabulous wealth. Nor was the Lady Tomi a whit less rapacious than her younger brother. Yoshimasa's indolence threw many details of the administration into her hands; and at last she came to intermeddle in most affairs. Barriers had been erected at the seven great entrances to Kyōto where transit dues were levied; but on the outbreak of the War of Ōnin the mob had thrown these down. Now, on pretext of contributing funds for the re-erection of the Imperial Palace the Lady Tomi had the barriers restored and very heavy tolls exacted at them. But not a penny of the money thus collected was devoted to the purpose for which it was professedly intended; it all went into the Lady Tomi's bottomless privy purse. At last the city mob rose, overthrew the barriers, and took to indiscriminate plundering and burning. The troops sent by the Daimyō to quell the riot were beaten off and Kyōto was at the mercy of a famished and infuriated rabble. The disturbance was only allayed by the proclamation of a *Tokusci*. This special *émeute* was a truly popular movement; but many of the *Tokusci* disturbances were not so, being incited by *Samurai*, many of whom their notorious gambling propensities and general debauchery had reduced to beggary. In the course of the great war Nara suffered greatly from an outbreak of this nature. Presently the cry of "Equalisation of Property" spread to far distant provinces; and we find Ōuchi and others having to deal with Socialistic disturbances in their own domains.

* Suetonius, *De Vitâ Caesarum, Nero*, § 38.

Yoshimasa had nominally resigned in favour of his son Yoshihisa, then nine years old, in 1474,—a step that threw more and more power into the grasping hands of the Lady Tomi, the Ashikaga Agrippina. As Yoshihisa grew to manhood he showed himself possessed of a penetrating intelligence, a strong will, and a fondness for hard work. This greatly disconcerted his mother; and the Lady Tomi thereupon began, only with too much success, to encourage in her own son that fondness for wine and women for which the Ashikagas were traditionally notorious. Yoshihisa's physical constitution was not robust; and his sensual excesses cost him his life at the early age of twenty-five. And yet he died in camp in the middle of a vigorously conducted and victorious campaign. Under happier auspices this unfortunate Yoshihisa might possibly have become the greatest of his stock.

He seems to have been able to analyse the causes of the decay of his house tolerably correctly, and had set to work with vigour to repair the errors of the past. One of the first things to be done was to curb the insolence and repress the aggressions of the great military chiefs. In 1487 or 1488, some forty-six landowners in Ōmi had appealed against the *Shugo*, Sasaki Takayori, who had seized their estates, and had all but “swallowed up” the whole of the province. The Sasakis were originally of Uda-Genji stock; but on the adoption of Sasaki Hideyoshi by Minamoto Tameyoshi in 1125 the family had become a Seiwa-Genji house. Under Yoritomo some half-dozen Sasakis had distinguished themselves as able captains and intrepid soldiers; and in his days or a little later we find Sasaki acting as *Shugo* in Aki, Iwami, Izumo, and Ōmi. Ōmi remained the chief seat of the house, which in the fourteenth century parted into the branches of Rokkaku and Kyōgoku. As usual in such cases, no great love was lost between these consanguineous septa; and in the great War of Ōnin they had fought on opposite sides. In Ōmi they were now at bitter feud with each other, and this afforded the young Shōgun his opportunity. In 1488 several of the other great Daimyō responded to his summons; and Sasaki had been all but crushed, when Yoshihisa suddenly died in camp.

As Yoshihisa was childless, Yoshimasa now adopted Yoshimi's son, Yoshitane, then twenty-five years of age, and made him Shōgun. About 1491 or 1492 operations against

Sasaki, who meanwhile had retrieved his position, were resumed; and Ōmi was again overrun by the loyal Daimyō, Sasaki having to escape for his life. The *Kwanryō* at this time was that Hatakeyama Masanaga, who had held the post just before the outbreak of the War of Ōnin. This was his fourth term of service in an office which he occupied for a total of some one-and-twenty years. He was the only one of the leaders in the Great War that survived; and his long experience of affairs gave him a great ascendancy. Unfortunately his arrogance and haughtiness made him very offensive to the great Daimyō who had served under him in the Ōmi campaign,—especially to Hosokawa's son, Masamoto, who, by the way, had already acted as *Kwanryō* for a brief season on two occasions.

As has been said, Hatakeyama Masanaga had been carrying on a private war against the rival branch of the house for years; and he now prevailed upon the Shōgun to declare this war a national one, and to throw the troops that had been employed in the Ōmi campaign against Kawachi and Kii. The rival Hatakeyama chief thereupon appealed to the monks of the Kōfukuji and to Sasaki, who at once joined him, while he also came to an understanding with Hosokawa Masamoto, then in Kyōto. As soon as Masanaga and the Shōgun entered Kawachi, Hosokawa rose and seized the capital, and then marched swiftly after them. Taken completely by surprise Masanaga committed suicide, while the Shōgun fled north to Etchū.

Hosokawa thereupon (1493) set up a new Shōgun in the person of Yoshizumi, the son of that brother of Yoshimasa's. Masatomo, who had been nominal *Kwanryō* of the Kwantō since 1461. With the exception of the thirteen years between 1508 and 1521, the Ashikaga Shōguns were henceforth destined to be nothing better than puppets in the hands of the Hosokawas or of the Hosokawa vassals, who were presently to overthrow and supplant that great house.

Hosokawa Masamoto was *Kwanryō* from 1494 to 1507; and during that time he exerted himself to reduce the provinces around Kyōto and to place vassals of his own in them as Shugo-dai,—or Deputy-Shugo. Some of these Deputies presently acquired so much strength as to be a menace to their master. His continued residence in Kyōto made it necessary for Masamoto to entrust the administration of his Shikoku

domains to his great vassals Miyoshi Nagateru and Kōsai Motochika, who presently became deadly rivals.

Now, Hosokawa Masamoto was devoted to magic arts, and to attain proficiency in these it was believed that sexual continence was absolutely indispensable. Hence Masamoto was childless; and so he adopted a son of the Court noble Kujō and also a collateral relative of his own. The former, known as Sumiyuki, was entrusted to the care of Kōsai, while the latter, Sumimoto, had Miyoshi for his guardian. In 1507, Kōsai, fearing that Sumimoto was to be declared heir, caused Hosokawa Masamoto to be assassinated in Kyōto; and then at once set up Sumiyuki as chief of the house. This brought up Miyoshi with an army from Shikoku; and in the fighting that ensued Kōsai and his protégé perished. Sumimoto was then made head of the great clan, and Kwanryō as well. As he was only eleven years of age, of course it was Miyoshi who was the master of the situation.

But just at this point things took a new turn. The former Shōgun had by no means abandoned his claims. In 1499 he had come down from the Hōkurikudō with a strong army and had been admitted into Hi-ei-zan. Here he was assailed and routed by Hosokawa Masamoto, who burned all the priests' quarters to the ground. However, the ex-Shōgun made good his escape; and after various vicissitudes at last reached Yamaguchi, where he was accorded safe asylum by Ōuchi Yoshioki. In 1508, Ōuchi, on learning of recent events in Kyōto, mustered a great force and marched upon the capital, whence the Shōgun Yoshizumi had to flee to Ōmi, while Yoshitane was restored to office, and Ōuchi appointed Deputy-Kwanryō.

Hosokawa Masamoto had adopted a third son, known as Hosokawa Takakuni; and this son also aspired to the positions of head of the house and of Kwanryō. Failing to realise his ambitions he had thrown in his lot with Yoshitane and Ōuchi; and he now became the most influential personage in the capital. Although the struggle was ostensibly between rival Shōguns, it was at bottom a contest between the Hosokawas,—Takakuni and Sumimoto, the latter being a puppet of Miyoshi's. The Sumimoto faction presently made a successful effort to recover the capital, whence Yoshitane and Ōuchi withdrew into Tamba to muster fresh troops. In the battle of Funaoka-yama Ōuchi and Yoshitane gained a decisive success, and Kyōto again

fell into their hands (1511). So long as Ōuchi remained in the capital Yoshitane's position as well as that of Takakuni was secure. But in 1518 troubles in his own provinces claimed Ōuchi's presence there; besides he had really been the main financial support of the Emperor and the Shōgun for the last ten years, and this generosity had impoverished and crippled him so seriously that a season of retrenchment was imperatively necessary.

By 1520 Hosokawa Takakuni was carrying things with such a high hand that the Shōgun began to find the situation impossible; and when Miyoshi re-appeared at the head of a strong force and drove Takakuni from the capital, Yoshitane at once recognised his rival Sumimoto as head of the house of Hosokawa. Meanwhile Takakuni, supported by Sasaki, had raised an army of 40,000 men; and against these Miyoshi with only 3,000 troops could make no head; and finding his flight cut off he retired to the temple of Chōnin and there committed *harakiri*. When Sumimoto died a few months later on in Awa, Takakuni attained his plenitude of power. In 1521 Yoshitane had to flee to Awaji, and Takakuni then set up the eleven-year-old son of Yoshizumi as Shōgun. In 1528 Yoshiharu, as this twelfth Shōgun was called, was driven from the capital by Miyoshi Nagamoto and had then to spend four years in Ōmi. In 1539 he was compelled to flee before another Miyoshi,—Chōkei,—into Yamato, where he lurked for three years. In 1545 he resigned; but even then his troubles were not at an end, for in the next year he was again constrained to seek asylum in Ōmi, where he died in 1550.

Thus within forty years three successive Ashikaga Shōguns,—the 10th, 11th, and 12th—had died in exile. A similar fate was in store for the fourteenth and the fifteenth, the last of the line, while the thirteenth, Yoshiiteru, had to commit *harakiri* in his own blazing palace (1565).

As for the Hosokawas, they failed to outlive their puppets. In 1527 Takakuni was driven from Kyōto by Miyoshi Nagamoto, who had espoused the cause of Sumimoto's eight-year-old son, Harumoto. Takakuni did indeed retrieve his position on this occasion; but in 1531 he was again attacked and he was then defeated and slain in his flight. Harumoto, the last Hosokawa Kwanyō, was overthrown by his vassals Miyoshi and Matsunaga in 1558, and died a prisoner in their hands in 1563.

And a few years later Miyoshi and Matsunaga alike were to go down before the might of Nobunaga of the house of Oda which had risen on the ruins of its suzerains, the Shiba.

During all this time the Kwantō, so far as any interference by Kyōto in its affairs was concerned, might well be considered a foreign country. It simply went its own way, solely occupied with its own domestic problems and with its attention wholly engrossed by its long and monotonous tale of intrigue, aggression, battle, murder, and sudden death in various forms. There was one Ashikaga Shōgun, or, as he was popularly termed, *Kubō*, with his court at Koga in Shimōsa, exercising a precarious superiority over some half-score or dozen of great houses in Awa, Kadzusa, Shimōsa, and Shimotsuke, and another with his seat at Horikoshi in Izu with authority over little more than that single province. The greatest power in the Kwantō was really the Uyesugi family, which, as has been said, had parted into the three branches of Inukake, Yamanouchi, and Ogigayatsu. The first had become extinct with the *Shitsuji*, Noritomo, who fell a victim to the great plague of 1461. When Fusaaki, the head of the Yamanouchi sept, died in 1466 he left only a daughter behind him; and a husband for her was provided in the person of Akisada of the Ogigayatsu stock, who now became the head of the Yamanouchi house. Akisada had owed his advancement to Nagao Masakata, one of the eight great Uyesugi vassals, and on the death of this Masakata, Akisada mortally offended his son, Kageharu, by depriving him of the succession in favour of another Nagao. Kageharu thereupon transferred his services to the Ogigayatsu branch, and in 1477 raised an army and attacked his former over-lord. This civil war went on until 1486, when a truce was patched up. But in 1493 it broke out again, and continued to rage till 1505, when the two families were constrained to sink their differences and unite to maintain their existence, now threatened by a new power which had found its opportunity in their dissensions. This new power was the second house of Hōjō,—that of Odawara.

About 1490, the Ashikaga Shōgun of Horikoshi, Masatomo, with the view of securing the succession to his favourite younger son, Yoshizumi, had ordered his eldest son, Cha-cha, to enter the priesthood. In 1491 Cha-cha assassinated his father and assumed his office. The crime excited profound indigna-

tion, whether real or simulated; and a retainer of Imagawa, the Lord of Suruga, took upon himself the duty of punishing it.

This retainer, Ise Shinkurō by name, marched against the patricide Cha-cha, overthrew him and put him to death, and then—coolly established himself at Nirayama as Lord of Izu ! His next step was to interfere in the Uyesugi quarrel. The headquarters of the Yamanouchi branch were in Sagami, which is contiguous with Izu, and Ise offered his services to the other, the Oigayatsu branch, which held the comparatively remote provinces of Echigo and Kōdzuke. Passing into Sagami he seized Odawara (1495); and at once proceeded to raise a castle there and to seize the adjoining country, just as he had already “swallowed up” Izu. In 1505, the Uyesugis, as has been said, awoke to a full sense of their folly and united their forces for a common effort against this interloping land-thief. But soon after, Nagao Tamekage, the chief Echigo vassal of the house of Oigayatsu, ventured to remonstrate with his Lord about the laxity of his administration, and this so irritated the latter that he endeavoured to put Nagao out of the way. In the fighting that ensued many of Nagao’s fellow-vassals espoused his cause; and their Lord was defeated and slain in 1509. This brought the Yamanouchi chieftain, Akisada, into Echigo; but he also was defeated and killed (1510). A section of Nagao’s fellow-vassals now banded themselves together to avenge the death of the suzerain; and between these factions of Oigayatsu retainers war raged in Echigo down to 1538. This meant that the Yamanouchi house was practically left alone to deal with the land-thief of Odawara. Long before this the latter had married his son to a female descendant of the Hōjōs, had then assumed the name of Hōjō, and having taken the tonsure and the priestly name of Sōun, was now known as Hōjō Sōun. With the death of Miura Yoshiatsu and the capture of his castle of Arai in 1518, the whole of Sagami passed into the hands of the great land-thief, who died in the following year at the patriarchal age of eighty-seven.

Hōjō Sōun’s son, Ujitsuna (1487–1541), seized the Uyesugi strongholds of Yedo (1524) and Kawagoye (1538); routed and killed the Koga Shōgun Yoshiaki (1539), and at the same time secured the submission of the Satomis of Awa, and thus reduced the whole of the Kwantō to his rule. Both he and his father had worked hard to establish a sound and just adminis-

tration in the wide domains they had so unblushingly purloined; and *Samurai* flocked to them from the Home Provinces, from Shikoku, and from other equally disturbed parts of the Empire.

The Ogigayatsu branch of the house of Uyesugi became extinct in 1544, while that of Yamanouchi was really perpetuated by the Nagaos, Tamekage's third son, the famous Kenshin, having been adopted as heir in 1551. Henceforth the seat of the Yamanouchi-Uyesugi power was not Kamakura, but Echigo.

The story of the rise of the later Hōjōs is a striking example of the fashion in which new feudal houses were now displacing many of those hitherto most prominent in the annals of the nation. In Mino, the old house of Toki was presently destined to succumb to that of Saito, the founder of which had been first a priest and then an oil merchant, and who began his career as a military man by assassinating the *Samurai* who had adopted him. In northern Ōmi, the Asai had made themselves independent of their suzerains, the Sasakis. Meanwhile a hitherto obscure offshoot of the Sasakis, the Amako, had established themselves as Lords of Idzumo, and were pushing their conquests into the provinces to the south, where among others they came into collision with the Ōuchi, with whom at times they carried on a by no means unequal strife. The great house of Akamatsu, racked and riven by a series of succession disputes, was now confined to a precarious hold over the single province of Harima, several of its former great vassals having thrown off their allegiance and established themselves as independent chieftains. In Kyūshū, the Shōni and the Kikuchi alike disappear; while in Shikoku, Chōsokabe, a hitherto obscure vassal of the Hosokawas and the Miyoshis, is now rising to greatness on the ruin of his over-lords. In Kaga, the Togashi go down before the militant Monto monks. The old Minamoto houses of Shiba, Hatakeyama, Yamana, Hosokawa, Isshiki have all either hopelessly fallen from their previous high estate, or are engaged in a final despairing struggle for existence.

The old houses that continue to survive with unjeopardised fortunes can easily be counted. Among such are the Daté and Ashina in Mutsu, the Satake in Hitachi, the Takeda in Kai, the Imagawa in Suruga, the (Yamanouchi) Uyesugi in Echigo, and the Ōuchi in the six provinces around Yamaguchi. In Kyūshū

we still find the Shimadzu, the Itō, the Aso, and the Ōtomo, while in Shikoku the Kōno still retain something of their former power.

Sandwiched in between the great families were many scores, perhaps some two hundred of smaller ones, all strenuously engaged in land-thieving,—a species of larceny then highly respectable. The position of these was naturally very precarious; at any time they might be “swallowed up” by a neighbouring great house, or even overthrown by some small clan with which they happened to be at feud. Hence a tendency to “commend” themselves to the nearest great house then in the ascendant. Their bonds of allegiance generally lay very lightly upon them, however; often at the slightest prospect of advantage they would either shake it off, or transfer it elsewhere. Then, they no less than the great houses were frequently convulsed by succession disputes and other domestic quarrels. Sometimes, as in the case of the later Hōjō, the chieftain was truly the head of the clan, a veritable king and leader of men within the domains he had either inherited or stolen. As a rule it was only clans with such heads that were able to extend their frontiers at the expense of their neighbours, or even to survive. But often the real power lay with one or other or several of the great sub-feudatories, and these were frequently jealous of each other’s influence in the counsels of their common master, and were generally on the outlook for an opportunity to trip each other up. A disputed succession to the headship of the fief was nearly always the occasion of a local civil war, by which, of course, neighbours were prompt to profit. Sometimes too the fortunes of a great house depended upon the astuteness of some exceptionally able retainer; and in such a case the baseness of the trickery and fraud to which hostile clans would resort to bring this retainer under his lord’s suspicion, and so effect his fall and the subsequent ruin of the house whose main support he was, makes one blush for human nature.*

The country was now in an interminable turmoil of war; but by “war” a great deal more was meant than the mere ordering of campaigns and the handling of troops on the battle-

* The *Taikōki* relates many such cases. For one of them,—and that by no means of the very worst type,—see Dening’s *Life of Hideyoshi*, pp. 74-78.



field. It was "war" conducted on the principles expounded in such Chinese manuals as *Sonshi's*. These works were now in the hands of nearly every one of the few that could peruse them; at night a professor—sometimes a Chinaman—would be set to read them aloud to the *Samurai* gathered in the castle-hall to hear him. In these Chinese analogues of Jomini and Clausewitz, what was chiefly expounded was not so much the principles of war as the dirtiest form of statecraft with its unspeakable depths of duplicity. The most cynical, the very worst passages in the notorious Eighteenth Chapter of "The Prince," pale before the naked and full-bodied depravity of the old Chinese lore on espionage. *Sonshi's* section on spies is truly abominable and revolting; yet this special section must be carefully conned by any one who wishes to understand the fashion in which "war" was waged in Japan at this time. In most respects the standard of public morality in the Empire was perhaps lower than it was in contemporary Italy, the only marked difference in favour of Japan being the comparative rarity, if not total absence, of cases of poisoning.

Yet vile as this age may seem to be, it was not without great redeeming features. It was only the strong and vigorous ruler that could hope to survive; and this had the effect of opening up careers to obscure men of ability, whose services a few centuries before would have been totally lost to the nation. Unsupported by capable sub-feudatories and subordinate officers, the great chieftain was now inevitably doomed. Hence the unceasing exertions of men like the Odawara Hōjōs to attract *Samurai* from other fiefs to their flag. Furthermore, without material resources no large following could be maintained; and hence the strenuous efforts made by intelligent chiefs to establish a sound and just financial and judicial administration within their domains. It now became perilous to regard the farmers as mere slaves; harsh treatment would surely drive them across the border into some neighbouring fief, where they would be eagerly welcomed and set to work to convert waste lands into fruitful rice-fields; while in an era when fighting-men were in so much request, able-bodied peasants who absconded could readily count on finding service under some hostile standard. In the great War of Ōnin we begin to hear of bodies of *Ashigaru* being employed. These bore the same relation to the heavy-panoplied *Samurai* that the peltasts

of Iphicrates did to the hoplites of his age. For a peasant to procure the not very costly equipment of an *Ashigaru* was comparatively easy; and once possessed of arms he readily found employment as a soldier.

Thus the attainment of any lasting success in the warfare of the time demanded the exercise of high practical ability, not in one, but in multifarious directions,—at the council-board, on the judgement seat, in the fiscal and financial administration of the fief. The best intellect of the nation, no longer doomed to stagnation and a death-like torpidity as it had been in the tenth and eleventh centuries under the Fujiwaras, was now thoroughly awake and vigorously at work. No doubt it was entirely concentrated on the pressing practical problems of the moment. But exercise on these work-a-day problems did more to develop the native vigour of the national mind at large than the practise of versification, whether in Japanese or Chinese, or the poring over glosses on Confucius or Mencius had ever effected for it. The fruit of this was to be seen in the last three decades of the sixteenth century, which produced a roll of illustrious names of constructive ability such as Japan had never seen before, and has never seen since.

The political condition of early sixteenth-century Japan bore a not remote resemblance to that of contemporary Germany, *minus* the Free Cities. In both countries the central power had entirely broken down. In 1495 Maximilian told his Diet that “the Empire was as a heavy burden with little gain therefrom”; and at the Diet of Speyer Granvella asserted that “for the support of His Majesty’s dignity not a hazel-nut’s worth of profit came from the Empire.” The Japanese Sovereign was in infinitely worse case than these Holy Roman Emperors, for unlike them he had no external resources to depend on. The situation cannot be better set forth than in the words of an annalist who wrote some few years later. Says he:—

“After the War of Ōnin (1467-1477) the *Samurai* abandoned the capital, and went back to the provinces. The hey-day of the Imperial city was over. The *Dairi* was rebuilt, but on a greatly reduced scale, and the Shōgun Yoshimasa reared some fine structures. But in the Kyōroku period (1528-1532) the war again became fierce; and temples, palaces, and mansions

went up in flames, while the citizens fled for their lives to remote places.*

"The Dairi was a roughly built structure. It was without earthen walls, and was surrounded by nothing but a bamboo fence. Common people made tea, and sold it in the garden of the Palace, under the very shadow of the Cherry of the Right and the Orange of the Left. Children made it their playground. By the sides of the main approach to the Imperial pavilion they modelled mud toys; sometimes they peeped behind the blind that screened the Imperial apartments. The Sovereign himself lived chiefly on money gained by selling his autographs. The meanest citizen might deposit a few coins with a written request such as,—I wish such and such a verse from the *Hundred Poets*,—or a copy of this or that section of the *Isc Tales*. After some days the commission was sure to be executed. At night the dim light of the room where the Palace Ladies lodged could be seen from Sanjō Bridge. So miserable and lowly had everything become."

It is significant that between 1465 and 1585 there was no case of an Emperor's abdication; and that during that period the succession in each case passed from sire to son without occasioning any dispute.† One reason for this was that the Throne as an Institution had ceased to be of any practical importance, and another was that although the Sovereigns often wished to abdicate there were no funds available to defray the expenses of the indispensable attendant ceremony. During the War of Ōnin, as the result of which the Emperor had to spend some thirteen years within the narrow confines of the Bakufu buildings in Muromachi, all the Court functions were abandoned; and when they were resumed they were *Ryaku-Shiki*, or Abridged Ceremonies only. The reason, of course, was the utter lack of funds, which at last came to be so extreme that on the death of Tsuchimikado II. in 1500, it was 44 days before

* It was in these years that Miyoshi drove the Shōgun to take refuge in Ōmi, while incessant fighting for the possession of the capital went on between Miyoshi and Hosokawa Takakuni. But it was in 1537 that its greatest single calamity overtook Kyōto, when more than one half of it was reduced to ashes by the monks of Hi-ei-zan.

† The following table completes the list of Sovereigns within our period:—

103. Tsuchimikado II., born 1442; succeeded 1465; died 1500.
104. Kashiwabara II., born 1464; succeeded 1500; died 1526.
105. Nara II., born 1496; succeeded 1526; died 1557.
106. Ogimachi, born 1517; succeeded 1557.

enough could be collected to defray the expenses of his obsequies, while Nara II., who became Emperor in that year, was in no position to celebrate his coronation until 1521.*

It may indeed seem extraordinary to find that an era of such unceasing turmoil and of such chronic misery and destitution should have been the golden age of Japanese pictorial art. The explanation is really very simple, however. The great patrons of painting from before the days of the renowned Kose no Kanoka (later ninth century) down to the outbreak of the Succession War in 1337 had been the Imperial Court, which had done much to foster the native Japanese schools,—the Yamato-ryū and the Tosa-ryū. As a consequence of the great civil strife of 1337 to 1392 the Court was greatly impoverished; and the third Ashikaga Shōgun, Yoshimitsu, then assumed the rôle of a Japanese Medici. In this he was emulated by his grandson, Yoshimasa, who, although said at one time to have been actually driven to pawn his armour to raise money to defray the expenses of the accouchement of his consort, yet lavished fabulous sums upon the indulgement of his artistic fancies. The older schools were not neglected; but it was the new school whose work was based on Chinese traditions of the Sung and Mongol dynasties that chiefly profited by Ashikaga munificencē. Most of the artists of this new school were Zen priests; in fact the great academy of the age was that Zen monastery of Sōkokuji, for the possession of which one of the first great battles of the War of Ōnin was fought, to be followed by a still fiercer one for the recapture of its ruins. It had been founded by Yoshimitsu in 1383 as a mortuary temple for the Ashikaga Shōguns, had become the headquarters of the ten Rinzai Zen sects, and had waxed fabulously wealthy. Here Josetsu taught; and under him studied Sesshū, Shūbun, and Kano Masanobu, “the founders of the three new academies which were to apotheosise in Japan the works of the great Chinese masters of the Sung and Yuen dynasties.” All these and most of the other great artists of the age took the tonsure; and as even in the general anarchy that followed the collapse

* It used to be generally asserted that it was the Monto monks who contributed the necessary funds on this occasion; and that in return for this service their chief priest was made a *Monzeki*. This seems to be a mistake, for it is plain that it was the Shōgun Yoshitane who at last raised the money, while the Monto Chief Priest did not become a *Monzeki* until the Tembun period (1532-1554).

of the Ashikaga power the monasteries and their possessions were left comparatively undisturbed, these great priest painters were always assured of tranquillity and an honourable subsistence. Besides, among the great feudal potentates the Ōuchi of Yamaguchi were not the only ones inclined to play the rôle of Mæcenas.

It has just been said that in Japan there were no Free Cities. To this assertion there is one single exception. In the disorders of the civil war between the Hatakeyamas, the people of Sakai dug a moat and threw up walls around their town; and hiring a military force of their own to protect them, constituted themselves into a sort of commercial republic. Later, in 1562, Vilella tells us that "the city of Sakai is very extensive, exceedingly thronged with many rich merchants, and governed by its own laws and customs in the fashion of Venice." From other sources we know that there were not a few *Samurai* among these traders. The merchant in Japan was generally regarded with contempt, and in the social scale he was placed at the bottom, below the farmer and the artisan. The consequence was that trade was forced into the hands of a class of men who would not be likely to exhibit the possession of any very high sense of integrity and honour. At the present day Japan is paying a very severe penalty for this. Now, the continued existence of Sakai, and of a few autonomous commercial cities like it, would have done much to elevate the position of the merchant in the national estimation; and an unwritten code of commercial morality might well have been evolved as strict as that which has earned for the Chinese trader the confidence and respect of Europeans.

It is well to remember that if Japan had no Free Cities, she had what either Germany, or indeed any other European country, had not,—a single great city with a population of half-a-million. Such Kyōto was even at one of the lowest ebbs in its prosperity, at the date of Xavier's visit to it in 1551. In 1467, at the outbreak of the War of Ōnin, it contained 180,000 families or perhaps 900,000 souls. Few cities in contemporary Europe could boast of even a tenth part of that population.

Yet when in Kyōto, in 1551, Xavier was very soon forced to the conclusion that "the most powerful of the Lords then in Japan was the King of Yamaguchi" (Ōuchi). This was in the very middle of what Japanese historians call the *Sengoku*

Jidai. During the first and longer half of the hundred and ten years between 1490 and 1600 the centrifugal forces were in the ascendant; and when the Apostle of the Indies was in the land the process of disintegration was still advancing apace. But in 1551 Nobunaga was seventeen, Hideyoshi fifteen, and Iyeyasu nine years of age, and the successive efforts of this great trio were destined to reunite the warring fragments of the Empire under a central sway as strong as that of Kamakura times and to impose the meed of a full quarter of a millennium of peace upon a people whose lust for war and slaughter appeared to be utterly beyond human control. But the work of these three illustrious men lies beyond the scope of the present volume; the story of what they accomplished, and how they accomplished it, has already been fully told in Murdoch and Yamagata's *History of Japan During the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse.*

INDEX.

INDEX.

In the following index the references to persons are given under the family names where available, but for the convenience of readers the personal names are also indexed, with the family names in parentheses after them, the words "see under" being dispensed with.

- Abdication, 139, 226, 239, 244, 277, 633
- Abe, 139, 269, 271, 284, 289
- Munetō, 271
- Abeno (Settsu), 563
- Abe Sadatō, 270, 271, 289
- Yoritoki, 269, 270, 289
- Achiki, 216
- Achi no Omi, 102
- Adachi, 470
- Kagemori, 470
- Kiyotsune, 393, 416, 457
- Munekage, 527
- Yasumori, 527
- Administration (also see Bakufu and under various family names)—
- central government, 58
- sinicisation, 92
- clan system, 94 *et seq.*
- regulations for the capital, 152
- home provinces, 153, 154
- establishment of Ministries, 158 *et seq.*
- under Kwammu, 209
- weakness of Kyōto administration, 230, 619
- provincial governors, 276
- government by Cloistered Emperor (*Insei*) 277 *et seq.*, 458, 460
- confusion of rights, 309
- organisation on feudal basis, 372 *et seq.*
- high constables (*Shugo*) and land stewards (*Jitō*), 385 *et seq.*, 472, 557, 567
- concurrent jurisdiction, 391
- Kamakura Bakufu, 405 *et seq.*
- Rokuhara system, 452
- Councils of State, 471
- Administration (*contd.*)—
- circuit envoys from Central Boards, 472
- Bukō* and *Kugō*, 547 *et seq.*
- Muromachi Bakufu, 586 *et seq.*
- revival of old institutions in Meiji era, 21
- Afumi no Kena no Omi, 108
- Agricultural *Be*, 101
- Ainu (Yemishi)—
- resemblance to Luchuans, 36 (note)
- migration from the continent, 47
- expeditions against, 66, 215
- soldiers, 132
- revolts, 13, 210
- ousted from Tokyo region, 152
- Buddhist propaganda, 178
- operations under Kwammu, 210
- raids on Japanese, 216, 217, 233
- fixing of status, 233
- origin of *Eta*, 233, 234
- employment of Ainu captives, 234
- General Superintendent of the Aborigines, 269
- feudal system in Ainu districts, 289
- Ainu auxiliaries, 532
- Akamatsu, 600, 601, 611, 618, 629
- Enshin, 540, 541, 543, 556, 558
- Masanori, 617
- Akasaka, 540
- Aki, 64, 231, 283, 325
- Akiye (Kitabatake)
- Akiko, 237
- Akinobu (Kitabatake)
- Akisada (Uyesugi)
- Akita, 233

- Akiyoshi (Kitabatake)
 Amagasaki Hill, 131
 Amagaseki, 365
 Amagashi Hill, 56
 Amako (Awa), 360
 Amako (Sasaki), 629
 Amano Tōkage, 420, 493
 Ama-terasu no Ohokami, 67
 Amida, 135 *et seq.*,
 Amida (Buddha), 479 *et seq.*
 Anaho, 83, 84
 Anahobe, 91, 117 *et seq.*
 Andō, 531
 Andō Gorō, 531
 Anjirō, 16
 Ankan, 80, 90, 109
 Ankō, 81, 83
 Annen, 425
 Antoku, 325, 335, 347, 348, 350, 361,
 365
 Aohaka (Mino), 305, 309
 Aoto Fujitsuna, 462 (note)
 Arai, 628
 Arako Kawachi no Mumakahi no
 Obito, 90
 Are, 54
 Arihara no Yukihira, 229
 Arima, Prince, 141
 Arimitsu (Hino)
 Arinori (Hino)
 Army (see Military system)
 Art, 634
 Asahina Saburō, 426
 Asai, 629
 Asakura, 608, 616
 Asawara Tameyori, 535 (note)
 Ashigaru, 631
 Ashikaga (family)—
 origin, 236 (note), 288, 300, 542
 genealogy, 591 (note)
 epitome of administration, 26
 struggle against Imperialists,
 557 *et seq.*
 intestine strife, 575
 Shogunate, 569 *et seq.*
 war against southerners, 573
 extravagance, 592, 593, 623
 heavy taxation, 602, 603
 decline, 621
 puppets in hands of Hosokawas,
 624
 last of the line, 636
 Ashikaga Cha-cha, 627
 — Isshiki, 515, 612
 — Masatomo, 618, 624, 627
 — Mitsusada, 600
 — Mochinaka, 599
 — Mochiuji, 598, 599, 600, 618
 — Motouji, 581, 583
 — Shigeuji, 618, 619
 — Tadafuyu, 574, 577
 — Tadatsuna, 329
 — Tadayoshi, 542, 550, 554, 570,
 574 *et seq.*, 580
- Ashikaga Takauji—
 commander of Bakufu army,
 541
 expedition against Daigo II.,
 542
 fall of Rokuhara, 543
 provincial governorship, 550
 recovery of Kamakura, 555,
 576
 flight from Chinjufun Shōgun,
 557
 investiture as Shōgun, 569
 assailed by the Nittas, 576
 appropriation of taxes, 586, 596
 death, 578
 character, 578 *et seq.*
 other references, 413, 544, 549,
 574, 575
 Ashikaga Yoshiakira, 569, 577, 578,
 580, 583
 — Yoshihara, 626
 — Yoshihisa, 600, 612, 615, 623
 — Yoshikane, 347
 — Yoshikazu, 598
 — Yoshimasa—
 assumption of Shogunate, 601
 extravagance, 604, 621
 granting of *Tokusei*, 606
 succession disputes, 607
 female influence, 607, 615, 622
 extirpation of Kais, 609
 yields to Yoshikado's claims,
 609
 favours Yoshinari, 610
 exasperation against Yamana
 Sōzen, 611
 resignation of office, 612
 warning to Hosokawa and Ya-
 mana leaders, 613
 bans Yoshimi and declares
 Yoshihisa Shōgun, 615
 incapacity as ruler, 621
 erection of Ginkakuji, 621
 debauchery, 621, 622
 adoption of Yoshitane as Shō-
 gun, 623
 patron of art, 634
 Ashikaga Yoshimi, 612, 613, 615
 et seq.
 — Yoshimitsu—
 early training, 583
 defeat of Yamana Mitsuyuki,
 584
 extension of power, 589
 revolt of Ōuchi Yoshihiro, 590
 character, 592, 594, 621
 extravagance, 592, 596
 attitude to religion, 592, 595,
 596
 encouragement of foreign trade,
 596
 succession disputes, 607
 encouragement of art, 634

- Ashikaga Yoshimochi, 597, 598, 599, 603, 604
 — Yoshinori, 590, 598, 600, 601
 — Yoshitane, 623 *et seq.*, 634 (note)
 — Yoshiteru, 626
 — Yoshitsugu, 599
 — Yoshizumi, 624, 625, 627
 Ashina, 629
 Aso, 317, 564, 575, 598, 630
 Astronomy, 75, 143
 Ata, 298, 311, 317
 Atogi, 43
 Awa, 203, 265, 341, 342, 448
 Awaji, 59, 100, 187, 199, 206
 Awazu, 353, 354 (note)
 Aya, 103, 104, 121, 132, 137, 139
 Ayabito (Kuromaro Takamuku no)
 Ayakasu, 132
 Azechi, Lady, 365
 Azuchi Castle, 45
 Azuma Kagami, 395, 418
- Bakufu (also see Administration and under various family names)—
 composition, 405
 control of military class, 414
 establishment of Shogunate, 414
 position of women, 423, 467
 critical periods, 428, 447
 waning of influence, 433, 434, 461, 527, 529
 internal dissensions, 435,
 Kyoto's failure to control, 437, 438
 Toba II.'s attempt to overthrow, 442 *et seq.*
 punishment of Imperial family, 449
 the Rokuhara replica, 452
 the Hōjō Regents, 461
 administration of justice, 462, 463, 531
 Kwantō Customary, 464 *et seq.*, 468
 control of clergy, 467
 State Council deliberations, 471
 control of domains, 471 *et seq.*,
 Kamakura officials, 473
 economic difficulties, 445, 530
 fall of Bakufu, 544
 establishment at Muromachi, 569 *et seq.*
 impotency of Muromachi Bakufu, 587
 reorganisation under Yoshimitsu, 589
 conspiracy against officials, 425
- Bamba, 543
 Barbarities, 84 *et seq.*, 241
 Battles (see Ainu, Civil War, China, Korea, and Mongolian Invasion)
Be (tomo), 98 *et seq.*
- Benkei (Musashi-Bō)
 Bidatsu, 90, 91, 92, 116, 117, 132
 Bifuku Mon-in, 293, 295, 296
 Bin (Min), 145, 147, 148 (note), 149, 158, 176
 Bitchu, 211, 350
 Bizen, 47, 350
 Bokkai, 496
 Bōnotsu, 493
 Buddhism (also see Temples)—
 in Korea, 41 (note)
 introduction into Japan, 53, 58, 91, 105, 110 *et seq.*
 gifts from Pakche king, 110, 114
 reception by Emperor, 113
 proscription, 113, 115
 reinstatement, 118
 influence of the Soga, 120
 Pakche propaganda, 121
 corruption among the priesthood, 125
 effect of new religion on Shintoism, 24, 172, 173, 193
 growth of power, 24, 174, 175
 restrictive legislation against priesthood, 175
 gorgeousness of fanes and idols, 176
 prophylactic against pestilence, 192
 absorption of Shintō, 24, 193
 Nara Daibutsu, 193, 194
 transfer of land to temples to escape taxation, 195
 Kwammu's attempt to diminish influence, 207
 sects, 265, 266, 477 *et seq.*
 war between the monasteries, 290, 490
 material enterprises, 487
 revival, 25
 images, 119, 176, 191, 192, 194, 208, 279, 332, 487, 488
 nuns, 116, 120, 125
 Bungo, 108, 297, 317, 350, 359, 386
 Buretsu, 81 *et seq.*, 86 *et seq.*, 126
 Burial customs (see Funeral customs)
 Burying alive, 69
 Bushidō, 37 (note)
 Buzen, 64, 108, 272
 Byō-dō-in, 328, 329
- Calendars, 75, 78, 112, 149
 Carters' *Be*, 99
 Castles in Japan, 45
 Cha-cha (Ashikaga)
 Chen-han, 73
 Chê pho, 599
 Chiba, 339, 341, 601, 618
 Chichibu range, 190
 Chihaya, 540, 584
 Chi Hwang-ti, 32, 103
 Chikafusa (Kitabatake)
 Chikahira, Izumi, 425

- Chikatada (Tate)
 Chikayoshi (Nakahara)
 Chikuzen, 108 *et seq.*, 151, 215
 (note), 316, 493, 494
 China (also see Sinitisation of
 Japan and individual Chinese
 names)—
 disorder in, 142, 491
 feudalism in, 31, 72
 Great Wall of, 32
 harried by Japanese pirates,
 15
 intercourse with, 36, 37, 142,
 145, 243, 491, 493, 588, 596,
 597
 Japanese envoys to, 36, 144
 Japanese in, 145, 147
 struggle with Tartars and Mon-
 gols, 491
 topography, 31, 151
 trade with, 493, 588, 596, 597
 Chinese art, 634
 — attack on Korean States,
 181, 182
 — ceremonial, 160
 — chronology, 75, 79
 — civilisation, 146, 148, 491
 — class divisions, 163 *et seq.*
 — classics, 159 (note), 160
 — emigration to Japan, 102,
 145
 — envoys to Japan, 505, 597
 — in Japan, 48, 102, 132, 145,
 493, 517
 — institutions, 21, 153, 157,
 163 *et seq.*, 190, 204, 228,
 386, 494
 — language, 48, 49, 203
 — learning, 7 *et seq.*, 58, 143,
 572
 — legend, 87
 — literature, 78, 143, 177, 229,
 243
 — military instruction, 631
 — origin of Japanese, 48
 — records, 24, 36 *et seq.*, 74,
 79, 87, 93, 143, 144
 Chin-han, 34, 80
 Chivo Dōji, 272
 Chōgen, 404
 Cho I, 498
 Chōkei, 582
 Chōkei (Miyoshi)
 Chōkōdō, 460
 Chōmei, 331
 Chōnen (Fujiwara)
 Chōsokabe, 27, 629
 Chōsen (Korea)
 Chow dynasty, 31, 72
Chronicles of Emperors, 54
 Cūāi, 40, 65, 67, 72, 89
 Chukyō (Kanenari), 404, 442, 448
 Civil war—
 succession dispute in Yamato,
 119
- Civil war (*contd.*)—
 capture of Fujiwara Oshikatsu,
 199
 Taira feud, 264, 283
 seizure of Kadzusa and Shi-
 mōso by Taira, 265
 Nine Years' War, 270
 defence of Kurigaya, 271
 revolt in Mutsu, 285
 siege of Kanazawa, 285 *et
 seq.*
 strife between temples, 290, 291,
 314
 Sutoku's attempt to regain
 throne, 296 *et seq.*
 capture of Shirakawa II. by
 Tairas, 302
 Minamoto assault on Rokuhara,
 305
 Taira and Minamoto rivalry,
 307, 329
 plot to overthrow Tairas, 319
et seq.
 battle of Byō-dō-in, 329
 battle of Stone-Bridge Hill, 341
 retreat of Tairas from Fuji
 river, 342, 343
 Taira defeat at Tonami, Shi-
 nowara, etc., 347
 Taira rally in Shikoku, 350
 capture of Shirakawa II. by
 Yoshitsune, 353
 Minamoto victory at Ichi-no-
 tani, 355 *et seq.*
 Minamoto attack on Tairas in
 Shikoku, 360 *et seq.*
 naval encounter at Dan-no-ura,
 363 *et seq.*
 reduction of Mutsu, 395, 396
 league against Kajiwara Ka-
 getoki, 416
 conspiracy against Bakufu offi-
 cials, 425
 war between Bakufu and Im-
 perialists, 444
 capture of Kyōto by Hōjo Ya-
 sutoki, 444
 capture of Daigo II. by Bakufu
 army, 540
 escape of Daigo II. and attack
 on Kyōto, 541
 insurrection in Kwantō, 543
 fall of Kamakura, 544
 Hōjō revolts, 555
 clash between Ashikaga Taka-
 uji and Imperialists, 556
 siege of Hi-ei-zan, 556, 557
 battle of Hyōgo, 558
 capture of Kyōto by Ashikagas,
 543, 560
 fall of Kanzaki keep, 562
 capture of Kamakura by Aki-
 iye, 563
 private wars, 564 *et seq.*, 598,
 619, 627, 628, 630

- Civil war (*contd.*)—
north v. south, 563 *et seq.*
Kitabatake's movement on
Kyōto, 572
battle of Shijō-nawate, 573
recovery of Kamakura by Ta-
kauji, 576
defeat of Yamanas, 584
capture of Chihaya castle 584
determined assault on Pa'ace
in Kyōto, 585
effect of succession wars, 587
plot against Yoshinori, 600
Yoshitoshi's attack on Kai, 608
Kyōto threatened by Shiba
Yoshikado, 609
Hatakeyama dissension, 610
Kyōto attacked by Yamana Sō-
zen, 611
Hosokawa *versus* Yamana (War
of Ōnin), 14, 613 *et seq.*,
632, 633
war in the Kwantō, 618
Sengoku Jidai, 619
Ashikaga Yoshitane's stand at
Hi-ei-zan, 625
battle of Funaoka-yama, 625
battle of Mimikawa, 14
battle of Sekigahara, 15
battle of Shimabara, 19
- Clans, 94 *et seq.*
Class distinctions, 163 *et seq.*, 172,
635
Cav-workers' Company, 69
Coinage, 186, 190, 191, 221, 222,
496, 620
conflagrations, 114, 299, 331, 573
Confucius, 205
Corvée (see Forced labour)
- Daibutsu at Nara (see Nara—Daibutsu)
Daigo, 189 (note), 236 (note), 244,
250, 258, 280
Daigo II.—
character, 280
factor in overthrow of Hōjōs,
532
genealogy, 533
accession, 536
Bakufu's distrust, 536
solicitude for poor, 539
support of priests, 539
deposed and banished, 540
escape from Oki, 540
rally of partisans, 541
defeat of Kamakura, 542 *et seq.*
recovery of throne at Kyōto,
546
ambition to restore civil power,
548
besieged on Hi-ei-zan, 560
escape to Yoshino, 561
death, 563
Dai Nihon Kobunsho, 190 (note)
- Dairi*, 632, 633
Dan-no ura, 364, 367, 405, 494, 510,
521
Danrinji, 486
Date, 590, 629
Dazaifu, 190, 196, 246, 347, 349,
513
Dengyō-daishi (Saichō), 207, 266,
494
Deshima, 12
Dewa, 215, 218, 220, 234, 269, 271,
386, 391, 395 *et seq.*
Divination, 39, 349
Dci, 339
— Sanehira, 358, 367, 386
Dōkyō, 198, 199, 200, 235
Dolmens, 44, 46, 47, 90, 108
Dōryū, 517
Dōsho, 193, 204
- Earthquakes, 379, 393
Echigo, 342, 344, 345, 347, 348, 424
(note), 619, 628, 629
Echizen, 229, 261, 345, 346
Edict of Reforms, 150, 152, 155
Education, 165, 166, 177, 203, 229,
242, 523
Eight Gods of Thunder, 59
Eisai, 486, 487, 494
Elshū, 494
Emishi (Soga Yemishi)
Emperors, Chronicles of, 54
Enchin, 266
Endō Moritō (Mongaku Shōnin)
Engi, 189 (note), 547
Enji-Shiki, 189 (note), 250
Enki (Nagasaki)
Enryaku-ji (see Hi-ei-zan)
Enshin (Akamatsu)
En-vū, 226
Epidemics—
pestilence in Yamato, 67, 113,
115, 116, 128
attributed to adoption of Bud-
dhism, 113, 115
smallpox, 192, 195, 489
propitiation of divinities, 192
advantage to the priesthood,
195, 489
contagious disease ascribed to
angry spirits, 248 (note)
pestilence in Kyōto, 330-333,
344, 490, 539, 573, 604
Eta, 183, 238, 239
Etchū, 345, 346
Even Pass of Hades, 59
- Famine, 128, 330, 331, 332, 344, 490,
573, 603, 604
Feudalism (also see Administration
and Bakufu)—
primeval system, 71
anti Taikwa organisation, 94
sustenance-fiefs, 150

- Feudalism (*contd.*)—
 class distinctions in feudal Japan, 164
 substituted for clan system, 165
 causes of the rise of feudalism, 170 *et seq.*
 mildness of Penal Code as a contributory cause, 262
 consolidation of Mutsu fief, 289
 confusion of rights, 309
 grants to Taira Kiyomori, 316
 sub-infeudation, 316, 620, 630
 spread in Kyūshū, 316
 work of Yoritomo, 372 *et seq.*
 contemporary feudatories of Yoritomo, 386
 end of Mutsu as a fief, 397
 centralised feudalism, 411
 feudal jurisprudence, 463
 supplanting of Imperial law, 464, 465
 appointment of governors a negation of feudal system, 550
 enlargement of fiefs, 566
 abolition of female fiefs, 566
 internal policy of fiefs, 566
 "Feudal Code," 463, 570, 571
 Ashikaga feudalism, 589 *et seq.*
 feudal chiefs in Great Council, 595
 Shōgun's relations with vassals, 594, 597
 taxes under feudal system, 602, 604
 cancellation of indebtedness (*Tokusei*), 606
 succession disputes, 607
 abolition, 20
 Fire God, 59
 Flesher's *Be.* 99
 "Following the dead," 69
 Football, 473
 Forced labour (*corvée*), 156, 157, 172, 224, 249, 268, 519
 Foreign trade, 12, 493, 588, 596, 597, 599
 Free Cities, 635
 Fubito (Fujiwara)
 Fujihara no Umakai, 215
 Fuji River, 342
 Fujitsuna (Aoto)
 Fujiwara (family)—
 origin, 67, 96, 140
 genealogy, 197 (note), 258
 Imperial consorts, 51, 235, 239, 275
 exclusive policy, 177
 victims to smallpox, 192
 relation to Emperors, 197, 259
 civil war, 199
 internal dissension, 235, 293, 294, 306
 basis of Fujiwara greatness, 238
 Fujiwara (*contd.*)—
 power over the throne, 25, 238, 239, 276
 Regents, 250, 256, 282, 294
 height of splendour, 256, 258
 autocracy, 259
 harmony with Minamoto, 259, 264
 Fujiwara in the Kwantō, 263
 effeminacy of Fujiwara in Kyōto, 263
 alliance with Taira and Minamoto, 268
 power broken, 268, 275
 exclusion from household of Empress, 318
 supplanted by Taira, 370
 Fujiwara Akimitsu, 258, 259
 — Arihira, 177 (note)
 — Chōnen, 179
 — Fubito, 192, 197, 235
 — Fusasaki, 197 (note), 256
 — Fuyutsugu, 229, 232, 236
 — Gemmyō, 254
 — Hidehira—
 disobeys order to punish Yoritomo, 352
 shelters Yoshitsune, 356, 394
 lord of Mutsu and Dewa, 383, 386, 391
 feared by Yoritomo, 383
 commands sons to support Yoshitsune, 394
 death, 394
 Fujiwara Hidesato (Tawara Tōda), 256, 263, 264
 — Hirotsugu, 196, 197 (note)
 — Kamatari—
 land scheme, 25
 establishment of centralised civilian government, 25
 declines hereditary post, 133
 friendship with Princes, 134, 135
 successful plot against Sogas, 134
 adviser in succession questions, 139
 founder of Fujiwara house, 140, 235
 character, 134, 140
 study of Chinese doctrines, 135, 149, 160
 death, 44
 burial in dolmen tumulus, 44
 daughters married to Tenchi, 184
 other references, 145, 174
 Fujiwara Kaneie, 258, 259
 — Kanemichi, 258, 259
 — Kiyohira, 285, 289
 — Kiyotsura, 248 (note)
 — Korechika, 259, 262
 — Korekata, 303, 304

- Fujiwara Kunitsuna, 313, 334
 — Kusuri, Lady, 227, 235, 248
 (note)
 — Matate, 197 (note)
 — Michiye, 457, 474
 — Michinaga, 258 *et seq.*, 264,
 267, 375
 — Michinori (Shinsai), 299, 301,
 302, 307
 — Mitsuyori, 303
 — Momokawa, 187, 197 (note),
 200 *et seq.*
 — Moroie, 324
 — Moromitsu (Saitō), 319 *et seq.*
 — Moronaga, 324
 — Morosuke, 250, 258
 — Moroye, 352
 — Motofusa, 313, 318, 323, 324,
 352
 — Motomichi, 313, 314, 324, 334,
 347, 352
 — Motosane, 308, 313
 — Mototsune, 189 (note), 239 *et*
 seq., 245, 258
 — Muchimarō, 197 (note) 198
 (note)
 — Nagate, 187, 197 (note)
 — Nakamarō (see Fujiwara no
 Oshikatsu)
 — Nakanari, 227, 235, 299
 — Nariakira, 265
 — Narichika, 319 *et seq.*
 — Nobuyori, 301 *et seq.*
 — Norimichi, 275, 276
 — Oshikatsu (Nakamarō), 197
 (note), 198, 199, 235
 — Saneyori, 250, 258
 — Saneyoshi, 288
 — Seigwa, 10
 — Sugane, 246, 247
 — Sumitomo, 251, 252, 255, 265
 — Tadabumi, 256
 — Tadahira, 189 (note), 250, 251,
 253 *et seq.*, 258
 — Tadamichi, 294, 295, 299
 — Tadzane, 294, 295, 299
 — Tokihira, 189 (note), 232, 240,
 244 *et seq.*, 258
 — Toshinaga, 406
 — Tsugunawa, 189 (note)
 — Tsunekiyo, 271, 289
 — Uchimarō, 235, 236
 — Uona, 197 (note), 256
 — Yasuhira, 14, 379, 394 *et seq.*
 — Yasumasa, 263
 — Yasunori, 233, 245, 247, 249
 — Yorinaga, 294 *et seq.*
 — Yorimichi, 267, 268, 269, 274,
 275 (note), 276
 — Yoritsune, 429, 439, 453, 462,
 470, 474
 — Yoshifusa, 197 (note), 236 *et*
 seq.
 — Yoshinobu, 274, 275
- Fujiwara Yoshitsugu, 188, 197
 (note), 474
 — Yoshiyasu, 429
 — Yoshiyo, 245
 — Yukimasa, 406
 Fukakusa II., 458, 459, 533
 Fukuwara, 319, 320, 324, 325, 330,
 354, 357
 Fumiya no Watamaro, 227, 233
 Funai, 601
 Funeral customs—
 mourning, 39
 prohibiting to erect mausolea,
 45
 dolmens, 44 *et seq.*, 70, 90, 108
 elaborate funerals, 45, 176
 eulogies of deceased, 53
 burial of attendants alive, 69
 clay images substituted for liv-
 ing bodies, 69, 70
 cremation, 204
 Furubito no Ōye, 130, 135, 137, 139,
 149
 Fusaaki (Uyesugi)
 Fusan, 599
 Fusasaki (Fujiwara)
 Fushimi, 311, 459, 475, 533, 535
 Fushimi II., 459
 Fuyutsugu (Fujiwara)
- Gakumonjo Ban*, 473
 Gembō, 196, 197
 Gemmyō, 54, 186, 187
 Gemmyō (Fujiwara)
 Genealogical discrepancies, 72
 Genku (Hōnen Shōnin), 478, 480
 Genshō, 186, 187, 215
 Ginkakuji, 621
 Gion temple, 266, 291
 Go (Japanese checkers), 203
 Go-Daigo (see Daigo II.)
 Go-Ichijō (see Ichijō II.)
 Gojō Bridge, 356
 Gōngorō (Kamakura)
 Gorō (Andō)
 Go-Sanjō (see Sanjō II.)
 Go-Shirakawa (see Shirakawa II.)
 Go-Shujaku (see Shujaku II.)
 Go-Toba (see Toba II.)
 Gozen (Tomoe and Shizuka)
 Gyōbu-Shō, 158, 162
 Gyōgi Bosatsu, 192, 193
- Hachiman, 200, 254, 272, 273, 374
 Hachiman Tarō (Minamoto Yochi-
 iye)
 Hada, 103, 104
 Hakata, 251, 252, 350, 508, 522
 Hakatoko, 85
 Hakozaki, 350, 511, 512, 519
 Han, 102 *et seq.*, 113
 Hanazono, 529, 536
 Hanazono II., 585
 Hanshō, 81, 82

- Han States, 73
 Han tribes, 34
 Harada, 298, 316
Hara-kiri, 312, 313, 329, 471, 600, 626
 Harima, 88, 100, 231, 249, 303, 350, 358, 514
 Harumoto (Hosokawa)
 Hashi no Muraji (Chief of Clay-workers), 69
 Hashi no Omi, 69
 Hatakeyama, 289, 420, 422, 590, 608, 609, 629, 635
 —Kunikiyo, 581
 —Masanaga, 609 *et seq.*, 624
 —Mochikuni, 609, 610
 —Motokuni, 584, 590
 —Shigetada, 342, 392
 —Yoshinari, 609, 610, 612, 618
 —Yoshitō, 612
 Hatsuda Tomoye, 416
Hayairu Ban, 473
 Hayanari (Tachibana)
 Hayato, 50, 63, 82 (note), 117, 132, 177, 215
 Heavenly Grandchild, 63, 70, 116
 Heguri, 91, 95
 Heianjō, 399
 Heiji, 333
 Heijō, 206, 226, 227, 229, 232
 Heishi (see Taira)
 Hemi, 288
 Heung-nu, 142
 Hi, 108 *et seq.*
 Hiburī, 251
 Hida, 114, 115, 151, 219
 Hidaka, Prince, 616
 Hidehira (Fujiwara)
 Hidenobu (Koremune)
 Hidesato (Fujiwara)
 Hidetake (Kimiono)
 Hidetoki (Hōjō)
 Hideyori, 120 (footnote), 191
 Hideyoshi, 2, 14, 16, 26, 292, 374, 379, 380, 387, 411, 413, 495, 550, 636
 Hideyoshi (Satake and Sasaki)
 Hi-ei-zan—
 foundation of Enryaku-ji, 207
 relation to Buddhist sects, 266
 strife with other temples, 266
 290, 291, 314, 440, 490
 attack on Fujiwara Yorimichi, 267
 feud with the Taira, 267
 hotbed of vice, 290
 conflict with Government, 291
 297
 clash with Minamoto, 291, 297, 305
 league with the Taira, 328
 monastery of the Tendai sect, 477
 burnt by Miidera, 490
 an Abbot Prince, 539
- Hi-ei-zan (*contd.*)—
 Daigo II. besieged in the monastery, 560
 decay of influence, 595
 battle between Ashikaga Yoshitane and Hosokawa Masamoto, 625
 other references, 325, 347, 352
 Higashiyama, 319
 Higo, 108, 200, 264, 298, 317
 Higuchi, 351
 —Kanemitsu, 354 (note)
 Hikaru (Minamoto)
 Hiki, 395
 —Munetomo, 420
 —Yoshikazu, 416, 419, 420
 Hikoshima, 359, 361
 Himeko, Queen, 37
 Himekuko, 37
 Himuka, 64
 Hing, 81, 83
 Hino, 532
 —Arimitsu, 585
 —Arinori, 480
 —Katsukira, 615, 622
 Hinckuma, 85
 Hirado, 271, 519
 Hiraga, 288
 —Tomomasa, 369, 421, 422
 Hirakori, 200
 Hiromoto (Ōye and Nakahara)
 Hirose, 116, 120
 Hiroshima, 64, 325
 Hirotsugu, 196, 197 (note)
 Hirotsune (Taira)
 Hiru-ka-kojima, 336
 Hisa-akira, 475, 533
Hisashi-Ban, 473
 History, Official (see *Nihongi*)
History of the Country, 54
History of the Emperors, 54
 Hitachi, 228, 252, 253, 254, 343
 Hi-uchi-yama, 346
 Hiung-nu Tartars, 32
 Hiyeda, 201
 —no Are, 54
 Hiyodori Pass, 356, 357
 Hiyoshi, 291, 325
 Hizen, 108, 196, 283, 317, 389, 519
 Hōjō (family)—
 origin, 339
 Jōei Shikimoku Code, 281 (also see Laws)
 treatment of Emperors, 455, 456
 contrast with Minamotos, 461, 462
 relations with Miuras, 470, 471
 attitude towards religion, 488
 weakening of power, 529
 contributory causes of decline, 529, 531
 fall, 545
 rise of later Hōjōs, 629

- Hōjō (*contd.*)—
 other references, 27, 241, 289, 374, 630
- Hōjō Hidetoki, 544
 — Masamura, 454, 462
 — Mitsutoki, 462, 470
 — Morotoki, 461, 528
 — Nagoshi, 564
 — Sadatoki, 459, 461, 526, 527, 528
 — Sanemasa, 513
 — Sōun, 628
 — Takatoki, 528, 529, 537, 538, 544
 — Tokifusa, 451, 452
 — Tokikuni, 527
 — Tokimasa—
 alliance with Minamoto Yoritomo, 336, 337
 slaughter of Taira Kanetaka, 338
 control of Minamotos, 345, 352
 commissions from Yoritomo, 368, 369, 390
 rigorous examination of Shizuka Gozen, 392
 head of Kamakura Council of State, 416
 conflict of interests with Lady Masa, 418
 assassination of Hiki Yoshikazu, 420
 Yoriye's attempt to slay, 420
 becomes Regent, 421
 resigns position, 422, 462
- Hōjō Tokimune—
 appeal to *Bushi*, 504
 reply to Kublai's expedition, 507
 mobilisation against Mongol invaders, 508, 523
 skill in archery, 510
 death, 526
 other references, 461, 517
- Hōjō Tokiyori, 461, 462, 470, 476, 484, 510
 — Tokiyuki, 544, 564
 — Tsunetoki, 461
 — Ujitsuna, 628
 — Yasutoki—
 attack on Hiki Munetomo, 420
 capture of Kyōto, 444, 448
 mercy to vanquished, 448
 execution of Court nobles, 449
 assumption of Regency, 454
 enthronement of Tsuchimikado, 457
 relatives and descendants, 461
 administration of justice, 462, 463
 economic problems, 476
 drastic measures against priesthood, 490
- Hōjō Yasutoki (*contd.*)—
 measures against pirates, 497
 abstinence during famine, 604
- Hōjō Yoshitoki—
 dispatched against Hiki Munetomo, 420
 shelters Sanetomo from Tokimasa, 422
 accord with Lady Masa, 424
 attacked by Wada Yoshimori, 426
 rising influence, 426
 defeat of Minamoto Tokimoto, 428
 declared an outlaw, 442
 saved by friendship of Miura Taneyoshi, 443
 re-instated as *shikken*, 448
 other references, 423, 425, 452
- Hoki, 59
 Hōki, 46, 542, 546
 Hokkedō, 470
 Hōkōji, 120, 137, 139
 "Home Provinces," 153, 154
 Honan rebellion, 32
 Honda Sadachika, 419 (note)
 Hōnen Shōnin (Genkū)
 Horikawa, 274, 277
 Horikawa II., 449, 456
 Horikoshi, 619
 Horses in Early Japan, 46, 70
 Hōshōji, 352
 Hosokawa, 288, 542, 611, 618, 626, 629
 — Harumoto, 626
 — Katsumoto, 610, 612, 614, 617
 — Kiyouji, 581
 — Masamoto, 624, 625
 — Sumimoto, 625, 626
 — Sumiyuki, 625
 — Takakuni, 625, 626
 — Yoriyuki, 581, 583, 589, 592, 595, 611
 Hossō sect, 193, 196
 How Chow, 142
 How Leang, 142
 Hsian, 181, 188, 203, 229, 491
Hsiao Ching, 205
 Hyé-cha, 121
 Hyé-chong, 121
 Hyé-phyōn, 114
 Hyōbu-shō, 158, 162
 Hyōgo, 319, 493, 558, 596
 Hyūga, 47, 49, 60, 64, 70, 219, 268, 419 (note), 564, 598
- Ichii, 118, 120
 Ichijō, 226, 259, 275 (note), 493 (note)
 Ichijō II., 259
 Ichiman (Minamoto)
 Ichinei, 525
 Ichinohe Oshiiwa, 81, 84, 88
 Ichi-no-tani, 355, 358

- Idzu, 300, 310, 339, 341, 344, 371, 628
 Idzumi, 231, 391
 Idzumo, 46, 59, 66, 67, 69, 96, 283, 629
 Ifuya pass, 60
 Iga, 369, 422, 560
 — Mitsusue, 439, 442
 Ihitoyo, 82, 88
 Ii Kamon no Kami, 307
 Ikaruga, 131
 Ike no Gozen, Lady, 310, 311
 Iki, 168, 508, 518
 Ikuta, 354, 355, 357
 Illa, 108
 Imagawa, 629
 — Sadayo, 582, 618, 628
 Images (see Buddhism—images)
 Imai Kanehira, 353, 354
 Imatsu, 520
 Imibe, 40, 67
 Imikl, 166
 Immigration into Japan, 102, 145, 182
 Imna (see Korea—Mimana)
 Imoko, Mono no Omi, 144
 Imperial burial mounds, 46
 — domains, 97 *et seq.*
 — line, 52
 "Impetuous Male," 60
 Inaba, 46
 Inaki, 58, 97, 166
 Iname (Soga)
 India, 146
 Ingyō, 56, 81 *et seq.*
 Inland Sea, 51, 59, 151, 231, 251, 252, 283, 358
 Inouye, Marquis, 147
 Insei system (Cloistered Emperors), 277 *et seq.*, 458, 460
 Inukake, 599
 Invasions (also see Mongol invasions)—
 Chinese in Korea, 33, 181
 Japanese in Korea, 42, 43, 73, 108
 southern invaders in Japan, 49, 50
 Kumaso and Hayato, 50
 Mongols in Japan, 504 *et seq.*, 519, 524, 525
 Iruka (Soga)
 Ise, 67, 192, 283, 293, 369, 421, 422, 560
 Ise Sadachika, 607, 609, 612, 615, 622
 — Shinkurō, 628
 Ise shrine, 449
 Ishibashi, 288, 341
 Ishikawa, 115, 288
 Iso-no-Kami, 117
 Isshiki (Ashikaga)
 Isshinden, 483
 Ito (Izu), 484
 Itō, 389, 564, 565, 598, 619, 630
 Itō, Prince, 147
 Itō Sukechika, 336, 337, 341
 Itsukushima (Miyajima)
 Itsu-se, 64
 Iwai, 57, 108 *et seq.*
 Iwaki, 46
 Iwami, 46, 541
 Iware, 118
 Iwashimidzu, 273, 325, 490
 Iwate Ken, 269, 270
 Iyehira (Kiyowara)
 Iyeyasu (Tokugawa)
 Iyeyoshi (Uchida)
 Iyo, Queen, 37
 Iyo (Shikoku), 83, 251, 252, 348, 361, 364, 381, 541
 Izanagi, 59
 Izanami, 59
 Izawa, 273
 Izu (see Idzu)
 Izumi Chikahira, 425
 Japanese in Korea (see Korea)
 Japanese language (see Language)
 Jenghiz Khan, 497
Jibu-Shō, 158, 161
 Jie Daishi (Ryōgen)
 Jimbo, 609
 Jimmu, 51, 63, 67, 71, 75, 96
 Jingō Kōgō, 33, 43, 62, 67, 73
Jintōshōtōki, 569 *et seq.*
 Jirō (Kusunoki)
Jitō (see Administration)
 Jitō, Empress, 164, 176 (note), 186, 187, 188, 204
 Jō, 289, 344
 Jōdo sect, 440, 478, 479
 Jōdo Shinshu (New Sect), 480, 486
 Jōe, 45
Jō-ei Shikimoku (see Laws)
 Jomei, 45, 129, 187
 Josetsu, 634
 Junna, 226 *et seq.*, 237, 280
 Junnin, 186, 187, 198, 199, 215
 Juntoku, 404, 442, 448, 457
 Kadzuraki, 88
 Kaga, 218, 345, 346, 483, 619, 621
 Kagechika (Ōba)
 Kagemori (Adachi)
 Kagesuye (Kajiwara)
 Kagetoki (Kajiwara)
 Kagetsuna, 298
 Kageyoshi (Ōba)
 Kagoshima Gulf, 49 (note), 63
 Kai, 265, 305, 342, 608, 609, 616
 Kaidu, 517
 Kajiwara, 289
 — Kagesuye, 416
 — Kagetoki, 358, 360, 361, 367, 381, 416
 Kamakura—
 description, 378
 population, 378
 earthquake, 379

- Kamakura (*contd.*)—
 shrine of Hachiman, 273, 379
 temples, 379, 462 (note), 595
 war with Kyōto, 342, 343, 350, 443, 541
 military authority, 378, 398, 410
 control of provincial officials, 389
 Yoritomo, Lord of Kamakura, 399
 administrative machinery, 405, 408, 409
 legislation, 281, 387 *et seq.*, 463 *et seq.*
 migration of scholars from Kyōto, 408
 Council of State, 416
 plot against Sanetomo, 420
 the Regency, 421
 revolt of the Tairas, 422
 position of women, 423
 frustration of Izumi conspiracy, 425
 defeat of Wada Yoshimori, 426
 weakening of influence in Kyōto, 433
 administration of justice, 463
 Imperial Prince as Shōgun, 474
 advent of civilian Shōguns, 475
 religion in Kamakura, 481 *et seq.*
 Buddha images, 487
 economic difficulties, 530
 intervention in succession disputes, 535
 attack on Emperor, 540
 fall of city, 544
 capture by Kitabatake Akiie, 563
 cut off from supplies, 568
 re-capture by Ashikaga Takauji, 576
 capture by Uyesugi Norimoto, 599
- Kamakura Gongorō, 286
 Kamatari (Fujiwara and Nakatomi)
 Kame-giku, 437
 Kameyama, 458, 533, 535
 Kameyama II., 582, 584
 Kamo, 325
 Kamomyō-jin, 207
 Kamo river, 291
 Kanamura (Ohotomo)
 Kanasa, 343
 Kanazawa, 285, 286
 Kane Lady, 436
 Kanehira (Imai)
 Kanele (Fujiwara)
 Kanemichi (Fujiwara and Nakahara)
 Kanemitsu (Higuchi)
 Kanenari (Chūkyō)
- Kanetaka (Taira)
 Kanetō (Nakahara)
 Kanetsuna (Minamoto)
 Kang-Wha, 497
 Kano-gawa, 336
 Kano Masanobu, 634
 Kanzaki (Ōmi), 182, 560, 562
 Kaotsu, 77
 Kara (Kaya), 74, 80, 106
 Ka-rak, 106 *et seq.*
 Karu, Prince (see Kōtoku)
 Karu, Princess, 82
 Kasagi, 540
 Kasasa, Cape, 49 (note)
 Kashigoye, 368
 Kata-kana, Invention of, 203
 Katō Shirozaemon, 495
 Katsukira (Hino)
 Katsumoto (Hosokawa)
 Katsuni (Nakatomi)
 Katsurabara, 252
 Kawachi, 103, 110, 119, 145, 282, 347, 351, 560
 Kawada, 396
 Kawagoye, 628
 Kawasaki, 270
 Kaya (see Kara)
 Kazuhito, 536
 Kazusa, 228, 252, 265, 341
Kebiishi-chō, 232
 Keikō, 65, 72
 Keitai, 80, 90, 97
Kemmu-shikimoku, 468, 569, 570, 579
 Kena no Omi, 108
 Kenrei-monin, 366, 369
 Kenshin (Yamanouchi)
 Kenzō, 81, 87, 100
 Kesa Gozen, 338
 Khitans, 491, 497
 Ki, 91
 Kibe (Ōmi), 483
 Kibi, 47, 57, 64, 72, 97, 151
 — no Mabi, 177 (note), 187, 203, 204, 247
 Ki-eh, 87
 Kii peninsula, 47
 Kikuchi, 298, 317, 541, 552, 565, 566, 598, 601, 619, 629
 Kimi-marō, 193
 Kimiono Hidetake, 284, 285
 Kim Ku-hyung, 106
 Kimmei, 90, 91, 111, 117, 272
 Kimotsuke, 317, 564
 Ki-nashi, 83
 Kinjū-Ban, 473
 Kinkakuji, 593
 Kinkata, 420 (note)
 Ki no Omi, 110
 Kin Tartars, 492, 497
 Kintsune (Saionji)
Kirokusho (Record Office), 275, 408
 Kise river, 342, 356, 385

- Kitabatake, 565
 — Akiye, 552, 556, 559, 562, 563
 — Akinobu, 563
 — Akiyoshi, 577
 — Chikafusa—
 character, 536, 537
 writings, 537, 569, 571, 572
 takes the tonsure, 552 (note)
 escape to Ise, 560
 war against Ashikagas, 568, 573 *et seq.*
 escape from Seki Castle, 569
 move on Kyōto, 572
 death, 569, 578
 Kitabatake Mitsumasa, 585
 Kitano, 248, 291
 "Kitchen middens," 47
 Kiyo-gimi (Sugawara)
 Kiyohira (Fujiwara)
 Kiyomaro (Wake)
 Kiyomori (Taira)
 Kiyomura, 203
 Kiyosumidera, 483
 Kiyotsune (Adachi)
 Kiyotsura (Fujiwara and Miyoshi)
 Kiyouji (Hosokawa)
 Kiyowara, 271, 282, 289, 406
 — Iyehira, 284, 285, 287
 — Sanehira, 284, 285
 — Takehira, 284, 285, 287
 — Takenori, 271, 272, 284
 — Takesada, 284
 Kō, 575
 Kōbe, 330, 355, 560
 Kōben (Myō-e), 488
 Kōbō Daishi (Kūkai), 227, 230, 265
 Kōbun (Ohotomo), 184, 185, 187, 188
 Kobunji, 195
 Kōdzuke, 46, 109, 252, 254, 342, 344, 349, 424, 544
 Kōfuku-ji, 266, 276, 290, 291, 314, 325, 328 *et seq.*, 440, 595, 596, 624
 Koga, 619
 Kōgen, 91
 Kōgen, 543, 545, 546
 Kōgon II., 577, 578
 Koguryu (see Korea)
 Kōgyoku, 129, 141
 Kohung, 44
 Kō-Ichigō, 259
Kojiki, 40, 50, 53, 57, 79, 81 *et seq.*, 188
 Kojima (Bizen), 321, 358
 Kōken, 186, 187, 195, 198, 203, 205
 Kōkō, 236 (note), 241
 Kokubunji, 195
Kōkyō (Hsiao Ching), 205
 Koma, 33, 73, 121
 Koman, 420 (note)
 Komaro, 135 *et seq.*
 Komatsu, 584
 Kominato (Awa), 483
 Kō Morofuyu, 575, 576
 Kō Moronao, 563, 570, 573 *et seq.*, 579, 580, 585
 — Moroyasu, 573, 575
 Kōmyō, 560
 Kōnin, 187, 188, 201, 202, 218, 226, 242
 Kōno 630
 Kōnoe, 274, 293, 294, 295, 493
 Kōno Michiari, 520
 — Michinobu, 361, 447, 448
 — Michitoki, 520
 Konu, 37, 47, 51
 Korea—
 Chinese invasion, 33, 36, 38, 181
 Chōsen, establishment of, 597
 collapse of Japan's power in peninsula, 112
 contest between Korean States, 105, 110, 142, 181
 Han tribes, 34, 35
 introduction of Buddhism into Japan from Pakche, 105, 110, 111
 Japanese in Korea, 42, 105 *et seq.*, 132, 599
 —envoys, 42
 —expeditions, 15, 42, 62, 74, 108, 111, 182, 215
 —domination, 43, 80, 105, 106, 110
 —pirates on Korean coast, 497, 499, 597
 Kara (Kaya), 74, 80, 106
 Ka-rak, 106 *et seq.*
 Koguryu, 33, 73, 93, 102, 105 *et seq.*, 142, 145, 181
 —extent of, 34
 Korea in Japanese mythology, 61, 64 (note)
 Korean envoys to Japan, 43, 110, 111, 182
 —tributes to Japan, 43, 105, 180
 —science and art, 120, 143, 215 (note)
 —scribes, 44, 53, 103
 Koreans in Japan, 42, 48, 102, 120, 132, 145, 182, 183, 215
 Kōryu, 496, 497, 498, 505, 511, 517, 523, 597
 —allegiance to Kublai Khan, 498 *et seq.*
 —missions to Japan, 505
 —contingent in Mongol invasion of Japan, 511, 521
 —exhaustion of resources, 517, 523
 —end in 1392, 597
 language, 35, 49
 Mimana (Imna), 34, 57, 74, 80, 102, 107 *et seq.*
 nuns sent to Pakche for instruction, 120

- Korea (*contd.*)—
 origin of western Koreans, 50
 Pakche (Kudara), 33, 73, 75,
 80, 85, 102, *et seq.*, 120,
 142, 143, 181
 —Japanese support against
 Silla and China, 112, 182
 —fall of, 181, 182
 —concubines for Japanese
 Emperor, 85
 political developments, 33, 105-
 107, 181, 182, 496
 punitive expedition to Japan,
 599
 records, 41, 43, 87, 203
 relations with Japan, 33, 42,
 105, 143, 182, 496, 505, 599
 Silla (Shiragi), 33, 42, 61, 73,
 80, 102, 105 *et seq.* 142,
 181, 182, 192, 496
 —alleged conquest of by
 Jīngō Kōgō, 33, 43, 73
 —seizure of Japanese pos-
 sessions, 110, 112
 —absorbed by Kōryū, 496
 smallpox brought to Japan
 from Silla, 192
 Tartar and Mongol invasions,
 497
- Korebito (Seiwa)
 Korechika (Fujiwara and Taira)
 Korehira (Taira)
 Koretaka (Fujiwara)
 Koremori (Taira)
 Koremune, 420 (note)
 —Hidenobu, 419
 —Tadahisa, 419 (note)
 Koretaka, 238
 Koreyasu, 475, 533
 Koreyoshi (Sugawara)
 Koromogawa, 218, 395
 Koryo, 73
 Kōryū (see Korea—Kōryū)
 Koryung, 106
 Kōsai Motochika, 625
 Kose, 91
 —Notari, 232
 —no Tokudai, 137, 138
 Koshi, 151
Koshi-Ban, 473
 Koshikijima, 524
 Kōtoku, 82, 83, 127, 134, 139, 141,
 149, 174
 Koto-shiro nushi, 62
 Kōyasan, 265, 539, 595
 Kublai Khan (see also Mongolian
 invasion), 438, 498, 500, 505 *et*
seq., 513, 517, 518, 523, 525
 Kudara (see Korea—Pakche)
 Kudō Shigemitsu, 312
 —Suketsune, 392
 Kuga, 594
 Kugyō (Minamoto)
 Ku-hyung, 106
- Kujō, 493 (note), 625
 Kukai (Kōbō Daishi)
 Kumano, 291, 301, 325
 Kumaso, 47, 50, 63, 72, 82 (note),
 96, 132, 219
Kumonjo, 406
Kunai-Sho, 158, 161
 Kunihito (Saga II.)
 Kunika, 253
 Kunikiyo (Hatakeyama)
Kunimiyakko (*Kuni Miyatsuko*,
Kunitsuko), 55, 97, 99, 100, 124,
 150, 154, 166, 171 (note)
 Kunioshi, Takamuku no Omi,
 137, 138
Kunitsuko (see *Kunimiyakko*)
 Kunitsuna (Fujiwara)
 Kurama, 355
Kurando, 231, 232
 Kurayamada (Soga)
 Kurikara, 347
 Kuriya-gawa, 271
 Kurodo, 302, 304
 Kuro-hiko, 84
Kuromaku, 140
 Kuromaro Takamuku, 145, 147, 149,
 158
 Kusakabe, 187
 Kusunoki Jirō, 585
 —Masakutsu, 584
 —Masanori, 565, 577, 582
 —Masashige—
 readiness to lead against Ka-
 makura, 539
 defence of Akasaka Castle, 540
 attempt to capture Kyōto, 540
 appointment to Settsu Gover-
 norship, 550
 conflict against Kamakura
 troops, 556, 557
 battle of Hyōgo, 559
hara-kiri, 560
 other references, 550, 551
 Kusunoki Masatsura, 573
 —Mitsumasa, 585
 Kusuri, Lady (Fujiwara)
 Kuyehaha, 68
 Kwai-leuk, 143
 Kwammu—
 genealogy, 187
 penalties against hoarders, 191,
 221
 character, 202, 209, 224, 280
 propitiation of departed spirits,
 206
 attitude to Buddhism, 207
 removal of Court, 207
 establishment of Kyōto, 208
 administration, 209 *et seq.*, 221,
 410
 operations against Ainu, 210,
 217, 220
 campaign against vagabondage,
 213, 214
 rising of a military caste, 214

- Kwammu (*contd.*)—
 reform of military system, 218, 219
 establishment of granaries, 219
 regulation of taxes, 222
 endowments to the University, 229
 Fujiwara consorts, 235
- Kwampaku*, 240
- Kwampisei, 147
- Kwantō, 217, 228, 251, 252 *et seq.*, 263, 264, 287, 344, 376, 464, 543, 576, 627, 628
- Kwazan, 226
- Kyōgoku, 267, 623
- Kyōto—
 construction, 208
 description, 208, 593
 Imperial Palaces, 208, 209, 593
 dearth of coinage, 221
 Chinese institutions, 227 *et seq.*
 frivolity of administrators and courtiers, 230, 376, 621
 evil of *Shō-en*, 231
 sanctioning of private war, 253
 Imperial Guards, 260, 261, 376
 astute device of a blockaded Governor, 261
 lawlessness, 262
 strife between temples, 266
 conflict between Emperor and Ex-Emperor, 298
 execution of Sutoku's supporters, 299
 transfer of capital to Fukuwara, 330
 famine and pestilence, 331, 332, 344, 573, 604
 flight of Tairas, 347
 outrages by Yoshinaka's troops, 349
 treachery of Minamoto Yukitve, 350
 raising of army against Tairas, 355, 358
 weakening of central administration, 376
 population, 377, 635
 capture by Yoritomo, 385
 respect for Yoritomo, 399
 Yoritomo's visits, 400, 411
 exodus of learned, 408
 capture by Hōjō Yasutoki, 444
 Bakufu administration, 452
 the Rokuhara system, 452
 penury of Imperial Court, 459
 judicial defects, 463, 468, 551
 religion, 488, 489
 attack by Kusunoki, 540
 fall of Rokuhara, 543
 military predominance, 547, 553
 attempt to control military class, 547 *et seq.*
- Kyōto (*contd.*)—
 capture by Ashikaga troops, 560, 577
 the Muromachi Bakufu, 569, 586, 587
 re-capture by Southerners, 578
 riots, 605, 622
 threatened by Shiba Yoshikado, 609
 attacked by Yamana Sōzen, 611
 War of Ōnin, 613 *et seq.*
 capture of Imperial Palace by Yamana Sōzen, 612
 reduced to desolation, 616
 toll barriers, 622
 Hosokawa struggle, 624, 625
 city half reduced to ashes, 633 (note)
 other references, 256, 325, 379, 390, 411, 430, 431, 559, 573, 598
- Kyūshū, 35, 47, 50, 62, 65, 72, 108 *et seq.*, 151, 193, 203, 218, 219, 233, 619
- Land—
 Imperial possession, 95, 98, 150, 171, 620
 ownership by clan leaders, 95
Mita, 107 (note)
 agricultural land, 155, 157
 land taxation, 157, 170, 212
 assignments to holders of high ranks, 167, 168, 557
 tax-free estates (*shō-en*), 25, 169, 170, 195, 210, 211, 213, 227, 228, 231, 280, 281, 390, 450, 620
 temple holdings, 195, 620
 distribution to peasants, 211
 rewards to troops, 316
 confiscation, 450 (note), 586
 appropriation of half taxes for support of troops, 586, 596
 land under cultivation, 264, 602
 land-thieving, 630
- Language, 2, 35, 48, 49, 203
- Laws—
 Yamato Constitution, 124, 125
 Edict of Reforms, 150, 152, 155
 Code of Taihō, 158, 167, 188, 189 (note), 192, 464
 Yamato judiciary, 162
 sumptuary laws, 185, 249, 279, 445, 477, 570, 579
 Tenchi Code, 188
 Penal Codes, 189, 262
 Civil Code, 189
 Chinese Code, 189
Engi-Shiki, 189 (note)
 special decrees, 221
 mildness of Penal Code, 262
 general amnesties, 262
 collision of Imperial and House laws, 281

- Laws (*contd.*)—
Jō-ei Shikimoku, 281, 387, 463
et seq., 570
 criminal cases under *Shugo*,
 388
 administration of justice under
 Yoritomo, 405, 417
Hōjō Code, 450 (note)
Tokusei, 530, 606, 622
 Kyōto judicial machinery, 463,
 468, 551
Kemmu Shikimoku, 570
- Leaou dynasty, 142
 Liang dynasty, 93
 Liao-tung, 496, 497
Liu H'ü, 163
 Li Yuen (Prince of T'ang), 146
 Lochana Buddha, 194
 Loh-yang, 37 (note), 143
 Lo Kuang-chung, 37 (note)
 Longevity of early Emperors, 40
 Lüchū, 35, 50, 64 (note), 311, 312
- Mabi (Kibi)
 Mabito, 166
 Magadha, 146
 Magari (Hirose), 120
 Magic, Practice of, 118, 131, 259,
 327, 584, 625
 Ma-han, 34, 49, 73
 Maki, 212 (note)
 Maki, Lady, 421, 422
 Makko, 111
 Mamichi (Sugano)
Mandokoro, 406
 Mane, 85
Manyōshū, 198
 Manzai, 595, 597
 Masa (Uzū)
 Masa, Lady—
 union with Yoritomo, 337, 338
 character, 340, 423, 424, 453
 taunted by Shizuka Gozen,
 392
 clash of interests, 418
 frustrates Hiki Yoshikazu's
 plot, 420
 influence over Yoriie, 415, 420
 saves life of Sanetomo, 422
 power over Kamakura leaders,
 443, 453
- Masahiro (ōuchi)
 Masahito (Shirakawa II.)
 Masakado (Taira)
 Masakata (Nagao)
 Masakutsu (Kusunoki)
 Masamori (Taira)
 Masamoto (Hosokawa)
 Masamura (Hōjō)
 Masanaga (Hatakeyama)
 Masanobu (Kano)
 Masanori (Akamatsu)
 Masashige (Kusunoki)
 Masatomo (Ashikaga)
- Masatsura (Kusunoki)
 Masu-ko, 294
 Mato, 110
 Matsunaga, 626
 Matsuura, 271, 317
 Michiari (Kōno)
 Michichika (Minamoto)
 Michiye (Fujiwara)
 Michinaga (Fujiwara)
 Michinobu (Kōno)
 Michi-no-Oho, 186
 Michinori (Fujiwara)
 Michi no Shi, 166
 Michitoki (Kōno)
 Michiyasu (Montoku)
 Michizane (Sugawara)
 Miidera (Onvōji), 266, 290, 325, 327
et seq., 352, 440, 477, 490
 Mikados, establishment of line, 61
 Mikawa, 555
 Mikuni (Echizen), 89
- Military institutions—
 capacity for organisation, 15
 War Department, 162
 Chinese organisation, 163, 164
 privileged military class, 164,
 * 172, 219, 445
 national army, 164, 172
 feudal system, 164
 Imperial Guards, 172, 219, 385
 growth of military spirit, 214,
 217, 263, 286
 mobilisation against Ainu, 218,
 219
 Kwammu's reform, 218
 military groups, 263
 Sonshi on strategy, 285, 631
 siege of Kanazawa, 286
 Yoshinaka's warriors, 349
 tax for military purposes, 385
 the operations against Mutsu,
 395, 396
 Yoritomo's military authority,
 402
Samurai-dokoro, 405
 "North-face" and "West-face"
 warriors, 434
Bushi tactics, 508 *et seq.*
 Mongol warfare, 509 *et seq.*
 Chinese manuals, 631
 espionage, 631
Ashigaru, 631
- Mimana (see Korea—Mimana)
 Mimasaka, 358
 Mimata, 118
Mimbu-Sho, 158, 162, 209
 Mimikawa, 14
 Min (see Bin)
 Minabuchi, 135, 147, 173
 Minamo'o (family)—
 origin, 236
 colleagues of Fujiwara, 236,
 259, 264

- Minamoto (*contd.*)—
 support of military men, 264, 287
 alliance with Fujiwara and Taira, 268
 rise to power, 277, 282, 284, 287
 House laws, 281
 genealogy, 288,
 internal dissension, 289, 290, 428
 repression of turbulent priests, 291
 traditional precocity, 309
 virtual extirpation, 334
 struggle with Tairas, 339, 360
 attack on Yashima, 360
 naval inferiority, 362
 battle of Dan-no-ura, 364
 ferocity to kith and kin, 427
 other references, 244, 263, 280, 292, 338, 344, 370
- Minamoto Hikaru, 246, 247, 249
 — Ichiman, 415, 419, 420
 — Kanetsuna, 327
 — Kugyō, 415, 426, 427
 — Michichika, 430, 433 *et seq.*
 — Mitsukuni, 291
 — Mitsunaka, 263, 275 (*note*) 288
 — Nakatsuna, 288 327
 — Nobu, 237
 — Noriyori—
 command of army against Tairas, 355, 356, 358 367
 escort of taxes, 353, 356
 outmanœuvred by Tomomori 358
 character, 359
 weakness as commander, 359 362, 363
 made away with for "reasons of State," 411
 treatment by Yoritomo, 428
- Minamoto Sanetomo—
 parentage, 415
 partition of the Shogunate, 419
 life attempted, 420
 appointed Sei-i-Tai Shōgūn, 420
 life saved by Lady Masa, 422
 the Izumi plot, 425
 palace attacked, 426
 support of Toba II., 433, 435
 project to visit China, 494
 introduction of tea, 494
- Minamoto Senju-maru, 415, 425 *et seq.*
 — Sukekata, 324
 — Tametomo, 297, 298, 300, 311, 312
 — Tameyoshi, 288, 291, 296 *et seq.*, 623
 — Tokimoto, 428
 — Tomonaga, 305, 309
- Minamoto Tsune, 237
 — Tsunemoto, 254
 — Wataru, 338 (*note*)
 — Yoriie, 404, 415 *et seq.*, 422, 431
 — Yorimasa, 288, 300, 305, 326 *et seq.*
 — Yorimitsu, 260, 262, 267, 275 (*note*), 288
 — Yorimochi, 439
 — Yorinobu, 263, 265, 270 275 (*note*), 288
 — Yoritomo—
 extraction, 236 (*note*)
 character, 292, 336, 337, 351, 366, 372, 375, 393
 spared by Kiyomori, 309, 310
 youthful precocity, 309
 banished to Idzu, 310, 336
 headway in the Kwantō, 330, 332
 Taira Kiyomori's dying request, 333
 construction of Kamakura, 335, 376
 trouble with Itō Sukechika, 337
 marriage with Lady Masa 337, 338
 summons to Minamotos, 338
 Minamotos *versus* Tairas, 339
 Kwantō Taira support, 340
 defeat at Stone-Bridge Hill 341
 retreat of Tairas from Fuji river, 342
 domination in the Kwantō, 344
 defeat of Yoshinaka, 353
 commission to destroy Tairas, 355, 358
 animosity against Yoshitsune, 359, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384
 lust for power, 366, 380
 devotion of Kajiwara Kagetoki, 367
 keen watch on Tairas, 371
 administration 375 *et seq.*, 379, 385, 390, 397, 404 *et seq.*
 holds aloof from Kyōto, 377, 381, 398
 conciliation of priesthood, 379, 397
 Yoshitsune's commission to chastise Yoritomo, 383
 occupation of Kyōto, 385
 counter-decree to punish Yoshitsune, 385
 appointment of *Shugo* and *Jitō*, 385 *et seq.*
 proclaimed a rebel, 390
 examination of Shizuka Gozen, 392
 cruelty to kith and kin, 393, 412
 decree to kill Yoshitsune, 394

- Minamoto Yoritomo (*contd.*)—
 · reduction of Mutsu and Dewa, 395
 defeat of Yasuhira, 14, 396
 military rights, 398, 402
 Kyōto respect, 399
 visits to Kyōto, 400, 411
 distrust of Shirakawa II., 401
 patent of *Sei-i-Tai Shōgun*, 402
 administration of justice, 405
 patronises scholars, 407
 death, 411
 other references, 263, 273, 305, 343, 345 *et seq.*, 349, 352, 356, 374, 430
- Minamoto Yoriyoshi, 269, 270 *et seq.*, 275 (note), 288, 374
- Yoshichika, 283, 288, 297, 298
- Yoshifusa, 275 (note)
- Yoshihira, 304, 305, 306, 314
- Yoshie (Hachiman Tarō), 270, 272, 273, 281 *et seq.*, 285 *et seq.*, 316
- Yoshikata, 297, 344
- Yoshikuni, 288
- Yoshikura, 297
- Yoshimitsu, 282, 285, 287, 288
- Yoshinaka, 342, 344 *et seq.*, 354 *et seq.*, 371, 383, 393
- Yoshitaka, 346
- Yoshitoki, 288, 442
- Yoshitomo, 296, 298, 299, 300 *et seq.*, 348
- Yoshitsuna, 270, 282, 288, 297
- Yoshitsune—
 genealogy, 288
 childhood, 311, 355
 spared by Taira Kiyomori, 311
 attack on Kyōto, 353
 victory at Ichi-no-tani, 355, 357
 military genius, 356, 362
 smuggled to Mutsu, 356
 encounter with Musashi-Bō-Benkei and consequences, 356
 animosity of Yoritomo, 359, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384
 official appointments, 360
 route of Tairas at Yashima, 360
 victory at Dan-no-ura, 363 *et seq.*
 slandered by Kajiwara Kagetoki, 367
 failure to conciliate Yoritomo, 368
 attacked by Yoritomo's emissaries, 380
 commission to punish Yoritomo, 381
 wrecked in typhoon, 384
 apprehensions of Yoritomo, 391, 394
 Yoshitsune reaches Mutsu in disguise, 394
- Minamoto Yoshitsune (*contd.*)—
 commits *hara-kiri*, 395
 other references, 361, 379, 383
- Minamoto Yukiye—
 conveys summons to Minamotos, 327, 338
 defeated by Tairas, 344, 346, 351, 353
 joins with Yoshinaka and beats Tairas, 347
 offended by Yoshinaka, 349
 unfortunate as commander, 350, 383, 384
 slanders Yoshinaka, 351
 character, 351
 hides in Kawachi, 357
 fear of Yoritomo, 381
 intimacy with Yoshitsune, 381
 life threatened by Yoritomo, 381
 defeat of Shōshun, 382
 commission to punish Yoritomo, 383, 384
 wrecked in typhoon, 384
 Yoritomo charged with counter-decree, 385
 Yukiye captured and slain, 391
- Minamoto Yukitsuna (Tada), 319, 320, 347
- Zenjō, 428
- Minato-gawa, 559, 580
- Ming-ti, 86
- Mining, 18, 194
- Mino, 102, 152, 263, 265, 629
- Minobu, 484
- Miroku, 114, 115
- Misasagi (tombs), 129
- Mishima, 134
- Mita*, 107 (note)
- Mitsuie (Nakahara)
- Mitsukuni (Minamoto)
- Mitsumasa (Kitabatake and Kusunoki)
- Mitsumura (Miura)
- Mitsunaka (Minamoto)
- Mitsusada (Ashikaga)
- Mitsusue (Iga)
- Mitsutoki (Hōjō)
- Mitsuyori (Fujiwara)
- Mitsuyuki (Yamana)
- Miura, 289, 339, 341, 427, 470, 471
- Mitsumura, 470
- Taneyoshi, 443
- Yasumura, 470
- Ycshiatsu, 628
- Yoshimura, 427, 442
- Yoshizumi, 364, 416
- Miwa, 96
- Miwa, Great God cf. 63, 67
- Miwa no Kimi, 117
- Mivajima (Itsukushima), 325, 361, 592
- Miyake*, 34, 107 (note), 109
- Miyakko*, 55
- Miyoshi, 406, 408
- Chōkei, 626

- Miyoshi Kiyotsura, 249
 — Nagamoto, 626
 — Nagateru, 625 626
 — Yasunobu, 405, 435, 443, 447, 464
 — Yasutoshi, 406
 — Yasutsura, 463
 — Yoshinobu, 416
 Mizuki, 511 *et seq.*
 Mizushima, 350
 Mochihito, 326 *et seq.*, 341, 348
 Mochikuni (Hatakeyama)
 Mochiuji (Ashikaga)
 Mommu, 186, 187
 Momoka (Fujiwara)
 Momokawa, 197
 Monchūyo, 405
 Mongaku Shōnin (Endō Moritō), 338, 404
 Mongol invasions—
 overthrow of China by Mongo's, 491, 492
 Korean peninsula swept, 497
 allegiance of Kōryū, 498
 missions to Japan, 498, 505, 507
 Kublai Khan's challenge, 499
 treatment of two Japanese subjects at Peking, 505
 first Armada, 507
 reduction of Tsushima, 507
 landing in Kyūshū, 508
 Japanese call to arms, 508
 tactical disadvantage of defenders, 508
 Mongol warfare, 509, 510
 retreat of invaders, 512
 Kublai's second attempt, 513
 execution of envoys, 513, 518
 unrest on the continent, 517
 formation of second Armada, 518
 combined Mongol and Kōryū fleets, 518
 seizure of islands, 519
 landing in Northern Hizen, 519
 Japanese assume the defensive on the water, 521
 composition of the invading fleet, 521
 overwhelmed by a hurricane, 522
 preparations for third invasion, 523
 death of Kublai and abandonment of attempt on Japan, 525
Monkenzanketsu-Ban, 473
 Mononobe, 57, 85, 96, 118 *et seq.*
 — no Moriya, 118
 — no Oho-Muraji, 113, 115, 116
 Mono no Omi (Imoko)
Monto (True *Jōdo*) sect., 619, 629
 Montoku, 236 (note), 237, 238
Montoku Jitsuroku, 189
 Moon God 60
 Morihito, 295
 Morikuni, 475, 533
 Mōri Motonari, 27
 Morinaga, 540, 548, 554 (note)
 Morioka, 269
 Morisada Shinnō, 404, 449
 Moritoki (Taira)
 Moriya (Mononobe)
 Korofuyu (Kō)
 Moroiye (Fujiwara)
 Moronaga (Fujiwara)
 Moronao (Kō)
 Morosuke (Fujiwara)
 Morotoki (Hōjō)
 Moroyasu (Kō)
 Moroye (Tachibana and Fujiwara)
 Motochika (Kōsai)
 Motofusa (Fujiwara)
 Motokuni (Hatakeyama)
 Motomichi (Fujiwara)
 Motomitsu (Fujiwara)
 Motomori (Taira)
 Motonari (Mōri)
 Motosane (Fujiwara)
 Mototsune (Fujiwara)
 Motouji (Ashikaga)
 Mountain Wardens' *Be*, 99, 100
 Mourning (see Funeral customs)
 Muchimarō (Fujiwara)
 Muku-hara, 113
 Mumakahi (Arako)
 Mumako (Soga)
 Mumayado (Shōtoku Taishi)
 Munakata, 317, 493
 Munekage (Adachi)
 Munekata (Nasu)
 Munekiyo (Taira)
 Munemori (Taira)
 Munetaka, 474, 533
 Munetō (Abé)
 Munetomo (Hiki)
 Muneyori (Taira)
 Muraji, 55, 95 *et seq.*, 103, 113, 120, 166
 Murakami, 258
 Murakami II., 563, 576, 582
 Murakami Genji, 236 (note)
 Mure, 360
 Muretsu (see Buretsu)
 Muroyama (Harima), 353
 Musa, 69
 Musashi, 46, 51, 190, 228, 254, 260, 265, 304, 341, 421, 544
 Musashi-Bō-Benkei, 356, 384, 394
 Music, 203
 Mutsu, 194, 215, 218, 220, 263, 285, 287, 289, 356, 386, 395 *et seq.*, 552, 562
 Mutsuhito, 202, 280
 Myō-e (Kōben)
 Myung-nong, 110, 112

- Nagamichi, Shiro, 424
 Nagamoto (Miyoshi)
 Nagao, 286, 289
 Nagaoka, 207, 208
 Nagao Kakeharu, 627
 — Masakata, 627
 — Sadashige, 427
 — Tamekage, 628
 Nagasaki Enki, 528
 — Takasuke, 531, 538
 Nagate (Fujiwara)
 Nagateru (Miyoshi)
 Nagato, 151, 190, 219, 228, 231,
 350, 358, 359, 363, 513, 541
 Nagatoshi (Nawa)
 Nagoshi (Hōjō)
 Nagoshi Takaie, 542
 Naitō, 281
 Nakaba Kanetō, 344
 Nakahara, 406
 — Chikayoshi, 416
 — Hiromoto (ōye Hiromoto)
 — Kanemichi, 354 (note)
 — Mitsuie, 406
 Nakamarō (Oshikatsu)
 Nakanari (Fujiwara)
 Naka no Ōye (Tenchi)
 Nakatomi, 57, 67, 96, 116
 — no Daibu, 115
 — no Kamatari (Fujiwara Kama-
 tari)
 — no Katsumi, 118
 — no Muraji, 113
 Nakatsukasa-Shō, 158
 Nakatsuna (Minamoto)
 Nakatsu, Prince, 82
 Names, Confusion of, 56
 Nan-en-dō, 276
 Naniha Canal, 114, 115
 Naniwa, 64
 Nanotsu no Kuchi (Chikuzen), 109
 Nanzenji, 595
 Naokata (Taira)
 Nara—
 establishment, 153, 188
 temples, 188
 Tō-dai-ji bell, 191
 smallpox, 192
 Daibutsu, 191 *et seq.*
 power of priesthood, 207, 377,
 378
 removal of capital, 207
 intrigue to restore capital, 227
 Buddhist sects, 265, 477
 dispute between temples, 266
 militant priests, 329, 490
 Kofukuji and Tō-dai-ji fired, 330
 Tokusei disturbance, 622
 other references, 209, 276, 295
 Nara (Emperor) II., 634
 Nariakira (Fujiwara)
 Narichika (Fujiwara)
 Narimichi, 473 (note)
 Narinaga, 553
 Nasol Wōn, 111
 Nasu, 618
 Nasu no Yoichi Munekata, 361
 National Doctors, 147
 Nawa, 619
 — Nagatoshi, 541, 550, 556, 560
 Nayan, 523
 Nenci Yukichika, 354 (note)
 Nichiren, 483, 501 *et seq.*, 516
 Nigi-haya-hi no Mikoto, 65
 Nihongi, 40, 43, 50, 54, 58, 64 *et*
seq., 71, 75 *et seq.*, 79, 81 *et seq.*,
 93, 185, 188, 202
 Nihon Kōki, 189 (note)
 Nijō, 301, 302, 307, 308, 493 (note)
 Nijō II., 533 *et seq.*
 Nikaidō, 406, 457
 Nimmyō, 228, 230, 235, 236
 (note), 237, 246, 259, 280
 Nine Years' War, 270
 Ningpo, 601
 Ningi no Mikoto, 63
 Niniken, 81, 86 *et seq.*, 89, 100
 Ninnaji, 306
 Nintoku, 59, 74, 79, 81 *et seq.*, 88
et seq., 100, 280
 "Nippon," Origin of name, 202, 203
 Nirayama, 336
 Nitta, 288, 343, 542, 553, 565, 576
 — Tadatsune, 420
 — Yoshioki, 581
 — Yoshisada—
 raises army in Imperial cause,
 543
 capture of Kaniakura, 544
 defeat of Kō Moroyasu, 555
 defeat of Ashikaga Takauji, 557
 character, 559, 580
 defeat in the West, 559
 escape to Kanzaki Castle, 560
 fall in Echizen, 562
 Nobu (Minamoto)
 Nobunaga, 14, 26, 292, 369, 411, 627,
 636
 Nobuyori (Fujiwara)
 Nomi no Sukune, 68, 242
 Noriake (Uyesugi)
 Norimichi (Fujiwara)
 Norimoto (Uyesugi)
 Noritada (Uyesugi)
 Noritomo (Uyesugi)
 Noritsune (Taira)
 Noriyori (Minamoto and Taira)
 Norizane (Uyesugi)
 Notari, Kose, 232
 Noto, 345, 346, 386, 389
 Ōba, 289
 — Kagechika, 341
 — Kageyoshi, 403
 Ōbaku sect, 485
 Ō-Ban, 473
 Obīto (see Arako)
 Oda, 608, 618, 627

- Odawara, 374, 627, 628
 Ōe (see Ōye)
 Ōgano 520
 Ogasawara, 288, 607
 Ogasawara (Taira)
 Ogigayatsu, 599, 627 *et seq.*
 Oharida, 113
Oho harahe. (Great Purification),
 174
 Oho-hatsuse (see Yūryaku)
 Ohomahe no Sukune, 83
 Oho-mono-nushi (Ōnamuji), 67
 Oho-muraji, 89, 113, 149
 Oho-omi, 89, 91, 113, 114, 149
 Ohotomo, 91, 96, 109, 121
 Ohotomo no Kanamura, 89
 Ohotomo, Prince (see Kōbun)
 Ohotsu, Prince, 186
 Ōjin, 65, 67, 74, 89, 97, 100, 420
 (note)
 Okada, Palace of, 64
 Oki, 283, 404, 448
 Okitsu, 576
 Okiyo, 254
Okura-Shō, 158, 162
 Okusaka, 81, 83
 Omi, 55, 66, 95 *et seq.*, 103, 120, 122,
 150, 166
 Ōmi, 152, 182, 185, 190, 330, 623, 629
 Omi, Achi no, 102
 Ōnamuji, 62, 67, 114, 117
 Ondo, 325
 Onigashima, 311
 ōnin, 607
 Onjōji (see Miidera)
 Ōno Gorōemon, 488
 Ono Yoshifuru, 251
 Ordeal by boiling water, 56
 Ōsaka, 15, 19, 64, 568, 573
 Oshiiwa (Ichinohe)
 Oshikatsu (Fujiwara)
 ōshima, 312, 364
 Ōsumi, 49 (note), 64, 70, 200, 212,
 215, 219, 268, 317, 419 (note)
 Ota, 288, 542
 Otohohito (Ōye)
 Ōtomo, 14, 27, 57, 544, 552, 556,
 567, 598, 601, 619, 630
 Ōtsu, 152, 185, 266
 Ōuchi, 598, 601, 618, 619, 629, 635
 — Masahiro, 613, 615, 617
 — Yoshihiro, 584, 590
 — Yoshioki, 625, 626
 Owari, 151, 152, 185, 291, 305, 344
 Oyama, 341, 424, 590, 618
 Ōye, 406, 408
 Ōye (Furubito and Yamashiro)
 Ōye Hiromoto—
 character, 340
 scheme of administration, 385,
 435
 president of *Kumonjo*, 406
 member of Kamakura Council,
 416
- Ōye Hiromoto (*contd.*)—
 advice to Shōgun disregarded,
 427, 436
 urges offensive policy against
 Kyōto, 443, 447
 decides fate of vanquished, 448,
 449
 death, 453
 other references, 446, 464
 Ōye Masahira, 265
 Ōye, Naka no (see Tenchi)
 Ōye no Otohito, 229
 — Tadafusa, 275, 285, 286, 340
 Ōyōmei (Wang Yang-ming), 11
- Pæderasty, 603
 Pakche (see Korea—Pakche)
 Pak-in, 497
 Palace archers, 99
 — attendants, 99
 — stewards, 99
 Peasants, Treatment and condi-
 tions of, 126, 156, 170, 172, 211,
 212, 222, 331, 465, 603, 604, 631
 Pèkchon river, 182
 Pien-chen, 73
 Pih Tse, 142
 Piracy, 15, 231, 250, 251, 255, 283,
 598, 601
 Plague (see Epidemics)
 Plain of High Heaven, 59
 Poetry, 515
 Poksin, 182
 Pottery, 495
 Prostitution, 603
 Punishments, 84 *et seq.*, 97, 191,
 467
 Purgation, 126, 127
 Pyon-han, 34
- Quelpart, 506
- Racial types, 48
 Rebellions.—
 Honan, 32
 Iwai, 108
 Ainu revolts, 132, 210
 Temmu wrests throne from
 Kōbun, 185
 revolt in Kyūshū, 193
 Taira Masakado, 255, 256
 Minamoto Yoshichika, 283
 Fujiwara Nobuyori, 303
 Minamoto revolt in Shinano,
 342
 Taira revolt in Ise and Iga, 369,
 421
 East proclaimed to be in insur-
 rection, 442
 Toba II., 444
 Nayan, 523
 Daigo II., 541

- Rebellions (*contd.*)—
 revolt in the Kwantō, 543
 Ōuchi Yoshihiro, 590
 revolt in Kyōto, 606
- Record of Ancient Matters* (see *Kojiki*)
- Reizei, 226, 258
 Reizei II., 274, 275
 Religious persecution, 440
 Renshi, Lady, 546, 549
 Richū, 81, 82, 84, 99, 100
 Rinsei, 590
 Rin Shihei, 13
 Rinzai sect, 485
Rinjū-Sandai-Kyaku, 189 (note)
 River of Heaven, 60
 Riyu 312 (note)
 Rokkaku, 612, 623
 Rokudai (Taira)
 Rokuhara, 304 *et seq.*, 321, 400, 452
 Rokujō, 308, 317
 Rokujōgawara, 306.
 Rokujō Tadaaki, 560
 Ryōgen (Jie Daishi), 266
 Ryujin (Ryūgu), 312 (note)
 Ryūmon (Yamato), 311
 Ryūzōji, 27, 389
- Sadachika (Honda and Ise)
 Sadamori (Taira)
 Sadashige (Nagao)
 Sadatō (Abé)
 Sadatoki (Hōjō)
 Sadayo (Imagawa)
 Sado, 404, 424 (note), 448
 Saeki, 317
 Saga—
 Kwammu's reform abortive, 214
 military system, 219
 abdication, 226, 236
 an accomplished scholar, 227
 alienation of land, 228
 character, 227, 228
 decline of Imperial authority, 228
 craze for Chinese learning, 229
 distrust of superior officials, 232
 reduces sons to status of subjects, 236
 other references, 230, 237, 280, 486
- Saga II. (Kunihito), 457, 458, 474, 533
 Saga-Genji, 236 (note), 259
 Sagami, 339, 340, 341, 378, 411, 628
 Sagara, 619
 Saguri (Awo)
 Saianfu, 517
 Saichō (Dengyō-Daishi)
 Saikō (Fujiwara Moromitsu)
 Saimei, 141, 182, 238
 Saionji, 493 (note)
 — Kintsune, 429, 442, 456, 457
- Saito, 629
 Saitō, 406
 Sakae, Miwa no Kimi, 117
 Sakai, 26, 635
 Sakamoto Takara no Omi, 204
 Saka-no-Uye Tamura Maro, 216, 218, 220, 221, 227, 233, 273
 Sakata, 262
 Saké, Hada no Miyakko, 103
Sam-guk-sa, 41, 44
Samurai dokoro, 405, 547
Sandai Jitsuroku, 189 (note), 250
 Sanehira (Kiyowara and Doi)
 Sanemasa (Hōjō)
 Sanetomo (Minamoto)
 Saneyori (Fujiwara)
 Saneyoshi (Fujiwara)
 San-in-dō, 354
 Sanjō, 236 (note), 259
 Sanjō II., 239, 274 *et seq.*, 300, 390, 410
San Kuo Chih Yen, 37 (note)
 Sanuki, 243, 249, 251, 299
 Sanyōdō, 46, 251, 350, 354, 358, 386
 Sarume, 67
 Sasaki, 629
 — Hideyoshi, 623
 — Takayori, 623, 624, 626
 Satake, 288, 343, 347, 618, 629
 — Hideyoshi, 343, 383, 386, 397
 Satomi, 288, 542, 618, 628
 Satsuma, 49 (note), 63, 70, 215, 219, 268, 298, 317, 386, 419 (note), 598
 Satsuma dialect, 35
 Scribes, 103
 Scribes' Company, 85
 Seamen's *Be*, 99, 100
 Sea-Plain, 64 (note)
 Seen-pe tribe, 142
 Seigwa (Fujiwara)
 Seimu, 71, 75
 Seinei, 81, 88, 99
 Seiwa (Korebito), 237, 238, 240
 Seiwa-Genji, 236 (note), 253, 254, 259, 260, 264
 Seki Castle, 569
 Sekigahara, 15
 Senju-maru (Minamoto)
 Senkwa, 90, 91, 109
 Seo-o, 42
 Sericulture, 104
 Sesshū, 634
 Seta, 305, 347, 353, 444
 Seto, 495
 Settsu, 120, 231, 263, 568
 Shaka Buṣu, 105, 111, 112
 Shiba, 608, 609, 618, 629
 — Takatsune, 556, 562
 — Tattō 114, 115, 119
 — Ujiyori, 558
 — Yoshikado, 609, 610, 612
 — Yoshimasa, 589
 — Yoshishige, 590
 — Yoshitake 608

- Shiba Yoshitoshi, 608, 609
 Shibukawa Yoshino, 609
 Shida Yoshihiro, 345
 Shido Bay, 361
 Shiga, 184, 520
 Shigaraki (Ōmi), 193
 Shigehira (Taira)
 Shigehito, 294, 295, 299
 Shigemitsu Kudō, 312
 Shigemori (Taira)
 Shigetada (Hatakeyama)
 Shigeuji (Ashikaga)
 Shigeyoshi (Taguchi and Uyesugi)
 Shigisen, 122, 123
 Shihei, Rin, 13
 Shijō, 456, 458 (note)
 Shijō-nawate, 573
 Shijō Takasuke, 573, 578
 Shiki, 187
shikibu-Shō, 158, 161, 242
 Shikō, 420 (note)
 Shikoku, 51, 215, 233, 251, 350, 358,
 362, 363
 Shima, 219, 560
 Shima (Zen-shin), 114, 115
 Shimabara, 15, 19, 28
 Shimadzu, 27, 268, 419 (note), 511,
 552, 564, 567, 574, 598, 619, 630
 Shimakōbe, 341
 Shimonoseki, 358, 362
 Shimōsa, 253, 254, 264, 265, 341
 Shimotsuke, 46, 201, 228, 254, 283,
 288, 296, 343, 395
 Shin, 420 (note)
 Shinano, 62, 151, 305, 342, 344, 349,
 554
 Shingon sect, 266, 477
 Shingū, 568
 Shinnō (Morisada)
 Shinowara, 347, 368
 Shinran, 480, 481
 Shinsai (Fujiwara Michinori)
 Shintō—
 instrument of government, 11,
 24, 58, 178
 dieties, 59 *et seq.*, 127
 worship abandoned in Pakche,
 114
 first use of word "Shintō," 114
 (note)
 public abuses, 126
 prestige impaired by Buddhism,
 173, 178
 recovery under Tenchi and
 Temmu, 174
 Great Purification, 174
 absorption by Buddhism, 193
 Kwammu's support of Shintō,
 207
 revival movement, 11, 572
 Shioda (Shinano), 419 (note)
 Shio san, 346
 Shiragi (see Korea—Silla)
- Shirakabe, Prince, 188
 Shirakawa—
 genealogy, 274
 accession, 277
 Cloistered Emperor, 277, 278
 administration, 278, 410
 character, 278
 proscription against taking of
 life, 279
 support of Buddhism, 279
 growth of *Shō-en* system, 280
 farclial legislation, 281, 282
 commissions Taira troops to
 crush Yoshichika, 283
 treatment of Yoshiye, 287
 turbulence of priests, 291
 death, 294
 other references, 275, 293
 Shirakawa II. (Masahito)—
 genealogy, 274
 accession, 277, 295
 threatened dethronement, 296
 administration, 300
 character, 300
 abdication, 300
 intercession for Fujiwara Nobu-
 yori, 306
 control over Emperor, 307
 discord between father and son,
 308
 deference to Kiyomori, 314
 Cloistered Emperor, 317
 connivance in plot against Tai-
 ras, 319
 treatment by Kiyomori, 322,
 324, 327
 confiscation of Shigemori's ma-
 nors, 323
 prisoner of Kiyomori, 326, 327,
 330
 brought to Kōbe with whole
 Court, 330
 hatred against Tairas, 334
 escape to Hi-ei-zan, 347
 reassumption of administration
 in Kyōto, 347
 proclamation of Toba II. as
 Emperor, 348
 conciliation of Yoshinaka, 349
 directs operations against
 Tairas, 349, 350, 355
 urged to proceed against Yoshi-
 naka, 352
 made virtual prisoner by Yoshi-
 naka, 352
 appointment of Yoshinaka as
 Sci-i-tai Shōgun, 353
 protected from Yoshinaka by
 Yoshitsune, 353
 distrust of Yoritomo, 401
 death, 401
 disciple of Genkū, 479
 Shiro-hiko, 84
 Shiro Nagamichi, 424

- Shishigadani, 319, 320
 Shizuka Gozen, 384, 392
 Shōan, 147, 148 (note)
Shō'en (see Land)
 Shōkō, 584
Shokugenshō, 569
Shokunihongi, 189 (note)
Shoku-Nihor-Kōki, 189 (note)
 Shōkyū, 450 (note), 481
 Shōmu, 186, 187, 188, 192, 194, 198, 226
 Shōni, 499, 508, 522, 544, 552, 567, 575, 598, 601, 619, 629
 Shōnin (Mongaku)
 Shōshun (Tosabō)
 Shōtoku, Empress, 186, 187, 199, 203
 Shōtoku Taishi (Mumayado)—
 genealogy, 90
 nominated Heir Prince, 91, 122
 laws, 93, 123, 124, 179
 vow to Four Heavenly Kings, 119
 zeal for Buddhism, 119, 122, 123
 character, 122
 administration, 122, 124, 129, 238
 encouragement of foreign learning, 143
 Chinese Court institutions, 157
 death, 122, 123, 125
 Shūbun, 634
Shugo (see Administration)
 Shuh, 37 (note)
 Shūhōsha, 248 (note)
 Shujaku, 250, 258
 Shujaku II., 274
 Shunten, 312 (note)
 Shūzenji (Izu), 420, 422
 Sii-she, 48
 Silla (see Korea)
 Sinicisation of Japan, 92, 145, 177, 202, 227
 Slaves, 172
 So (Kumaso), 63, 70, 96
 Sō, 369
 Socialism, 622
 Sōdzu, 125
 Sogas—
 attempt to usurp throne, 46
 contention for supremacy, 57
 consorts of Emperors, 91, 124
 founder of house, 91
 authority wielded, 96, 148
 defended by Yamato Aya, 104
 attitude to Buddhism, 115, 120
 Kamatari's *coup d'état*, 135 *et seq.*
 power broken, 92, 135 *et seq.*
 Soga no Iname, 91, 92, 113, 114
 ——— Iruka, 92, 129 *et seq.*, 183, 184
 ——— Kurayamada, 135, 136, 138, 139
 ——— Mumako, 91, 92, 114 *et seq.*, 124
 Soga Oho-omi, 113, 133, 173
 ——— Yemishi, 92, 125, 129 *et seq.*, 138
 Sogaku-in, 229
 Sogdiana, 146
 Sō-gei-shu-chi-in, 230
 Sogen, 517
 Sōgō, 125
 Sōkokuji, 634
 Sōma, 289
 Sōnshi, 285, 631
 Sōn'on, 312 (note)
 Soseki, 595
 Sō Sukekuni, 507, 508
 ——— Tomomune, 507
 Sōtō sect, 485
 Sōun (Hōjō)
 Sōzen (Yamana)
 Succession disputes, 89, 117, 119, 121, 184, 253, 294, 459, 531, 598, 607, 609
 Sugane (Fujiwara)
 Sugano no Mamichi, 189 (note)
 Sugawara, 229, 242, 244
 ——— Kiyogimi, 229
 ——— Kreyoshi, 242
 ——— no Michizane—
 scholarship, 177 (note), 242, 243
 writings, 189 (note)
 infant prodigy, 242
 official appointments, 243, 244, 246
 advice to cut off relations with China, 243, 491
 educates Daigo Tennō, 244
 remarkable rise to power, 245
 jealousy of great families, 245
 rivalry of Tokihira, 246
 banishment, 246
 death at Dazaifu, 247
 propitiation of ghost, 248
 enshrined, 196 (note), 204
 character, 248
 other references, 257, 407
 Sui dynasty, 142, 143, 145
 Suiko, Empress, 57, 90, 91, 122, 129, 144, 238
 Suinin, 66
 Suizei, 57
 Sujin, 67
 Sūjun, 90, 91, 119
 Sukechika (Itō)
 Sukekata (Minamoto)
 Sukekuni (Sō)
 Sukemori (Taira)
 Suketsune (Kudō)
 Sukō, 576, 577
 Sukune, 166
 Sukune (Nomi, Ohomahe, and Ta-keuchi)
 Suma, 355, 357
 Sumida river, 51, 341

- Sumi inlet, 73
 Sumimoto (Hosokawa)
 Sumitomo (Fujiwara)
 Sumiyuki (Hosokawa)
 Sumptuary laws (see Laws)
 Sung, 7 *et seq.*, 179, 491, 517
 Sun Goddess, 51, 60, 67, 127
 Suruga, 152, 342, 344, 356, 385, 428
 Susa-no-wo ("Impetuous Male"),
 60
 Sutoku, 274, 277, 293 *et seq.*
 Suwa, 62, 449
 Suwō, 132, 231, 251, 359, 363
 Suya, 609
 Suzuka, Prince, 197
- Tabe, 107 (note)
 Tachibana, 230, 242, 271
 — Hayanari, 227, 237, 248 (note)
 — no Moroye, 194, 198
 — Tōyasu, 252
 — Ujigimi, 235, 237
 Tada, 288, 542
 Tadaaki (Rokujō)
 Tadamomi (Fujiwara)
 Tadafusa (ōye)
 Tadafuyu (Ashikaga)
 Tadahira (Fujiwara)
 Tadahisa (Koremune)
 Tadamasa (Taira)
 Tadamichi (Fujiwara)
 Tadamori (Taira)
 Tadanari, 457
 Tadanori (Taira)
 Tadatsuna (Ashikaga)
 Tadatsune (Taira and Nitta)
 Tadayoshi (Ashikaga)
 Tada Yukitsuna (Minamoto Yuki-
 tsuna)
 Tadazane (Fujiwara)
 Taga, 215, 216
 Taguchi, 350
 — Shigevoshi, 363 *et seq.*
Taihei-ki, 546, 551
 Taihō Code (see Laws)
 Taima, 68
 T'ai Peh of Wu, 48
 Taira (family)—
 origin, 252, 253
 internal dissensions, 264, 289,
 290, 300, 307
 family feuds, 264, 283
 feud with priests, 267
 alliance with Fujiwaras and
 Minamotos, 268
 intermarriage with other fami-
 lies, 271
 rise to power, 277, 307, 308
 House laws, 281
 Imperial Guards, 282
 seat of power, 263, 283, 284, 332
 rise of Ise Heishi, 283
 division into septs, 288, 289
 Taira *versus* Minamoto, 292
 307, 339, 341, 349, 353
- Taira (*contd.*)—
 assist Emperor Nijō to escape
 from conspirators, 304
 attack on Kurodo Palace, 304
 Provincial Governorships, 309
 attempted overthrow, 313, 326
 held responsible for calamities,
 333
 weakening of power, 333, 334
 lack of effective leadership, 335
 retreat from Fuji river, 343
 driven from Kyūshū, 350
 entrenchment at Yashima, 350
 establishment at Fukuwara, 354
 defeat at Ichi-no-tani, 355
 immunity in Shikoku, 357
 command of the sea, 357
 driven from Yashima, 360
 an unfavourable omen, 361
 defeat at Dan-no-ura, 365
 revolt in Ise and Iga, 369
 power of Ise Heishi, 370
 triumph of Minamoto, 383
 attempt to recover power, 421
- Taira Hirotsune, 341, 383
 — Kanetaka, 337
 — Katsurabara, 252
 — Kiyomori—
 assumption of clan headship,
 284
 character, 292, 310, 315, 322,
 323, 333, 376, 399
 joins Minamoto force, 296
 defeat of Sutoku, 299
 execution of Tadamasa, 299
 official appointments, 301, 308,
 315
 struggle with Minamoto Yoshi-
 tomo, 301
 rescue of Emperor Nijō, 304
 execution of Ncbuyori, 306
 head of Ise Heishi, 307
 friendly relations with Mina-
 moto Yorimasa, 307, 326
 spares Yoritomo, 309, 310
 seizure of mother of Tokiwa,
 311
 makes Tokiwa concubine, 311
 spares Yoshitsune, 311
 dread of Tametomo, 311
 influence over Fujiwaras, 313
 deference of Shirakawa II., 314
 rewarded with gifts of *kōden*,
 315
 becomes a priest, 317
 control of sovereign, 317
 treatment of Shirakawa II.,
 318, 323, 324
 outrage on Fujiwara Motofusa,
 318
 mansion at Fukuwara, 319
 punishment of Shishigadani
 plotters, 321
 patronage of temples, 325

- Taira Kiyomori (*contd.*)—
 discovery of Minamoto plot, 327
 defeat of Yorimasa, 329
 action against turbulent monasteries, 329, 330
 transfer of capital, 330
 dying request, 333
 Kiyomori's widow, 365
 end of house of Kiyomori, 369
 tactics in rising to power, 370, 375, 377
 improvement of Hyōgo harbour, 493
- Taira Korechika, 283
 — Korehira, 263, 264
 — Koremori, 342, 369
 — Masakado, 196 (note), 253
et seq., 265
 — Masamori, 283
 — Moritoki, 421
 — Motomori, 421
 — Munekiyo, 305, 309, 310
 — Munemori—
 official appointments, 319, 324
 escorts ex-Emperor Takakura to Miyajima, 325
 appointed commander to smite rebels, 328
 character, 335, 340, 362
 appeal to monks for support, 347
 flight from capital, 347
 cowardice, 335, 358, 361
 retreat from Yashima, 360
 fortification of Shimonoseki straits, 362
 incompetence, 363
 capture at Dan-no-ura, 365
 execution, 368
 other references, 344, 353, 362, 364
- Taira Muneyori, 263, 264
 — Naokata, 265, 267
 — Noritsune, 358, 361
 — Noriyori, 365
 — Ōgasawara, 342, 344
 — Rokudai, 369
 — Sadamori, 253, 256
 — Shigehira, 328, 330, 357, 368
 — Shigemori—
 advice to Kiyomori, 304
 leads attack on Kurodo Palace, 305
 official appointments, 319
 intercedes for Narichika, 321
 influence over Kiyomori, 322, 324, 333, 370
 character, 322, 323, 340
 declines services of Chinese physician, 323
 death, 323
 manors confiscated by Shirakawa II., 323
- Taira Shigemori (*contd.*)—
 other references, 302, 318, 345, 369
- Taira Sukemori, 318
 — Tadamasu, 297, 299, 300, 307, 334
 — Tadamori, 281, 283, 293, 310, 333
 — Tadanori, 342
 — Tadatsune, 264, 265, 270
 — Tomochika, 340
 — Tomomori, 330, 358, 359, 361, 362, 364, 365
 — Tomoyasu, 352
 — Ycrimori, 305, 369
 — Yoritsuna, 527, 528
- Tairi, 312 (note)
- Tai-tsung, 146, 147, 151
- Takachiho, Mount, 61, 96
 — Palace, 64
- Takaei, 283, 317
- Takaie (Nagoshi)
- Taka island, 521, 522
- Takakuni (Hosokawa)
- Takakura, 308, 317, 324, 361, 479
- Takamatsu, 360
- Takamochi, 252, 253
- Takamuku (Kuromaro)
- Takamuku no Omi (see Kunioshi)
- Takamusubi, 62
- Takanaka, 555
- Takao, Mount, 338 (note)
- Takara no Omi, Sakamoto, 204
- Takashima Palace, 64
- Takasuke (Nagasaki and Shijō)
- Takata (Shimotsuke), 483
- Takatoki (Hōjō)
- Takatsukasa, 493 (note)
- Takatsune (Shiba)
- Takauji (Ashikaga)
- Takayori (Sasaki)
- Takeda, 26, 288, 342, 345, 629
- Takeda, Prince, 118
- Takehira (Kiyowara)
- Take-minakata, 62
- Takenori (Kiyowara)
- Takenouchi, 288
- Takeri Palace, 64
- Takesada (Kiyowara)
- Takeuchi no Sukune, 67, 72, 75, 91
- Tamagawa, 544
- Tamba, 46, 89, 132, 249, 347, 355
- Tamekage (Nagao)
- Tametomo (Minamoto)
- Tameyori (Asawara)
- Tameyoshi (Minamoto)
- Tam-hyé, 111
- Tamna, 506
- Tamu-no-Mine, 290
- Tamura Maro (see Saka-no-Uye)
- Tandai*, 452
- Tanegashima, 215
- Taneyoshi (Miura)

- T'ang, 146, 163, 179, 181, 203, 244
 note), 491
- Tau-ki, 87
- Tanuma, 28
- Tartars, 491, 492, 510 (note)
- Tasa, 85
- Tatarahama, 558
- Tate Chikatada, 354 (note)
- Tattooing, 39
- Tawara Tōda (see Fujiwara Hide-sato)
- Taxation—
- silk as industrial tax, 103, 156, 172
 - sustenance-fiefs, 150
 - taxes in kind, 153, 224
 - Chinese system, 153, 157
 - degree of taxation, 156, 602, 603
 - abolition of old taxes and forced labour, 156
 - house-tax, 156
 - contributions of horses, weapons, and rations, 156
 - land-tax, 157, 223, 224, 602
 - corvée* (forced labour), 156, 157, 172, 224
 - immunity from taxation, 168
 - tax-free estates, 169, 170, 195, 210, 211, 213, 227, 228, 231, 269, 280, 281, 390, 450, 620
 - exemption of monasteries, 195
 - depletion of treasury, 210, 211
 - fiscal malpractices, 211, 212
 - remission in time of famine, 212
 - payment in cash, 221
 - Sozei* or *Kwanto*, 223
 - Seizei*, 223
 - Kuge*, 223
 - Zatto*, 223
 - failure to collect taxes in Mutsu, 269
 - tax for military purposes, 385, 586, 596
 - Dansen*, 596
 - road barriers, 153, 596
 - miscellaneous taxes, 604
 - other references, 108, 154, 390, 465, 473, 514, 620
- Tea ceremonial, 495, 496
- Tea, Introduction of, 494
- Temmu—
- historical commission, 54, 66, 75, 77, 185
 - re-arrangement of titles and ranks, 166, 167, 171
 - support of Shintō, 174
 - curtains temple holdings, 175
 - donations to Buddhist Church, 176
 - hesitation to accept throne, 184
 - becomes a priest, 184
 - revolt in Owari, 185
 - wrests throne from Kōbun, 185
- Temmu (*contd.*)—
- frivolous administration, 185
 - death, 186
 - descendants, 187, 201, 271
 - cancellation of plebeian indebtedness, 212
- Temples (also see under individual names)—
- Buddhist temples in Yamato, 92, 125
 - burning of temples, 114, 115, 330, 490
 - construction in propitiation, 119, 120, 195
 - immorality, 125
 - official inspection, 125
 - land-holdings, 175, 195, 228, 525
 - temples in Nara, 188, 207
 - lavish expenditure on construction, 176, 191
 - conversion of Shintō shrines, 193
 - establishment of Enryaku-ji on Hiyeizan, 207
 - enactment restricting construction, 214
 - Shirakawa's patronage, 279
 - strife between temples, 290, 291, 314, 490
 - indignation against Emperor Takakura, 325
 - political strife, 329, 441, 490
 - execution of monks, 330
 - renovation of temples by Yoritomo, 379
 - position at end of twelfth century, 477
 - temples in Kamakura, 595
 - decay of older fanes, 595
- Tenchi (Naka-no-Ōye)—
- friendship with Kamatari, 134, 135
 - marriage, 135
 - assassination of Soga Iruka, 136
 - defence of Hōkōji, 137
 - declines to accept throne, 139
 - slaying of Prince Furubito, 139
 - influence over Kōtoku, 139
 - protagonist of Reformers, 140, 160
 - accession, 141
 - establishment of university, 165
 - support of Shintō, 174
 - character, 183, 202, 280, 413
 - welcome to Koreans, 183
 - descendants, 187
 - establishment of Dajō-kwan (Council of State), 231
- Tendai sect, 266, 477, 478
- Tennōji, 120 (footnote), 384
- Tenson, 312 (note)
- "Three Precious Things," 119, 121


- Thunder, Eight Gods of, 59
 Timur, 525
 Titles, Readjustment of, 166, 167
 Toba, 274, 277, 280, 282, 283, 293
et seq.
 Toba II.—
 accession, 348, 430
 removal to Hōshōji for safety, 352
 assumes direction of affairs on death of ex-Emperor, 401
 character, 404, 429, 430, 432, 443
 refusal to nominate sons as Shōgun, 428, 438
 contest with Bakufu, 429, 437, 439, 442, 444
 nomination of successor, 430
 abdication, 430
 patron of sport, 431, 432
 compels brother to abdicate, 433
 comparison with Shōgun, 433
 neglects administration, 435
 craze for architecture, 436
 sale of offices, 436
 "West-face Warriors," 439, 441
 winning-over of military men, 439
 devotion to Church, 439, 442
 religious persecution, 440
 clash with priests, 440, 441
 consolidation of monasteries, 442
 coup against Bakufu officers, 442
 failure to gain Miura support, 443, 444
 defeat of Imperialists, 444 *et seq.*
 Toba II. banished to Oki, 448
 failure to overthrow Bakufu, 444, 452, 453
 other references, 456, 479, 504
 Tō-dai-ji, 191, 266, 320
 Togano, 494
 Togashi, 607, 619, 629
 Tōi, 230, 265, 477
 Tōjirō, 505
 Tōjō, 573
 Tōkage (Amano)
 Tōkaidō, 265, 327, 349, 385
 Toki, 542, 612, 629
 Tokifusa (Hōjō)
 Tokihira (Fujiwara)
 Tokikuni (Hōjō)
 Tokimasa (Hōjō)
 Tokimoto (Minamoto)
 Tokimune (Hōjō)
 Tokitada, 366
 Tokiuji (Yamana)
 Tokiwa Lady, 310, 311
 Tokiyori (Hōjō)
 Tokiyuki (Hōjō)
 Tōk-sa-than, 108
 Toku, Lady, 317
 Tokudai (Kose)
 Tokugawa, 13, 21, 45, 82, 92, 94, 236, 280, 288, 397
 — Iyeyasu, 16, 19, 26, 220, 411, 432, 550, 636
 — Yoshimune, 12
 Tokusei (see Laws)
 Tomi, Lady, 612, 614, 615, 622, 623
 Tomo, 98 *et seq.*
 Tomochika (Taira)
 Tomoe Gozen, 354 (note), 423
 Tomomasa (Hiraga)
 Tomomori (Taira)
 Tomomune (Sō)
 Tomonaga (Minamoto)
 Tomo no Miyakko, 55, 99, 100, 150, 166, 171 (note)
 Tomosada (Uyesugi)
 Tomosugi (Echigo), 354 (note)
 Tomoyasu (Taira)
 Tomoye, Hatsuda, 416
 Tonami, 347
 Toneri, Prince, 57 (note), 186, 187, 271
 Tone river, 51
 Tong-guk Tong-kam, 41
 Tong Kam, 41, 44
 Tori-sake-no-seki, 424 (note)
 Tosa, 251, 404, 448
 Tosabō Shōshun, 382, 392
 Tōsandō, 265, 327, 349, 385
 Toshinaga (Fujiwara)
 To-sim, 111
 Tōtōmi, 344
 Tōyasu (Tachibana)
 Toyo, 64, 108, *et seq.*
 Tribute, 36, 45
 Ts'en, 80
 Ts'eng Ts'an, 205
 Tsi, 80
 Ts'in, 32, 102, 103, 104
 Ts'in, Eastern, dynasty, 142
 Tsubaki, 116
 Tsubura, 95
 Tsuchimikado, 404, 433, 448, 456
 Tsuchimikado II., 633
 Tsugunawa (Fujiwara)
 Tsukizaka, 69
 Tsukushi, 64, 108 *et seq.*
 Tsunetoki (Hōjō)
 Tsunesada, 237
 Tsuruga, 608
 Tsurugaoka, 273, 374, 402, 426
 Tsushima, 168, 186 (note), 215, 283, 369, 497, 507, 599
 Tunguses, 142
 Uchida Iyeyoshi, 354 (note)
 Uchi no Omi, 111
 Uda, 241, 243, 244, 407
 Uda II., 459, 533
 Udzu Masa, 103

- Uji, 275, 291, 328, 347, 353
Uji (family names), 55, 94
 Ujigawa, 328, 329, 444
 Ujigimi (Tachibana)
 Ujinori (Uyesugi)
 Ujitsuna (Hōjō)
 Ujiyori (Shiba)
 Ukida, 15
 Uma, 310
 Umakai, 197, 215
 Unebi, Mōnt, 132
Uneme (Court ladies), 85
 Uona (Fujiwara)
 Urabe, 262
 — no Yoshika, 189 (note)
 Urazoye, 312 (note)
 Usa, 64, 200, 272
 Usami, 395
 Usui, 262, 345, 346
 Usuki, 317
 Utsunomiya, 397, 565, 618
 Uyesugi, House of, 27, 599, 618, 627
 628
 — Akisada, 627, 628
 — Fusaaki, 618, 627
 — Noriaki, 570, 576, 581
 — Norimoto, 599
 — Noritada, 618
 — Noritomo, 627
 — Norizane, 599, 600
 — Shigeyoshi, 574
 — Tomosada, 570
 — Ujinori, 599

 Wa, 36, 38, 51, 80, 142 (note)
 Wada Yoshimori, 405, 416, 420, 425,
 426
 Wake, 71, 97, 150
 — no Kiyomaro, 200, 209
 Wakiya Yoshisuke, 562
 Wang Po-son, 111
 Wang-san River (Korea), 106
 Wang To-nyang, 111
 Wang Yang-Kwi, 111
 Wang Yang-ming, 11
 Wani, 43
 War, God of, 65
 Watamaro (Fumiya)
 Watanabe, 262
 Watanabe (Settsu), 360
 Wataru (Minamoto)
 Wei, 36 (note), 80, 142
 Wei records, 36
Wina Be, 85
 Wodate, 100
 Woharida, 84
 Wohodo, 89
 Women, Position of, 39, 466, 467
 Wrestlers, Patron God of, 68
 Wrestling, 68
 Writing, Introduction of, 53
 Wu, 37 (note), 80, 81, 88, 89, 107,
 144, 203
 Wuti, 32
 Wu-wang, 72

 Yahata (see Hachiman)
 Yajirō, 505
 Yakushiji, 201
 Yamabe no Muraji, 100
 Yamabe, Prince, 202
 Yamaguchi, 625
Yamamori Be (see Mountain War-
 dens' *Be*)
 Yamamoto, 288
 Yamana, 288, 542, 577, 581, 583, 601,
 610, 614, 618, 629
 — Mitsuyuki, 584
 — Sōzen, 609 *et seq.*
 — Tokiuji, 577
 Yamanouchi, 599, 627, *et seq.*
 — Kenshin, 629
 Yamashiro no Ōye, 129 *et seq.*
 Yamato (early history)—
 seat of Great Wa, 38
 customs, 39
 early Emperors, 40
 foreign relations, 41 *et seq.*,
 105
 dolmens 44, 46, 47, 90, 108
 origin of Japanese, 48
 conquest, 49, 64, 65
 establishment of central State,
 51
 Temmu's historical commission,
 54 *et seq.*, 77
 the Great Reform, 57, 142 *et*
 seq.
 introduction of Buddhism, 53,
 58, 91, 105, 110 *et seq.*
 mythology, 59 *et seq.*
 trouble with Idzumo 63, 67
 relations with Kyūshū, 64, 66
 Kumaso migration 47, 50, 63
 Imperial succession, 71
 atrocities of Buretsu, 86
 Sinicisation, 92, 145
 administrative system 94 *et seq.*
 Be or *Tomo* (guilds), 99 *et*
 seq.
 social organisations, 101
 immigrants, 102
 interests in Korea, 105 *et seq.*
 insurrection in Kyū-hū 108
 assists Pakche against Silla,
 110
 Pakche presents, 111
 proscription of Buddhism, 114,
 115
 succession disputes, 89, 119, 121
 consolidation of Soga power,
 121
 Shōtoku Taishi's "Constitu-
 tion," 123, 124
 spread of Buddhism, 123, 125
 public abuses, 127
 famine and pestilence, 128
 Soga's attempt to establish new
 dynasty, 131, 132

- Yamato (*contd.*)—
 revolt of Ainu, 132
 assassination of Soga Iruka,
 136
 extent, 151
 Yamato-dake no Mikoto, 40, 65, 67,
 72
 Yamato, Great God of, 67
 Yamato-hiko, 69, 89
 Yamato-hime no Mikoto, 67
 Yamazaki, 140
 Yanasa, 110
 Yang Keen, 145
 Yang-san, 106
 Yang-ti, 143, 145
 Yashima (Sanuki), 350, 354, 358.
 360 *et seq.*
 Yasuda, 288
 Yasuhira (Fujiwara)
 Yasumaro, 54
 Yasumasa (Fujiwara)
 Yasumori (Adachi)
 Yasumura (Miura)
 Yasunobu (Miyoshi)
 Yasunori (Fujiwara)
 Yasutoki (Hōjō)
 Yasutoshi (Miyoshi)
 Yasutsura (Miyoshi)
 Yedo, 628
 Yemishi (see Ainu)
 Yemishi (Soga)
 Yezo, 47, 396
 Yoichi, Nasu no, 361
 Yomei, 90, 91, 118 *et seq.*
 Yōm-pho, 599
 Yoriie (Minamoto)
 Yōrimasa (Minamoto)
 Yorimichi (Fujiwara)
 Yorimochi (Minamoto)
 Yorimori (Taira)
 Yorinaga (Fujiwara)
 Yorinobu (Minamoto)
 Yoritomo (Minamoto)
 Yoritsuna (Taira)
 Yoritsune (Fujiwara)
 Yoriyoshi (Minamoto)
 Yōriyuki (Hosokawa)
 Yoshiakira (Ashikaga)
 Yōhiatsu (Miura)
 Yoshichika (Minamoto)
 Yoshifuru, Ono 251
 Yoshifusa (Fujiwara and Mina-
 moto)
 Yoshihara (Ashikaga)
 Yoshihira (Minamoto)
 Yoshihiro (Shida and Ōuchi)
 Yoshihisa (Ashikaga)
 Yoshiie (Minamoto)
 Yoshikado (Shiba)
 Yoshikane, 253, 254
 Yoshikane (Ashikaga)
 Yoshikata (Minamoto)
 Yoshika, Urabe no, 189 (note)
 Yoshikazu (Hiki and Ashikaga)
 Yoshikuni (Minamoto)
 Yoshikura (Minamoto)
 Yoshimasa (Shiba and Ashikaga)
 Yoshimi, 528, 542
 Yoshimi (Ashikaga)
 Yoshimitsu (Minamoto and Ashi-
 kaga)
 Yoshimochi (Ashikaga)
 Yoshimori (Wada)
 Yoshimune (Tokugawa)
 Yoshimura (Miura)
 Yoshinaka (Minamoto)
 Yoshinari (Hatakeyama)
 Yoshino, 151, 184, 185, 384, 540, 560,
 573, 581
 Yoshino (Shibukawa)
 Yoshinobu (Minamoto, and Miyoshi)
 Yoshinori (Ashikaga)
 Yoshioki (Nitta and Ōuchi)
 Yoshisada (Nitta)
 Yoshishige (Shiba)
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 Yoshitaka (Minamoto)
 Yoshitake (Shiba)
 Yoshitane (Ashikaga)
 Yoshiteru (Ashikaga)
 Yoshitō (Hatakeyama)
 Yoshitoki (Minamoto and Hōjō)
 Yoshitomo (Minamoto)
 Yoshitoshi (Shiba)
 Yoshitsugu (Fujiwara and Ashi-
 kaga)
 Yoshitsuna (Minamoto)
 Yoshitsune (Minamoto)
 Yōshiyasu (Fujiwara)
 Yoshiyo (Fujiwara)
 Yoshizumi (Miura and Ashikaga)
 Yōzei, 236 (note), 240
 Yui-ga-hama, 374
 Yuki, 427, 541
 Yūki, 600, 618
 Yukichika (Nenoi)
 Yūkihira (Arihara)
 Yūkiie (Minamoto)
 Yukimasa (Fujiwara)
 Yukitsuna (Minamoto)
 Yung-Hwui, 189
 Yung-o, 42
 Yūryaku (Oho-hatsuse), 45, 77, 81
et seq., 97 *et seq.*, 107, 126
 Yūsa, 609
 Zayton Harbour (Chincheu), 518
 Zenjō (Minamoto)
 Zen sect, 440, 467, 481, 482, 484, 485,
 486, 595, 634
 Zen-shin, Nun (Shima), 114, 115



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A HISTORY OF JAPAN

DURING THE CENTURY OF EARLY EUROPEAN
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BY

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IN COLLABORATION WITH

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The following is an excerpt from the Annual Report of the Council of the Asiatic Society of Japan for 1909:—

The Council feels quite gratified that it is able to report the undertaking of a special publication outside of its regular Transactions. It has been so fortunate as to secure the right to publish Vols. I. and III. of Murdoch's "History of Japan." It will be remembered that Vol. II. was published as a private venture a few years ago, and that it became recognized at once as authoritative. Vol. I. is now in the press and is expected to be out in April, 1910: Vol. III. is still in the author's hands. Vol. I. will be on sale at the regular price of 10 *yen* net, but with a reduced rate of 9 *yen*, post free, to all who remit on or before May 1, 1910. And one copy will be furnished to any member of the Society at the special price of 5 *yen*, post paid. This "History of Japan" in 3 volumes is, without doubt, the standard work on this subject.

Extracts from Press Reviews.

PROFESSOR BASIL H. CHAMBERLAIN (Emeritus Professor of Japanese and Philology in the Imperial University of Japan) in the *Kobe Chronicle* (Japan) :—

“ There are two ways of writing history. One—practised by most of our would-be instructors in Japanese matters—is to take a few pre-existing popular summaries and to boil them down, abridging, omitting details, expanding only general judgements, so that each time this process is repeated the result becomes vaguer, and a sort of general formula is at length reached, which, with a judicious change of dates and of proper names, might serve for the ‘ history,’ so called, of almost any country. The other method is to go back to the original documents, to visit the scenes described therein, and to attain by the use of one’s individual judgement to some measure of ‘ that complex, fragmentary, doubt-provoking knowledge which we call truth.’ Mr. Murdoch has chosen this better way, stony and briary though it be. To be sure, few investigators are equipped for such a task as he is. Latin, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, French, also Dutch, German, and of course English, in which eight languages the original documents on the European side are severally composed, are all familiar to him; and to guard against a perhaps insufficient mastery over Japanese, he has associated with himself a Japanese collaborator, who has supplied excellent translations from the standard Japanese authorities and from manuscripts hitherto unpublished. Mr. Murdoch’s general culture includes an intimate acquaintance with the standard literature of Europe, ancient as well as modern, and more especially with European history. When we add to this that he proves himself to possess the historic sense and an impartial mind, and that he is the spokesman of no party, either religious or political, it is evident that the *beau idéal* of a historian is here very nearly realised. He is also fortunate in his subject, woven as it is of two main threads,—one Christian missionary enterprise, which is of perennial interest; the other, the foundation of that centralised Japanese government by three great rulers—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu—which in our day has blossomed forth into a world-power, and whose *origines* have therefore become more than ever worthy of investigation. Jesuits, Portuguese adventurers, Spanish galleons captured by Dutch rovers, honest Will Adams at Ieyasu’s Court, the well-nigh incredibly sumptuous *fêtes* given by Hideyoshi, but paid for by that astute ruler’s vassals, Buddhist monks of the church militant marching to battle fifteen thousand strong, fair Court ladies scouring the country on delicate political errands, Daimyos so devoutly Christian that they offer their subjects the choice between baptism and exile at a day’s notice, intrigues, conversions, apostasies, sieges, burning castles, and the happy dispatch,—all these pictures and a hundred more pass before us in breathless succession, the story being often told in the very words of one of the original actors, or at least of some contemporary. The beginnings of many things Japanese are here found which would not have been expected. For instance, it turns out that the Japanese gold and silver coinage had its origin in the needs of the Portuguese trade. Japanese mining, too, was nursed by foreigners, as was her early shipbuilding industry. Then, as now, this nation was eager for instruction in every useful branch of knowledge. Then, as now, the cleverest men were at the helm, and led the way in intelligent curiosity. No truth emerges more clearly from numberless circumstances narrated in Mr. Murdoch’s pages than that the Japanese governments, both local and central, during the first decades of intercourse with the Europeans,—say, from the discovery of Japan in 1542 or 1543 down to the year 1612 and even later,—were most anxious to attract the foreign trade and to avail themselves of every new invention and science which the foreigners had to offer, from fire-arms and clocks to geography and mathematics. . . .

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" . . . Mr. Murdoch's admirable work appears most opportunely. Based, as it is, upon original documentary evidence, and upon personal experience of the scenes and sites described, it at once secures our complete confidence, and securely enables us to trace, step by step, the evolution of this astonishingly virile race from exclusive feudalism into a genuine *Weltmacht*. From first to last the book is replete with European interest, so that the timid English reader need not fear being confronted on every page with unsympathetic ideas. . . . Mr. Murdoch's book describes how the Portuguese discovered Japan; the introduction and vicissitudes of Christianity; the career of the Japanese Napoleon, Hideyoshi; the Tokugawa administrative system (Shogunate); the English Factory; Will Adams; the Portuguese and Dutch rivalries; and the deliberate completion of the exclusion programme (which lasted until forty-five years ago). It will be observed that the history under notice does not deal with contemporary times, but simply sets out, in an absolutely authentic way, the particulars of *how* the Japanese developed into what they were when we first 'found them' and had open and general relations with them in 1858. . . . No library worthy of the name should be without this book."

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"I regret not having been able, in preparing this essay, to avail myself of the very remarkable 'History of Japan during the century of Early Foreign Intercourse (1542-1651),'—by James Murdoch and Isoh Yamagata,—which was published at Kobe last winter. This important work contains much documentary material never before printed, and shows new light on the religious history of the period. The authors are inclined to believe that, allowing for numerous apostasies, the total number of Christians in Japan at no time much exceeded 300,000; and the reasons given for this opinion, if not conclusive, are at least very strong. Perhaps the most interesting chapters are those dealing with the Machiavellian policy of Hideyoshi in his attitude to the foreign religion and its preachers; but there are few dull pages in the book. Help to a correct understanding of the history of the time is furnished by an excellent set of maps, showing the distribution of the great fiefs and the political partition of the country before and after the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Not the least merit of the work is its absolute freedom from religious bias of any sort."

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